Was Hitler's "Stop and Hold" order beneficial in Winter 1941?

I've seen this argued both ways, but I would be curious to hear what AH.com has to say on the issue.

Furthermore I have heard it argued that without the stop and hold order the Wehrmacht would have had to retreat and give up much ground in the center (possibly all the way to Minsk I've heard argued) but would have taken less casualties.

So was the stop and hold order (for Winter 1941 only) a net gain or loss for the Wehrmacht?
 
It is debatable. On the one hand the order did anticipate the weakness of Soviet resources (even if accidentally, see below) and stiffened the forces morale. Not to mention entrenched in their fortified positions, the Germans would not have been exposed to the biting cold as they were or have been as strung out and therefore more vulnerable to Soviet forces. On the other hand, it exposed German manpower to as much of a grindfest (in relative terms) on the central axis of the front as their Soviet counterparts.

It should be observed that Hitler's hold fast order also benefited by the fact that Stalin responded to the initial triumphs of December '41 by trying to do too much, too fast and promptly expanded what was a single strategic offensive into a front-wide operation... thereby diluting scarce Soviet resources. Had Stalin focused Soviet effort and resources on the central axis, it is conceivable that the Soviets might have encircled and destroyed the German 9th Army at Rzhev, which would have essentially been a Stalingrad-esque blow a full year before Stalingrad.
 
Depends on how you look at it. Whilst it meant the Germans didn't lose ground and possible avoid a Napoleon retreat out of Russia entirely it meant the German army took more causalities.

My Source is Rise and Fall of the Third Reich by William Shirer. A turn in the tide page 853 to end of the chapter.
 
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