Was Germany punished too hard for WWI?

[Mikestone8]

It was undoubtedly harsh but many at the time actually thought it was too lenient, Foch stated that only a permanent occupation of the Rhineland would prevent another war. Personally I think that Versailles' failure wasn 't solely due to the harshness of the terms but also that war weary public opinion in the Entente wasn't prepared to pay the price of enforcing that peace. The French tried it over the Ruhr Crisis and had the ground pulled from under them by the British and Americans. Soon you had the worst of all worlds, a humiliated Germany looking for revenge, and complacent Entente powers who didn't recognise the danger until it was too late.

Exactly - and a harsher ToV would have required even greater effort to enforce.

Whether it was too hard (or ftm too easy) on Germany is not the real issue. What matters is whether the victors would have to stand guard, ready to intervene should Germany try to shake it off. If they would, then it was guaranteed to fail, since the will to do this would never be forthcoming.

 

[funnyhat]

the German military .. despite its losses in 1918 and the mutiny in the Navy did not consider itself defeated and was willing to prostitute itself to any political faction that agreed to give them the chance to try again.

The correct Versailles treaty would have broken the Prussian Empire up completely. The Allies never should permitted a "German" nation again.

The question I have is whether things would have gone differently had the Allies simply insisted on a German surrender, rather than agree to an armistice. The armistice gave cover to the fact that Germany was being defeated. If you have the same terms of Versailles but have Germany surrender beforehand, does that take the air out of the "stabbed in the back" balloon?

 

[jmc247]

The question I have is if things would have gone differently had the Allies simply insisted on a German surrender, rather than agree to an armistice. If you have the same terms of Versailles but have Germany surrender beforehand, does that take the air out of the "stabbed in the back" balloon?

No.

You need to conquer Germany or at least a good part of it if you want the population to accept these terms. That means boots on the ground deep in German territory. The British and French didn't want that because it would have meant much more leverage for the U.S. at the peace table and thus a treaty that would have been better for Germany and Europe as well.

 

[Kome]

Lenient in comparison to what happened to Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans.

Though it should be observed that Austria and Hungary didn't start stiring up shit after the war. And the Ottomans pretty much completely ignored their treaty and started fucking things up, but once that was finished Turkey's only foreign expansion after that was Crimean style annexation of Hatay.

The Treaty of Neuilly provides another example of a post-ww1 treaty, though its remarkable in the fact that it actually convinced Bulgaria to stop waging war. It seems rather harsh, but unlike everyone else it actually had a clause that allowed the Bulgarian state to continue existing.

Brest-Litovsk was extremely harsh, but never enforced, and it definitely didn't stop the Soviet Union from going full expansionist.

All that might have some interesting connotations for Versailles, but we might need more case studies to draw a scientific conclusion.

 

[fasquardon]

You need to conquer Germany or at least a good part of it if you want the population to accept these terms. That means boots on the ground deep in German territory. The British and French didn't want that because it would have meant much more leverage for the U.S. at the peace table and thus a treaty that would have been better for Germany and Europe as well.

They did have boots on the ground, if not deep into German territory, than at least on important territory. The problem was, the allies didn't like paying for the occupation of the Rhineland (mostly the British), so they didn't link the end of occupation with the end of reparations. Then the French tried to establish some teeth to the treaty by occupying the Rhur, along with the Belgians, but the French didn't want to raise taxes to pay for the maintinance of those troops - even though the Rhur occupation made a profit for them! So as a consequence, they had a currency crisis and the British talked them into withdrawing.

So, really, had the British and French been willing to pay for the boots on the ground, rather than just saying "well, the Germans should let us have our cake and eat it", it probably would have been enough to convince the Germans that playing by the rules was, indeed, the right way to go.

So I am not sure that "more boots on the ground" would have worked - what needs to change is for the victorious allies, or even one victorious ally, to be willing to pay for the boots on the ground.

fasquardon

 

[CalBear]

As noted by others it was either too harsh or too lenient.

It embarrassed Germans to the point of humiliation, imposed reparations that we nearly impossible to repay, but did nothing to ensure that the terms were actually followed or that the German economy would actually be able to generate the funds needed to pay the reparations imposed. Utter folly.

The simple fact that the Entente was incapable of enforcing the Treaty was evident the day it was imposed. As noted, France's Army was nearly as broken as the German's, Britain had been bled white (as had France and Germany), and the huge construct that was the AEF was dismantled even more quickly than it had been constructed. The only way the Treaty could possibly have worked was a version of what happened following WW II, realistically that was simply not going to happen.

 

[Kome]

They did have boots on the ground, if not deep into German territory, than at least on important territory. The problem was, the allies didn't like paying for the occupation of the Rhineland (mostly the British), so they didn't link the end of occupation with the end of reparations. Then the French tried to establish some teeth to the treaty by occupying the Rhur, along with the Belgians, but the French didn't want to raise taxes to pay for the maintinance of those troops - even though the Rhur occupation made a profit for them! So as a consequence, they had a currency crisis and the British talked them into withdrawing.

So, really, had the British and French been willing to pay for the boots on the ground, rather than just saying "well, the Germans should let us have our cake and eat it", it probably would have been enough to convince the Germans that playing by the rules was, indeed, the right way to go.

So I am not sure that "more boots on the ground" would have worked - what needs to change is for the victorious allies, or even one victorious ally, to be willing to pay for the boots on the ground.

fasquardon

Kind of wonder what good reparations are if they cant even cover the cost of occupation.

But then it becomes circular logic, because whats the point of occupation if you're using it to obtain reparations that are spent to cover the occupation that is for enforcing reparations.

 

[fasquardon]

Kind of wonder what good reparations are if they cant even cover the cost of occupation.

But then it becomes circular logic, because whats the point of occupation if you're using it to obtain reparations that are spent to cover the occupation that is for enforcing reparations.

Oh, the reparations more than covered the cost of occupation - the problem is they had to pay for the boots before they got the reparations, and even then, the reparations were mostly in things like coal, telegraph poles, finished goods etc. Not in money with which soldiers could be payed. So there had to be higher taxes to pay the men, and higher taxes were very, very tough to sell, particularly during the post-war crash.

And keep in mind, this is at a time when most taxes are not proportional to income, so the taxes would mostly be payed by the poorer classes, while the benefits from reparations were mostly to be found in lower prices for raw materials for businesses. So for the common voter the pain would be felt immediately, but the benefits of reparations would be felt more diffusely.

fasquardon

 

[Julian]

As a whole Versailles is overstated as a cause of WW2. By the are 1920s Germany was starting to normalize its relations with the world, negotiate reduced reparations, and rearm gradually without preparing to invade others. The Great Depression was a much greater factor as it ruined a decade of political and economic recovery.

 

[fasquardon]

It embarrassed Germans to the point of humiliation, imposed reparations that we nearly impossible to repay, but did nothing to ensure that the terms were actually followed or that the German economy would actually be able to generate the funds needed to pay the reparations imposed. Utter folly.

I don't think either of those are the fault of the treaty of Versailles. The embarrassment of Germany was because the German political and officer classes felt that telling people to be embarrassed was better than telling them to feel defeated. The reparations were far from impossible to pay, it's just that no-one, either on the allied side, or the German side, were willing to invest the political capital in making the reparations system function smoothly. The funds needed to pay the reparations could have been (as OTL) borrowed or met by increased taxation. But since there were no downsides to not paying the reparations, there was no reason for German politicians to go to the German people and tell them "sorry, we know you are hard up, but we have raise taxes to pay off these reparations, or else, well, nothing, the allies have already agreed to withdraw from our country by 1935".

The simple fact that the Entente was incapable of enforcing the Treaty was evident the day it was imposed. As noted, France's Army was nearly as broken as the German's, Britain had been bled white (as had France and Germany), and the huge construct that was the AEF was dismantled even more quickly than it had been constructed. The only way the Treaty could possibly have worked was a version of what happened following WW II, realistically that was simply not going to happen.

I don't think the Entente were incapable of enforcing the treaty. It was simply a matter of no-one being willing to take responsibility. People in all countries were getting told that someone or something else would take care of the problem.

fasquardon

 

[MattII]

Given the context of the post, evidently MattII meant that the Entente should have invaded Germany itself before actually signing an armistice. Which is, of course, a bad idea. Germany asked for the armistice - what should the Entente have said? "Sure, but first, we'll kill thousands more of your soldiers and loot the Rhineland so it doesn't seem like your army was 'stabbed in the back'!"?

I'm not saying it should have been done, I'm just saying that was why the whole 'stabbed in the back' myth came about.

As a whole Versailles is overstated as a cause of WW2. By the are 1920s Germany was starting to normalize its relations with the world, negotiate reduced reparations, and rearm gradually without preparing to invade others. The Great Depression was a much greater factor as it ruined a decade of political and economic recovery.

Versailles was a big reason why Hitler became so popular.

 

[Julian]

Versailles was a big reason why Hitler became so popular.

Which didn't last very long; the Nazi party was in rapid decline in the late 1920s prior to the Depression.

 

[kung Zog]

As a whole Versailles is overstated as a cause of WW2. By the are 1920s Germany was starting to normalize its relations with the world, negotiate reduced reparations, and rearm gradually without preparing to invade others. The Great Depression was a much greater factor as it ruined a decade of political and economic recovery.

Indeed. Although Versailles was used in Nazi and authoritarian propaganda (Stahlhelm etcetera) national indignation and humiliation was not what caused the rise of the Nazi party from a minor party (2.8% in 1928) to a major one (18.3 % in 1930 and 37.3% in 1932), the depression was.

 

[Twice_Bitten]

The Prussian Empire lost in colonies outside Europe:
so what? .. that was the standard penalty for losing a war versus Britain
(and if fact HELPED continental Germany economically .. all the territories lost were in the red)

They had to surrender Alsace & Lorraine back to France:
so what? .. they had been seized only 50 years before as a result of a war
and had been French for hundreds of years before that

The Hohenzollerns were deposed:
nothing to do with Versailles! - they had fled before the end of hostilities ... fearing the ire of ordinary Germans.

They had to give up minor territories in the east:
so what? .. contrast and compare with the treaty of Brest-Litvost that the Prussians enforced on the Russian Empire

they had to pay reparations:
so what? .. compare with Prussian terms on French in 1870 and 1815
The initial amount was high but the Prussian aggression had turned millions of acres and hundreds of French and Belgian towns and villages into blood churned mud
germany and German industry was physically untouched.


The Rhineland was occupied:
again so what? compared to 1870 and 1815 when France had to pay to keep its oppressors


The new Germany was limited in its armed forces:
so what? 1914-18 was the fourth German war in Europe in less than two generations.
besides once again that should help .. not hinder German recovery


If you want to understand how WW1 gave rise to WW2, then


is the key.

the German military .. despite its losses in 1918 and the mutiny in the Navy did not consider itself defeated and was willing to prostitute itself to any political faction that agreed to give them the chance to try again.

The correct Versailles treaty would have broken the Prussian Empire up completely. The Allies never should permitted a "German" nation again.

1) Did France loose all its colonies in its many wars against GB?

2) According to Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alsace-Lorraine

Since the Middle Ages, France sought to attain and preserve its "natural boundaries", which are the Pyrenees to the southwest, the Alps to the southeast, and the Rhine River to the northeast. These strategic aims led to the absorption of territories located west of the Rhine river. What is now known as Alsace was progressively conquered by Louis XIV in the 17th century, while Lorraine was integrated in the 18th century under Louis XV.
The German nationalism which arose following the French occupation of Germany, sought to unify all the German-speaking populations of Europe in a single nation-state. As Alsace and Moselle (northern Lorraine) were mostly composed of German dialects speakers, these regions were coveted by the German Empire.

So this territory was taken by France herself many centuries before.

3) What about the demands to turn over the Kaiser as war criminal for instance?

4) I have to agree, but to partition a Country without a means for free travel between the parts Looks like, how is it called, a cheap shoot?

5) 1815 was not Germany alone. It was GB, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany. And how Long did the French had to pay? The Germans paid the last Money for WWI last year.

6) Again: 1815 was not Germany alone. It was GB, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany. And how much of France was occupied? And was it also the industrial heartland of France that was occupied?

7) Could you please tell me when the four wars were? I know only of 1870 and 1914. As I said before (and I have to expand) 1813 and 1815 were made by the alliance of GB, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany.

8) Limits of armed Forces: Was it not that all powers should disarm but failed to do so?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferdinand_Foch
After the Treaty of Versailles, because Germany was allowed to remain a united country, Foch declared "This is not a peace. It is an armistice for twenty years".

So at least one Person understood Versailles perfectly.

And to Clemenceau: According to an article in the german Magazine DER SPIEGEL The Non-peace of Versailles (german Version: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-65954988.html and I could not find the english Version) It starts with
"Der studierte Arzt hatte zwei Kriege der beiden Großmächte in nicht einmal 50 Jahren erlebt, jeweils auf französischem Boden. Er hasste das Reich "abgrundtief für das, was es Frankreich angetan hat"....Clemenceau beschäftigte auf der Konferenz nur eine Frage: Wie konnte sich sein Land vor einer Wiederholung schützen?...Clemenceau: "Der Fehler der Deutschen ist, dass es 20 Millionen zu viel von ihnen gibt.""
Clemenceau lived through two wars fought between Germany and France on French soil. He hated Germany for what it had done to France.... The main question to him was: How could this be avoided in the future?...The Problem with the Germans is, there are 20 Million too many of them."

So I would like to ask you: When did the enmity between started between France and Germany and how many times did one Country invade the other one?

 

[kalamona]

Though it should be observed that Austria and Hungary didn't start stiring up shit after the war. And the Ottomans pretty much completely ignored their treaty and started fucking things up, but once that was finished Turkey's only foreign expansion after that was Crimean style annexation of Hatay.

The Treaty of Neuilly provides another example of a post-ww1 treaty, though its remarkable in the fact that it actually convinced Bulgaria to stop waging war. It seems rather harsh, but unlike everyone else it actually had a clause that allowed the Bulgarian state to continue existing.

Brest-Litovsk was extremely harsh, but never enforced, and it definitely didn't stop the Soviet Union from going full expansionist.

All that might have some interesting connotations for Versailles, but we might need more case studies to draw a scientific conclusion.

You can stir shit, if you are able to, however...
As for Austria, referring to a certain austrian, as the foremost shitstirrer would be cheap, however, the Anschluss thing was not really an enforced occupation and so on...

As for Hungary? Well, stirring shit from day one... franc forgery, assasination of Alex, and by the first possible time: revision of the treaty.

You could name maybe the turks as the least shitstirrers, but they simply chosed to fight in the right moment and sit out teh wrong moment.

 

[kalamona]

As a whole Versailles is overstated as a cause of WW2. By the are 1920s Germany was starting to normalize its relations with the world, negotiate reduced reparations, and rearm gradually without preparing to invade others. The Great Depression was a much greater factor as it ruined a decade of political and economic recovery.

More or less the political mindset of Germany after ww1 was pretty much revanchist. While its only a guess, i think, that even a weimarian democratic germany would have jumped upon an opportunity of revenge.

Hitler made an opportunity for himself.

 

[CalBear]

I don't think either of those are the fault of the treaty of Versailles. The embarrassment of Germany was because the German political and officer classes felt that telling people to be embarrassed was better than telling them to feel defeated. The reparations were far from impossible to pay, it's just that no-one, either on the allied side, or the German side, were willing to invest the political capital in making the reparations system function smoothly. The funds needed to pay the reparations could have been (as OTL) borrowed or met by increased taxation. But since there were no downsides to not paying the reparations, there was no reason for German politicians to go to the German people and tell them "sorry, we know you are hard up, but we have raise taxes to pay off these reparations, or else, well, nothing, the allies have already agreed to withdraw from our country by 1935".



I don't think the Entente were incapable of enforcing the treaty. It was simply a matter of no-one being willing to take responsibility. People in all countries were getting told that someone or something else would take care of the problem.

fasquardon

Being unwilling, if that unwillingness is known going in, which was the case here, makes one incapable of enforcement.

 

[fasquardon]

Being unwilling, if that unwillingness is known going in, which was the case here, makes one incapable of enforcement.

Right. But the incapability depended upon the domestic politics of Britain, France and, to a lesser extent, the US, not on any material limitations of any of the powers.

More or less the political mindset of Germany after ww1 was pretty much revanchist. While its only a guess, i think, that even a weimarian democratic germany would have jumped upon an opportunity of revenge.

It depends on how much risk Germany ran in the process of getting that revenge, I think. Both Hitler and the governments that preceeded him both wanted to throw off the shackles of Versailles, but Hitler was willing to gamble on much riskier bets than any other likely German leader would be willing to.

fasquardon

 

[MattII]

Indeed. Although Versailles was used in Nazi and authoritarian propaganda (Stahlhelm etcetera) national indignation and humiliation was not what caused the rise of the Nazi party from a minor party (2.8% in 1928) to a major one (18.3 % in 1930 and 37.3% in 1932), the depression was.

Versailles didn't just have an effect on the population mind you, it also rode big in the minds of the Nazis, so it actually had a significant effect on Germany's pre-war policies.

 

[SlideAway]

More or less the political mindset of Germany after ww1 was pretty much revanchist. While its only a guess, i think, that even a weimarian democratic germany would have jumped upon an opportunity of revenge.

Hitler made an opportunity for himself.

Actually even this isn't completely clear. After the initial postwar panic, there was relatively little active support for anschluss with Austria or the Sudetenland. The only revanchist claims that were embraced across the spectrum were against Poland. And even there, the military and most other political leaders would have preferred to wait a decade or so, by which point relations may well have normalized. As it was, Hitler basically recognized the borders in 1934 and actually enjoyed relatively good relations with the Poles without encountering any major internal opposition.

More importantly, accounts from the time, even from foreigners, remarked that the German public greeted the re-outbreak of war with complete apathy or even apprehension -- nothing like the enthusiasm of 1914.

In other words, there's quite a bit of evidence that the German public wanted to rearm, wanted to reaffirm their place as a major European and world power, and wanted to redraw the Polish border -- but weren't all that keen on another war.