Was Brooke too Europe-minded? Did he overlook Asia as CIGS?

Was Brooke too "Europe" minded or is it an impression one gets when reading Bryant's book?

Europe-first strategy is obviously a good choice insofar as Asia was a bit far and the immediate danger to Britain, was ... Germany .. in Europe.

But even so, as CIGS one would expect more. I am not sure I really can see what more could have been done, but I do have this un-easy feeling that Bryant coloured Brookes diary notes in a European colour.

Comments?

Ivan
 

Cook

Banned
The Germany First strategy was the correct decision; Germany posed an immediate threat to the Soviet Union and being the more powerful state, was the most important to halt as soon as possible and then defeat. Japan, at worst, could overrun S.E. Asia, invade India and Australia; but although that would diminish the overall strength of the allies, it could never defeat them. So only sufficient forces necessary to halt the Japanese need be provided until Germany was defeated, once Germany was out of the way Japan could be dealt with. It was a jointly agreed strategy by the British and American chiefs prior to American entry into the war.

Despite this, more forces were sent to the Pacific theatre in the first six months of 1942 than were sent to the European theatre, even though it took far more shipping to move equivalent sized forces; it was still necessary to contain the Japanese, but once halted, their eventual defeat could be given an low priority.
 
Makes a lot of sense.

According to Bryant, the priorities were clear: 1) Britain, 2) Continent.

Now, according to Brooke himself, his strategy was clear:

1) Clear North-Africa
2) Open the Med
3) Recover 10 million tons of shipping via the Med
4) Operate against Italy
5) Tie down untold number of German tyroops in Italy as a strategic backwater
6) Invade France
7) Defeat Germany across Northern Europe

That is a clear-cut and easy to understand strategy.

Now, I do not see the same type of clear strategy insofar as Britain and Far-East is concerned.

Sure, the talk is about Irrawady, Capture of Rangoon, Get back at Singapore. All of this does come across as isolated goals and not really coordinated.

That said, US infuence and war goals should probably also be balanced in all of this, but the different inter-allied conferences do not have clear-cut goals as far as I am aware.

King might have a master-plasn but he surely was not interested in letting Britain into the Pacific if it could be avoided.

Ivan
 
Sure, the talk is about Irrawady, Capture of Rangoon, Get back at Singapore. All of this does come across as isolated goals and not really coordinated.

They do make sense.

Priorities are

Hold India
Hold Australia
Retake Burma (reopens Burma road to China - a US priority; best done by an amphibious landing at Rangoon)
Retake Malaya - amphibious landing in the North, then Singapore)

The offensive actions needed depended on strong amphibious forces, which would not exist for months after a successful D-Day, and so were a low priority. Slim's Burma campaign, although successful, was mostly unnecessary as Rangoon was taken by an amphibious landing.
 
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