The short answer: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pFf9OBU5Ti0
Sorry, couldn't resist, especially after seeing the word "intrinsically" in the title.
Sorry, couldn't resist, especially after seeing the word "intrinsically" in the title.
This is such an arbitrary discussion. Lets start by defining some words.
What exactly is democracy? If we use the literal definition we quickly find that no true democracy even exists to this very day.
Further, how exactly is extremism not, in any case, pro-democracy? In a time where the bulk of history was littered with "non-democratic" institutions, is it not extreme to support "democratic" institutions? Think about i this way, proponents of universal suffrage were viewed as extreme. Modern British suffrage was won by extremists that fought and won against the entrenched elite. Insofar as extremism in the Socialist/Communist sense, proponents of said systems viewed it as more democratic. The "dictatorship" of the proletariat was not a dictatorship in the modern sense, but merely a designation that put into the hands of the working-class the power that was, in their eyes, often used a means of oppression (i.e the means of production). In that, we find a British people that have, to the detriment of the status quo, taken the extreme course and fought for "democracy".
The point is that democracy is a word that, in the modern sense, means nothing. Further, by a great many reasonable metrics, Britain was less democratic then Germany, the nation that fell to the counter-revolution.
Even still, i'm sure you all know of the Labour parties early history. In the worsening state of Britain economically, they swooped in and gained 102 seats in Parliament whilst the Conservative party lost 83. Then, in 1945, Labour won in a landslide and brought what many detractors viewed as radical both then, and to this very day; single-payer universal healthcare. By many standards, thats pretty extreme to this very day.
So then, I guess "British Culture" isn't resistant to extremism?
Britain had a mild Great Depression, unlike Germany, the US, or France.
More/less democratic is bringing in something different than that which has been argued, which is stable/functional. The two do not necessarily correlate; a system can be democratic, but less democratic than another one, and yet be more stable and functional. More people voting can be viewed as being more democratic, but it does not mean the system is more stable and functional, at least necessarily. Saying whether a system is more democratic is an entirely different subject than that which is at hand, which is based on my proposal from a book that I read that functional democratic systems are more stable, and that the Germans did not have a functional democratic system (even if including some more democratic elements) while the British did. Arguments over more/less democratic are a red herring that do not relate to the essentials of the argument thus set forth.
Furthermore, I hardly find a democratically elected and democratically run party winning through democratic means (as opposed to the 1933 German elections which were fraudulent and saw major suppression of opposing parties) and implementing a broad social program, an expression of extremism on the level of a party winning, going to war in acts of aggression against most of the world, conducting major genocides, and creating a totalitarian state…
Yes it was not quite 40% unemployment with a dollar worth more to burn.
A dollar worth more to burn? What? The Depression was deflationary, not inflationary. Kids playing with money was a feature of Germany's 1923 hyperinflation (and it would be a mark and not a dollar), not of the Depression.
Well see, theres the problem. Something I didn't touch on in my previous post, because I knew you would respond in this way, is the concept of extremism.
What does it mean? Seriously, can a discussion truly be had on whether or not various elements of society are "extreme"? Here's what we unequivocally know to be true with regard to extremism.
- It has a negative connotation
- As such, those labeled as extremists never self-identify as extreme. It is a word bestowed upon them so as to rob them of their legitimacy.
Think about it this way.
When Corbyn is called a "terrorist sympathizer", what discussion is then had? You have those that oppose the man that immediately agree with the assertion. Those that support him then go on to, rightly, dissect what the word "terrorist sympathizer truly means. In that, we find that it has no definitive meaning.
Likewise, one need only look at the 100's of various definitions for what constitutes an act of "terrorism". In our discourse, we speak of it as some monolithic attribution that, striped of its nuance, immediately delegitimizes a person/organization. Meanwhile, a group that acts in virtually the same way is then, in our discourse, labeled as a "freedom fighter".
As such, what you label as "extremist" another views as not. What then are we left with? Who is right, you or the detractor? The truth is that neither of you are right because the word has no definitive meaning. McCarthy labeled the Communists of America as extreme radicals that were agents of a foreign power. Meanwhile, the Communists of America took it to label themselves as liberators of the oppressed and working-class. Tell me, where is the objective truth in this? There is none.
What you call extreme, another would call sane. Labour would have gone down a path that was far to the left of where they ended up had the depression worsened, so is that "extreme" in your eyes? To me, the Marxist, going far left isn't extreme in the slightest. To you, however, it could most certainly be. What then? Is anyone truly right? If the word has no definitive meaning, through what can we uncover the truth?
They made it through all of their challenges with each time their parliamentary system being strengthened and the aristocratic/reactionary/undemocratic elements being sidelined or weakened, their parliament had ultimately supreme power (in contrast to the German Empire where there was the problem of the Kaiser vs. rest of the institutional structure, the parliament exercised constant power (as compared to the German model with the potential of being sidelined by the Kaiser a la Saverene affair, as well as constant interference, the events of WW1 where the German situation devolved to a military dictatorship where the Reichstag's endeavors could be ignored, and of course the ultimate collapse of the Weimar Republic), a longer experience with parliamentary democracy (1849 was when the Landtag was first implemented in Prussia, yes? I'd probably refrain from using this as a significant factor though, as simply dating the establishment of a parliament is hardly dating the establishment of effective parliamentarian/democratic institutions), and I was under the impression that in the German Empire's system ministers were responsible to the Kaiser rather than to an elected institution. Not to mention, universal suffrage was also combined with three-class suffrage in Prussia, which somewhat removes some of the positive aspects of universal suffrage...With regard to the rest, from what do you conclude that Britain had, historically, a more "stable/functional" system of governance?
Which the British political system survived with the failure of the strike to overthrow. According to Wikipedia the failure of it led to a strengthening of conventional party actions by the labor unions seeking to work through parties instead of strikes.I can just copy/paste the following.
*The General Strike 1926
I don't study British politics so don't know what this entails as a precise incident, although I do know of the British conflict over free trade/protectionism, and government reform. Off-impulse I'd seek to say that again whatever problem it was was resolved, and furthermore that I find it hard to call a debate over protectionism and government reform the equivalent of the instability and rise of radical extremists that characterized 1930s German politics...*The challenge of protectionism and reform 1906ish
Which was successfully navigated by the British with the strengthening of democratic institutions, in contrast to the situation that transpired around the same time with the Saverne affair.*The Constitutional Crisis 1910-1911
My experience is with the French model from the era, with its constant collapse and merry-go-round of political parties and governments. In general one of the lessons from that is that it is possible for governments to look "weak", and "fragile", while in actuality the institutional system proves surprisingly resilient to attempts to upend it.*The instability of politics in the 1920s with a series of weak governments facing a newly expanded electorate(always under-considered IMHO)
Seems rather in support of my position, the British had a perception of a fading and dying society, but they made it through with their democratic institutions intact.*The perception of "dying Britain" in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
In a time of crisis, like an economic depression, "democracy" means nothing.
Are you aware of the measures FDR took? He literally threatened, and eventually forced to concede, the Supreme court.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_Procedures_Reform_Bill_of_1937
He was prepared to annihilate an entire branch of US government, a nation that many here would argue had the longest "democratic tradition". In short, the stability/functionality of "democratic" institutions aren't indicative of its tendency to undermine said institutions.
Hyperinflation was before the Great Depression in the rest of the world yes, but it helped to get the Nazi Party off the ground.
The whole era of the 20s to early 30s was a economic wreck in Germany.
I think its worth bearing in mind that Britain had a number of "lucky escapes" in the period.
Of those that spring to mind, the careful handling of:
*The General Strike 1926
*The challenge of protectionism and reform 1906ish
*The Constitutional Crisis 1910-1911
*The instability of politics in the 1920s with a series of weak governments facing a newly expanded electorate(always under-considered IMHO)
*The perception of "dying Britain" in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
by various Governments, as well as sheer luck (think what the General Strike would have been like if the TUC had not been basically caught unawares by it...), did much to stem the appeal of extremism.
I've often heard that the extremism of figures such as Oswald Mosley, Enoch Powell, and others, were typically laughed at by the majority of Brits in the 1920s and 30s with some of the reasons why being chalked up to the hilarity that demagoguery and fiery political rhetoric was/is viewed by the British media.
It could be nonsense, but as it says, was/is their something unique about British culture that made it naturally resistant to the allure of extremism in the 1920s and 30s?
If so, what traits made it so?
Structures
I tend to idealise the Westminster System on this board, and for good reason. If you have a hereditary head of state (to whom the armed forces can be loyal apolitically), an elected legislature, an appointed head of government, an independent (and well-trained) civil service, an independent judiciary, property rights and freedom under the law, then that structure can cope with a hell of a lot. Bear in mind that 5/6ths of Ireland had torn itself away violently in the 20's, and the British state coped.
In Japan, the same system led to more militarism rather than less. Everyone was in theory loyal to the emperor, but what this meant was that people did whatever they wanted and excused it in terms of doing this for the emperor. The military had de facto autonomy, and got Japan into all sorts of foreign adventures, as field commanders assassinated foreign leaders and such on their own accord.
Japan didn't even have much of a Depression, even less so than Britain. In 1931 it went off the gold standard (like Britain) and implemented a fiscal stimulus. It recovered quickly, and by 1934 its economy was already overheating. The finance minister, Takahashi Korekiyo, responded by cutting government spending, prioritizing cutting military spending. The military responded by assassinating him, setting up the stage for WW2-era totalitarianism.
Hmmm..no.
I don't think the 20thC resistance of the UK to fascist & communist ideologies was due to a putative British national character, at least not directly. But I do think the circumstances pulling it in that direction were less, and I also think the UK had structures in place that enabled it to cope better
Need
UK won WWI and had a floating currency in the 30's. The pressures due to a national feeling of humiliation and the worst depredations of the Great Depression were therefore absent.
Structures
I tend to idealise the Westminster System on this board, and for good reason. If you have a hereditary head of state (to whom the armed forces can be loyal apolitically), an elected legislature, an appointed head of government, an independent (and well-trained) civil service, an independent judiciary, property rights and freedom under the law, then that structure can cope with a hell of a lot. Bear in mind that 5/6ths of Ireland had torn itself away violently in the 20's, and the British state coped.
Conclusion
So Britain had no need to go fascist/communist in the 30's, because the structures in place meant there was no need for it, and the pressures requiring it were less
Assassinating government ministers who cut military spending?
I guess the Japanese peoples are different to the British Peoples in that respect!
I did a bachelor thesis on voter turnout at the European Parliamentary elections and because I linked the abysmal turnout in the East to a political culture effect of the Iron Curtain and communism, I read quite a lot of stuff about the various nations and, as the topic demanded it, their respective political cultures.
It may all sound lofty, especially if you read what they wrote about the "old" democracies. What the author said about Britain was that it's a "non-state society", i.e. industrialization not only preponed economic unity but also civic unity before state bureaucracy could have risen to a level capable of subversion of what already existed in civic society. They also wrote something how the monarchy survived the rise of the bourgeoisie as it co-opted it and that this non-state society also benefited the trade unions because it meant that they didn't have to pay for any collateral damage that resulted from the heavy shenanigans trade unions have to play from time to time in order to succeed. Etc. pp. They also wrote that 2/3 of Britons consider themselves to be working-class even if actual socio-economics differ.
And about voter turnout itself: My very professor who checked my thesis (he's 77 by now) wrote that the late Weimar Republic had fantastic voter turnout and he saw it as a symptom of high polarization and you know what it did to the Republic. And from another German colleague, low voter turnout likely has to distinct forms: In a consolidated democracy (i.e. among West Germans), abstaining from the ballot is a sign of benevolent indifference, meaning they're OK with how things are run and don't think that any result will make a difference that's it worth voting. In a new democracy or at least the post-Communist ones (i.e. among East Germans), voter turnout is a sign of resigned indifference, meaning that they may not be that OK with how things are run but don't think that the vote makes any difference.
And yes, the memory of functioning times under democracy makes a democracy last. Good times under democracy make for a specific support of it whereas a long enough survival (let's say a generation) of said specific support makes for a diffuse support of democracy (the feeling that there's no desirable alternative to democracy) and that's why British democracy survived the un-survivable even in the key moments of the early 20th century: The diffuse support for its democracy was so robust that it couldn't be hurt by anything and it had enough chance to get hurt.