Was British Culture Intrinsically resistant to Extremism?

This is such an arbitrary discussion. Lets start by defining some words.

What exactly is democracy? If we use the literal definition we quickly find that no true democracy even exists to this very day.

Further, how exactly is extremism not, in any case, pro-democracy? In a time where the bulk of history was littered with "non-democratic" institutions, is it not extreme to support "democratic" institutions? Think about i this way, proponents of universal suffrage were viewed as extreme. Modern British suffrage was won by extremists that fought and won against the entrenched elite. Insofar as extremism in the Socialist/Communist sense, proponents of said systems viewed it as more democratic. The "dictatorship" of the proletariat was not a dictatorship in the modern sense, but merely a designation that put into the hands of the working-class the power that was, in their eyes, often used a means of oppression (i.e the means of production). In that, we find a British people that have, to the detriment of the status quo, taken the extreme course and fought for "democracy".

The point is that democracy is a word that, in the modern sense, means nothing. Further, by a great many reasonable metrics, Britain was less democratic then Germany, the nation that fell to the counter-revolution.

Even still, i'm sure you all know of the Labour parties early history. In the worsening state of Britain economically, they swooped in and gained 102 seats in Parliament whilst the Conservative party lost 83. Then, in 1945, Labour won in a landslide and brought what many detractors viewed as radical both then, and to this very day; single-payer universal healthcare. By many standards, thats pretty extreme to this very day.

So then, I guess "British Culture" isn't resistant to extremism?

More/less democratic is bringing in something different than that which has been argued, which is stable/functional. The two do not necessarily correlate; a system can be democratic, but less democratic than another one, and yet be more stable and functional. More people voting can be viewed as being more democratic, but it does not mean the system is more stable and functional, at least necessarily. Saying whether a system is more democratic is an entirely different subject than that which is at hand, which is based on my proposal from a book that I read that functional democratic systems are more stable, and that the Germans did not have a functional democratic system (even if including some more democratic elements) while the British did. Arguments over more/less democratic of elements of the competing systems are a red herring that do not relate to the essentials of the argument thus set forth.

Furthermore, I hardly find a democratically elected and democratically run party winning through democratic means (as opposed to the 1933 German elections which were fraudulent and saw major suppression of opposing parties) and implementing a broad social program, an expression of extremism on the level of a party winning, going to war in acts of aggression against most of the world, conducting major genocides, and creating a totalitarian state…
 
Britain had a mild Great Depression, unlike Germany, the US, or France.

Yes it was not quite 40% unemployment with a dollar worth more to burn.

Germany-unemployment.jpg~original
 

Cueg

Banned
More/less democratic is bringing in something different than that which has been argued, which is stable/functional. The two do not necessarily correlate; a system can be democratic, but less democratic than another one, and yet be more stable and functional. More people voting can be viewed as being more democratic, but it does not mean the system is more stable and functional, at least necessarily. Saying whether a system is more democratic is an entirely different subject than that which is at hand, which is based on my proposal from a book that I read that functional democratic systems are more stable, and that the Germans did not have a functional democratic system (even if including some more democratic elements) while the British did. Arguments over more/less democratic are a red herring that do not relate to the essentials of the argument thus set forth.

Furthermore, I hardly find a democratically elected and democratically run party winning through democratic means (as opposed to the 1933 German elections which were fraudulent and saw major suppression of opposing parties) and implementing a broad social program, an expression of extremism on the level of a party winning, going to war in acts of aggression against most of the world, conducting major genocides, and creating a totalitarian state…

Well see, theres the problem. Something I didn't touch on in my previous post, because I knew you would respond in this way, is the concept of extremism.

What does it mean? Seriously, can a discussion truly be had on whether or not various elements of society are "extreme"? Here's what we unequivocally know to be true with regard to extremism.

- It has a negative connotation
- As such, those labeled as extremists never self-identify as extreme. It is a word bestowed upon them so as to rob them of their legitimacy.

Think about it this way.

When Corbyn is called a "terrorist sympathizer", what discussion is then had? You have those that oppose the man that immediately agree with the assertion. Those that support him then go on to, rightly, dissect what the word "terrorist sympathizer truly means. In that, we find that it has no definitive meaning.

Likewise, one need only look at the 100's of various definitions for what constitutes an act of "terrorism". In our discourse, we speak of it as some monolithic attribution that, striped of its nuance, immediately delegitimizes a person/organization. Meanwhile, a group that acts in virtually the same way is then, in our discourse, labeled as a "freedom fighter".

As such, what you label as "extremist" another views as not. What then are we left with? Who is right, you or the detractor? The truth is that neither of you are right because the word has no definitive meaning. McCarthy labeled the Communists of America as extreme radicals that were agents of a foreign power. Meanwhile, the Communists of America took it to label themselves as liberators of the oppressed and working-class. Tell me, where is the objective truth in this? There is none.

What you call extreme, another would call sane. Labour would have gone down a path that was far to the left of where they ended up had the depression worsened, so is that "extreme" in your eyes? To me, the Marxist, going far left isn't extreme in the slightest. To you, however, it could most certainly be. What then? Is anyone truly right? If the word has no definitive meaning, through what can we uncover the truth?


With regard to the rest, from what do you conclude that Britain had, historically, a more "stable/functional" system of governance?

I can just copy/paste the following.

*The General Strike 1926
*The challenge of protectionism and reform 1906ish
*The Constitutional Crisis 1910-1911
*The instability of politics in the 1920s with a series of weak governments facing a newly expanded electorate(always under-considered IMHO)
*The perception of "dying Britain" in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In a time of crisis, like an economic depression, "democracy" means nothing.

Are you aware of the measures FDR took? He literally threatened, and eventually forced to concede, the Supreme court.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_Procedures_Reform_Bill_of_1937

He was prepared to annihilate an entire branch of US government, a nation that many here would argue had the longest "democratic tradition". In short, the stability/functionality of "democratic" institutions aren't indicative of its tendency to undermine said institutions.
 
Yes it was not quite 40% unemployment with a dollar worth more to burn.

A dollar worth more to burn? What? The Depression was deflationary, not inflationary. Kids playing with money was a feature of Germany's 1923 hyperinflation (and it would be a mark and not a dollar), not of the Depression.
 
A dollar worth more to burn? What? The Depression was deflationary, not inflationary. Kids playing with money was a feature of Germany's 1923 hyperinflation (and it would be a mark and not a dollar), not of the Depression.

Hyperinflation was before the Great Depression in the rest of the world yes, but it helped to get the Nazi Party off the ground.

The whole era of the 20s to early 30s was a economic wreck in Germany.
 
Well see, theres the problem. Something I didn't touch on in my previous post, because I knew you would respond in this way, is the concept of extremism.

What does it mean? Seriously, can a discussion truly be had on whether or not various elements of society are "extreme"? Here's what we unequivocally know to be true with regard to extremism.

- It has a negative connotation
- As such, those labeled as extremists never self-identify as extreme. It is a word bestowed upon them so as to rob them of their legitimacy.

Think about it this way.

When Corbyn is called a "terrorist sympathizer", what discussion is then had? You have those that oppose the man that immediately agree with the assertion. Those that support him then go on to, rightly, dissect what the word "terrorist sympathizer truly means. In that, we find that it has no definitive meaning.

Likewise, one need only look at the 100's of various definitions for what constitutes an act of "terrorism". In our discourse, we speak of it as some monolithic attribution that, striped of its nuance, immediately delegitimizes a person/organization. Meanwhile, a group that acts in virtually the same way is then, in our discourse, labeled as a "freedom fighter".

As such, what you label as "extremist" another views as not. What then are we left with? Who is right, you or the detractor? The truth is that neither of you are right because the word has no definitive meaning. McCarthy labeled the Communists of America as extreme radicals that were agents of a foreign power. Meanwhile, the Communists of America took it to label themselves as liberators of the oppressed and working-class. Tell me, where is the objective truth in this? There is none.

What you call extreme, another would call sane. Labour would have gone down a path that was far to the left of where they ended up had the depression worsened, so is that "extreme" in your eyes? To me, the Marxist, going far left isn't extreme in the slightest. To you, however, it could most certainly be. What then? Is anyone truly right? If the word has no definitive meaning, through what can we uncover the truth?

Given that this topic has been about the fall of "democratic" societies - ie. bourgeoisie, liberal democratic states -, the extremists would have to be in this case those who would overthrow the pillars of such societies. The Labor Party's post war policies may have been "radical", but they did not fundamentally overthrow the foundations of such an organization, although it was of course modified. Therefor, I would hesitate to call them "extremists", although I'll freely admit that "extremist" is a word that can be easily bandied about and its usage should be defined for its place within conversation. In this case, it should principally be in reference to a branch of people who sought to overthrow liberal democracy; if you can suggest a better word to group together the wide variety of such opponents of liberal democracy then I'll gladly use it.

With regard to the rest, from what do you conclude that Britain had, historically, a more "stable/functional" system of governance?
They made it through all of their challenges with each time their parliamentary system being strengthened and the aristocratic/reactionary/undemocratic elements being sidelined or weakened, their parliament had ultimately supreme power (in contrast to the German Empire where there was the problem of the Kaiser vs. rest of the institutional structure, the parliament exercised constant power (as compared to the German model with the potential of being sidelined by the Kaiser a la Saverene affair, as well as constant interference, the events of WW1 where the German situation devolved to a military dictatorship where the Reichstag's endeavors could be ignored, and of course the ultimate collapse of the Weimar Republic), a longer experience with parliamentary democracy (1849 was when the Landtag was first implemented in Prussia, yes? I'd probably refrain from using this as a significant factor though, as simply dating the establishment of a parliament is hardly dating the establishment of effective parliamentarian/democratic institutions), and I was under the impression that in the German Empire's system ministers were responsible to the Kaiser rather than to an elected institution. Not to mention, universal suffrage was also combined with three-class suffrage in Prussia, which somewhat removes some of the positive aspects of universal suffrage...

http://www.ghi-dc.org/files/publications/bulletin/bu051/023_bu51.pdf

To forestall claims of bias against the Germans, I should make the point, as made by that article, that the German system was necessarily impossible of evolving into a more stable-by-democratic-means system, but instead that it had not at the time due to various reasons, and that it was fully possible that it would in the future. That was something the above posted article illuminates; that the German system had the elements that might have allowed for its functionality(after all, Weimar was temporarily a succesful democracy), but was not yet fully functional.

I can just copy/paste the following.

*The General Strike 1926
Which the British political system survived with the failure of the strike to overthrow. According to Wikipedia the failure of it led to a strengthening of conventional party actions by the labor unions seeking to work through parties instead of strikes.

*The challenge of protectionism and reform 1906ish
I don't study British politics so don't know what this entails as a precise incident, although I do know of the British conflict over free trade/protectionism, and government reform. Off-impulse I'd seek to say that again whatever problem it was was resolved, and furthermore that I find it hard to call a debate over protectionism and government reform the equivalent of the instability and rise of radical extremists that characterized 1930s German politics...

*The Constitutional Crisis 1910-1911
Which was successfully navigated by the British with the strengthening of democratic institutions, in contrast to the situation that transpired around the same time with the Saverne affair.
*The instability of politics in the 1920s with a series of weak governments facing a newly expanded electorate(always under-considered IMHO)
My experience is with the French model from the era, with its constant collapse and merry-go-round of political parties and governments. In general one of the lessons from that is that it is possible for governments to look "weak", and "fragile", while in actuality the institutional system proves surprisingly resilient to attempts to upend it.

*The perception of "dying Britain" in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Seems rather in support of my position, the British had a perception of a fading and dying society, but they made it through with their democratic institutions intact.

In a time of crisis, like an economic depression, "democracy" means nothing.

Are you aware of the measures FDR took? He literally threatened, and eventually forced to concede, the Supreme court.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_Procedures_Reform_Bill_of_1937

He was prepared to annihilate an entire branch of US government, a nation that many here would argue had the longest "democratic tradition". In short, the stability/functionality of "democratic" institutions aren't indicative of its tendency to undermine said institutions.

You are drawing the wrong conclusions from this. The lesson that can be drawn isn't that a US president was willing to attempt to change around US institutional structures in his own favor, but instead it failed.
 
I vaguely remember seeing an image of a British trade union poster (circa 1917-18) proclaiming "Evolution, not Revolution", possibly in a text book in high school. This, to me at least, seems to sum up the feelings prevalent amongst the British Empire at the time, that necessary change will come and that blood is no longer needed for that change to occur. (Although, unfortunately, blood was still split.)

Political action, such as protests, strikes and the formation of various Labour parties, were seen as the best way to achieve these changes, rather than turning to the gun.

In other words, the British public had basically decided that revolution just wasn't British anymore.
 
Hyperinflation was before the Great Depression in the rest of the world yes, but it helped to get the Nazi Party off the ground.

The whole era of the 20s to early 30s was a economic wreck in Germany.

You're making 3 mistakes in 2 sentences.

1. Hyperinflation was specific to Germany. It did not happen in other countries that suffered in the Depression, such as the US and France. (France had a one-time bout of inflation in the 1920s, rather than hyperinflation.)

2. The Nazis ran as part of an extreme right bloc in May 1924, and got 32 seats, out of 472. Then the new elections in December 1924 gave them 14 seats. In 1928 they got 12. That's not getting off the ground. That's irrelevance. Then the Depression hit, and in 1930 they got 107 seats.

3. Between stabilization in 1924 and the onset of the Depression in 1929, the German economy was doing well.
 

Lateknight

Banned
No the British were just as vulnerable as any other country in fact they're little empire was sort of a extremist racasist state.
 
Wait the British weren't Extremists?
Didn't the Glorious Revolution end up with anti Catholic policies?
Cause a lot of Famines in India?
Didn't they bomb a country for wanting to fix its Opuim problem?

Didn't they use a policy that starved German Civilians in WW1?


oh wait you mean why they didn't become a dictatorship?
Well that has to do with several events in English history such as Magna Carta, English Civil War, Glorious Revolution, American Influence, Reforms of 1830's
 
I think its worth bearing in mind that Britain had a number of "lucky escapes" in the period.

Of those that spring to mind, the careful handling of:

*The General Strike 1926
*The challenge of protectionism and reform 1906ish
*The Constitutional Crisis 1910-1911
*The instability of politics in the 1920s with a series of weak governments facing a newly expanded electorate(always under-considered IMHO)
*The perception of "dying Britain" in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

by various Governments, as well as sheer luck (think what the General Strike would have been like if the TUC had not been basically caught unawares by it...), did much to stem the appeal of extremism.

I'd just like to say, as my points have been taken out of context, that highlighting constitutional moments of crisis was not a point about the weakness of British democracy but that, in many cases, it was supremely lucky in how it dealt with issues. Any of these points COULD HAVE LED TO AN INCREASE IN EXTREMISM but didn't because of skillful political handling, circumstance, and dumb luck.

I find it very difficult to buy into a concept that the British are somehow naturally anti-extreme. That's like saying that the Russians are "automatically drawn to dictators" or that the Germans are "hopelessly militaristic" as countries which doesn't take into account the nature of modern history. For more than 50% of the 20th century Germany has been a constructive force for peace in Europe, whilst to simply say that Russians are drawn to extremists is to write off the thousands upon thousands of dissidents, democrats, and minorities purged by Tsars and Dictators throughout the period.

As for those arguing that it all "happened in the past - see Cromwell" - history just doesn't work like that! No-one in the thirties looked at a BUF leaflet and thought "Well, I don't know....I like some of their policies but remember the English Civil War?"

Britain doesn't have one monolithic national identity like that - no country does. Not on that individual level. Migration had shaped Britain dramatically by the 1930s, for example, and not everyone would have had a direct connection to or recognition of Magna Carta or the Glorious Revolution say. So much of this is lazy hindsight - you only need a few events to fall against Britain's favour in the 20th century to see extremism blossom beyond a radical fringe.
 
I've often heard that the extremism of figures such as Oswald Mosley, Enoch Powell, and others, were typically laughed at by the majority of Brits in the 1920s and 30s with some of the reasons why being chalked up to the hilarity that demagoguery and fiery political rhetoric was/is viewed by the British media.

It could be nonsense, but as it says, was/is their something unique about British culture that made it naturally resistant to the allure of extremism in the 1920s and 30s?

If so, what traits made it so?

Hmmm..no.

I don't think the 20thC resistance of the UK to fascist & communist ideologies was due to a putative British national character, at least not directly. But I do think the circumstances pulling it in that direction were less, and I also think the UK had structures in place that enabled it to cope better

Need
UK won WWI and had a floating currency in the 30's. The pressures due to a national feeling of humiliation and the worst depredations of the Great Depression were therefore absent.

Structures
I tend to idealise the Westminster System on this board, and for good reason. If you have a hereditary head of state (to whom the armed forces can be loyal apolitically), an elected legislature, an appointed head of government, an independent (and well-trained) civil service, an independent judiciary, property rights and freedom under the law, then that structure can cope with a hell of a lot. Bear in mind that 5/6ths of Ireland had torn itself away violently in the 20's, and the British state coped.

Conclusion
So Britain had no need to go fascist/communist in the 30's, because the structures in place meant there was no need for it, and the pressures requiring it were less
 
british are the oldest democracy in the world wich helps alot with also a monarch as a nice figurehead to stabilize things a little bit aswell to avoid extremism while for germany for example had the feckless hindenberg as president as the check to the power for the rise of nazism . The british monarch actually has decent amount of power but they never use it. Last time the monarch was in charge of british goverment more or less was when we got the american rebellion.People underestimate the impact that had on british goverment in the future and its future geostrategic situation since honestly it wasnt the soviets who forced the british to decolonize after ww2 but the americans and british couldnt do much cause of the will and money werent there for that.

And as someone said that democracy is the best worst option not perfect model for goverment. It also breeds a political class wich only cares about getting reelcted and opposing your opponents if its a two party system to be honest - america is a really bad example for democracy to be honest at the moment. Also limiting moneys influence is a good idea to be honest to get a fairer goverment for the boardest base of population or that what the idea should be for goverments.
 
Structures
I tend to idealise the Westminster System on this board, and for good reason. If you have a hereditary head of state (to whom the armed forces can be loyal apolitically), an elected legislature, an appointed head of government, an independent (and well-trained) civil service, an independent judiciary, property rights and freedom under the law, then that structure can cope with a hell of a lot. Bear in mind that 5/6ths of Ireland had torn itself away violently in the 20's, and the British state coped.

In Japan, the same system led to more militarism rather than less. Everyone was in theory loyal to the emperor, but what this meant was that people did whatever they wanted and excused it in terms of doing this for the emperor. The military had de facto autonomy, and got Japan into all sorts of foreign adventures, as field commanders assassinated foreign leaders and such on their own accord.

Japan didn't even have much of a Depression, even less so than Britain. In 1931 it went off the gold standard (like Britain) and implemented a fiscal stimulus. It recovered quickly, and by 1934 its economy was already overheating. The finance minister, Takahashi Korekiyo, responded by cutting government spending, prioritizing cutting military spending. The military responded by assassinating him, setting up the stage for WW2-era totalitarianism.
 
In Japan, the same system led to more militarism rather than less. Everyone was in theory loyal to the emperor, but what this meant was that people did whatever they wanted and excused it in terms of doing this for the emperor. The military had de facto autonomy, and got Japan into all sorts of foreign adventures, as field commanders assassinated foreign leaders and such on their own accord.

Japan didn't even have much of a Depression, even less so than Britain. In 1931 it went off the gold standard (like Britain) and implemented a fiscal stimulus. It recovered quickly, and by 1934 its economy was already overheating. The finance minister, Takahashi Korekiyo, responded by cutting government spending, prioritizing cutting military spending. The military responded by assassinating him, setting up the stage for WW2-era totalitarianism.

Assassinating government ministers who cut military spending?

I guess the Japanese peoples are different to the British Peoples in that respect!
 
Hmmm..no.

I don't think the 20thC resistance of the UK to fascist & communist ideologies was due to a putative British national character, at least not directly. But I do think the circumstances pulling it in that direction were less, and I also think the UK had structures in place that enabled it to cope better

Need
UK won WWI and had a floating currency in the 30's. The pressures due to a national feeling of humiliation and the worst depredations of the Great Depression were therefore absent.

Structures
I tend to idealise the Westminster System on this board, and for good reason. If you have a hereditary head of state (to whom the armed forces can be loyal apolitically), an elected legislature, an appointed head of government, an independent (and well-trained) civil service, an independent judiciary, property rights and freedom under the law, then that structure can cope with a hell of a lot. Bear in mind that 5/6ths of Ireland had torn itself away violently in the 20's, and the British state coped.

Conclusion
So Britain had no need to go fascist/communist in the 30's, because the structures in place meant there was no need for it, and the pressures requiring it were less

I think you have nailed it
 
I did a bachelor thesis on voter turnout at the European Parliamentary elections and because I linked the abysmal turnout in the East to a political culture effect of the Iron Curtain and communism, I read quite a lot of stuff about the various nations and, as the topic demanded it, their respective political cultures.

It may all sound lofty, especially if you read what they wrote about the "old" democracies. What the author said about Britain was that it's a "non-state society", i.e. industrialization not only preponed economic unity but also civic unity before state bureaucracy could have risen to a level capable of subversion of what already existed in civic society. They also wrote something how the monarchy survived the rise of the bourgeoisie as it co-opted it and that this non-state society also benefited the trade unions because it meant that they didn't have to pay for any collateral damage that resulted from the heavy shenanigans trade unions have to play from time to time in order to succeed. Etc. pp. They also wrote that 2/3 of Britons consider themselves to be working-class even if actual socio-economics differ.

And about voter turnout itself: My very professor who checked my thesis (he's 77 by now) wrote that the late Weimar Republic had fantastic voter turnout and he saw it as a symptom of high polarization and you know what it did to the Republic. And from another German colleague, low voter turnout likely has to distinct forms: In a consolidated democracy (i.e. among West Germans), abstaining from the ballot is a sign of benevolent indifference, meaning they're OK with how things are run and don't think that any result will make a difference that's it worth voting. In a new democracy or at least the post-Communist ones (i.e. among East Germans), voter turnout is a sign of resigned indifference, meaning that they may not be that OK with how things are run but don't think that the vote makes any difference.

And yes, the memory of functioning times under democracy makes a democracy last. Good times under democracy make for a specific support of it whereas a long enough survival (let's say a generation) of said specific support makes for a diffuse support of democracy (the feeling that there's no desirable alternative to democracy) and that's why British democracy survived the un-survivable even in the key moments of the early 20th century: The diffuse support for its democracy was so robust that it couldn't be hurt by anything and it had enough chance to get hurt.
 
I did a bachelor thesis on voter turnout at the European Parliamentary elections and because I linked the abysmal turnout in the East to a political culture effect of the Iron Curtain and communism, I read quite a lot of stuff about the various nations and, as the topic demanded it, their respective political cultures.

It may all sound lofty, especially if you read what they wrote about the "old" democracies. What the author said about Britain was that it's a "non-state society", i.e. industrialization not only preponed economic unity but also civic unity before state bureaucracy could have risen to a level capable of subversion of what already existed in civic society. They also wrote something how the monarchy survived the rise of the bourgeoisie as it co-opted it and that this non-state society also benefited the trade unions because it meant that they didn't have to pay for any collateral damage that resulted from the heavy shenanigans trade unions have to play from time to time in order to succeed. Etc. pp. They also wrote that 2/3 of Britons consider themselves to be working-class even if actual socio-economics differ.

And about voter turnout itself: My very professor who checked my thesis (he's 77 by now) wrote that the late Weimar Republic had fantastic voter turnout and he saw it as a symptom of high polarization and you know what it did to the Republic. And from another German colleague, low voter turnout likely has to distinct forms: In a consolidated democracy (i.e. among West Germans), abstaining from the ballot is a sign of benevolent indifference, meaning they're OK with how things are run and don't think that any result will make a difference that's it worth voting. In a new democracy or at least the post-Communist ones (i.e. among East Germans), voter turnout is a sign of resigned indifference, meaning that they may not be that OK with how things are run but don't think that the vote makes any difference.

And yes, the memory of functioning times under democracy makes a democracy last. Good times under democracy make for a specific support of it whereas a long enough survival (let's say a generation) of said specific support makes for a diffuse support of democracy (the feeling that there's no desirable alternative to democracy) and that's why British democracy survived the un-survivable even in the key moments of the early 20th century: The diffuse support for its democracy was so robust that it couldn't be hurt by anything and it had enough chance to get hurt.


What he said.
 
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