Was Britain Right to Enter WWI?

Was Britain Right to Enter WWI?

  • Yes

    Votes: 236 56.2%
  • No

    Votes: 198 47.1%

  • Total voters
    420
You are using that quote to support the assertion that the French government knew when they started mobilising (or when Russia started mobilising) that war was inevitable.

I would respectfully suggest the burden of proof lies with you.
Which means you have no proof to the contrary, got it.

I would merely suggest that if you agree on something with your primary ally, it stays in effect until you either explicitly rescind it or agree on something different. I can't imagine such a central point just fading away with time. So unless I find some more recent agreement to the contrary, I have to assume the initial understanding between the two allies was still valid in 1914. If you now claim that there was actually a change in policy, then I believe the burden to prove that is on you. Otherwise, I would have to prove the non-existence of such evidence, which is very difficult indeed.
 
No I never agreed that Russian mobilization was not automatically leading to war. I admitted that it would have led automatically to war only if the germans were idiotic enough to wait for them to make the first move.

Considering Germany then declared war on them a day after the ultimatum it's Germany pushing this. Countries are allowed to mobilise troops

Russia ordered mobilization first - and refused to stop it when it became a clear cut case that it means war. This is proof that they were determined to go to war and any negotiation offer was on their part dishonest.


No because unlike Germany who mobilise and invade on the same day, Russia can mobilise and still attend peace talks (as you point out below teh Russian plan allows/needs 15 days)

Also while germany was not mobilizing during this talk and offers Russia was.

Because for the umpteenth time for Germany mobilising and invading are one and the same thing, i,e. thy can do both in the same day and more importantly choose to do so.

and that's the point Germany could in theory have mobilised and held back from invasion, but no that doesn't fit with their war plan so they don't. But that is on Germany not anyone else.

And as long as Russia is going along with its mobilization plan - which has them attacking Germany 15 days later, when France starts mobilization, Germany has to react. Even if neutral countries make sincere offers to meditate - as long as the mobilizations proceed the war is inevitable - and russia absolutely refused to stop mobilization.
Only both Russia and France are suggesting talks, all Germany/AH has to do to have talks, is to say yes to talks.

Bu there's another key point Germany and AH don't want to have talks because they're convinced they will do better out of war.
 
By doing that it was clear cut?

Hell Germany certainly thought so since they declared war on Russia the next day on the 1st Aug!


And frankly the rest is basically either:

1). 'why didn't the entente power act as precipitously as Germany and AH', well because they weren't so hell bent on a war as the CP and were a trying to avoid it (with no help from the CP) and were working out if the CP was actually going to cross their individual Rubicon's, e.g Luxembourg or Belgium!

or

2). 'why didn't France make it easy for Germany to work out which plan to go with when it starts invading everyone'. Only it not France job to make Germanies' life easy when ordering is mobilisation. Franc didn't force Germany to declare war on them, Germany is it's grown up country and is in control of who it declares war on!

The is last is key because your argument here is basically "Why didn't everyone let Germany/AH do what they wanted to do", followed by "Germany/AH was forced to act when everyone didn't". Ignoring the key point that the rest of the world doesn't owe Germany/AH anything and Germany/AH are not children and are responsible for their own choices and actions.





Conrad being an idiot is AH's / Germanies' problem not the Entente's. Hell if AH had been faster in July as Germany urged them to be and when sympathy was still more solidly on their side they might have been able to do this without teh escalation and 'asking forgiveness rather then permission'. But instead you have plan that won't now work because the context it in has changed being stuck to because of political investment and teh assumption that "oh well we'll just beat everyone as per our plans" can't fail.
France and Russia used these delaying tactics to great effect at the time. This same delaying tactics are used know by their apologists to say: this wasnt a smoke screen, this was not delaying tactics, they wanted peace. They absolutly had to mobilize in response to.... something. Sorry but not buying it.
 
Except that in this case for some powers it did - For Germany because of the Schlieffen plan, and for France and Russia as they agreed on a coordinated attack on Germany on the 15th day of mobilization.
And who's fault is it that Germany designed a defense strategy based on a dooms day clock? The Heer decreed the war plan was unalterable, and beyond the control of the Civilian Government, and even the Kaiser. There was no room for diplomacy, and after gaining the initial approval of the Kaiser for a Serbian War, they told him nothing could now stop a general all out war. This was a case as Clausewitz would say of War serving War. They forgot another Clausewitz lesson, war is too important to be left to the Generals. That's because war is an extension of politics by other means, not an end in itself. The Generals wanted to force a war to eliminate Russia as a "threat" before 1916, and no weak willed Kaiser, or incompetent civilians in the Government, and Foreign Ministry were going to stop them from saving Germany.
 
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Oh on talk about Russian mobilization. Russia had done the same thing in 1912 and had received German support back then when the Germans rebuffed Austrian ambitions in the Balkan Wars.
France and Russia used these delaying tactics to great effect at the time. This same delaying tactics are used know by their apologists to say: this wasnt a smoke screen, this was not delaying tactics, they wanted peace. They absolutly had to mobilize in response to.... something. Sorry but not buying it.
I like how you are deflecting the fact that Entente offers on the 31st and 1st agreed to mobilization taking place whilst negotiations were going on and offered the Hague Tribunal, the most neutral of all mediations in 1914. Also how you are deflecting that the order to mobilize was taken in Germany on the 29th of July and that on 27th of July itself they were preparing for war.
Nonetheless if that is apologia, why did Germany refuse neutral mediation from the Hague Tribunal?
Why did Germany decide to go to war definitely on the 27th of July?
Why did Germany decide to go for mobilization on the 29th of July?
Why did Bethmann, Jagow, Muller and Moltke decide before Russian mobilization that war must happen before Russian mobilization?
German apologists tend to ignore this fact.
 
France and Russia used these delaying tactics to great effect at the time. This same delaying tactics are used know by their apologists to say: this wasnt a smoke screen, this was not delaying tactics, they wanted peace. They absolutly had to mobilize in response to.... something. Sorry but not buying it.
Hang on - it's Germany and Austria-Hungary who deliberately delayed the release of the ultimatum to Serbia until after the French president Poincare had left Russia. If they not done this then there would have been more opportunity for the French government to co-ordinate a response with the Russians. The Germans did not want this and jumped on Poincare's partial isolation from Paris as an opportunity to push harder.
 
France and Russia used these delaying tactics to great effect at the time. This same delaying tactics are used know by their apologists to say: this wasnt a smoke screen, this was not delaying tactics, they wanted peace. They absolutly had to mobilize in response to.... something. Sorry but not buying it.

1). prove the offer to negotiate weren't genuine, with out relying on "well entente apologists would say that" blather because just as equally the same argument can be levelled at "CP apologists", neither is worthwhile.

2). It can only be a delaying tactics against Germany if Germanies plan is to attack before everyone else, you get that doesn't speak to well of Germany's intentions here when it comes to avoiding a war!

3). Weather you buy it or not the Russians and French were mobilising in response to AH and German actions, You know stuff like the fact that AH had delivered an ultimatum carrying the threat of war, started partial mobilising and then declared war, and Germany was backing them to the hilt.

3). You point at Russian mobilisation with a 15 day gap (and a lot can happen in 15 days) before a planned invasion as being unforgivable, yet Germany mobilise and invade on the same day. Yeah sorry not buying it, the irony is your point makes more sense when levelled at Germany .
 
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Which means you have no proof to the contrary, got it.

I would merely suggest that if you agree on something with your primary ally, it stays in effect until you either explicitly rescind it or agree on something different. I can't imagine such a central point just fading away with time. So unless I find some more recent agreement to the contrary, I have to assume the initial understanding between the two allies was still valid in 1914. If you now claim that there was actually a change in policy, then I believe the burden to prove that is on you. Otherwise, I would have to prove the non-existence of such evidence, which is very difficult indeed.
Not really - I wasn't making the point, you were. You established that there was a well documented conversation with the Deputy French Chief of Staff and the Russian Tsar during the negotiations for a military alliance which characterised mobilisation as an act of war. It can be if it is not rescinded.

On 12 March 1912 Russian General Staff issued a telegram to Warsaw military district stating "the telegram relating to mobilisation is to regarded at the same time as the Imperial command for initiating hostilities against Austria and Germany" - so you are right?

On 21 November 1912 the Tsar revoked this saying " the proclamation of mobilisation must not be regarded as an Imperial order for the opening of hostilities". Only a specific telegram from the Minister of War could do this. So Russia could - and did - change their minds.,

 
However the other offers included Dutch mediation, or mediation from the Hague Court, which was categorically told no by Germany.
Because mediation without the power to enforce it is worthless and once more without the demobilization of Russia/France Germany would put itself at risk. Who says this mediation result is accepted?
I will go once into more detail on this. In Germany the military thinkers and planers were aware that fighting a two-front war against Russia and France would be a hard nut to crack. For coming out ahead they came to the conclusion that it would be best to focus on one side first to close one front. For foreseeable reason they deduced that Russia would be far harder to beat down. Historic evidence and sheer size made Russia out to be a bitch to bring down. Therefore, France was the obvious choice. The plan to beat France quickly was the famous Schlieffen Plan, updated and changed by the Younger Moltke. This plan was seen and accepted as the best chance of winning a two-front war against these two Great Powers. Without it the chances for winning would be significantly lower.
On the other side France and Russia had one plan, to simply beat down Germany through a two-front assault. France with the clear intent to enter the Ruhr territory.

Problematic for Germany was that their plan hinges on many things. From the element of surprise, to speed to a multitude of other minor things. It was fragile in the area of flexibility. Therefore, any minor changes to the timetable or introduction of new elements stood to severely hamper its execution, which would severely hamper the chances of German victory in case of a war.

So Germany should put itself under existential threat in hope a mediation by a third power, not even a peer to either side will work out. I can see why that was not done. I think you measure with two sets of scale. If you put a gun to someone's head and then tell them to put their own gun away to negotiation while your own stays in place, you cannot then blame the one with the gun to his head for rejecting such an offer. That guy would want the gun gone from his head to do that, which is what Germany demanded.
Viviani's offer on the 31st specifically allowed mobilization on all sides as a result of rising tensions. His offer only forbid offensive actions on all sides. Such an offer being accepted would have allowed germany to take war preparations yet negotiate. Germany did not take the offer at all.
Once more wrong, the German plans hinges on many elements and them not taking actions would play out detrimental to their mobilization plans while the plans of France and Russia accommodated such a time window. Therefore, one side is disadvantaged the other not. This is not hard to understand.
The answer to the ultimatum which i posted upthread allows neutral supervisors to the investigation, meaning independent powers like the Swiss, Dutch, Swedes, and Spaniards, to which even the Kaiser agreed to. Serbia's answer to the ultimatum was hailed throughout europe as acceptable and a great diplomatic move that removed all clauses for war. The Austrian ambassador on the other hand been told to return to Vienna whether or not Serbia accepted the ultimatum. That speaks volumes itself.
Let me state the first thing, an ultimatum is that an ultimatum.
Oxford Dictionary defines it so:" a threat in which a person or group of people are warned that if they do not do a particular thing, something unpleasant will happen to them. It is usually the last and most extreme in a series of actions taken to bring about a particular result".
To make it simple, if I give an ultimatum, you do not get to negotiate. The moment Serbia rejected the terms, and this was a rejection of them, they knew what that meant. The upper echelons of power knew what would come, they got strengthened in their resolve by the Russian ambassador and therefore went for it. Assured Russia had their back and with Russia, France.

Not through all of Europe and Wilhelm noted this on the side of the page. Essentially his first thoughts regarding the matter, considering how some historians attributed some form of pacifism to him and his general lack of political insight he is not the best person to support such a claim.
Such an interpretation is filled with more than a tinge of propaganda shining through. It ignores the tone and actions of Serbia beforehand. It ignores the celebrations held in Serbia in response to the murder of Ferdinand. It ignores the newspaper outright proclaiming Austria to be at fault for the murder, claiming A-H is using the murder to claim Serbian complicity for political reasons. Reducing the normal time of mourning as a slight. Honestly, they were massive dicks about it. I will give a small list and then maybe this bullshit will look differently. If you look at it in a vacuum, it is no wonder that you misinterpret it or come to such a quite frankly speaking loop-sided conclusion.

" On 29 June, Miroslav Spalajković, the Serbian minister in St Petersburg, issued statements to the Russian press justifying Bosnian agitation against Vienna and denouncing the Austrian measures against Serbian subjects suspected of involvement with irredentist groups. For years, Spalajković told the Vecherneye Vremya, the political leadership in Vienna had been manufacturing anti-Austrian organizations, including ‘the so-called “Black Hand”, which is an invention’. There were no revolutionary organizations whatsoever in Serbia, he insisted. In an interview granted on the following day to Novoye Vremya, the Serbian diplomat denied that the murderers had received their weapons from Belgrade, blamed the Jesuits for stirring up a feud between Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and warned that the arrest of prominent Serbs in Bosnia might even provoke a military assault by Serbia against the monarchy." -Sleepwalkers p.243/44

"Pašić, too, muddied the waters with ill-judged displays of bravado. In a speech held in New Serbia on 29 June, attended by several cabinet ministers, twenty-two members of the Skupština, numerous local functionaries and a delegation of Serbs from various regions of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Pašić warned that if the Austrians should attempt to exploit the ‘regrettable event’ politically against Serbia, the Serbs ‘would not hesitate to defend themselves and to fulfil their duty’. "Sleepwalkers.245

"On 3 July, for example, during an official requiem in Belgrade in memory of the archduke, Pašić assured the Austrian minister that Belgrade would treat this matter ‘as if it concerned one of their own rulers’. The words were doubtless well meant, but in a country with such a vibrant and recent history of regicide they were bound to strike his Austrian interlocutor as tasteless, if not macabre." -Sleepwalkers p.245

"On 30 June, the Austrian minister in Belgrade, Ritter von Storck, met with the secretary-general of the Serbian foreign ministry, Slavko Gruić, and enquired as to what the Serbian police had been doing to follow up the threads of the conspiracy which, it was well known, led into Serbian territory. Gruić retorted with striking (and possibly disingenuous) naivety that the police had done nothing whatsoever – did the Austrian government wish to request such an investigation? At this point Storck lost his temper and declared that he regarded it as an elementary duty on the part of the Belgrade police to investigate the matter to the best of their ability, whether Vienna requested it or not.
Yet, despite official assurances, the Serbian authorities never conducted an investigation proportionate to the gravity of the crime and the crisis to which it had given rise. At Gruić’s prompting, Interior Minister Protić did, to be sure, order Vasil Lazarević, chief of police in the Serbian capital, to look into the assassins’ links with the city. A week later, Lazarević closed his ‘investigation’ with a cheerful announcement to the effect that the assassination in Sarajevo had no connection whatsoever with the Serbian capital. No one by the name of ‘Ciganović’, the chief of police added, ‘existed or had ever existed’ in Belgrade.66 When Storck solicited the assistance of the Serbian police and foreign ministry in locating a group of students suspected of planning a further assassination, he was provided with such a muddle of obfuscation and contradictory information that he concluded that the Serbian foreign ministry was incapable of operating as a trustworthy partner, despite the assurances of Nikola Pašić. There was no pre-emptive crackdown against the Black Hand; Apis remained in office; and Pašić’s tentative investigation of the border regiments involved in smuggling operations fell far short of what was needed." p.244

"Serbian official communications depicted Austrian recriminations as an utterly unprovoked assault on Serbia’s reputation, the appropriate response to which was haughty official silence." -Sleepwalkers p.245

"Spalajković’s widely reported claim to the press in St Petersburg that the Belgrade government had warned Vienna of the assassination plot in advance raised awkward questions – disregarded by the Russians – about Serbian foreknowledge." - Sleepwalkers p.250

Serbia had a long-standing history of provoking, disparaging and insulting A-H. Reading their response with this knowledge it reads differently. Considering how long these neutral observers would need any chance of getting this investigation on track would be gone. Suggesting that the Serbians would have no chance to hide any involvement after such a long time, is ludicrous.
In the context of their actions, their now known complicity in the assassination and the enmity between the two states, it was the logical conclusion of such a string of provocations. You cannot act this way against a Great Power without repercussions.
 
France and Russia used these delaying tactics to great effect at the time. This same delaying tactics are used know by their apologists to say: this wasnt a smoke screen, this was not delaying tactics, they wanted peace. They absolutly had to mobilize in response to.... something. Sorry but not buying it.
What your saying is Germany & Austria were the only countries with a right to mobilize forces, inside their own territory? Any reaction to aggressive moves on their own part were acts of war? All diplomacy is reduced to a 24 hour ultimatum to back down, and let us do whatever we want? German strategy was based on a doomsday clock. They built that clock on false assumptions, and expected everyone else to accept their own paranoid world view.

Everyone should know that human events are controlled by railroad schedules. We have no choice but to attack France, to get at Russia. The Franco German border is too narrow, so Luxemburg & Belgium must accept our right to occupy them. If you resist your starting the war, and must pay a price. Britain must understand we have a right of necessity to invade Belgium. We must invade Russia before they build more railroads, their economy is growing too fast, which makes them a mortal threat, that must be eliminated. Why can't the world see we are surrounded by people who want to destroy us, so we must destroy them first?
 
Because mediation without the power to enforce it is worthless and once more without the demobilization of Russia/France Germany would put itself at risk. Who says this mediation result is accepted?

That is why the parties all agree to subject themselves to the outcome. that how this stuff works. You are right the parties could have not accepted the outcome of course, but there's always the option to have a war later. The primary goal of this was to prevent war then and there, on the general underlying principle that any day where there's not a war between the great powers of Europe, is a good day. Even if it would also be hoped that reasonable people would find a long term solution that works for all.


I will go once into more detail on this. In Germany the military thinkers and planers were aware that fighting a two-front war against Russia and France would be a hard nut to crack. For coming out ahead they came to the conclusion that it would be best to focus on one side first to close one front. For foreseeable reason they deduced that Russia would be far harder to beat down. Historic evidence and sheer size made Russia out to be a bitch to bring down. Therefore, France was the obvious choice. The plan to beat France quickly was the famous Schlieffen Plan, updated and changed by the Younger Moltke. This plan was seen and accepted as the best chance of winning a two-front war against these two Great Powers. Without it the chances for winning would be significantly lower.
On the other side France and Russia had one plan, to simply beat down Germany through a two-front assault. France with the clear intent to enter the Ruhr territory.

Problematic for Germany was that their plan hinges on many things. From the element of surprise, to speed to a multitude of other minor things. It was fragile in the area of flexibility. Therefore, any minor changes to the timetable or introduction of new elements stood to severely hamper its execution, which would severely hamper the chances of German victory in case of a war.

So Germany should put itself under existential threat in hope a mediation by a third power, not even a peer to either side will work out. I can see why that was not done. I think you measure with two sets of scale. If you put a gun to someone's head and then tell them to put their own gun away to negotiation while your own stays in place, you cannot then blame the one with the gun to his head for rejecting such an offer. That guy would want the gun gone from his head to do that, which is what Germany demanded.

Once more wrong, the German plans hinges on many elements and them not taking actions would play out detrimental to their mobilization plans while the plans of France and Russia accommodated such a time window. Therefore, one side is disadvantaged the other not. This is not hard to understand.


You are right but to be frank that's Germany's problem, and the requirements of Germany's chosen solution to their specific dilemma are not a compelling reason for anyone else.
Let me state the first thing, an ultimatum is that an ultimatum.
Oxford Dictionary defines it so:" a threat in which a person or group of people are warned that if they do not do a particular thing, something unpleasant will happen to them. It is usually the last and most extreme in a series of actions taken to bring about a particular result".
To make it simple, if I give an ultimatum, you do not get to negotiate. The moment Serbia rejected the terms, and this was a rejection of them, they knew what that meant. The upper echelons of power knew what would come, they got strengthened in their resolve by the Russian ambassador and therefore went for it. Assured Russia had their back and with Russia, France.

Not through all of Europe and Wilhelm noted this on the side of the page. Essentially his first thoughts regarding the matter, considering how some historians attributed some form of pacifism to him and his general lack of political insight he is not the best person to support such a claim.
Such an interpretation is filled with more than a tinge of propaganda shining through. It ignores the tone and actions of Serbia beforehand. It ignores the celebrations held in Serbia in response to the murder of Ferdinand. It ignores the newspaper outright proclaiming Austria to be at fault for the murder, claiming A-H is using the murder to claim Serbian complicity for political reasons. Reducing the normal time of mourning as a slight. Honestly, they were massive dicks about it. I will give a small list and then maybe this bullshit will look differently. If you look at it in a vacuum, it is no wonder that you misinterpret it or come to such a quite frankly speaking loop-sided conclusion.

" On 29 June, Miroslav Spalajković, the Serbian minister in St Petersburg, issued statements to the Russian press justifying Bosnian agitation against Vienna and denouncing the Austrian measures against Serbian subjects suspected of involvement with irredentist groups. For years, Spalajković told the Vecherneye Vremya, the political leadership in Vienna had been manufacturing anti-Austrian organizations, including ‘the so-called “Black Hand”, which is an invention’. There were no revolutionary organizations whatsoever in Serbia, he insisted. In an interview granted on the following day to Novoye Vremya, the Serbian diplomat denied that the murderers had received their weapons from Belgrade, blamed the Jesuits for stirring up a feud between Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and warned that the arrest of prominent Serbs in Bosnia might even provoke a military assault by Serbia against the monarchy." -Sleepwalkers p.243/44

"Pašić, too, muddied the waters with ill-judged displays of bravado. In a speech held in New Serbia on 29 June, attended by several cabinet ministers, twenty-two members of the Skupština, numerous local functionaries and a delegation of Serbs from various regions of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Pašić warned that if the Austrians should attempt to exploit the ‘regrettable event’ politically against Serbia, the Serbs ‘would not hesitate to defend themselves and to fulfil their duty’. "Sleepwalkers.245

"On 3 July, for example, during an official requiem in Belgrade in memory of the archduke, Pašić assured the Austrian minister that Belgrade would treat this matter ‘as if it concerned one of their own rulers’. The words were doubtless well meant, but in a country with such a vibrant and recent history of regicide they were bound to strike his Austrian interlocutor as tasteless, if not macabre." -Sleepwalkers p.245

"On 30 June, the Austrian minister in Belgrade, Ritter von Storck, met with the secretary-general of the Serbian foreign ministry, Slavko Gruić, and enquired as to what the Serbian police had been doing to follow up the threads of the conspiracy which, it was well known, led into Serbian territory. Gruić retorted with striking (and possibly disingenuous) naivety that the police had done nothing whatsoever – did the Austrian government wish to request such an investigation? At this point Storck lost his temper and declared that he regarded it as an elementary duty on the part of the Belgrade police to investigate the matter to the best of their ability, whether Vienna requested it or not.
Yet, despite official assurances, the Serbian authorities never conducted an investigation proportionate to the gravity of the crime and the crisis to which it had given rise. At Gruić’s prompting, Interior Minister Protić did, to be sure, order Vasil Lazarević, chief of police in the Serbian capital, to look into the assassins’ links with the city. A week later, Lazarević closed his ‘investigation’ with a cheerful announcement to the effect that the assassination in Sarajevo had no connection whatsoever with the Serbian capital. No one by the name of ‘Ciganović’, the chief of police added, ‘existed or had ever existed’ in Belgrade.66 When Storck solicited the assistance of the Serbian police and foreign ministry in locating a group of students suspected of planning a further assassination, he was provided with such a muddle of obfuscation and contradictory information that he concluded that the Serbian foreign ministry was incapable of operating as a trustworthy partner, despite the assurances of Nikola Pašić. There was no pre-emptive crackdown against the Black Hand; Apis remained in office; and Pašić’s tentative investigation of the border regiments involved in smuggling operations fell far short of what was needed." p.244

"Serbian official communications depicted Austrian recriminations as an utterly unprovoked assault on Serbia’s reputation, the appropriate response to which was haughty official silence." -Sleepwalkers p.245

"Spalajković’s widely reported claim to the press in St Petersburg that the Belgrade government had warned Vienna of the assassination plot in advance raised awkward questions – disregarded by the Russians – about Serbian foreknowledge." - Sleepwalkers p.250

Serbia had a long-standing history of provoking, disparaging and insulting A-H. Reading their response with this knowledge it reads differently. Considering how long these neutral observers would need any chance of getting this investigation on track would be gone. Suggesting that the Serbians would have no chance to hide any involvement after such a long time, is ludicrous.
In the context of their actions, their now known complicity in the assassination and the enmity between the two states, it was the logical conclusion of such a string of provocations.

And of course AH has no history in the region of provoking or being disparaging etc, and those actions you quote are the only ones that took place in this time period.

You cannot act this way against a Great Power without repercussions.

And here's were we really get to it, AH might makes right, right? So OK AH can also suffer the repercussions for acting against Great powers right?
 
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Because mediation without the power to enforce it is worthless and once more without the demobilization of Russia/France Germany would put itself at risk. Who says this mediation result is accepted?
That is up to Germany to decide. But by the time mediation results would have been approved, all sides would have been mobilized adequately. Germany decided to invade the day it mobilized. Russia decided to send peace offers on the day it mobilized. There is a fundamental difference to those reactions. Germany could accept russian mobilization in 1912 against German allies in the Ottoman Empire and pointed at the Hague Tribunal themselves in 1912 , but could not accept it in 1914. Hypocritical no?
I will go once into more detail on this. In Germany the military thinkers and planers were aware that fighting a two-front war against Russia and France would be a hard nut to crack. For coming out ahead they came to the conclusion that it would be best to focus on one side first to close one front. For foreseeable reason they deduced that Russia would be far harder to beat down. Historic evidence and sheer size made Russia out to be a bitch to bring down. Therefore, France was the obvious choice. The plan to beat France quickly was the famous Schlieffen Plan, updated and changed by the Younger Moltke. This plan was seen and accepted as the best chance of winning a two-front war against these two Great Powers. Without it the chances for winning would be significantly lower.
On the other side France and Russia had one plan, to simply beat down Germany through a two-front assault. France with the clear intent to enter the Ruhr territory.
And? Britain made a plan to invade the USA in Spanish American War. The USA made a plan to invade Canada in the interwar years. Nepal made a plan to partition Tibet with the PRC in the 1950s, the French planned to intervene in Spain in the 1930s, etc etc. Plan =/= actual situation on the ground when it breaks open. Germany and France both stayed rigid with their 'attacking neutrals like there's no tommorow' and 'offensive doctrine with such a low manpower background' plans respectively and were unwilling to change. The blame for that lies solely with Germany and France themselves.
Problematic for Germany was that their plan hinges on many things. From the element of surprise, to speed to a multitude of other minor things. It was fragile in the area of flexibility. Therefore, any minor changes to the timetable or introduction of new elements stood to severely hamper its execution, which would severely hamper the chances of German victory in case of a war.
So Germany should put itself under existential threat in hope a mediation by a third power, not even a peer to either side will work out. I can see why that was not done. I think you measure with two sets of scale. If you put a gun to someone's head and then tell them to put their own gun away to negotiation while your own stays in place, you cannot then blame the one with the gun to his head for rejecting such an offer. That guy would want the gun gone from his head to do that, which is what Germany demanded.
This is whataboutism. Germany was considered a guarantor of Belgian neutrality as it was considered the successor state to Prussia who signed the treaty of 1839. Mediation would have anulled any reason for Belgium to prepare as Albert I decided on July 31st otl and would have allowed Germany to invade without much resistance at all unlike otl, stretching the French even more thin.

Nonetheless, your analogy is not a useful one. It was Austria-Hungary's ultimatum which broke Serbian constitutional rights, and Austria-Hungary was holding a gun to Serbia's head for following its own constitution. Germany was more than willing to give A-H bullets with their blank check. Russia was an ally of Serbia and decided to raise a gun at Austria-Hungary to step back. Germany seeing that their ally may have been asking a little wee too much decided to raise its own guns as well whilst France did the same whilst Britain looked at its own gun wondering whether or not to raise it. That is a more apt description of what happened otl.

If your analogy is to be used then Bethmann-Hollwegg and Falkenhayn should have agreed with the Kaiser along with Jagow and Moltke on the 27th that war was averted instead of declaring preliminary wartime laws on the 27th. The gun pointing at Germany's face if your analogy is to be used was a making of their own.

Once more wrong, the German plans hinges on many elements and them not taking actions would play out detrimental to their mobilization plans while the plans of France and Russia accommodated such a time window. Therefore, one side is disadvantaged the other not. This is not hard to understand.
And? What of it?
Britain's plan otl in ww1 hinged on sending 200,000 men to France and let them deal with it.
Did that happen? No, of course not. But Britain adapted.
France's plan hinged on an invasion of the Ruhr. Did that happen? No, but France adapted to a more defensive strategy that allowed them to defend Verdun.
Germany on the other hand was still trying a proto-Schlieffen plan in 1916 as per Falkenhayn and von Bulow's own writings. It is categorically a shame to call the German military prestigious if they were that rigid and unwilling to adapt per the situation. Willingness for peace implies that they would have accepted negotiations. Jagow didn't even hear the Tribunal's offer for mediation and sent the ambassador back to Holland without even hearing him, on the orders of not the military, but Bethmann-Hollwegg, ie the civilian government which had no say in the military workings of the empire. That is not the actions, civilian or military government, of a state wanting peace, or a peaceful non-hegemonic europe at all.
Let me state the first thing, an ultimatum is that an ultimatum.
Oxford Dictionary defines it so:" a threat in which a person or group of people are warned that if they do not do a particular thing, something unpleasant will happen to them. It is usually the last and most extreme in a series of actions taken to bring about a particular result".
To make it simple, if I give an ultimatum, you do not get to negotiate. The moment Serbia rejected the terms, and this was a rejection of them, they knew what that meant. The upper echelons of power knew what would come, they got strengthened in their resolve by the Russian ambassador and therefore went for it. Assured Russia had their back and with Russia, France.
This is an utterly simplistic view with no basis in history. Britain's ultimatum to America in 1861 over the Trent Affair was negotiated, the Anglo-French ultimatum to Russia was negotiated, even though negotiations soon fell which led to the Crimean War, the Russian ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire in 1830 was negotiated and war was averted, etc etc. Going by simple definitions only, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or North Korea, and the German People's Democratic Republic or East Germany were paragons of democracy, but they aren't.
Not through all of Europe and Wilhelm noted this on the side of the page. Essentially his first thoughts regarding the matter, considering how some historians attributed some form of pacifism to him and his general lack of political insight he is not the best person to support such a claim.
Such an interpretation is filled with more than a tinge of propaganda shining through. It ignores the tone and actions of Serbia beforehand. It ignores the celebrations held in Serbia in response to the murder of Ferdinand. It ignores the newspaper outright proclaiming Austria to be at fault for the murder, claiming A-H is using the murder to claim Serbian complicity for political reasons. Reducing the normal time of mourning as a slight. Honestly, they were massive dicks about it. I will give a small list and then maybe this bullshit will look differently. If you look at it in a vacuum, it is no wonder that you misinterpret it or come to such a quite frankly speaking loop-sided conclusion.
I have agreed that the Serbians themselves reacted badly, but i seem to be unable to find an answer as to why Serbia is going to break its own constitution to answer an Austrian ultimatum? That is something that has never been done since the concept of constitution was laid down.
" On 29 June, Miroslav Spalajković, the Serbian minister in St Petersburg, issued statements to the Russian press justifying Bosnian agitation against Vienna and denouncing the Austrian measures against Serbian subjects suspected of involvement with irredentist groups. For years, Spalajković told the Vecherneye Vremya, the political leadership in Vienna had been manufacturing anti-Austrian organizations, including ‘the so-called “Black Hand”, which is an invention’. There were no revolutionary organizations whatsoever in Serbia, he insisted. In an interview granted on the following day to Novoye Vremya, the Serbian diplomat denied that the murderers had received their weapons from Belgrade, blamed the Jesuits for stirring up a feud between Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and warned that the arrest of prominent Serbs in Bosnia might even provoke a military assault by Serbia against the monarchy." -Sleepwalkers p.243/44
This one is true and a very bad act i will admit.
What was to be a reasonable response to this? Demand his resignation. Not the subjugation of the entire country.
"Pašić, too, muddied the waters with ill-judged displays of bravado. In a speech held in New Serbia on 29 June, attended by several cabinet ministers, twenty-two members of the Skupština, numerous local functionaries and a delegation of Serbs from various regions of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Pašić warned that if the Austrians should attempt to exploit the ‘regrettable event’ politically against Serbia, the Serbs ‘would not hesitate to defend themselves and to fulfil their duty’. "Sleepwalkers.245
Even Hollwegg after the assassination told the German Reichstagg that the assassination was not pretext for war enough to go to war with Serbia, before the military pressured him to give the blank check. Italy stated the same thing, so did France, so did the Three Pashas in the Ottoman Empire, so did the Russians, so did the Hague. It was grounds for an international and Austrian led investigation yes, and purging of the Serbian military involved in the organizations, but pretext for war was not considered by any other great power other than Austria in June.
"On 3 July, for example, during an official requiem in Belgrade in memory of the archduke, Pašić assured the Austrian minister that Belgrade would treat this matter ‘as if it concerned one of their own rulers’. The words were doubtless well meant, but in a country with such a vibrant and recent history of regicide they were bound to strike his Austrian interlocutor as tasteless, if not macabre." -Sleepwalkers p.245
This is funny considering the Ottoman regicide of Serbs during the Balkan Wars as well, and the Austrian expulsion of Mujahirs from Bosnia. This is what we call bad faith diplomacy on part from Austria, you realize?
"On 30 June, the Austrian minister in Belgrade, Ritter von Storck, met with the secretary-general of the Serbian foreign ministry, Slavko Gruić, and enquired as to what the Serbian police had been doing to follow up the threads of the conspiracy which, it was well known, led into Serbian territory. Gruić retorted with striking (and possibly disingenuous) naivety that the police had done nothing whatsoever – did the Austrian government wish to request such an investigation? At this point Storck lost his temper and declared that he regarded it as an elementary duty on the part of the Belgrade police to investigate the matter to the best of their ability, whether Vienna requested it or not.
Yet, despite official assurances, the Serbian authorities never conducted an investigation proportionate to the gravity of the crime and the crisis to which it had given rise. At Gruić’s prompting, Interior Minister Protić did, to be sure, order Vasil Lazarević, chief of police in the Serbian capital, to look into the assassins’ links with the city. A week later, Lazarević closed his ‘investigation’ with a cheerful announcement to the effect that the assassination in Sarajevo had no connection whatsoever with the Serbian capital. No one by the name of ‘Ciganović’, the chief of police added, ‘existed or had ever existed’ in Belgrade.66 When Storck solicited the assistance of the Serbian police and foreign ministry in locating a group of students suspected of planning a further assassination, he was provided with such a muddle of obfuscation and contradictory information that he concluded that the Serbian foreign ministry was incapable of operating as a trustworthy partner, despite the assurances of Nikola Pašić. There was no pre-emptive crackdown against the Black Hand; Apis remained in office; and Pašić’s tentative investigation of the border regiments involved in smuggling operations fell far short of what was needed." p.244
This was before the ultimatum. The Serbians replied to the ultimatum that they would conduct investigation with representatives with all members of the Hague Tribunal present to supervise their investigation as a part of their response. Something that even the Kaiser and Reichstagg found completely reasonable.
"Serbian official communications depicted Austrian recriminations as an utterly unprovoked assault on Serbia’s reputation, the appropriate response to which was haughty official silence." -Sleepwalkers p.245
Till date no investigation modern or from the 20th century has implicated the entire Serbian state or government with the assassination and Black Hand. So yes, the Austrian recrimination was quite unprovoked to invade an entire country and kill 40% of its male population in response to 2 killings.
"Spalajković’s widely reported claim to the press in St Petersburg that the Belgrade government had warned Vienna of the assassination plot in advance raised awkward questions – disregarded by the Russians – about Serbian foreknowledge." - Sleepwalkers p.250
His claim was never prooved, even after Austro-Hungarian archives were publicized in 1923. Press claims are not proof.
Serbia had a long-standing history of provoking, disparaging and insulting A-H. Reading their response with this knowledge it reads differently. Considering how long these neutral observers would need any chance of getting this investigation on track would be gone. Suggesting that the Serbians would have no chance to hide any involvement after such a long time, is ludicrous.
Your 'Long' history comes from the month of June and July 1914.
Meanwhile in 1878 Austria-Hungary tried to invade Serbia but was threatened by Germany and Russia not to.
In 1897, they sent gendamerie with their legation force to Belgrade.
In 1908 they threatened war with Serbia.
In 1912 they decided they wanted Serbia again and almost went to war with it for a nonexistent excuse.
In the context of their actions, their now known complicity in the assassination and the enmity between the two states, it was the logical conclusion of such a string of provocations. You cannot act this way against a Great Power without repercussions.
Herein lies the problem. This was not the 19th century.
 
I am not sure how this is being lost on you but mobilization is not declaration of war.
During the Crimean War, Prussia and Sweden-Norway mobilized partially whilst Austria fully mobilized. They didn't join the war.
During the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 Austria and Germany mobilized partially again.
During the American Spanish War, Canadian and British North American troops were partially mobilized.
During the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, Britain did mobilize the Royal Navy and the Qing feebly did mobilize its northern armies near beijing.
Mobilization =/= War.
partial Mobilization =/= full Mobilization
 
partial Mobilization =/= full Mobilization
of course i find it interesting that you omit Austria did fully mobilize, all of the Qing Armies were the northern armies and the British could only fight the russians on sea, so a royal navy mobilization was a full mobilization.

Also point stands. Mobilization =/= War as the duma stated in 1912, as the Hague Conference Defined in 1907 that a ultimatum beforehand was required. Instead we know what happened with Russia when Germany rashly declared war.
 
That is why the parties all agree to subject themselves to the outcome. that how this stuff works. You are right the parties could have not accepted the outcome of course, but there's always the option to have a war later. The primary goal of this was to prevent war then and there, on the general underlying principle that any day where there's not at war between the great powers of Europe, is a good day. Even if it would also hoped that reasonable people would find a long term solution that works for all.





You are right but to be frank that's Germany's problem, and the requirements of Germany's chosen solution to their specific dilemma are not a compelling reasons for anyone else.


And of course AH has no history in the region of provoking or being disparaging etc, and those actions you quote are the only ones that took place in this time period.



And here's were we really get to it, AH might makes right, right? So OK AH can also suffer the repercussions for acting against Great powers right?
So Germany should go out of its way and accept existential danger and a huge disadbventage in the slight hope that the French and Russians - while their strategic position is getting stronger day by day as Germany is giving up one of its biggest adventages - will opt for peace. Any other great suggestions? Maybe give back Alsace Lorraine, scuttle the german fleet or invite the russian army to Berlin to stay without putting up a fight? The war would be avodid for sure...

You are completely disregarding germanies basic safety considerations and fault them for not doing the same.
 
Why is everybody getting so hopping mad all of a sudden? Can somebody explain to me in words of one syllable what the issue is here?
It's just that I can feel the butthurt radiating through my screen, and that's a sign nobody's actually listening to a goddamn thing their fellows are saying.

Edit: see last two posts to see what I mean.
 
Because mediation without the power to enforce it is worthless and once more without the demobilization of Russia/France Germany would put itself at risk. Who says this mediation result is accepted?
I will go once into more detail on this. In Germany the military thinkers and planers were aware that fighting a two-front war against Russia and France would be a hard nut to crack. For coming out ahead they came to the conclusion that it would be best to focus on one side first to close one front. For foreseeable reason they deduced that Russia would be far harder to beat down. Historic evidence and sheer size made Russia out to be a bitch to bring down. Therefore, France was the obvious choice. The plan to beat France quickly was the famous Schlieffen Plan, updated and changed by the Younger Moltke. This plan was seen and accepted as the best chance of winning a two-front war against these two Great Powers. Without it the chances for winning would be significantly lower.
On the other side France and Russia had one plan, to simply beat down Germany through a two-front assault. France with the clear intent to enter the Ruhr territory.

Problematic for Germany was that their plan hinges on many things. From the element of surprise, to speed to a multitude of other minor things. It was fragile in the area of flexibility. Therefore, any minor changes to the timetable or introduction of new elements stood to severely hamper its execution, which would severely hamper the chances of German victory in case of a war.

So Germany should put itself under existential threat in hope a mediation by a third power, not even a peer to either side will work out. I can see why that was not done. I think you measure with two sets of scale. If you put a gun to someone's head and then tell them to put their own gun away to negotiation while your own stays in place, you cannot then blame the one with the gun to his head for rejecting such an offer. That guy would want the gun gone from his head to do that, which is what Germany demanded.

Once more wrong, the German plans hinges on many elements and them not taking actions would play out detrimental to their mobilization plans while the plans of France and Russia accommodated such a time window. Therefore, one side is disadvantaged the other not. This is not hard to understand.

Let me state the first thing, an ultimatum is that an ultimatum.
Oxford Dictionary defines it so:" a threat in which a person or group of people are warned that if they do not do a particular thing, something unpleasant will happen to them. It is usually the last and most extreme in a series of actions taken to bring about a particular result".
To make it simple, if I give an ultimatum, you do not get to negotiate. The moment Serbia rejected the terms, and this was a rejection of them, they knew what that meant. The upper echelons of power knew what would come, they got strengthened in their resolve by the Russian ambassador and therefore went for it. Assured Russia had their back and with Russia, France.

Not through all of Europe and Wilhelm noted this on the side of the page. Essentially his first thoughts regarding the matter, considering how some historians attributed some form of pacifism to him and his general lack of political insight he is not the best person to support such a claim.
Such an interpretation is filled with more than a tinge of propaganda shining through. It ignores the tone and actions of Serbia beforehand. It ignores the celebrations held in Serbia in response to the murder of Ferdinand. It ignores the newspaper outright proclaiming Austria to be at fault for the murder, claiming A-H is using the murder to claim Serbian complicity for political reasons. Reducing the normal time of mourning as a slight. Honestly, they were massive dicks about it. I will give a small list and then maybe this bullshit will look differently. If you look at it in a vacuum, it is no wonder that you misinterpret it or come to such a quite frankly speaking loop-sided conclusion.

" On 29 June, Miroslav Spalajković, the Serbian minister in St Petersburg, issued statements to the Russian press justifying Bosnian agitation against Vienna and denouncing the Austrian measures against Serbian subjects suspected of involvement with irredentist groups. For years, Spalajković told the Vecherneye Vremya, the political leadership in Vienna had been manufacturing anti-Austrian organizations, including ‘the so-called “Black Hand”, which is an invention’. There were no revolutionary organizations whatsoever in Serbia, he insisted. In an interview granted on the following day to Novoye Vremya, the Serbian diplomat denied that the murderers had received their weapons from Belgrade, blamed the Jesuits for stirring up a feud between Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and warned that the arrest of prominent Serbs in Bosnia might even provoke a military assault by Serbia against the monarchy." -Sleepwalkers p.243/44

"Pašić, too, muddied the waters with ill-judged displays of bravado. In a speech held in New Serbia on 29 June, attended by several cabinet ministers, twenty-two members of the Skupština, numerous local functionaries and a delegation of Serbs from various regions of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Pašić warned that if the Austrians should attempt to exploit the ‘regrettable event’ politically against Serbia, the Serbs ‘would not hesitate to defend themselves and to fulfil their duty’. "Sleepwalkers.245

"On 3 July, for example, during an official requiem in Belgrade in memory of the archduke, Pašić assured the Austrian minister that Belgrade would treat this matter ‘as if it concerned one of their own rulers’. The words were doubtless well meant, but in a country with such a vibrant and recent history of regicide they were bound to strike his Austrian interlocutor as tasteless, if not macabre." -Sleepwalkers p.245

"On 30 June, the Austrian minister in Belgrade, Ritter von Storck, met with the secretary-general of the Serbian foreign ministry, Slavko Gruić, and enquired as to what the Serbian police had been doing to follow up the threads of the conspiracy which, it was well known, led into Serbian territory. Gruić retorted with striking (and possibly disingenuous) naivety that the police had done nothing whatsoever – did the Austrian government wish to request such an investigation? At this point Storck lost his temper and declared that he regarded it as an elementary duty on the part of the Belgrade police to investigate the matter to the best of their ability, whether Vienna requested it or not.
Yet, despite official assurances, the Serbian authorities never conducted an investigation proportionate to the gravity of the crime and the crisis to which it had given rise. At Gruić’s prompting, Interior Minister Protić did, to be sure, order Vasil Lazarević, chief of police in the Serbian capital, to look into the assassins’ links with the city. A week later, Lazarević closed his ‘investigation’ with a cheerful announcement to the effect that the assassination in Sarajevo had no connection whatsoever with the Serbian capital. No one by the name of ‘Ciganović’, the chief of police added, ‘existed or had ever existed’ in Belgrade.66 When Storck solicited the assistance of the Serbian police and foreign ministry in locating a group of students suspected of planning a further assassination, he was provided with such a muddle of obfuscation and contradictory information that he concluded that the Serbian foreign ministry was incapable of operating as a trustworthy partner, despite the assurances of Nikola Pašić. There was no pre-emptive crackdown against the Black Hand; Apis remained in office; and Pašić’s tentative investigation of the border regiments involved in smuggling operations fell far short of what was needed." p.244

"Serbian official communications depicted Austrian recriminations as an utterly unprovoked assault on Serbia’s reputation, the appropriate response to which was haughty official silence." -Sleepwalkers p.245

"Spalajković’s widely reported claim to the press in St Petersburg that the Belgrade government had warned Vienna of the assassination plot in advance raised awkward questions – disregarded by the Russians – about Serbian foreknowledge." - Sleepwalkers p.250

Serbia had a long-standing history of provoking, disparaging and insulting A-H. Reading their response with this knowledge it reads differently. Considering how long these neutral observers would need any chance of getting this investigation on track would be gone. Suggesting that the Serbians would have no chance to hide any involvement after such a long time, is ludicrous.
In the context of their actions, their now known complicity in the assassination and the enmity between the two states, it was the logical conclusion of such a string of provocations. You cannot act this way against a Great Power without repercussions.
The bottom line is Germany didn't have a defense strategy, they had an offense strategy. The military leadership decided they needed to start a war with France & Russia before 1916. By the same Schlieffen logic the narrow Franco/German border is narrow enough to be defended with an economy of force. Germany's central position, and excellent rail system would allow them to transfer forces to meet threats. The German Army was superior tactically, had more firepower, and was supported by a far stronger industrial base then Russia, or France had. Diplomatically by not invading neutral countries Britain would be hard put to enter the war, and cut off German overseas trade. The United States would be much less hostile.

Instead of having a rational defensive strategy, with limited objectives, they decided on a high stakes, bet it all strategy of eliminating France, and Russia as great powers. The Paranoid mind set that time was against them led them to take national risks, that were completely unnecessary. The basic premise of the Schlieffen Plan was illogical, because it depended on German soldiers marching much faster then French soldiers could. Taking the long track though Belgium the Right Wing was supposed get around the French Left. By giving the French the interior lines they could move forces West to cover their Left Faster then the Germans could get there. Adding the BEF into the mix, just reinforced the French Left, and made the stalemate the plan was intended to avoid even more likely.

The Germans were lucky that Plan 17 was tailor made for the Schlieffen Plan, but they were still able to regroup in time. Didn't they think the French could use their own RR's? The Germans were very lucky the French weren't still using Plan 16. They would've stood almost no chance of getting around the French Left then, and France would've been spared the massive losses of men, and the Iron Belt of Lorraine. German thinking was too aggressive, and far reaching to be realistic. It was just based on too many false assumptions.
 
So Germany should go out of its way and accept existential danger and a huge disadbventage in the slight hope that the French and Russians - while their strategic position is getting stronger day by day as Germany is giving up one of its biggest adventages - will opt for peace.

By "go out of it's way" you actually mean not start a general world war between the great powers*, oh poor, poor Germany truly no other possible options available and forced to go to war in order to avoid the threat of war :rolleyes:. The funny thing is I think you have just nicely summed up the prevailing attitude in Berlin, however given that you see why maybe the French and Russians were just a tinsy bit wary of Germany?!

You argument is "but it's not fair, if Germany can't go to war in 1914 then it's less likely to win a later war", only Germany is not owed a victory here.

Also Germany's only in existential danger if you believe France and Russia are just dying for an opportunity to crush Germany. Which is a massive and somewhat telling assumption on your part. Beause while this might come as a shock to you no not every European great power was hell bent on solving it's problems of even just achieving it's goals with a general all out war! But I get it the assumption certainly is a convenient self-justification for war.


*Due to backing AH's attempt to monopolise the Balkans no less, truly the noblest goal!

Any other great suggestions? Maybe give back Alsace Lorraine, scuttle the german fleet or invite the russian army to Berlin to stay without putting up a fight? The war would be avodid for sure...
Yes those examples are just like invading your neutral neighbours :rolleyes:

You are completely disregarding germanies basic safety considerations and fault them for not doing the same.
No I'm saying Germany isn't special, and doesn't get to to avoid the blame for causing a war that killed 10-20m people because it felt it was going to miss an opportunity for European dominance. Because Germany is not owned great power status let alone European hegemony even if it feels like the rest of Europe not kowtowing to it is massively unfair and a sign of their belligerence towards it (that can only be safeguarded against by war)

And you know what if Germany can only feel safe by winning a war against everyone around it, that says more abut Germany than everyone else.
 
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They had close to a million dead, went broke, fought a worse war 25 years later, went even more broke, lost their empire, and became dependent on the US. Millions of your colonial subjects died in the second war. Both sides resort to attempts to strangle the civilian population in order to win.

If your goal is to maintain the empire it failed. If your goal is to maintain some kind of long term peace it failed. If your goal is to remain first among the Great Powers it failed. If your goal is maintain British 1914 social structure it failed.

Who cares if Germany becomes dominant? At worst you establish a special relationship with them as their greatest ally, similar to their OTL relationship with the US or EU. Germany might not even become dominant. Russia bounced back from an even worse period than Germany in WWI to become the number two power. Germany might need two years to win the war and find itself exhausted for the next decade while you grow richer selling to both sides.
Really so what you would have us sit it out and let Germany take control of Europe. Yes millions died on all sides and treasure was spent but freedom is more important. Should we have kept out of WW2 most no and it’s a big no how many of Europe’s Citizens would have been murdered in cold blood if we did not stop Hitler. Did the UK lose its Empire yes were we broke yes we were did we depend on America for hand outs yes to some extent but America wanted an end to our Empire no matter what. The loan that we were given at the end of Lend Lease was very restrictive it mostly had to be spent on American goods. If you look at the TiZara mission that went to the states you will see that what we gave freely was worth its weight in gold. As to the empire well you will find that we planned to give it up any way it’s just a crying shame it was rushed especially in Indian that idiot Mountbatten should have been shot on the spot he rushed it and what happened hundreds and thousands died for no reason. Mind you the Indian political leaders were also to blame in a big way tragic very tragic. However we have the common wealth so in one way it’s still there. Look at the state America is in now in debt to China for trillions hardly any medical cover for most of its population thousands living in trailer parks whole towns with hardly any jobs but still trying to dominate the world which it does but at the expense of its citizens for gods sake you have nut jobs walking in to shops buying guns and just killing people for no sane reason. So who will have the last laugh the UK or America I’d say the UK we have free universal health care citizens in real houses etc etc why simple we do not have to fork out billions on a empire.
 
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