Was Barbarossa inevitable?

[ivanotter]

All,

Was it possible to avoid the German invasion of USSR?

It is not a matter of making massive changes in the likes of Stalin dying, Hitler dying or anything massive.

A few pointers:
· It is correct that Mein Kampf described the need for lebensraum and that could only be on the cost of USSR
· It is correct that Hitler saw USSR as the ultimate enemy

Here we have a bit of speculative things:

· The performance of Red Army in Finland was not impressive and might have convinced Hitler (and generals) that USSR could be defeated

· The purges had decimated the professional part of the red Army and new cadres were not there yet
· The equipment (in general) of Red Army was a bit obsolete compared to newer technologies
· Hitler did not believe in the numbers Guderian presented

Let us try to look at what Glantz is saying in his ‘Barbarossa’ about Stalin:

“June 1941 is often cited as a classic example of a leader ignoring evidence of an opponent’s capability to attack because he doubted the intention to attack.

Let us look at twisting a few things:

Hitler starts to believe in Guederian’s numbers. These are impressive and Hitler later claimed that if he had believed in the numbers, he might never have started the invasion. Is this compelling evidence or is it just a blame-game?

Finland: If Germany (Hitler and generals) had looked beyond the Finnish conflict and started to look at the immediate actions to remedy the glaring mistakes, could it have tempered the appetite for Barbarossa?

Japan-USSR: If Zhukov had been ‘tagged’ as an efficient commander? If the USSR offensive capabilities had been recognised?

Reserves and mobilisation: If the generals had realised the potential of raising new armies in USSR?

Could Stalin have delayed Barbarossa in any way? Trade deals? Poland? Baltic concessions? Anything at all?

Could any of these things have made Hitler think twice on this issue?

… or was it all set in stone (and in the stars) and nothing could have prevented it?

Let it be said: 1941 was probably the only time it could have had a chance of success. 1942 would be shaky.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Let it be said: 1941 was probably the only time it could have had a chance of success. 1942 would be shaky.

This is the key point, if the Germans don't go then, they can't later. The Soviets have been working since the end of the Winter war to repair the damage done to the Red Army by the purges and they are rapidly re-equipping with modern weapons. By 1942 they'd be too strong to attack unless Stalin guts the high command again.

 

[King Augeas]

Indeed, but if Hitler does wait until 1942, it can still be argued that it's now or never as the Soviets will be too strong in 1943!

 

[History Learner]

In 1940, Hitler did seem to be serious about securing a Soviet alliance. @wiking had discussed this before.

 

[ivanotter]

I fully concur: 1941 it would have to be.

Apparently, Stalin also counted on a rational Hitler. To Stalin it was not rational to attack USSR in any event. It would, according to Stalin, be foolish as the potential of USSR was so much bigger than Germany's.

Stalin did not discard the option of a German invasion (hence the frantic pace of re-armament etc), but still did not anticipate the magnitude.

I know it is an unfair comparison but her goes:

D-Day landing- initial landings: 156,000
Barbarossa - initial strength: 3,000,000

Could anyone really have grasped the magnitude of Barbarossa?

 

[ivanotter]

1942 would have given Germany another year to get the logistics sorted (more trucks, etc).

BUT would Torch have gone ahead without the German losses in Russia?

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Germany would have attacked the Soviets in either May or June 1942 so unless Rommel had been given enough to defeat the 8th Army then Torch would have gone ahead in November 1942.

 

[Court Jester]

1942 would have given Germany another year to get the logistics sorted (more trucks, etc).

BUT would Torch have gone ahead without the German losses in Russia?

It would have also given Soviets another year to sort their problems. This means rorganization of armed forces largely completed, more fortified border, dispersal airfields completed, a lot more T-34, KV-1/2, Yak-1, Pe-2, Il-2... with troops actually trained to use them.

And Torch would have gone on regardless, as lack of casualties in the East doesn't remove the sea lift limitations for Axis.

 

[Michele]

Could any of these things have made Hitler think twice on this issue?

No.
With Hitler, the thing is that all the reasoning actually is ex-post rationalization of things he already wanted to do in his guts. Some analysts fail to understand this.

So, if the Krasnaya Armiya had fared well in Finland, Hitler would have concluded that that was

a) a weird exception to the basic truth that the Slavs were incompetent because of race, and
b) evidence that curbing them was even more necessary, and
c) possibly, a good casus belli.

Same end result. Maybe not in the OTL year, but the Wehrmacht will go there.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

It has to be in 1941. In 1940 Germany has to deal with France while it's still unprepared. After 1941 the Soviets will be too strong to attack and there will be the growing threat of a re-armed Britain returning to Europe to worry about. Only 1941 offers the slightest chance of being able to defeat the Soviets and be able to bring the army back to the west before the British can be ready to try an invasion.

 

[RodentRevolution]

In 1941 Germany is facing a long war and the resource situation is not conducive to a long war. Knocking Britain out of the war quickly is not a goer, the ideal Heer requirement Sealion was 40 divisions but capacity could only be found for 13, in 1941 sea lift capacity is not much better but the British have more and better armed regulars, better armed and trained Home Guard requiring an even larger ideal force.

Germany will need time to build up its sea lift capacity and wittle down the RN while building up the KM. This will all require a lot of resources, Germany its eating into its reserves of said resources.

So even ignoring the ideological imperative of invading the USSR there is the logical one. The Soviets have the resources Germany needs. The German will not be able to afford the payments due in late 1941 for already supplied resources without further compromising their supply situation. Soviet fortifications in the west will be completed in time for the campaign season of 1942, Soviet rearmament will have progressed further than Germany's by the opening of the campaign season in 1942, Soviet forces will be better organised unless Stalin purges them again by 1942, if the Soviets hold out for longer Germany's resource situation will be worse in 1942.

Since Britain has a cheat card called the USA in this mod of Weltkrieg then trying to outlast them is not a viable option. Thus it is 1941 or bust for Germany against the USSR.

 

[thaddeus]

my view is if not inevitable it is pretty damn close, resulting from ideology of course but also from the original deal made with the USSR. they traded away their little trading bloc of Poland, Finland, and the Baltics, which had replaced during 1930's the lost trade with Soviets.

IDK if they could have struck a deal solely over Poland? but they certainly would have been in better position economically (and strategically.)

 

[TheKutKu]

All,

Was it possible to avoid the German invasion of USSR?

It is not a matter of making massive changes in the likes of Stalin dying, Hitler dying or anything massive.

A few pointers:
· It is correct that Mein Kampf described the need for lebensraum and that could only be on the cost of USSR
· It is correct that Hitler saw USSR as the ultimate enemy

Here we have a bit of speculative things:

· The performance of Red Army in Finland was not impressive and might have convinced Hitler (and generals) that USSR could be defeated

· The purges had decimated the professional part of the red Army and new cadres were not there yet
· The equipment (in general) of Red Army was a bit obsolete compared to newer technologies
· Hitler did not believe in the numbers Guderian presented

Let us try to look at what Glantz is saying in his ‘Barbarossa’ about Stalin:

“June 1941 is often cited as a classic example of a leader ignoring evidence of an opponent’s capability to attack because he doubted the intention to attack.

Let us look at twisting a few things:

Hitler starts to believe in Guederian’s numbers. These are impressive and Hitler later claimed that if he had believed in the numbers, he might never have started the invasion. Is this compelling evidence or is it just a blame-game?

Finland: If Germany (Hitler and generals) had looked beyond the Finnish conflict and started to look at the immediate actions to remedy the glaring mistakes, could it have tempered the appetite for Barbarossa?

Japan-USSR: If Zhukov had been ‘tagged’ as an efficient commander? If the USSR offensive capabilities had been recognised?

Reserves and mobilisation: If the generals had realised the potential of raising new armies in USSR?

Could Stalin have delayed Barbarossa in any way? Trade deals? Poland? Baltic concessions? Anything at all?

Could any of these things have made Hitler think twice on this issue?

… or was it all set in stone (and in the stars) and nothing could have prevented it?

Let it be said: 1941 was probably the only time it could have had a chance of success. 1942 would be shaky.

It’s not inevitable if goering is in power.

With Hitler it is

 

[Scott Washburn]

I'm not sure how much stronger the Red Army would have been in 1942 than in 1941. The real problem with the Red Army was that Stalin was obsessed with numbers. He wanted more tanks, more guns, and more planes, but not all the supporting units which would be needed to actually make them effective. In 1941 the Russians lost something like 20,000 tanks, but very few of them were actually destroyed by the Germans. They broke down or ran out of fuel and ammo and were abandoned because there was no supporting units to keep them in repair and supplied. Would the situation have been much better in 1942?

 

[RodentRevolution]

I'm not sure how much stronger the Red Army would have been in 1942 than in 1941. The real problem with the Red Army was that Stalin was obsessed with numbers. He wanted more tanks, more guns, and more planes, but not all the supporting units which would be needed to actually make them effective. In 1941 the Russians lost something like 20,000 tanks, but very few of them were actually destroyed by the Germans. They broke down or ran out of fuel and ammo and were abandoned because there was no supporting units to keep them in repair and supplied. Would the situation have been much better in 1942?

The short answer is a lot stronger.

The longer answer is that in 1941 the Soviet Army was still reorganising. This meant new staffs were still getting to know the formations under their control and each other and lower down the scale mechanics attached to the tank and mechanised divisions were still at the stage of learning their trade. A whole extra year gives time for more training, time for identifying weaknesses and even correcting some and time to actually work on repairing recently re-allocated equipment.

It is not just a question of numbers but of cohesion and experience.

 

[ivanotter]

I have also thought that Goering would have been a candidate for NOT invading USSR. If Hitler had been removed (stroke, bomb or a good ol' coup), then Goering would have done the bravado and NOT invaded. That has been my opinion all along.

Based on the above it looks as though Germany was severely cornered with the only way out to rob the bank - USSR.

Similar to Japan when the oil embargo got announced?

Goering could also count so the economic forecasts would have been reacted upon.

Would it have made any difference in terms of the conduct of the campaign? 1941 was probably still the only bet

 

[Jellico]

How much weaker will Germany be in 1942? They couldn't feed or even exploit their western conquests effectively. Germany was increasingly reliant on Russia to be able to function. The entire point of going to war was so that Germany wouldn't be reliant on anybody.

So the choices are kneel down and submit to Russian dominance, or try and take the Russians down and secure the resources for direct exploitation by Germany. What do you do?

 

[Arlos]

Now, an interesting thought, what would have happened to the USSR without the winter war?

 

[Leander]

Now, an interesting thought, what would have happened to the USSR without the winter war?

As far as I know the winter war was what showed them the problems they had. They failed pretty badly against the Finns but learned lessons from that and more importantly also applied them. This is something a lot of the observers at the time (including the germans) did not see: The war ultimately strengthened the red army going forward.

If they do not manage to figure out their weaknesses without the war they will have to learn a lot of the painfull lessons during the opening stages of Barbarossa.
If this is enough to loose them that war I can not say, but it might be.

 

[Arlos]

As far as I know the winter war was what showed them the problems they had. They failed pretty badly against the Finns but learned lessons from that and more importantly also applied them. This is something a lot of the observers at the time (including the germans) did not see: The war ultimately strengthened the red army going forward.

If they do not manage to figure out their weaknesses without the war they will have to learn a lot of the painfull lessons during the opening stages of Barbarossa.
If this is enough to loose them that war I can not say, but it might be.

That is very true, on the other side, the winter war is also what convinced Hitler that the Red Army was weak, so it’s difficult to say where this would all end.