More trains and supplies got through per month after 1941 than in 1941, upgrades were done though they didn't meet the platonic ideal of central European rail standards. Plus the phrasing the article's author used is a bit odd if he was only talking about the lines themselves, not also rail car availability. "Perennial shortage of transport capability" is also likely a reference to a shortage of trains, as Germany had to run all of occupied Europe on their own and French stocks of rail, as they didn't have much in the way of captured Soviet trains to use, so there was never enough to go around in the East, especially by 1942 given the loss of locomotives in the winter and the expansion of the front lines all the way to Grozny. Despite the author's claims the Germans did manage to keep their forces supplied for the most part after 1941, though without a doubt there was probably a lot that could have been done better/more efficiently even without sufficient resources that the German war effort clearly lacked.
The situation in 1944 though was a function of the sabotage campaign partisans launched, not to mention the role of the VVS bomber force hitting bridges during the operation:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration#Operations_Rail_War_and_Concert
The start of Operation Bagration involved many
partisan formations in the
Belorussian SSR, which were instructed to resume their attacks on railways and communications. From 19 June large numbers of explosive charges were placed on rail tracks and though many were cleared, they had a significant disruptive effect. The partisans were also used to mop up encircled German forces once the breakthrough and exploitation phases of the operation were completed.
[40]
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/connor.pdf
During the period 19-22 June, they attempted some 2,000 cuts of railways and succeeded in 1000 of them, setting some 10,000 individual charges per night. !hey - also attacked some 26 headquarters. These activities affected German reinforcements arriving after the battle more than they did internal communications or resupply, the latter due to the speed with which the German defenses fell. Had they had to fight for an extended period, depending upon the lines for resupply, they might well have felt the effects in resupply as well.
So no, the actual studies on the issue show that the Germans did not dedicate sufficient resources to tackling the logistic issues and they did not rebuild the entire rail infrastructure of and that they did not learn, adapt, and overcome the issue. In fact, Stahel points out that the Germans stripped these support units of things like their vehicles in order to replace losses among the combat formations. The Germans did the opposite of devote resources: they took them away.
Resources that would come from where? It was a zero sum situation in 1941. Supply throughput increased after 1941, so they clearly were able to rebuild the rail situation to a higher degree than existed during the invasion even if not up to rail standards in western Europe despite dealing with an increasing partisan attack problem, one that focused on attacking the rail lines (Operations Concert and Rail War for example), yet failed to cut off German supplies during even heavy use operations like Kursk.
As to the Stahel comment, what book and page was that on? Context matters, especially if it were a one off situation.
Because it committed the Germans to such a protracted engagement within the Soviet Union that the resources expended could in not possibly be recouped for the subsequent war against the Americans. The Germans might still have won out the war in the east, but on the material front they still had lost WW2. The only iffy thing is WAllied public opinion in regards to the blood price at that point.
The protracted engagement started before the Moscow offensive and even with the fall of Moscow the ongoing campaign wouldn't have immediately ended. Going in Hitler was informed that the East would be a resource sink for years due to the occupation costs and repairs that would be needed to war and sabotage damage. Likely the material war was already lost due to L-L anyway regardless of even Barbarossa.
Given Soviet and WAllied rates of advances and casualties inflicted in the timespan their operations lasted during the summer of 1944, they very much would have proportion of damage inflicted and square mileage captured that the Germans managed during Barbarossa... had they kept pushing their armies at the tempos the Germans did for six months straight like they did Barbarossa. But they didn't, because they understood the dangers of such overextension. So instead their operations were much shorter then that of Barbarossa: the WAllied great summer pell-mell across France lasted two months. The Soviets summer rampage lasted three. After that, they wound down operations and focused on securing their flanks and bringing up supplies in a manner the Germans conspicuously failed to do in the autumn of '41.
Operation Market-Garden suggests otherwise, as does the grinding attritional fighting the US got into in Lorraine, while the situation in the East meant they had to stop after Bagration because of the resistance they faced;
the Germans did after all did launch several counterattacks that bloodied Soviet forces. In 1941 the Germans were able to keep attacking through October and only got into real trouble when the weather turned on them in October-November and they didn't take the hint to stop for the year. From June-October the advances the Germans made weren't unsustainable and yet the Allies never matched those in 1944. Arguably they did in 1945 due to the overall collapse of the Axis powers in Europe, but that was a vastly different situation than that faced in 1941.
Because they rested in September with minimal operations on the flanks, which let the rail services focus on pushing up throughput. Had they advanced sooner, the sudden demands on the rail services to support the offensive would have refocused their limited resources increase would not have occurred and the collapse would have come sooner. This increase in throughput managed to build a small stockpile off of those increased train arrival which they proceeded to burn through in that initial lunge. Earlier in September, the stockpile did not exist yet, so the offense would have face-vaulted from the start. In August, the train throughput was less then half that of September, so a army-group level attack would have face-vaulted spectacularly.
Kiev was fought and won September only officially ending on the 26th, while 2nd Panzer Army then turned after attacked toward Moscow on the 31st. No real rest there, especially given they were marching to the front right after Kiev was wrapped up.
Through September 3rd PG forces were attacking toward Leningrad and then had to spend at least a week if not more marching back to AG-Center, same with 4th PG.
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/...a-brief-military-history/#Isolating Leningrad
There were also a number of 3rd PG forces counterattacking the Staraya Russa offensive in September and spearheading the advance on Demyansk and the Valdai Hills:
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=208902
Soviet casualties were climbing to the end of September in the region, where the attacking infantry and armor teams were driving them back.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Контрудар_под_Старой_Руссой#Последующие_события
There was little stockpile available by October, none for 2nd PG and 2nd Army, while 3rd and 4th PGs had been in combat through most of September. As you yourself said the stockpile was gone in a matter of days and clearly wasn't needed to actually result in the Vyazma or Bryansk pockets (wrapped up 11 days after you said the stockpiles were gone) and German forces were still able to advance on Moscow though they were ultimately stopped by mud gumming up the advance. Clearly operating hand to mouth wasn't a significant problem given the results achieved after the claimed stockpile was gone. ITTL that larger number of train arrivals in earlier months just mean forces as supplied from the trains rather than an initial small stockpile. As it was the front was already ripped open, so there wasn't the need to break open the front lines to create holes for the Panzer groups to exploit and spend those supplies. Plus with fewer divisions to supply (2nd and 5th Panzer divisions not arrived yet) that means more for who is already there. Plus since Soviet forces are weaker in early-mid August than in October (the Soviets also aren't getting replacements during the 'quiet' September you claim along the Moscow axis) and are right on the heels of the loss of multiple armies at Smolensk/Roslavl they are vulnerable to being defeated by an arguably weaker German force that was present in October.
Got a source on the number of trains coming in in August? Doesn't seem to have been a problem given the advances made in August in Ukraine and toward Leningrad/the Valdai Hills, while defending against very heavy Soviet offensives against Smolensk.
Your bending over backward to ignore that the actual German advance had already collapsed after the 3rd and the Germans were not, in fact, able to make significant advances afterward and what advances they did make they did over the bloody corpses of their fallen men, a clear indication of a force that has passed it's culmination point. That is the essential point which you can not hide, although your desperately trying too do so.
Yeah, the 1 million Soviet soldiers killed/captured after October 3rd were insignificant. Speaking of bending over backwards...
Something tells me Zhukov and Stalin didn't consider the advance past Borodino insignificant, nor the loss of ~80% of their forces in front of Moscow, which happened after October 3rd.
At this point, I've provided multiple scholarly sources which show that the rail and supply situation was already impossible. You've given nothing in return except circumstantial evidence that does not necessarily say anything about the supply situation.
You've claimed it based on some mentioned names, you haven't proven it with sources that are actually focused on that issue or the potential options that were available. So you're in no better boat than I am, considering all we have is circumstantial evidence to go on given this is a 'what if' we are talking about.
Which ignores that both Stahel and Crewald show the Germans were stopped dead on the Moscow axis and the rail lines were not putting through the necessary supplies to continue the advance in that direction. Only on the flanks, where Soviet forces were vastly weaker and German supply conditions were better, were the Germans still able to push.
They weren't stopped dead, nor did either author show that. Hitler diverted their striking power to the flanks to clear them up:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kiev_(1941)#Prelude
On 19 July
Hitler issued
Directive No. 33 which would cancel the assault on Moscow in favor of driving south to complete the encirclement of Soviet forces surrounded in Kiev.
[9] However, on 12 August 1941,
Supplement to Directive No. 34 was issued, and it represented a compromise between Hitler, who was convinced the correct strategy was to clear the salient occupied by Soviet forces on right flank of Army Group Center in the vicinity of Kiev before resuming the drive to Moscow, and
Halder,
Bock and
Guderian, who advocated an advance on Moscow as soon as possible. The compromise required
2nd and
3rd Panzer Groups of Army Group Centre, which were redeploying in order to aid
Army Group North and
Army Group South respectively, be returned to Army Group Centre, together with the
4th Panzer Group of Army Group North, once their objectives were achieved. Then the three Panzer Groups, under the control of Army Group Center, would lead the advance on Moscow.
[10]
Sure, and the Germans continued their offensive until October 30th. Doesn't change that their offensives had become impossible before then.
As a result of the mud, sure.
As I said: Halder's diary, entry August 5th 1941. I'm not sure on the page number, since there seem to be different editions but the copy I'm looking at gives page 21. Specifically, it says:
"60 Ton Truck Clms: Difficulties about tires and spare parts. (An officer must be sent to the ZI) Casualties in the columns of requisitioned civilian trucks: 30%. In the columns organized by the Army: 20%. Losses are particularly heavy in AG-North."
Thanks for that. I'm not sure that was such a serious issue, as on the next page Halder says AG-North was getting sea convoys, which helps offset their truck issues...as confirmed on P.24 (Aug. 6th) where quoting Wagner again Halder writes that supply everywhere is adequate and even good for AG-North. So if AG-North was seeing disproportionately heavy losses among the Army Groups, then the numbers quoted are skewed and not representative of what the situation was in AG-Center or even South. On P.22 AG-South captured a large fuel dump, which Halder says will facilitate the continued advance of 1st PG. Plus he also says that the '60 ton truck clms' have been taken off of the border to Minsk, as likely the train route had been extended at that point, which means the wear and tear on the army group supply trucks was about to substantially lessen. Within a week or so it would get even shorter, as the link up with Smolensk would be complete. So really the entries you've quote just show that the German supply situation 2 months deep into the operation AND right at the point we are talking about was still quite good and going to get better due to the extension of the rail line to Minsk.
Leaving aside accuracy about some minute details (French vehicle factories were non-functional in 1940-41, for example), the breakdown is pretty clearly civilian vs military so an idea of what proportion was civilian vs what proportion were military would take. A clarification on what counts as "civilian" would possibly be useful as the Heer could be applying that to captured foreign vehicles.
What's the source of the claim that French vehicle factories were non-functional in 1940-41? They were producing for German contracts:
As to what the definitions were, I don't know what was classified as what by the Germans. If you have any info on that regard I'm all eyes.
The context is pretty clear: we have timestamps and locations and everything. It stands in stark contrast to your supporting evidence which amounts to... well, nothing.
Funny, because based on your claims about what Halder's diary demonstrated, we in fact see that supply was doing just fine in early August per Wagner's reports. So without looking at the rest of the claims in context it is hard to actually say that they say what the author is claiming.
Glantz is pretty thorough in Stumbling Colossus and they were... a mess. Then against, that's up to about June 1941. Circumstantial evidence from others seems to indicate that Soviet logistics, aside from understandable material shortages, functioned fine in the August through November but had great difficulty with the subsequent offensives during the winter. The Railway Operations article I posted above indicates that the issues were finally solved with reforms in March-April 1942 that centralized all the transportation assets under a single command structure, after which they seemed to function okay.
I also have Stumbling Colossus, it covers their pre-war situation, it says very little about their supply operations during the fighting other than where it intersects with certain units falling apart due to supply difficulties. Like the Mechanized Corps, which didn't have enough trucks even with full TOE, which they were not at. Soviet supply difficulties were a pretty huge factor in the problems at the border. If anything their supply situation improved the closer they got to Moscow due to how many fewer men they had to supply and how close it was to the factories producing war materials. Plus being largely on the defensive for August-October meant that they didn't have to get very complex in their supply operations, while their offensives toward Smolensk didn't advance far enough for problems to really crop up. They did later one of course when they were trying to advance in mud (November) and when they advanced far as in December-January. That problem would crop up when they advanced too far too fast repeatedly throughout much of the rest of the war, but otherwise, so long as the front was static, the Soviets were functioning largely fine so long as they could muster the trains. But then the same was true of the Germans.
What the hell are you talking about? This is what he has to say about that 1.4 million figure, which is footnoted to his 1.25 million figure for September 30th:
"Another official Russian source shows slightly different personnel strength figures for the Red Army's fronts operating along the western (Moscow) axis at the beginning of the Battle for Smolensk and the beginning of Operation Typhoon. For comparison's sake, these figures are as follows: [table for July 10-September 10 1941 which shows 1.4 million men]"
Otherwise, there is no table in the book which makes a claim of 1.4 million men and Glantz certainly doesn't claim it as his own number, particularly since it gives a slightly different strength figure for the Western Front on July 10th (about 20,000 fewer) then he does.
You were claiming that the Soviets were stronger in August than October, so the only number in Glantz I could find that supported that was the 1.4 million number from his book. So what numbers do you have to show the Soviets in front of Moscow/East of Smolensk were stronger in August than October?
At best, they cite memos and reports of the Germans claiming what they can do in a vacuum, claims they echo post-war memoranda, but which pay no regard to the logistics of the matter to actually make those claims happen. Those are what the others actually point to. One is discussing claims, the other is discussing actual hard numbers that the success or failure of those claims rest upon.
And yet we have Halder's diary quoting Wagner from the time saying the supply situation in early August was good with AG-North despite truck attrition and adequate for the other fronts. I'm sure things could have been better, but the head of OKH quoting OKH's own quarter master said the supply situation was decent.
Megargee's book on Barbarossa.
You mean the one about war crimes during Barbarossa, not specifically the military or logistics situation?
Unsubstantiated claims. There wasn't even much opportunity to test them out, seeing as many Soviet formations weren't properly manning their defensive positions when the Germans attacked, what with the stand down to receive winter gear and everything.
You've only been dealing in unsubstantiated claims on the defense line situation in August.
You haven't even sourced your new claim here that there was a Soviet stand down in early October to pick up winter gear.
I've previously cited a passages from Crewald's book which explicitly states that in other threads. I'd cite them again, but I'm having a devil of a time refinding my copy.
Creveld's essay is hardly definitive, though it would be helpful to know what he said. I'll see if I can find my scan of the essay and post from it later.
Ignoring that the sudden requirements of having to immediately sustain a new offensive, which would be even more immense without a pre-built stockpile, would wreck the rail services just as they did in October.
The rail services weren't wrecked in October and in August the Germans were launching two offensives with AG-Center forces, toward Leningrad and toward Kiev, while extending rail lines in those directions and the infantry armies were holding the line in heavy positional combat by Smolensk. As it was the stockpile IOTL was basically meaningless to supply operations in October and in August Guderian had already ripped the front to the south, so the supply intensive job was effectively over on that front, which would be a big savings had they opted to attack east rather than south. Given that Guderian historically was able to move deeply south despite not having a nearby rail line or good roads south of Roslavl to use, all while a substantial chunk of his forces were locked down in the defense of Yelnya, shows that supply issues weren't the primary problem facing AG-Center forces. Per maps we've used in the past to talk about the advance of the rail lines, Guderian had only unconverted rail lines at his disposal into September during his drive south and a scant few captured Soviet trains. Otherwise his supply trucks were driving back to Smolensk or beyond. Heading East would have probably saved supplies and trucks considering the quality of roads in the direction vs. south.
I don't know where you think it makes sense to claim that the supply requirements of launching only a single army-level attack against vastly weaker forces on the flanks (and which required supporting attacks from other Army Groups on other axis's to succeed) have the same requirements as launching a army group wide assault against the main strength of the enemy's forces or that the rail heads reaching the frontline in mid-August suddenly means they were operating with the level to sustain major army group offensives when the number of trains-per-day shows that the best they managed in August was far short of daily requirements, never mind the requirements of the need for stockpiling of an offensive. The military logic doesn't support the first and the raw numbers don't support the latter.
Guderian's attacks included 2nd Army as well as 2nd PG, plus half the air support of the Army Group. They were also facing multiple Soviet Fronts as well. While that is going on Western Front is attacking AG-Center, while 3rd PG is either fighting against said Soviet offensives or being dispatched to help AG-North against Leningrad. VIII air corps was also heavily engaged there as well. Many more supplies were being consumed than a single army push on one flank. And in no way was Guderian's forces stronger that what was arrayed against it. As it was AG-Center was in the grapple with Western Front and several others throughout August and in to September IOTL...which is why it couldn't stockpile supplies, not the train situation alone. Since they were beating off heavy offensives by multiple Soviet Fronts simultaneously the supplies needed to fight them were already being used, I'm just suggesting instead of sitting still and taking the beating or advancing on the flanks, to just maneuver in a different direction to pocket them and wipe them out earlier. Historically we saw that despite not getting stockpiles or breathing space 2nd and 3rd PG were still running around destroying entire armies and Fronts in August-September, traveling further north and south than they'd have to travel East to deal with Western and Reserve Fronts.
According to a GKO strength report dated September 11th, 1941, the combined strength of the Western, Reserve, and Bryansk Fronts were 1.296 million, and this is literally the day after the late-August/early-September offensives ended which cost the Red Army some 100,000 casualties in the Reserve and Bryansk Fronts alone. A matching ration report also for September 11th, 1941 shows . By September 30th it was 1.25 million. The weakening of Soviet forces on the Moscow axis in the intervening time is clear. All the published numbers point to Soviet forces being as strong or stronger in August-September then they were on October 1st. You have failed to provide the slightest bit of scholarly evidence showing Soviet forces are weaker.
That's September, not in early August when I suggested they go on the offensive. BTW how did those three fronts have more men after the Soviets ended their September offensives than on October 1st? Where did you find that GKO report?
A claim you have nothing except wishful thinking to back up. And I said pretty clearly it's operational.
In August Guderian had already opened the road east by destroying the 28th army at Roslavl; recon reports from that period state the roads east were clear of Soviet troops. The hard part is effectively done, they just needed to exploit against an undefended target and catch Soviet defenders by surprise. The challenge would be in the north against the wing of the Northwest and West Fronts, but if 4th PG doesn't advance on Leningrad and instead detaches forces to assist 3rd PG defeat Soviet forces and exploit in the direction of Vyazma they should have more than enough forces given Soviet weakness after the defeat at Smolensk. After all Soviet initial offensives in that direction toward Smolensk were defeated without much trouble.
By September he was attacking into Ukraine. In August... it's complicated, as he was kinda on the Moscow axis but pushing in the southward direction? But that's an irrelevant red-herring your using to distract from what I actually said, namely the fact that AGC's formations records further north record the rain too.
He was south of Roslavl, which was well south of where he would be in my scenario. He was on AG-Center's supply lines as he pushed toward Ukraine and hit the rains that washed out rail lines around September 10th (though IIRC this was not the Smolensk line, rather the one that ran through the Pripyet Marshes.
