Was Barbarossa Doomed from the start?

Perceived need and further development of the concept. The early HEAT tank shells were not...optimal.

but they had an existing grenade for "light armor" if they had developed the Schiessbecher? and that attachment could fire other types? just rereading on this subject and it seems the range is so much greater vs. the Panzerfaust.

if widely deployed and then they discover not effective against Soviet tanks such as T-34, would they try to improve the AT grenades rather than different path with weapon of much shorter range (and single use.)

relating this to Barbarossa to have more firepower down to individual soldier, as they were forced to use Panzers as "fire department" and not just to deal with Soviet armor.
 

Deleted member 1487

Yes, Smolensk was a pretty serious counter attack.
I agree, fighting the US and the USSR at the same time was insanity. But if they kept their mobile reserve alive, ie no over reach in winter 41, strengthening/straigthening out the lines and maybe some small encirclement ala early case blue, then the Axis would be a much tougher nut to crack. Perhaps the Soviets can be stopped around the river defensive lines and be held there until the WAllies make a good case to surrender? I think that could be a very different world/result
The problem for Germany is that still just means they lose after a really bloody and traumatic attrition war. They need to go for the win, which means taking risks and that drove their OTL strategy (that and lack of knowledge of the full potential power of the US and USSR). Not sure though your formulation ends with a very different world or result in the end. It would take a while to get there, but the Soviets are able to build themselves up too with the large breather they are getting from late Autumn on. Time is on their side, not Germany's.
 
If we take some of the ideas from the thread about improving the Luftwaffe from 1940, and although Britain is not defeated, taking a couple of the ideas

a) Germany deploys the Blohm and Voss boat in the North Atlantic as a recon aircraft instead of the FW 200, greatly increasing shipping losses during the critical Winter 40-41 period when Britain had less defenses. The Butterflies of this is that Britain does try to hold Crete, saving hundred of Ju52s.
b) Germany deploys a fast JU88 earlier, less losses of the aircraft occur and earlier production, potentially a few hundred extra bombers for Barbarossa.

The extra Ju52s can probably keep 1 Panzer division supplied at the spearheads, maybe 2. Which might not seems like much but in the exploitation phase of Typhoon or Smolensk, keeping an extra Panzer division or two moving would be a big deal when they were often idled for days for lack of fuel.

The extra medium bombers could easily be deployed against Leningrad from good Baltic state fields (noting the extra aircraft deployed on those fields in the Demaynsk airlift)
Same from Romanian fields against Odessa during the siege or during its evacuation.

Its not inconceivable that the extra bombers on the flanks could produce the fall of Leningrad and/or Sevastopol before the end of 1941.
Its not inconceivable that with extra supply in the center, the Germans could push a Panzer division into the Moscow suburbs during the brief window in October 41 when it was possible. (by November the Soviets have enough armies in reserve near Moscow that its hard to do much useful by then).
 
The only reason those reinforcements were necessary was the losses the Germans took sitting on the defensive in August-September and attacking on the flanks against strategically pointless targets.

AGC's two panzer groups in August/September were around 500 AGCs. The dispatch of the two panzer divisions and the third panzer group from Army Group North increased that to 1,500. The reality is that the German forces were too weak without those forces, and the logistical lines strengthened during August-September to conduct their operations.

Operational surprise wasn't really that necessary in the aftermath of Smolensk, because of how disorganized and worn down Soviet forces were.

Soviet forces by August of '41 were considerably stronger then they had been beforehand or would be in October after expending themselves in the August/September counter-offensives. The 24th is a prime example: it entered the El'nya offensive as one of the strongest armies in the Soviet OOB. By the time of Typhoon, it was among the weakest. Had it been dispatched to block Guderian instead of being wasted away attacking a pointless salient, the Kiev encirclement likely would have gone very different. In any case, it's crippling during the El'nya offensive meant it's destruction for the Germans at Bryansk was a pretty simple task. The presupposition the Soviets were weaker simply has no support in the historical record. Even ignoring that, the lack of operational surprise would be of considerable difference as it helped the Germans immeasurably in Typhoon even against the weakened Soviets. A good example of this is stuff like at the time the Germans attacked, most Soviet troops had been pulled from their defensive positions so they could be issued with winter clothing. Hence, they encountered very little resistance breaking through the frontlines.

Had the Germans focused their effort on another series of pockets they could have avoided the hammering they got by trying to hold on until the southern flank was cleared and Leningrad encircled by pocketing the Soviet forces to the direct East.

That's precisely what the Germans achieved in August-September: they exploited the weakness of the Soviet flanks to achieve just such a series of pockets at a time when their logistical and fighting strength was unable to support more frontal assaults as heading eastward would have entailed. Heading directly east would mean attacking into Soviet strength, not Soviet weakness, and would not achieve such a success given the strength of Soviet defenses and the weakness of the German forces.

The pre-invasion plan, sure. But that had gone out the window back in early July when the 2nd Strategic echelon appeared unexpectedly and Soviet reserves just kept appearing.

Which should have told the Germans their intelligence was badly flawed, which in turn meant their strategic plan was built on quicksand that was already sucking, and that hence their continuing fixation on Moscow was madness.

What does June 1941 have to do with this discussion? Yes, the Germans were stronger and so were the Soviets in June 1941 as both their pre-war armies were intact; we're talking about the situations after major fighting happened in October 1941 and June 1942. Those two situations weren't comparable for a variety of reasons I already laid out and you've entirely avoided.

Obviously because you don't understand the point: the June 1941 has to do with the discussion as a comparison of strength to OTL June 1942. Had the Germans prepared for a multi-year campaign and not hurt themselves with their overextension in late-'41, they could have entered June 1942 in a strength similar to that of June 1941, which would have meant the ability to prosecute offensives on a similar scale as opposed to the vastly reduced one they were forced to IOTL 1942.

And Stalin denying them replacements and two German preparatory offensives before Case Blue (Wilhelm and Fridericus II) to set up the conditions to allow Case Blue to succeed. So not simply because of 2nd Kharkov. Which makes it very different from the situation in October 1941 as the Soviets had gotten all the replacements that Stalin could generate and there weren't special extra offensives to weaken the Soviets before the main offensive in October; the fighting in August-September were all part of a series of offensives and counter attacks ongoing at the same time that culminated in the Soviet victory at Yelnya.

Whether Stalin withheld Soviet replacements to make good their weakness or not does not change the fact that the reason Soviet forces in the region were so weak as to require such replacements were because of the devastating losses at 2nd Kharkov. It's also worth noting that Friedericus II was, as the name suggests, an extension of Friedericus I... which historically was executed in a modified version to destroy the Soviets at 2nd Kharkov. And there were, in fact, extra-offensives to weaken the Soviets before the main offensive in October: it's known to history as the Kiev encirclement. Meanwhile, in October 1941 the replacements provided did not strengthen the Soviets back to the pre-El'nya strength, even leaving aside the poor quality of those replacements.

I don't think you understand was 'part of' means. They were separate from, i.e not occurring during. They were short, limited offensives launched to weaken Soviet forces before launching Case Blue to allow it to break through the Soviet lines. Without them the OTL breakthrough wouldn't have been possible like IOTL. So 2nd Kharkov alone was not enough to weaken Soviet forces to allow for the OTL success of Case Blue.

They were necessary to the execution of Blau and were planned as an essential means of it's start, thus they were inherently a part of it. To claim that Fredericus and Wilhelm were not part of it is as inane as claiming Operation Neptune wasn't part of Operation Overlord.

How wide of a front are you counting? At the point of contact Soviet forces were considerably weaker in Ukraine, while if you include the entire region and time period that Case Blue covered that was eventually engaged them perhaps you could add up to 1.7 million men on the Soviet side, including the Caucasian Front:

The width of the front the Germans started Blau on, which covers a region stretching approximately from Orel to the Black Sea. If you were to tunnel vision away from your linked too quote, the info box of the respective sides forces in the wiki article you linked too show, the initial forces were 1.7 million at the point and time of contact ("initial") and rise to 2.7 million only if you include the entire region and time period that Case Blue covered ("totally"). It's a bit confusing, as both cite the same first source which, regrettably, is not available online... so I'm doing a bit of looking elsewhere. The second source cited for your quote is Glantz's "When Titans Clashed" but leafing through the chapter on Blau doesn't give me any figures for German manpower strength. I'm still tracking down my copy of Enduring the Whirlwind to find Lidtke's precise numbers.

EDIT: Found my copy of "To the Gates of Stalingrad", which also gives a figure of 1.7 million Soviet opposing the Germans on June 28, 1942.

Plus per Stahel the German forces in the East were overall weaker in October than in August even with the reinforcements;

Stahel puts German forces in Army Group Center at the start of October as 1.9 million and 1,500 AFVs. This is compared to August/September when they had 1.2 million men and less then 500 running panzers. Air strength is a bit trickier to pin down, as the numbers he gives are comparing June 22nd vs October 2nd.

in terms of trucks having stripped 5000 from AG-Center to give to South in September, AG-Center was considerably weaker logistically.

Which ignores that the weakest logistical link was the trains, not the trucks. As it was, many German trucks sat at the railheads unusable because the trains couldn't deliver fuel for them. Another 5,000 motor vehicles sitting around with empty fuel tanks does AGC zero good.

weather made the tough logistical situation impossible

Exactly backwards. The historical record, up too and including the German quartermaster staff just before Typhoon started (as Stahel notes) is that the logistical situation was already impossible. That is a bald-faced reality you cannot wish away.

To ignore the impact of the weather on the roads and ground is to miss out on the critical component of the situation in October.

To ignore the collapse of the railroads is to miss out on a even more critical component. The state of the roads and truck park means little if the railways can't keep pace.

If the wheeled trucks supplying the advance couldn't keep moving back and forth to supply hubs even the advance of tracked AFVs is going to bog down, as it did IOTL.

The Soviets too had to keep wheeled trucks moving back and forth from the supply hubs to the frontline over most of the same roads the Germans were, yet they had little problem with the mud.

In 1942 and 1943 the Germans were not operating in front of Moscow on the offensive, so the situation was different, but even then it impacted them, albeit less because of being more on the defensive or at least static compared to leaping hundreds of miles deeper into Russia.

The Germans in '42 or '43 had to conduct extensive maneuvering to maintain their defenses and required wheeled trucks to transport supplies from their railheads to the frontline. The demands for this on the defense are no different then that on the offense. The fact they were operating in Ukraine or Southern Russia or Leningrad region is irrelevant since these regions are hit just as hard as the Moscow region is. Notably this also goes for the other side of the front: the Soviets in October/November 1943 had just conducted a massive advance directly comparable to that achieved by the Germans in 1941, were still extending their railheads forward to the front, yet they were scarcely troubled by the mud and even went on to conduct further offensives that picked up even more territory.

Supposition? We know how strong the Soviet and German forces were in 1941. We know what each side was capable of offensively and defensively based on the actual history of the events. If all you have are general aphorisms and statements to support a point, you're not actually decent point. "Nuh-uh" isn't an actual counter argument.

Yes, we do know. We know that the Germans were not strong enough to take Moscow and the Soviets were strong enough to defend it. That means attempting to be even more ambitious, such as trying to take Moscow in an even faster timeframe, is less realistic, not more.
 
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elkarlo

Banned
The problem for Germany is that still just means they lose after a really bloody and traumatic attrition war. They need to go for the win, which means taking risks and that drove their OTL strategy (that and lack of knowledge of the full potential power of the US and USSR). Not sure though your formulation ends with a very different world or result in the end. It would take a while to get there, but the Soviets are able to build themselves up too with the large breather they are getting from late Autumn on. Time is on their side, not Germany's.
Germany was the LBO of war machines. Leverage buy outs. Basically mortgage the future for the win now. I have mixed feelings on if they could have beaten the USSRin 41. It was close, but the USSR was a tougher nut to crack. Perhaps more and better prep, plus taking time to retool industry so they had only a few types of trucks and equipment being made. Which maybe would have allowed parts to be uniform and make that last thrust to Moscow more feasible logistically.
 

Deleted member 1487

Germany was the LBO of war machines. Leverage buy outs. Basically mortgage the future for the win now. I have mixed feelings on if they could have beaten the USSRin 41. It was close, but the USSR was a tougher nut to crack. Perhaps more and better prep, plus taking time to retool industry so they had only a few types of trucks and equipment being made. Which maybe would have allowed parts to be uniform and make that last thrust to Moscow more feasible logistically.
Not really sure that applies. It wasn't like they collapsed when the war went longer than intended and they were able to roll with the fact that their pre-war assumptions about Soviet staying power was greater than expected. What prep could they realistically have done differently? Retooling was out of the question for a 1941 invasion. The attack on Moscow wasn't dependent on types of trucks, rather time frame and spending that vital time attacking strategically less important objectives, leaving too little to actually take Moscow before weather took it's toll on logistics, which did more than anything to strangle the offensive.
 

nbcman

Donor
Germany was the LBO of war machines. Leverage buy outs. Basically mortgage the future for the win now. I have mixed feelings on if they could have beaten the USSRin 41. It was close, but the USSR was a tougher nut to crack. Perhaps more and better prep, plus taking time to retool industry so they had only a few types of trucks and equipment being made. Which maybe would have allowed parts to be uniform and make that last thrust to Moscow more feasible logistically.
It wouldn't have helped much because tens of thousands of the German trucks used in 1941 were captured from Britain and France during 1940. Maybe the new production could have been standardized but that wouldn't help eliminate the problem with the captured vehicles.
 
I think the only way Germany can win in 1941 a large scale Soviet command collapse or even more widespread command incompetence

The Leningrad military district's forces were able to retire several time's over, avoiding encirclement without having panicked STAVKA political officers show up to shoot them for cowardice; they mostly confined their meddling and unintended sabotage to the center and southern parts of the front where there was much greater depth to retreat

A Stalin order of not 1 step back on the Dvina river would have invited the Germans to shift forces East and then to conduct an envelopement against the Gulf of Riga; would would have largely eliminated all opposition between themselves and the city of Leningrad

The loss of Leningrad, particularly if taken quickly off the march would have enormous downstream consequences to the Soviets; including but not limited to:

loss of major industry and population in the city to the Germans
German ability to use the port to reduce a share of the logisitic burden across the Northern sector of the front
Ability to redeploy Army Group North's formations to reinforce other sectors
Possible delay or decision to not send lend lease to the Soviets out of the concern they would suffer imminent defeat or collapse (which was a real possibility in the original timeline
 
my view the LW offered the quickest (available) solution to logistics. a crash conversion of Gotha gliders to powered flight once the captured French aircraft engines became available, instead of the monster Gigant project? would have provided hundreds more transports.

can understand the cancellation of JU-252, in favor of producing every fighter and bomber possible, it was no sure thing to defeat Poland, France, drive UK from continent. but the year after fall of France did nothing but minus their number of transports.
 
can understand the cancellation of JU-252, in favor of producing every fighter and bomber possible, it was no sure thing to defeat Poland, France, drive UK from continent. but the year after fall of France did nothing but minus their number of transports.

While not winning the War, tell Junkers that they will build licensed versions of the Douglas DC-2, just as the Russians and Japanese did.

They both saw that there was no better Transport to be had, so leave the -52 behind in 1935
 
my view the LW offered the quickest (available) solution to logistics. a crash conversion of Gotha gliders to powered flight once the captured French aircraft engines became available, instead of the monster Gigant project? would have provided hundreds more transports.

can understand the cancellation of JU-252, in favor of producing every fighter and bomber possible, it was no sure thing to defeat Poland, France, drive UK from continent. but the year after fall of France did nothing but minus their number of transports.

I always liked the Arado 232 for transport aircraft (a rear loader, high wing, short field capable). Probably too late for 1941. Would have been handy 2nd half of 42, in the med and in Russia.

Like a lot of German aircraft, getting an available engine proved the tricky part.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arado_Ar_232

German transport aircraft just got shredded a lot in Norway and Crete, so losses were high, but yeah if somehow you could tweak some extra aircraft production and/or do Crete better and have a couple hundred extra transport aircraft, keeping an extra panzer division or two supplied with fuel makes a big difference when trying to complete the Smolensk encirclement or exploit Typhoon during the first couple of weeks when the Soviets don't have their reserves near.
 
While not winning the War, tell Junkers that they will build licensed versions of the Douglas DC-2, just as the Russians and Japanese did.

They both saw that there was no better Transport to be had, so leave the -52 behind in 1935
The Russians and Japanese licensed the DC-3.
Even trading all the Ju-52 in the LW with C-130 will not solve the logistic problem. You need a way to get a decent train flow and then lost of trucks to operate from the railheads.
The changes needed to try and win Barbarossa are like 20% in forces, but more like 100% in logistics and you need PODs so big you change WW2 entirely.
 
The Russians and Japanese licensed the DC-3.
Even trading all the Ju-52 in the LW with C-130 will not solve the logistic problem. You need a way to get a decent train flow and then lost of trucks to operate from the railheads.
The changes needed to try and win Barbarossa are like 20% in forces, but more like 100% in logistics and you need PODs so big you change WW2 entirely.
If you have the license and are building DC-2 in 1935, stretching the fuselage and adding longer wing sections is not hard to do for 1936 production. Even the -2 is a far better aircraft, its cruising speed faster than to top speed on the Ju-52, while using one less engine and being faster and easier to build. Given that the Germans will still need to do airdrops and move cargo thru the air, this change takes care of that, while Truck and Rail need to be addressed as well.
In the past I have posted on the Germans using steam powered trucks like the British were doing, using solid wheels and coal.

For Rail, the Germans should have been making locomotives and tenders suitable for use in Russia, cold weather and larger tenders.

They found this out in WWI, but as in other things, forgot by WWII what fighting in Russia would be like. It was the same Mud and Rail system as 20 years prior.
 
If you have the license and are building DC-2 in 1935, stretching the fuselage and adding longer wing sections is not hard to do for 1936 production. Even the -2 is a far better aircraft, its cruising speed faster than to top speed on the Ju-52, while using one less engine and being faster and easier to build. Given that the Germans will still need to do airdrops and move cargo thru the air, this change takes care of that, while Truck and Rail need to be addressed as well.
In the past I have posted on the Germans using steam powered trucks like the British were doing, using solid wheels and coal.

For Rail, the Germans should have been making locomotives and tenders suitable for use in Russia, cold weather and larger tenders.

They found this out in WWI, but as in other things, forgot by WWII what fighting in Russia would be like. It was the same Mud and Rail system as 20 years prior.
The WW1 analogy does not work.
In WW1 they did it in three years, with smaller non mechanized forces. In WW2 they were trying to do it in six months, six times faster, with larger forces, part of which were mechanized. The combined greater tempo and supply needs alone mean it's a different game.
 
The WW1 analogy does not work.
In WW1 they did it in three years, with smaller non mechanized forces. In WW2 they were trying to do it in six months, six times faster, with larger forces, part of which were mechanized. The combined greater tempo and supply needs alone mean it's a different game.
But the Heer was just as limited by horses in 1941 as they were in 1916. The roads hadn't changed, mostly dirt, and the RR routes were nearly identical.

When much of your logistics is horsedrawn, you are looking back to Napoleon for what can be supplied from a supply depot.
 

Deleted member 1487

But the Heer was just as limited by horses in 1941 as they were in 1916. The roads hadn't changed, mostly dirt, and the RR routes were nearly identical.

When much of your logistics is horsedrawn, you are looking back to Napoleon for what can be supplied from a supply depot.
Not even remotely. Askey's Barbarossa books cover the logistics of the invasion, the actual tonnage hauled by horses was a small fraction of that by truck. How else can you explain how they outran rail heads by hundreds of miles and advanced to depths unthinkable in WW1 in a matter of months, when in WW1 they were limited to no more than 50 miles from rail heads. The whole Grosstransportraum army group truck supply apparatus was something entirely new and much upgraded in tonnage hauling ability than in that which was used in France in 1940. Within Russia roads had improved too somewhat as had the rail situation. It seems the Germans though it had improved more than it had due to the Soviet embargo on maps and published data about their internal situation, so assumptions that they had upgraded to a more 'regular' Europe rail system made them think things would significantly better than it was in 1914-18. There was clearly a reason that they thought all they had to do was convert the rail gauge and everything else would be similar enough to work.
 
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Not even remotely. Askey's Barbarossa books cover the logistics of the invasion, the actual tonnage hauled by horses was a small fraction of that by truck. Roads had improved somewhat as had the rail situation. It seems the Germans though it had improved more than it had due to the Soviet embargo on maps and published data about their internal situation, so assumptions that they had upgraded to a more 'regular' Europe rail system made them think things would significantly better than it was in 1914-18. There was clearly a reason that they thought all they had to do was convert the rail gauge and everything else would be similar enough to work.

Of the 300 odd German divisions, roughly 50 were motorized. The rest made due with around 1 million horses a year in harness.

And not even those motorized divisions were free from horsepower.
 

Deleted member 1487

Of the 300 odd German divisions, roughly 50 were motorized. The rest made due with around 1 million horses a year in harness.

And not even those motorized divisions were free from horsepower.
You are completely ignoring the army group motorized/mechanized supply service that allowed them to cut loose from the rail heads; horse supply limited them to no more than 50 miles from rail heads in WW1, truck supply at the army group level allowed for 300 miles in theory and in practice actually more. And yes the motorized divisions were entirely horse free other than non-TOE horses they picked up as they advanced for whatever reason.
 
And yes the motorized divisions were entirely horse free other than non-TOE horses they picked up as they advanced for whatever reason.
That reason being they didn't have sufficient transport capacity without them.

US forces requisitioned motor transport in France, and didn't bother with all the horses the Heer left behind.
 
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