Was Barbarossa Doomed from the start?

what allowed the Soviets to outperform the Germans in mobilizing their population by so much.)

Well the overly short and simple answer is two things:
1. An autocratic regime which allowed measures which wouldn't have been possible for an democratic one in the same position and more importantly
2. Lend and Lease. Food and rolling stock from the US allowed the Sowjetunion to shift people from food and transport production to weapons production and recrutiment.
 

Deleted member 1487

I agree , but stopping offensives whenines grow too long would reduce axis losses. The axis had better troops until mid 43, when losses changed that dynamic.
In 42 taking out leningrad, Sevastopol, and then working the Soviets in the south would have been workable. Without missing creep and over extended lines with case blue, it'd make counter attacks much more costly.
Stopping it early may temporarily stop the losses, but the Soviets will prepare defenses and their own offensives at their leisure, which will inflict losses on the Germans. And there is no guarantee that waiting would make any 1942 offensives easier. History demonstrated that letting the Soviets breath to build up was a bad idea.
 
Taking Moscow would probably have been irrelevant if the essential oil fields were not captured and held and/or Stalin was deposed and those who took over were more willing to sue for peace, which might or might not have been accepted, depending on the terms offered to Hitler.

Had Germany concentrated entirely on taking Moscow and utterly ignored everything else, the Wehrmacht would soon be paralyzed on the grander scale due to lack of fuel to run its machinery. If the Soviet Union did not surrender, the Germans would find themselves on the defensive for a very long time. If an offensive was to maintained, that could continuously punch the Red Army into submission without respite, the Caucuses and the oil fields there were completely essential to the success of such an operation.

Making an offensive towards the oil fields was the only chance Germany had for getting the natural resources required to continue an offensive and therefore a possibility of a military victory. With oil stocks so low, the Germans had to stockpile it for extremely limited operations that would never be enough to defeat the Red Army decisively. Sure, taking Moscow would have been a considerable political victory that might have resulted in Stalin being deposed, but that would have been no sure thing, and if it didn't happen, Germany would be irrevocably doomed. It is debatable whether it was better to bank on a political or military victory, as both had low odds of success.
 
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Sure, there were a number of strategic and operational mistakes the Germans made. Arguably the Soviets could have made even more and suffered accordingly. But in the sense of defeating the USSR entirely in one campaign yes, it couldn't work like that, but that doesn't mean mortal wounds couldn't have been inflicted in 1941 that would have taken down Stalin's regime in 1942.

Exactly this. The Germans came within an hair of getting both Moscow and Leningrad in the October-December, which would've set them up for total collapse in 1942.
 
Its hard to make the Soviet armed forces worse positioned or prepared to meet the invasion than they were. You could do something along the lines of Stalin gets overthrown, the regime collapses and/ or sues for peace, and ironically the best POD for that is probably no purges.

The Barbarossa plan could be improved on, though given the size of task I think earlier commentators are being over-critical of the plan itself. The Germans would have to get everything right. But something on the lines of a two year plan, where the goal in 1941 is to seize Moscow (disrupt Soviet politics, communications, and logistics), and in 1942 the goal is to take the resource rich areas to the South. They sort of do this anyway, but in this version there would be no attempt to take Leningrad, with Army Group North consisting of two infantry armies operating as flank guards from the start, and probably no diversion of Guderian to take Kiev in 1941, though if the panzerarmee and air assets are removed from Army Group North at the start, adding them either to Center or South probably makes the diversion unnecessary or less of a big deal. Taking Moscow first and then Ukraine would have worked if they had actually taken Moscow in 1941. There is even more room for improvement in the planning for Case Blue, again same idea, concentrate on securing the lower Volga first and cutting off the oil fields, then go for the oil fields later.
 
Barbarossa can't realistically be won by the Nazi's, but it could be lost by the Soviets it if they roll enough ones that their ability to resist collapses through Stalin dying, starting another self-destructive purge, or loosing his nerve and suing for peace (and Hitler having a brief moment of sanity and accepting something short of a Ural border). These are all low probability outcomes, but crazier things have happened in the real world.
 

elkarlo

Banned
Stopping it early may temporarily stop the losses, but the Soviets will prepare defenses and their own offensives at their leisure, which will inflict losses on the Germans. And there is no guarantee that waiting would make any 1942 offensives easier. History demonstrated that letting the Soviets breath to build up was a bad idea.
Perhaps. The Germans easily bypassed any and all defenses in 42, it seems to be a non issue.
But overextending their armies they allowed the Soviets to attrit them. Without these wasteful offenses the Germans would still at least have a mobile reserve to stop offensives, which the Germans lost by late July 43.
 
Theoretically in the short term with better luck and decision-making, but long-term it's impossible for the Nazis to win due to a combination of economics and Generalplan Ost being stark raving nuts.

The main problem for the Nazis was twofold; ticking time bomb that was the economy, and Hitler being an insane evil bastard whose lunatic influence permeated the nest of vipers that called itself a state. That meant that any "victory" would inherently be severely limited and disastrous long-term.
 
Stopping it early may temporarily stop the losses, but the Soviets will prepare defenses and their own offensives at their leisure, which will inflict losses on the Germans. And there is no guarantee that waiting would make any 1942 offensives easier. History demonstrated that letting the Soviets breath to build up was a bad idea.

A hypothetical German consolidation in September or October would only have involved a momentary transition to the defense, and would still have included local offensives after the ground froze and mobility resumed. The Germans needed an operational pause to bring up more supplies including winter clothing, repair, and replace damaged vehicles (and if they had conceived a multi-stage campaign that the task of defeating the USSR demands they would not have ramped down production for the army and so would have more replacements to offer), and give the troops a breather. But that would take a month or two and then they'd be free to resume attacking in select regions. Leningrad would be an obvious target, but reducing any Soviet forces poorly deployed too far forward would also be on the menu. The only thing off the table would be an all-or-nothing push for Moscow.

If the Germans resumed a major push for Leningrad in November after the ground froze, contemporary Soviet doctrine would still have mandated major counter offensives there and elsewhere along the frontlines, in the hopes of drawing forces away. Similarly, the response to any encircled forces would be more attacks to try and relieve them. All a German breather gets the Soviets is a similar breather in September and October, before the Germans resume smaller scale, less ambitious attacks.

It's almost certain that if the Germans had transitioned to the defensive with some later limited offensives the Soviets would have attacked, regardless of the suspicions of some Soviet generals that the balance of forces was not in their favour. The only real question is how quickly they would have knocked it off once they realized they were getting nowhere (as would be likely) and whether the Germans would manage to pocket a substantial portion of the attacking forces with any "backhand blow" they subsequently launched.
 
Well the overly short and simple answer is two things:
1. An autocratic regime which allowed measures which wouldn't have been possible for an democratic one in the same position and more importantly
2. Lend and Lease. Food and rolling stock from the US allowed the Sowjetunion to shift people from food and transport production to weapons production and recrutiment.

I think the second is undoubtedly part of the answer. However, the Nazis were also an autocratic regime - but how do British, American, Canadian, Australian, Finnish and New Zealander mobilizations compare to the German and Soviet mobilizations? For example, I have vague memories that in terms of overall economic and military mobilization Australia and Canada outperformed the Soviets. But I can't remember seeing detailed statistics to support that.

Also, if you read the Soviet story from the beginning, their performance in WW2 is pretty astounding. In 1932, the Soviet regime is not only callous, but also astoundingly incompetent in the face of famine in Ukraine, Southern Russia and Kazakhstan. Hitler actually had good reasons to think that the Soviet structure would come crashing down if he gave it a good kick. It's actually pretty amazing that the people who were regularly messing things up on a grand scale in the 1930s are the same ones who out-organize the Nazis in the 40s and emerge from WW2 as one of 3 superpowers.

starting another self-destructive purge

This assumes that the Soviets stopped the purge for WW2. They didn't. In terms of actual human cost, WW2 may have been the worst of the purges. Though it is true that the purges had become less damaging to Soviet organization. Being good at your job counted for something, even if it meant you ended up working in prison camps for engineers and scientists as Korolev did after late 1939 (though note, this change pre-dating the start of Barbarossa shows it wasn't directly connected).

Hitler being an insane evil bastard whose lunatic influence permeated the nest of vipers that called itself a state

I am reminded on Molotov's assessment of Hitler (Molotov having actually met the man): that Hitler was quite rational, and even intelligent, but utterly enthralled by bad ideas.

It's especially amusing, of course, coming from Molotov who to his dying day thought that Collectivization had been a failure because it hadn't gone far enough. Even so, I think it is a sound observation. Hitler wasn't a lunatic. He just had some really bad ideas.

fasquardon
 
I am reminded on Molotov's assessment of Hitler (Molotov having actually met the man): that Hitler was quite rational, and even intelligent, but utterly enthralled by bad ideas.

It's especially amusing, of course, coming from Molotov who to his dying day thought that Collectivization had been a failure because it hadn't gone far enough. Even so, I think it is a sound observation. Hitler wasn't a lunatic. He just had some really bad ideas.
Vyacheslav Molotov was a dimwitted, brown-nosing little toady who couldn't lie worth a damn and was as good a judge of people as I am a brain surgeon (and I have a congenital neurological condition that causes random hand twitches!).

Adolf Hitler was a gullible, dim-witted psychopath and an obsessive conspiracy theorist to make Alex Jones look rational. And what's worse, he thought he was the new Clausewitz. He was a disaster of a leader and a worse person, and Germany winning with him in charge was basically impossible.
 
Vyacheslav Molotov was a dimwitted, brown-nosing little toady who couldn't lie worth a damn and was as good a judge of people as I am a brain surgeon (and I have a congenital neurological condition that causes random hand twitches!).

Adolf Hitler was a gullible, dim-witted psychopath and an obsessive conspiracy theorist to make Alex Jones look rational. And what's worse, he thought he was the new Clausewitz. He was a disaster of a leader and a worse person, and Germany winning with him in charge was basically impossible.

And yet, the actual evidence shows both men to be rather normal specimens of humanity. Evil is rather banal stuff.

fasquardon
 
It's actually pretty amazing that the people who were regularly messing things up on a grand scale in the 1930s are the same ones who out-organize the Nazis in the 40s and emerge from WW2 as one of 3 superpowers.

"Three Superpowers"?

Vyacheslav Molotov was a dimwitted, brown-nosing little toady who couldn't lie worth a damn and was as good a judge of people as I am a brain surgeon (and I have a congenital neurological condition that causes random hand twitches!).

Adolf Hitler was a gullible, dim-witted psychopath and an obsessive conspiracy theorist to make Alex Jones look rational.

Of these, pretty much the only ones that are accurate are "brown-nosing little toady" and "obsessive conspiracy theorist to make Alex Jones look rational". "Psychopath" is debatable, as it's an iffy medical term that isn't universally accepted.
 
Of these, pretty much the only ones that are accurate are "brown-nosing little toady" and "obsessive conspiracy theorist to make Alex Jones look rational". "Psychopath" is debatable, as it's an iffy medical term that isn't universally accepted.
Molotov couldn't even come up with good Party lines, his propaganda in the Winter War was nothing short of laughably incompetent to the point that even Leonid Brezhnev would find it ridiculous. He was also an inept coward, and whatever else you can say about Stalin (believe me, there are many, many things I can say, none of them complimentary), the man had a force of personality (which, yes, largely consisted of "I will have your daughters raped by Beria before I have you shot if you fail and/or disobey me") that Molotov never could have matched.

Hitler wanted to wipe out an entire religion and went through with the plan. Which is pretty out there even by Human standards.
 

Deleted member 1487

Perhaps. The Germans easily bypassed any and all defenses in 42, it seems to be a non issue.
But overextending their armies they allowed the Soviets to attrit them. Without these wasteful offenses the Germans would still at least have a mobile reserve to stop offensives, which the Germans lost by late July 43.
In 1942 only because the Soviets depleted themselves on the offensive in Ukraine that summer first, plus they hoarded reserves to defend Moscow and Stalin refused to believe the German offensive in the south was genuinely just aiming for the south. All that added up to a relatively easily penetrated front in Ukraine without reserves to stop the Germans; when they did pop up it was piecemeal and on the flanks.
BTW on the defensive in 1941 the Germans suffered a worse casualty exchange rate than on the offensive.
 

Deleted member 1487

A hypothetical German consolidation in September or October would only have involved a momentary transition to the defense, and would still have included local offensives after the ground froze and mobility resumed. The Germans needed an operational pause to bring up more supplies including winter clothing, repair, and replace damaged vehicles (and if they had conceived a multi-stage campaign that the task of defeating the USSR demands they would not have ramped down production for the army and so would have more replacements to offer), and give the troops a breather. But that would take a month or two and then they'd be free to resume attacking in select regions. Leningrad would be an obvious target, but reducing any Soviet forces poorly deployed too far forward would also be on the menu. The only thing off the table would be an all-or-nothing push for Moscow.

If the Germans resumed a major push for Leningrad in November after the ground froze, contemporary Soviet doctrine would still have mandated major counter offensives there and elsewhere along the frontlines, in the hopes of drawing forces away. Similarly, the response to any encircled forces would be more attacks to try and relieve them. All a German breather gets the Soviets is a similar breather in September and October, before the Germans resume smaller scale, less ambitious attacks.

It's almost certain that if the Germans had transitioned to the defensive with some later limited offensives the Soviets would have attacked, regardless of the suspicions of some Soviet generals that the balance of forces was not in their favour. The only real question is how quickly they would have knocked it off once they realized they were getting nowhere (as would be likely) and whether the Germans would manage to pocket a substantial portion of the attacking forces with any "backhand blow" they subsequently launched.
Historically the Germans did consolidate in August-September on the Moscow axis. That got them the really punishing Soviet offensives that cost them some of the worst casualties of the campaign to that point. Offensive action on the other hand on the flanks got much better casualty ratios and disrupted Soviet attacks so badly that they were launched weakly and disorganized, costing them more than if they were able to take time to plan out the offensive and mitigate the problems of the less well trained forces they were raising at that point. The more time they wait for Leningrad, the more time the Soviets build up defenses and raise more forces to hold the city, as well as either evacuate industry or build more weapons on site. Counterpunching in 1941 isn't going to yield anything like the Kiev or Vyazma pockets and only gives the Soviets time to mobilize their reserves after which any campaign is going to be a long costly slog and probably ultimately unwinnable due to US entry and the very thin margin for victory thereafter.
 
Leningrad certainly offered operational and strategic options, but the center of Soviet power remained Moscow especially due to the communications and rail convergence on the city as well as it having about 10% of the entire nation's industry in part due to the large deposits of iron and coal nearby; that last point also meant that it was the regional hub for electrical generation, as they brought the hydroplant on line at the reservoir nearby.

AGS certainly had too much going on itself to participate in Typhoon, it was advancing to the Donbas, Rostov, and Kharkov. Plus they had the worst logistic situation of any of the army groups once across the Dniester. They were better off tying down Soviet forces on the Dniester and not being a logistical drain on AG-Center, as well as pulling them in to help deal with Soviet forces in Ukraine.

guess my view of Leningrad first is shaped by the potential improvement(s) on the naval side, that do not require the reshuffling of large numbers of troops from other operations? in other words a large upside from small POD.

tens of thousands of Soviet forces slipped thru their fingers at Tallinn and later Hanko, whether they (and the Soviet naval guns) tipped the balance in defense of Leningrad is of course open to opinion.

if they made a stronger naval effort on the Black Sea, u-boats there from the outset, there is no seaborne evacuation by the Soviets from Odessa? and no Soviet sea link with Crimea later?
 

elkarlo

Banned
Stopping it early may temporarily stop the losses, but the Soviets will prepare defenses and their own offensives at their leisure, which will inflict losses on the Germans. And there is no guarantee that waiting would make any 1942 offensives easier. History demonstrated that letting the Soviets breath to build up was a bad idea.
True, but how much of the German losses would have been attributed to being over extended? The rush to Moscow had them taking crazy risks to make it there by winter.
When they did have good defensive lines they held well .
With possibly lower propitiation losses the Germans would have more strength in 42 and possibly be able to take Sevastopol and leningrad. Which would have freed up a large amount of troops for minor offensive operations for the remaining campaign season
 
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