Was a North Vietnamese victory in the Vietnam War inevitable?

He made the quote in his 1977 book on the 1975 offensive, were he directly laid the blame of the ARVN's decline in combat capabilities directly on the loss of aid:
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And according to the book, the VPA had grown stronger compared to what it was in 1973 anyways. The arrangement and wording also indicates that the fall in material support was independent to the fall of morale.

Sure, leadership in that particular instance could've been the deciding factor for the better than average performance of the 18th Division. That does not, however, dispute any of my charges; it's an attempt at a cherry pick, rather.

Sure it does! After all, had the rest of the ARVN enjoyed the leadership of the 18th division. That's rather indicative that your charge that the problem was a lack of supplies is false.

Also, characterizing the 18th division's performance as "better than average" is insulting to the memory of it's men. It's performance ranks right up there with the 1970 Cambodian Operations as the best the ARVN show in the war, even if it was it's final show.

And that's exactly my point; arguing that because they captured $5 Billion worth of equipment means the problem was in the logistics network falls flat when one realizes that it's a statistical illusion. It does nothing to answer the overall point of shortages and rather uses the aircraft, for example, to obfuscate that question.

130,000 tons of ammunition in stockpiles, the equivalent to more then a half-years worth of ARVN expenditures, when the frontline units only have a couple of shells for each artillery battalion is not any sort of illusion and very much indicative of a problem in the logistics unit. You can try and ignore this all you want, but the fact is that the ARVN's supply state was largely disconnected from it's performance. If one was expecting the lack of aid to be the key problem, then what we should have seen frontline forces with only a couple of shells and a few magazines-per-rifle as well stockpile with something like a couple thousand tons of ammunition left.

If they only had 100,000 on hand, after two million shells shipped in from the Chinese over 1974-1975, that implies a very heavy rate of expenditure and that the loss of support from China would be major in any real environment of contention from the ARVN. This is critical, because if we presume that 1975 plays out like you suggest, by the time they recover from it it'll be 1978 and Chinese aid will have been cut. End game, as I said in my original post.

Erm, the Chinese shipped the VPA 965,000 shells during 1975. Those shells didn't teleport down into the frontlines in South Vietnam at the start of the year but rather were shipped in over the course of it... where they were mostly retained up north, with the campaign ultimately relying mainly on captured ARVN stocks. The bulk of those shipment would likely have arrived AFTER the 1975 offensive had ended, and none would have arrived at the START of the offensive, what with it technically being in 1974 (December 13th, to be precise). The Vietnamese only planned to expend <17,000 in the campaign (which goes to show just how unambitious the initial offensive plans were and how pitiful the ARVN had become that it collapsed to such a weak attack badly enough to encourage the VPA to go all the way first to Hue and then to Saigon) and from the captured stocks they basically recouped all expected losses. So by 1965 it would be 100,000 + 965,000. And why would it take the VPA 3 years to bounce back? They largely go to ground when the American air force shows up, remember? They don't try to keep a sustained offensive in the face of the air campaign as they tried in 1972 but rather just wait the air intervention out. So their losses will be relatively minimal and their expenditures in ammunition are covered by just what they capture.

And even if it takes until 1978, then A: what prevent the Vietnamese from carrying on and knocking out South Vietnam with the aid they've already acquired in the intervening years and B: why would Chinese aid be cut if the Vietnamese haven't yet invaded Cambodia?

Something else I forgot is that the Chinese effort was a border battle, not extensive strategic, conventional offensives that had come to mark the war from 1972 to 1975 for the PVA.

Yeah, a "border battle" with as many men and armor as was committed to the VPA's ultimate offensive in 1975 and with similar casualty rates. :rolleyes:

The ARVN butchered the NVA in 1972, completely destroying their armored element and inflicting 100,000 deaths to 40,000 of their own; NVA commanders literally had manpower shortages after it and their units were so exhausted that it took until 1975 for another major offensive to be attempted. Air power alone doesn't explain this at all, but even then that's not an argument against my position; I'm arguing continued American support, both in logistics and air power, would be decisive in allowing South Vietnam to make it until China turns on the North and from there it's game over.

As I've said in discussions elsewhere: casualty ratios mean fuck all. Your fixation on them utterly ignores all the other aspects of the campaign. Prior to the introduction of American airpower, the VPA was soundly THRASHING the ARVN and even after it's introduction it took a solid month before the VPA's capabilities declined enough for the and even then they were able to hold their ground and fight the ARVN counter-offensive to a standstill, costing the ARVN losses in it's junior and mid-level leadership that it never recovered from. Any analysis which ignores these aspects is so woefully incomplete as to be worthless. The ultimate outcome of the Easter Offensive may have been a defeat for the North, but a defeat is all it was and one it had only suffered by razor thin margins (and they knew it). For the south, it was the herald of the end.

It was enough for South Korea, and they didn't have the added benefit of China going hostile to North Korea like she did with North Vietnam in just a few years.

Uh... what? South Korea was dependent on it's survival on the presence of large American ground troops against North Korea throughout the entire Korean War... and in the aftermath, the US has continued to maintain significant ground forces on the Korean peninsula alongside South Korean forces too this very day. So the claim that aid alone was enough for South Korea is flagrantly false.
 
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And according to the book, the VPA had grown stronger compared to what it was in 1973 anyways. The arrangement and wording also indicates that the fall in material support was independent to the fall of morale.

I have no doubt the NVA had gained in strength by 1975, given the increased Chinese aid from 1972 onwards but this, again, does not explain away my position; if it was merely a matter of the NVA getting better, they would've been overpowering the ARVN rather than what we saw IOTL of the ARVN disintegrating. That is consistent with a collapse in morale and lack of logistics, with Dung noting that the ARVN's pacification efforts had halted and that they had become passive, which he literally notes was caused by the collapse of American aid. Again, this is entirely consistent with Murray's predictions, and what Davidson and Veith have stated were the root cause.

When the Defense attache for the U.S., the North Vietnamese commander in charge of the offensive, and three different modern historians are all in agreement on the subject, it's very telling.

Sure it does! After all, had the rest of the ARVN enjoyed the leadership of the 18th division. That's rather indicative that your charge that the problem was a lack of supplies is false.

It really doesn't, which is why the Professionals talk logistics instead of leadership. It's a cherry pick being used to explain the entirety of a military force while completely discounting localized factors that could explain it; there's a reason why we don't asses WWII solely by Pearl Harbor or Kiev.

130,000 tons of ammunition in stockpiles, the equivalent to more then a half-years worth of ARVN expenditures, when the frontline units only have a couple of shells for each artillery battalion is not any sort of illusion and very much indicative of a problem in the logistics unit. You can try and ignore this all you want, but the fact is that the ARVN's supply state was largely disconnected from it's performance. If one was expecting the lack of aid to be the key problem, then what we should have seen frontline forces with only a couple of shells and a few magazines-per-rifle as well stockpile with something like a couple thousand tons of ammunition left.

Give us a link to average expenditures by the ARVN for one, and at this point you're also going to have to start posting citations because it's just tiring getting these claims without substance to them from you.

Erm, the Chinese shipped the VPA 965,000 shells during 1975. Those shells didn't teleport down into the frontlines in South Vietnam at the start of the year but rather were shipped in over the course of it... where they were mostly retained up north, with the campaign ultimately relying mainly on captured ARVN stocks. The bulk of those shipment would likely have arrived AFTER the 1975 offensive had ended, and none would have arrived at the START of the offensive, what with it technically being in 1974 (December 13th, to be precise). The Vietnamese only planned to expend <17,000 in the campaign (which goes to show just how unambitious the initial offensive plans were and how pitiful the ARVN had become that it collapsed to such a weak attack badly enough to encourage the VPA to go all the way first to Hue and then to Saigon) and from the captured stocks they basically recouped all expected losses. So by 1965 it would be 100,000 + 965,000. And why would it take the VPA 3 years to bounce back? They largely go to ground when the American air force shows up, remember? They don't try to keep a sustained offensive in the face of the air campaign as they tried in 1972 but rather just wait the air intervention out. So their losses will be relatively minimal and their expenditures in ammunition are covered by just what they capture.

And they received over 1 million in 1974 and you said they only had 100,000 on hand in 1975, so what's your point?

As for the question of American air support, you've now boxed yourself into a corner on this point. If your contention is that said air power does nothing to the NVA, then that means the ARVN utterly smashed them to pieces in 1972; you cannot have it any other way on this subject with your statements here. With that in mind, what was the only thing to have changed between 1972 and 1975 for the ARVN? They lost American logistical aid.

And even if it takes until 1978, then A: what prevent the Vietnamese from carrying on and knocking out South Vietnam with the aid they've already acquired in the intervening years and B: why would Chinese aid be cut if the Vietnamese haven't yet invaded Cambodia?

Relations between Cambodia and Vietnam had collapsed before Saigon even fell and relations were already starting to decline as a result with China. By 1978, North Vietnam is surrounded by hostile forces on all sides and the ARVN has had a further three years to continue improving itself while in 1978, Chinese supplies will have been lost by the NVA.

Yeah, a "border battle" with as many men and armor as was committed to the VPA's ultimate offensive in 1975 and with similar casualty rates. :rolleyes:

I'd absolutely love for you to link me to something that suggests China was planning on a strategic offensive deep into Vietnam rather than just engaging in hostilities along the periphery to place stress on Vietnamese efforts elsewhere (Cambodia).

As I've said in discussions elsewhere: casualty ratios mean fuck all. Your fixation on them utterly ignores all the other aspects of the campaign. Prior to the introduction of American airpower, the VPA was soundly THRASHING the ARVN and even after it's introduction it took a solid month before the VPA's capabilities declined enough for the and even then they were able to hold their ground and fight the ARVN counter-offensive to a standstill, costing the ARVN losses in it's junior and mid-level leadership that it never recovered from. Any analysis which ignores these aspects is so woefully incomplete as to be worthless. The ultimate outcome of the Easter Offensive may have been a defeat for the North, but a defeat is all it was and one it had only suffered by razor thin margins (and they knew it). For the south, it was the herald of the end.

And you've just contradicted yourself from your previous statements, as here you claim American airpower was decisive after you've just claimed that "they largely go to ground when the American air force shows up, remember?". If they go to ground and wait out the air attacks, that means it surely was the ARVN kicking their teeth in.

Uh... what? South Korea was dependent on it's survival on the presence of large American ground troops against North Korea throughout the entire Korean War... and in the aftermath, the US has continued to maintain significant ground forces on the Korean peninsula alongside South Korean forces too this very day. So the claim that aid alone was enough for South Korea is flagrantly false.

And this exactly proves my point; the U.S. kept support going to South Korea but it didn't for South Vietnam. We pulled out the logistical aid and direct military support from our aircraft and naval units, and that's what doomed them.
 
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So, you're saying only the militaries active in a specific year can be compared with each other? If that's the case then that also means the only western armies that the ARVN was better than were those of Cambodia, Laos, Guatemala, Rhodesia, South Korea, and Portugal. And I'm skeptical of them being better than the last two.

Uh, what? I never said that and literally none of those are Western Armies besides Portugal, which no one was claiming was better than the ARVN.

That means the US staying in the war, which naturally also means much more than continued aid.

I've consistently said air support and logistics since I came into this thread.

Yeah but after Tet VC combat units were mostly just rebadged PAVN units.

How about Cambodian and Laotian Communists? Soviet and Chinese "advisers"? It's the name game at this point.

South Korea had something better, North Korea was an unstable pile of ruble after the UN and Chinese rolled over it, and South Korea had a somewhat respected government. South Korea also had a demographic advantage over the North, while the opposite was true in Vietnam.

North Vietnam had about as many bombs dropped on it as Germany did in WWII and South Korea was a corrupt dictatorship that even North Korea had the economic advantage over until the 1970s/1980s. For most of Korea's existence, likewise, the North has had the demographic edge and the reversal is a relatively recent phenomenon.
 
Uh, what? I never said that and literally none of those are Western Armies besides Portugal, which no one was claiming was better than the ARVN.
Then what are you saying when you assert that the ARVN was the third best military in the west. Because it's increasingly sounding like you mean nothing by it and simply included it because it sounds cool.

How about Cambodian and Laotian Communists? Soviet and Chinese "advisers"? It's the name game at this point.
This is a name game you started in an attempt to obfuscate the actual casualty ratio of the ARVN in 1972.

I've consistently said air support and logistics since I came into this thread.
And that requires the US to stay in the war.

North Vietnam had about as many bombs dropped on it as Germany did in WWII
And unlike Germany and North Korea, North Vietnam was repeatedly given ample time to rebuild and recover between surges in areal activity, and was never subjected to an invasion.

South Korea was a corrupt dictatorship that even North Korea had the economic advantage over until the 1970s/1980s.
A state of affairs that came about years after the armistice. During which time South Korea decayed and North Korea rebuilt. Looking at the facts at the time of the armistice (ie the relevant period when discussing why South Korea didn't succumb to South Vietnam's fate) South Korea was militarily and institutionally stronger than North Korea (which had had the entire pacific theatre worth of bombs dropped on it in a relatively short period of time, been occupied, and existed at the mercy of its Chinese saviours).

For most of Korea's existence, likewise, the North has had the demographic edge and the reversal is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Entirely wrong.
350px-Population_of_Korea.svg.png

The south has always had approximately twice the population of the north. In any drawn out conflict the South has a massive edge in the form of a vastly larger manpower pool to mobilize (and this was seen in the Korean War, with the South fielding over 600,000 soldiers at its peak, whereas the North only musters less than 300,000 at its peak).
 
The south has always had approximately twice the population of the north. In any drawn out conflict the South has a massive edge in the form of a vastly larger manpower pool to mobilize (and this was seen in the Korean War, with the South fielding over 600,000 soldiers at its peak, whereas the North only musters less than 300,000 at its peak).
But almost all the Industry was in the North, the south was Agricultural
 
But almost all the Industry was in the North, the south was Agricultural
At the time of the armistice neither had much in the way of industry, as the North had essentially been bombed flat. It would be years of painful rebuilding before the North regained its prewar industrial advantage. And that industrial advantage was arguably of little military advantage as the North had no way to prevent the South from just importing the difference.

Additionally, North Korea's industries were of somewhat limited military utility. Certainly they produced plenty of small arms, artillery, and munitions, but they were still extremely dependant on imports for almost all their vehicular needs.

On the subject of the South's agrarian nature, unlike the North they weren't a few bombed rail lines away from famine.
 
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Then what are you saying when you assert that the ARVN was the third best military in the west. Because it's increasingly sounding like you mean nothing by it and simply included it because it sounds cool.

Again, what? I stated that, in the estimation of U.S. observers, the ARVN was considered the third best force in the Free World in the early to mid 70s. I'm not sure what you're even attempting to argue here.

This is a name game you started in an attempt to obfuscate the actual casualty ratio of the ARVN in 1972.

Do tell.

And that requires the US to stay in the war.

Air support and logistical aid does not, as the U.S. was already doing that IOTL until Watergate really started going.

And unlike Germany and North Korea, North Vietnam was repeatedly given ample time to rebuild and recover between surges in areal activity, and was never subjected to an invasion.

It was bombed as badly as Germany was, so no.

A state of affairs that came about years after the armistice. During which time South Korea decayed and North Korea rebuilt. Looking at the facts at the time of the armistice (ie the relevant period when discussing why South Korea didn't succumb to South Vietnam's fate) South Korea was militarily and institutionally stronger than North Korea (which had had the entire pacific theatre worth of bombs dropped on it in a relatively short period of time, been occupied, and existed at the mercy of its Chinese saviours).

In other words, all advantages South Vietnam actually had over South Korea if we go with is logic.

Entirely wrong.
350px-Population_of_Korea.svg.png

The south has always had approximately twice the population of the north. In any drawn out conflict the South has a massive edge in the form of a vastly larger manpower pool to mobilize (and this was seen in the Korean War, with the South fielding over 600,000 soldiers at its peak, whereas the North only musters less than 300,000 at its peak).

In the wider existence of Korea, not just since the Korean War.
 
It was bombed as badly as Germany was, so no.
Not exactly. Even during Linebacker II, there were off limit areas, and Haiphong and Hanoi were not the rubble piles that Hamburg and Berlin were.

The last real unrestricted bombing the USAF did was on North Korean cities. They looked like WWII pictures, moonscapes with a few walls here and there.
 
Not exactly. Even during Linebacker II, there were off limit areas, and Haiphong and Hanoi were not the rubble piles that Hamburg and Berlin were.

The last real unrestricted bombing the USAF did was on North Korean cities. They looked like WWII pictures, moonscapes with a few walls here and there.

In terms of total tonnage was my point. Speaking of which, fun fact: part of the restrictions Washington put on Bombers during the early phases of the war was that they couldn't even hit airfields. Loaded MiGs would be sitting out on the runways and we couldn't even get at them until they were in the air.
 
Again, what? I stated that, in the estimation of U.S. observers, the ARVN was considered the third best force in the Free World in the early to mid 70s. I'm not sure what you're even attempting to argue here.
And my responce was that such judgments are stupid and without value.

You can go back and reread your own comment.

Air support and logistical aid does not, as the U.S. was already doing that IOTL until Watergate really started going.
Pretty sure sustained strategic bombing campaigns would require a state of war.

It was bombed as badly as Germany was, so no.
No, it wasn't. Tonnage doesn't mean jack if it's not landing on population centres and isn't followed up on with a ground campaign.

In other words, all advantages South Vietnam actually had over South Korea if we go with is logic.
Except the ARVN wasn't stronger than the PAVN, there were still large domestic insurgencies in South Vietnam, North Vietnam's cities weren't reduced to ruble, Hanoi hadn't been recently occupied by southern and American troops, nor was it currently occupied by Chinese liberators, and North Vietnam had the larger population.

In the wider existence of Korea, not just since the Korean War.
In 1949 the South had a population of 20 million while the North had a population of 9 million. In 1940 there were 15 million in the south and 8 million in the north. The south had more flatlands and a warmer climate, naturally that translated into a larger population.
 
The RVN surviving the 1975 offensive doesn’t change the DRVNs capacity for three year offensives, nor does it change the US’s repositioning in south east Asia, nor does it change the revolution or growing PRG strength. If not 78 then 81.
 
The RVN surviving the 1975 offensive doesn’t change the DRVNs capacity for three year offensives, nor does it change the US’s repositioning in south east Asia, nor does it change the revolution or growing PRG strength. If not 78 then 81.

But at what point does the Warsaw Pact nations get tired of supplying North Vietnam?

After the losses of '68, '72 and then '75, why do you think the flow of military supplies would remain a free running tap?

Well, other than the Chinese shutting off most all the rail links by time the '78 Tet or Easter offensive would launch.
 
But at what point does the Warsaw Pact nations get tired of supplying North Vietnam?

After the losses of '68, '72 and then '75, why do you think the flow of military supplies would remain a free running tap?

Well, other than the Chinese shutting off most all the rail links by time the '78 Tet or Easter offensive would launch.

More importantly China quits supplying in 1978 and by 1979 the USSR is into Afghanistan...
 
I don't know how you plausibly get this but one way I see this working is if the US hands power to the National Liberation Front, again I don't know how you get the US to do this but the NLF was much more democratic and cosmopolitan than the CPV and they were sidelined almost immediately after the war by the CPV and the NVA. If you give them power they certainly won't be the same as the northern cadres who took over. I'm not really sure how you plausibly do this though. Maybe a one country two systems kind of thing, but the US couping the South Vietnamese government and giving the NLF coalition power in the south, would actually throw a huge wrench in northern plans.
 
I don't know how you plausibly get this but one way I see this working is if the US hands power to the National Liberation Front, again I don't know how you get the US to do this but the NLF was much more democratic and cosmopolitan than the CPV and they were sidelined almost immediately after the war by the CPV and the NVA. If you give them power they certainly won't be the same as the northern cadres who took over. I'm not really sure how you plausibly do this though. Maybe a one country two systems kind of thing, but the US couping the South Vietnamese government and giving the NLF coalition power in the south, would actually throw a huge wrench in northern plans.
The NLF had plenty of bones to pick with the Worker's Party, but it was still devoted to reunification. I think merely calling off the man hunt and letting them stand for election would better than simply handing them the reigns of power (and I'm skeptical of that being a good idea). That way they get wrapped up in Saigon's politics and are force to honestly court southern interest groups, under which circumstances their differences with Hanoi could grow into chasms, and their commitment to reunification will be like that of every other southern political faction, ie when the north submits to us.
 
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There’s no reason the VWP cadre in the NFL openly or in the fraternal parties won’t continue underground self-government and operating the PLAF. Wedging the NFL against the VWP in the DRVN is about wedging the southern VWP. And that’d be hard. Not impossible but hard.
 
In the wider existence of Korea, not just since the Korean War.


Okay so that was all quite weird. Because the conversation basically went like this:

STRD:
South Korea had something better, North Korea was an unstable pile of ruble after the UN and Chinese rolled over it, and South Korea had a somewhat respected government. South Korea also had a demographic advantage over the North, while the opposite was true in Vietnam.

HL:
North Vietnam had about as many bombs dropped on it as Germany did in WWII and South Korea was a corrupt dictatorship that even North Korea had the economic advantage over until the 1970s/1980s. For most of Korea's existence, likewise, the North has had the demographic edge and the reversal is a relatively recent phenomenon.

STRD:
*shows graph which demonstrates that this "recent" phenomenon has been around since at least 1950*

HL:
I meant in the time before there was a North and South Korea which thus really has nothing to do with the point STRD originally brought up about South Korea having a demographic advantage over North Korea unlike the situation in Vietnam that we are debating and is thus of highly questionable relevance.

Perhaps to humour the debate even further you can provide the time (and population figures) for when northern Korea (not North Korea) above the 38th parallel had a larger population than southern Korea (not South Korea) below the 38th parallel? Because at the moment it clearly isn't 1940.
 
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North Vietnam had about as many bombs dropped on it as Germany did in WWII and South Korea was a corrupt dictatorship that even North Korea had the economic advantage over until the 1970s/1980s. For most of Korea's existence, likewise, the North has had the demographic edge and the reversal is a relatively recent phenomenon.

1. The United States used way too many bombs on South Vietnam fighting the insurgency. Other then a Tet like situation where the enemy goes conventional we shouldn't have been doing B-52 air support missions in the South nor using bombers to try to interdict insurgent supply lines in the jungle.

2. On North Vietnam LBJ believed that one wrong bomb could ignite WW3 and therefore greatly managed the conduct of the bombing mission so we ended up mainly bombing to no real military effect during his administration. Only near the end did Nixon restart bombing in the North and allow the Air Force to hit targets of major military value.

To fight an insurgency in the South outside of major conventional attacks was counterproductive as in it was creating more enemy then it killed. As a means to force North Vietnam to the peace table it was almost by design ineffective until 1972, but by then Congressional support for the war had collapsed.

Still a number of Nixon people have said they highly regret not making greater demands on North Vietnam in 1972 such as to allow a small number of Americans in the South after and for the North to vacate the territory they held in the South because they realize moreso in retrospect after having talked to North Vietnamese generals and officials then at the time that they really did have North Vietnam over a barrel at the time.
 
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1. The United States used way too many bombs on South Vietnam fighting the insurgency. Other then a Tet like situation where the enemy goes conventional we shouldn't have been doing B-52 air support missions in the South nor using bombers to try to interdict insurgent supply lines in the jungle.

My Uncle, who did two tours there, said the Arc Lights were among the most awesomely terrifying things ever experienced, from being pinned down by PAVN forces and being 'saved' by one of those missions, as for whatever reason, the regular Firebases that they had normally gotten 175mm and 155mm support from, were unavailable. He said that the Arc Light from about a mile away made a 175mm FFE mission or Skyraider support look like firecrackers, and he said the Buff drivers were a lot better in putting in bombs at Danger Close than anyone, excepting some Skyraiders and a few A4s
 
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