Was a Dunkirk-like evacuation of Singapore possible?

MatthewB

Banned
Here’s the list of British convoys to Singapore http://www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Singapore.html

Between Jan 3 and Feb 5, 1942 ten convoys arrived at Singapore carrying over 30,000 troops. Had Churchill wanted to, could a Dunkirk evacuation be possible? Send those convoys with empty troopships and it seems doable. The troops need only be shipped to Burma or Calcutta, ideally the latter so to avoid being cut off when Rangoon falls. Though the Australians may want their boys sent home.

Now, I know this would be a disaster for British prestige and for respect from Washington as their own troops hold out at Corregidor, but those evacuated British and CW troops can fight again, likely defending India.

So, that aside, how do we execute this evacuation? Someone has to hold the rear guard, and it can’t just be the Indians as they’ll rightfully revolt back in India. Perhaps command and weapons can be turned over to the Malays and Chinese? And the convoys need protection, perhaps from the RAF on Sumatra and HMS Indomitable (Jan 27th she was off Sumatra)?
 
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If they were to evacuate it would be to either Sumatra or more likely Java, and it would be mainly rear area troops and wounded that went, the so called useless mouths. Those 30,000 troops that were sent to Singapore would be dropped off in Java while the convoys carried on to Singapore to load up. Presumably the 100 Hurricanes Indomitable ferried to Singapore would also have been sent to Java. The Australians would definitely want their men out of the trap but they like the British infantry would have to form the rear guard because the Indian divisions were not up to the task and could not be relied upon to not collapse. Technically an evacuation could have been done to an extent, but politically it would be impossible and likely lead to the fall of Churchill's government.
 
Which raises more interesting question, if in late 1940 an analysis is made that with current resources Malaya is hard to defend, could the UK along with the Netherlands exile government, have chosen Java for an island to be held? Would this have had, thanks to local agriculture and more local resources, advantages over trying to hold Malaya?
 
Which raises more interesting question, if in late 1940 an analysis is made that with current resources Malaya is hard to defend, could the UK along with the Netherlands exile government, have chosen Java for an island to be held? Would this have had, thanks to local agriculture and more local resources, advantages over trying to hold Malaya?

Not really. Losing Malaya cedes control of the seas and waterways in the Malay Archipelago to Japan, opening the way to their invasion of the Dutch East Indies, and allow them to take out vulnerable parts of the region at their leisure. In contrast, the thing about the invasion of Malaya is that the Japanese were going all in. They have no reserves, period, and any reinforcements they need to take the peninsula would inevitably have to be drawn elsewhere, especially China which had always been their main focus. The British holding out longer in Malaya or even driving the entire force swimming in the South China Sea would have severely crippled Japanese war plans and deny them valuable oil and other natural resources to supplement their war effort in China. That isn't to say the British didn't have problems of their own (hence why they lost Malaya IOTL), but they certainly could have done better than what can be summed up as a shambolic defence.
 
Not really. Losing Malaya cedes control of the seas and waterways in the Malay Archipelago to Japan, opening the way to their invasion of the Dutch East Indies, and allow them to take out vulnerable parts of the region at their leisure. In contrast, the thing about the invasion of Malaya is that the Japanese were going all in. They have no reserves, period, and any reinforcements they need to take the peninsula would inevitably have to be drawn elsewhere, especially China which had always been their main focus. The British holding out longer in Malaya or even driving the entire force swimming in the South China Sea would have severely crippled Japanese war plans and deny them valuable oil and other natural resources to supplement their war effort in China. That isn't to say the British didn't have problems of their own (hence why they lost Malaya IOTL), but they certainly could have done better than what can be summed up as a shambolic defence.

I do agree with you, Brits were able to grasp a defeat from jaws of a stalemate, but in Java they would have help of KNIL ground and air forces and better oceanic supply route possibilities and no possibility of an overland invasion. Furthermore, any invasion convoys would have longer route than from French Indochina and any initial air raids would have no fighter escort, unless carriers are used.
 
I do agree with you, Brits were able to grasp a defeat from jaws of a stalemate, but in Java they would have help of KNIL ground and air forces and better oceanic supply route possibilities and no possibility of an overland invasion. Furthermore, any invasion convoys would have longer route than from French Indochina and any initial air raids would have no fighter escort, unless carriers are used.

Well, there is Singapore Shonan-To as a launching point, so if anything, the distance has been severely cut down. :/

Japanese are crazy, and idiotic at times, but they knew fully well they need to take Malaya and the Philippines before securing the Dutch East Indies. Not defending these areas just makes their job easier.
 
Well, there is Singapore Shonan-To as a launching point, so if anything, the distance has been severely cut down. :/

Japanese are crazy, and idiotic at times, but they knew fully well they need to take Malaya and the Philippines before securing the Dutch East Indies. Not defending these areas just makes their job easier.

The idea is not to abandon Malaya and Singapore, but merely leave them with delaying forces, at least until larger forces for the theater will be available. So, basically leave defence of Malaya for 9th Indian Infantry division and Singapore garrison, send reinforcements for Java instead. This gives more time to build up defense of Java.
 

MatthewB

Banned
The idea is not to abandon Malaya and Singapore, but merely leave them with delaying forces, at least until larger forces for the theater will be available.
No it’s not. We’re not withdrawing from one besieged island onto another. The troops need to be removed to where they can’t be encircled while they rebuild and re-equip and then re-enter the fight, i.e. India.

As for Churchill’s government falling, I don’t see it. Churchill authorized the mass retreats from both Dunkirk (June 1940, 338,000 troops evacuated) and Greece (June 1941, 51,000 troops evacuated). Why would a similarly sized evacuation to India doom his government?

For the rearguard tasked with fighting to the end in Singapore, I can think of no better commander than the useless Percival.
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
Here’s the list of British convoys to Singapore http://www.netherlandsnavy.nl/Singapore.html

Between Jan 3 and Feb 5, 1942 ten convoys arrived at Singapore carrying over 30,000 troops. Had Churchill wanted to, could a Dunkirk evacuation be possible? Send those convoys with empty troopships and it seems doable. The troops need only be shipped to Burma or Calcutta, ideally the latter so to avoid being cut off when Rangoon falls. Though the Australians may want their boys sent home.

Now, I know this would be a disaster for British prestige and for respect from Washington as their own troops hold out at Corregidor, but those evacuated British and CW troops can fight again, likely defending India.

So, that aside, how do we execute this evacuation? Someone has to hold the rear guard, and it can’t just be the Indians as they’ll rightfully revolt back in India. Perhaps command and weapons can be turned over to the Malays and Chinese? And the convoys need protection, perhaps from the RAF on Sumatra and HMS Indomitable (Jan 27th she was off Sumatra)?

Evacuating Singapore out of the blue was very difficult from a political point of view. The continious reinforcement of Malaya was downright criminal though. Thousands of those didn't even fire their gun. 10,000 of those at Burma, Sumatra and Java would have made a huge difference.

If the Allies do evacuate Singapore Sumatra and Java are probably the safest and closest destinations, for the first leg anyway. Depending on the timing this could be done pretty safely. It was not until february 5th that allied convoys started losing ships.

Which raises more interesting question, if in late 1940 an analysis is made that with current resources Malaya is hard to defend, could the UK along with the Netherlands exile government, have chosen Java for an island to be held? Would this have had, thanks to local agriculture and more local resources, advantages over trying to hold Malaya?

They very well could. The biggest obstacle was that the UK didn't decide to defend the Dutch East Indies until very late in 1941. Lacking a guarentee the Dutch government had no choice but to be part of the Allies in Europe but neutral in Asia. This also screwed up the deployment of Australian forces at Ambon and Timor.

Java could very well act as a thorn in the flank of the Japanese empire. From Java the Allies could contest SLOCs around Malaya and Borneo and it would be a great base of operations for bombers against the oilfields on Sumatra and Borneo. The biggest problem could be supplying it though. If the Japanese advance closes the seas to the North that means most ports are closed as well. As a port on the south side there is Tjilatjap but that one is lacking in connections to the north of the island. If the decision is made early enough the DEI government might be able to remedy that though and if Southern Sumatra is held that would keep Batavia's port open at least.
 
If they were to evacuate it would be to either Sumatra or more likely Java...
Sumatra has the advantages of it being nearer, allows contention of the Sunda Straits and Straits of Malacca, accounts for more than half of all the oil produced in the Dutch East Indies at the time, and had one of the main refineries at the eastern end of the island. IIRC the refinery was captured by airborne troops largely intact, I don't know offhand abound what the oilfields – denying them to the enemy would certainly hurt the Japanese.
 
A better POD in this instance is that someone tells Churchill that Singapore is not a fortress, that the forces (air, sea, land) needed to hold it are in North Africa and the Med, and the defenses were never set up to repulse overland attacks, and Churchill believes him. This happens in December 1941. Churchill complained about this not happening in his history and there does seem to have been a breakdown of communication at this point. Maybe have Dill or Churchill send Brooke to the area on some mission in mid 1941, or Percival or whatever alternative land commander you want takes a look at the defenses and actually goes home and demands to see Churchill to tell him that the place is close to indefensible.

A later POD might be Wavell not haiving his accident at the port, but at that point its probably too late. But things change if the War Office realizes that there is to be no last stand in Singapore as of December 8th, 1941. And the Admiralty may also not bother with sending the Price of Wales if its generally realized among senior officials in London that Singapore is pretty much indefensible once the Japanese take the airfields in northern Malaya.
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
A later POD might be Wavell not haiving his accident at the port, but at that point its probably too late. But things change if the War Office realizes that there is to be no last stand in Singapore as of December 8th, 1941. And the Admiralty may also not bother with sending the Price of Wales if its generally realized among senior officials in London that Singapore is pretty much indefensible once the Japanese take the airfields in northern Malaya.

Force Z wasn't meant to defend Singapore, it was send to act as an detterent.
 
IMHO the problem is that, by the time it becomes obvious that Singapore is doomed, the Japanese have enough sea and air control to make a hash of evacuation convoys/ships. Furthermore the distances to the DEI are substantially greater than across the Channel. The only options are either are better defense plan, which doesn't require much extra in the way of actual troops and equipment than OTL, or realizing that defending Singapore is a lost cause and not sending massive amounts of troops only to be lost or captured.
 
Furthermore the distances to the Dutch East Indies are substantially greater than across the Channel.
I'm sorry? The Strait of Malacca looks to be narrower than the English Channel so I'm curious what you're classing as the Dutch East Indies.
 
I agree however moving across that strait and no further is not a big plus, once there moving further away from the Japanese except by sea is an issue, so best to get fairly far away to begin.
 
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