Was 2nd El Alemain really necessary ?

Here's a question. Was the allied plan to break enemy forces at El Alemain and then launch Torch as a follow up really the best way to go about things ?

A quick glance of the map tells me that that was were the enemy was most concentrated, and the position kind of played to the Axis strengths (no battle of maneuver, close-in fighting to minimize the effect of airpower, heavily fortified positions, narrow front). So, given this, did the Allies have any other alternatives ? I thought about a couple of possible options, and wanted to check on how doable they are:

Scenario A
Significant forces kept in Egypt but naval landings at Tripoli and/or Benghazi. Rommel is cut off and forced to disengage from El Alemain, leading to a battle of maneuver in the open field the allies can win easily (better armor, numerical superiority, airpower etc)

Scenario B
Torch brought forward couple of weeks/El Alemain delayed. Rommel is probably forced to retreat to save his rear areas, leading to an open field battle etc etc.

Scenario C
Allied landing in Tunisia only, with the aim of reaching Tripoli ASAP, while significant forces in Egypt stand by to pounce the axis as soon as they abandon their fortified line. The rest of French North Africa is bound to follow more or less on its own.

Scenario D
Allied landing in Sicily. This might be the most risky, but could potentially lead, if successful, to Rommel being more or less cut off. What kind of forces did the Italians have in Sicily to resist a determined Allied landing ?

Scenario E
Anything else you can think of...
 
Here's a question. Was the allied plan to break enemy forces at El Alemain and then launch Torch as a follow up really the best way to go about things ?

A quick glance of the map tells me that that was were the enemy was most concentrated, and the position kind of played to the Axis strengths (no battle of maneuver, close-in fighting to minimize the effect of airpower, heavily fortified positions, narrow front). So, given this, did the Allies have any other alternatives ? I thought about a couple of possible options, and wanted to check on how doable they are:

Scenario A
Significant forces kept in Egypt but naval landings at Tripoli and/or Benghazi. Rommel is cut off and forced to disengage from El Alemain, leading to a battle of maneuver in the open field the allies can win easily (better armor, numerical superiority, airpower etc)

Unlikely as any naval force runs risks from the Luftwaffe based in Crete plus the Italian Navy. Samller landings behind & closer to the front might be possible but with out a break through would be left at risk from Axis reinforcements.

Scenario B
Torch brought forward couple of weeks/El Alemain delayed. Rommel is probably forced to retreat to save his rear areas, leading to an open field battle etc etc.

While Torch would be a distraction, the Axis still has sizable reinforcements in Italy and PanzerArmee Afrika is still intact allowing Rommel to decide wheter to stay or retreat. If he does retreat it means the Allies will face a stronger more mobile force elsewhere possibly delaying the conquest for sometime.

Scenario C
Allied landing in Tunisia only, with the aim of reaching Tripoli ASAP, while significant forces in Egypt stand by to pounce the axis as soon as they abandon their fortified line. The rest of French North Africa is bound to follow more or less on its own.

Possibly but the Allies could not be sure and with the possibility of the French Forces in Africa attacking them, the Allies cannot risk being that far out on a limb with enemies coming at them from both sides.

Scenario D
Allied landing in Sicily. This might be the most risky, but could potentially lead, if successful, to Rommel being more or less cut off. What kind of forces did the Italians have in Sicily to resist a determined Allied landing ?

Substancial forces are in Sicily at this time plus Italy morale is not broken. German Luftwaffe forces are also sizable. Furthermore it would be comparatively easy for the Axis to shift reinforcements to Sicily to cut off the Allied Landing from Northern Italy and Southern France.

Scenario E
Anything else you can think of...

Overall the most likely alternate to the battle would be to make a behind the front along Rommel's immediate supply lines coupled with the British Assault on Rommel's frontline. This would force hime to decide quickly between staying and fighting with the Probability of being cutoff entirely or running while the landings are still unsecure and he has a chance to force his way past.
 
Overall the most likely alternate to the battle would be to make a behind the front along Rommel's immediate supply lines coupled with the British Assault on Rommel's frontline. This would force hime to decide quickly between staying and fighting with the Probability of being cutoff entirely or running while the landings are still unsecure and he has a chance to force his way past.

IIRC that was Hitler's initial fear, and I think that U-boats were organised to attack anything passing the coast of Tunisia. Luckily that didn't happen.
On a side note I'm busy shuddering violently at the thought of Fredenhall vs Rommel and a full-strength Panzerarmee Afrika. Not nice.
 
Yes, as it was the only place US troops would be able to fight the Germans in Europe and the democracies did not feel it politic to just do nothing and let the USSR do *all* the work on the ground against the Axis. Torch was designed to do what it did, to pocket a good-sized number of Axis troops via a pincer movement. Rommel and his subordinates had achieved a psychological advantage in complete disproportion in numbers, so Monty's successful offensive also served to reduce that edge, which a more indirect struggle would still wind up having to face in a different battle.
 
Magnum, I would disagree with your original assessment. Rommel had been far superior to the British in maneuver warfare in the year and so before 2nd El Alamein. The narrow front at El Alamein played to British strengths, not Axis ones.
 

Cook

Banned
Scenario A
Significant forces kept in Egypt but naval landings at Tripoli and/or Benghazi.

Rommel had already demonstrated that he was able to destroy two British armies, one in front of him and one behind only a few months earlier, culminating in the fall of Tobruk and the retreat to Egypt. Attempting to do the same thing again, with the added difficulties associated with an amphibious landing rather than operating from an already secured port, would not have been an inviting idea. Added to that is the fact that the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica still dominated the central Mediterranean making any convoys very hazardous. German and Italian submarines were also operating in strength there.
Scenario B
Torch brought forward couple of weeks/El Alemain delayed.

The intention was to prevent the Afrika Corps from withdrawing.
Scenario C
Allied landing in Tunisia only, with the aim of reaching Tripoli ASAP,

Same problem as Scenario A. Landings in Tunis were ruled out by the allied high command because of the threat of air attack from Sardinia and Sicily and submarine attack. The landings in French North Africa secured the allied flank and provided air bases to attack Sicily from. Morocco was considered essential by the Americans in case the Germans responded to the landings by occupying Spain and closing the Straits of Gibraltar, the British didn’t think they were necessary and would have preferred taking the risk of landings in Tunisia. Given that the Torch landings were America’s introduction to the war a cautious approach was considered best, even though the more hazardous eastern landings were by British forces. Had Tunisia been included presumably the forces landed in Morocco would have landed in western Algeria and everything else moved along one position.
Scenario D
Allied landing in Sicily.

Impossible without bases for close air support.
 
At thsat time Rommel was still past master in maneouvre war fare. As far as i know.

The German panzer was superior at that time as well (compare Pz IV and later VI with mathilda's and so on). Even the Allieds tanks were known as "tommy cooker" or "Ronsons".

Rommels tactic was so "clothe" his panzers in anit-tank guns going forward and anti-tank mines retreating. not a bad choice really.

Ivan
 
When everyone disagrees with you, it’s usually a sign you’re wrong. However, I’m not prepared to throw in the towel just yet :p. Also, I would have written something sooner, but work got in the way :(

Here are some considerations regarding some issues previously pointed out:


1.The axis position at El Alemain

The Germans and Italians were heavily outnumbered, with only 547 (of which 298 were Italian) tanks, 552 guns and 116k men as opposed to 1029 tanks, 900 Guns and 195k men for the British. The nature of the terrain mean that they couldn’t be outflanked, with the British having to attack their defensive line head on. Said defensive line (which was well and truly well thought out and formidable) was their only trump card, and it also allowed them to use their superior 88mm AT guns to their fullest. Absent the defensive line and with an open flank, Panzerarmee Afrika would be in an even more impossible position. And bringing them into this impossible position (no fortifications, open flank) was my originial intention.

2.Why such a position would be advantageous to the British

a. Superiority in numbers
Having more troops meant the British could send overwhelming forces against the Axis’ open flank and still keep more than enough men up north near the coast in case Rommel tried to concentrate in one place. Forcing Rommel to string his forces out would also mean his 88’ would not be in such an advantageous position.
b. Superiority in quality
The best british tank, the Sherman, outclassed the best axis models (the early model Pz IV and the Pz III), while the worse British tanks were far superior to the worse axis ones (the Italian models)
c. Superiority in Intel
While axis intel did enjoy succes in NA at times, by now the british were miles ahead
d. Superiority in airpower
530 planes as opposed to only 480 (of which 130 were in Italy and Greece, 200 were Italian and only 150 were German). Moreover a battle in an open field would make the British aircraft even more effective than they were at El Alemain (where they were no pushovers btw)

e. Superiority in supplies

Monty was really good at this, and the way the British handled their supply situation OTL after El Alemain only proves it. However, the most important thing is this. A retreating Panzerarmee Afrika would be sitting ducks, for the simple fact they lacked the fuel to move everyone at once. The situation was so bad, that Rommel even went as far as spreading his Panzer reserve close to the front instead of keeping them together further back because he couldn’t move them at once effectively. If Rommel starts retreating, I doubt he will make it to Tobruk given his fuel problems. When he retreated OTL, he didn’t have this problem because there weren’t that many men and machines left to move (e.g. only 36 German tanks survived). And if moving all his units under normal circumstances is bad enough, imagine the situation should the trickle of supplies coming in from Tripoli (see the following points) were to totally dry up

3. The threat posed by the Italian navy

The only thing the Italian navy was good at by this point was losing and/or staying in port. Seriously, given the situation, what on earth could they do other than stay in port or get sunk ? The Allies enjoyed a massive superiority, which they could increase even further with ships from the Home Fleet or even from the US (although it would be totally unnecessary), should they feel the need.

4. The threat posed by U-boats

True, they would be a nuisance. However, could they really have that big of an impact on a naval landing in the central med ? There were only about a dozen or so of them in the area anyway. Name one landing that was threatened, or even seriously hampered, by U-boats. And if you mention Overlord, that was such a disaster for the U-boats that they more or less stopped existing as a significant threat afterwards.

5. The threat posed by French forces in NA striking the Allied flank
What Vichy France had in NA were quasi-immobile poorly armed infantry units of very, very, very (and did I mention very?) questionable loyalty (a fact proven by how Torch took place). They sold a lot of their trucks to the Axis back in '41 and, since then, were slow in getting replacements. The French were very likely to turn over to the Allies within a few days at most.


6. The threat posed by Axis airpower
This is probably the only serious threat an allied landing in Tunisia only or in Tripoli might face. However, airpower cannot stop an invasion on its own. Most axis planes were based in Sicily (including 225 German bombers, of which only 130 were serviceable), so:
a) the allies land in Tunisia.
Right next to axis airfields, HOWEVER, given that the local french will change sides quite quickly, the allies can bring in their own aircraft and operate them from French runways. This will eventually even out the odds. Also, a couple of carriers worth of fighters might provide enough aircover in the first crucial days. Even if they don't, axis planes based in Sicily cannot stop a landing in Tunis&Bizerta by themselves and a counter-invasion of Tunisia by Axis troops would be pure suicide with allied troops and ships swarming the area.
b) the Allies land in Tripoli
Right in the middle of the central Med, however, it's a long flight time from Sicily to Tripoli. Some assistance can also be provided by fighters based in Malta, and again, maybe a carrier or two until they get local runways operational.

7. The psychological advantage held by Rommel's forces needed to be reduced
If Panzerarmee Afrika is utterly destroyed at Mersa Matruh, or near the Libyan border, or around Tobruk, with only minimal casualties to the British, would it not raise the morale of His Majesty's soldiers in the same way ?

8. Morocco needed to be taken lest the Germans invade Spain
I think we can all agree here that a Nazi invasion of Spain would be the optimal outcome for the western allies

9 Rommel was a master of maneuver warfare
He was. But if is tanks have no fuel and are hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, what good can he do ? The situation just a few months prior was so drastically different that it's not really a good comparison.

So, in short.

If the Allies land in Tunisia only, there is little resistance on the ground, with the French turning sides either instantly or after a day or two, but are bound to face strong air attacks as well as the occasional U-boat. They race an armored brigade south and cut Tripoli off, meaning that Rommel will have a hard time getting enough food and water, let alone other supplies. Reinforcements follow leading to the eventual fall of Tripoli's garrison. To the west, Rommel begins to retreat but is hacked to pieces by the British, who would be preparing for just this situation.

If the Allies land at Tripoli, again, all they have to do is prevent any trucks exiting the port. Capturing the city would be preferable (and probably doable), but not necessary. Air attacks would be nasty, but Malta (and maybe carriers) would provide some relieve until bases are set up. Rommel's army is probably destroyed before it even manages to cross the Libyan-Egyptian border.


Allied casualties between 3-8000, victory by December.
 
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We know, now, that the Regina Marine (Italian Navy) was a minimal threat. It was suspected, then, that this was the case (the embarrassing incident of a RM BatDiv being run off by a squadron of RN light cruisers among other incidents).

But remember the situation in 1942. The Allies had been losing, often badly, all across the globe. Victories had been few an generally overshadowed by much more serious defeats. The Allies had also, again almost exclusively, been on the strategic defensive and reacting to Axis moves. Torch was an attempt to turn that around... which meant it was not an operation to run risks on. You run risks when you have to (not the case - safe options were available) or when the potential reward is great (not the case - a cheaper victory in Africa was worth little in the long run).

Amphibious warfare was also in its (relative) infancy at that point; most of the specialized equipment and tactics were untested notions or still being developed. For example, only a handful of LSTs and LCIs and no LSMs had been commissioned.

It was also not a given that the French forces in N. Africa would flip to the Allies (in fact there was fighting IOTL).

None of this says it would have been impossible to land at any place desired on the N. African coast, true. But with what the Allies knew and the situation there were in at the time such a landing simply wasn't worth the risk.
 
The axis position at El Alamein was actually an advantage to the Brits. While the position was heavily fortified, it was still exactly what the British excelled at. The British had several times came up short against the Germans and Rommel in particular in manouvre warfare. It was never their strong side. Their strong side was the set-piece battle, planned warfare and logistics. In that regard, El Alamein was ideal. They had the Germans and Italians in a small area, with a much better supply situation than themselves, there were no room to manouvre and even if they failed, they could bring up enough men and equipment to continue to hold their position and eventually grind the axis down.
 
The axis position at El Alamein was actually an advantage to the Brits.

So if Rommel set up his position some km further east, with an open flank and no fortifications, he would, by your logic, have been better off, despite the fact that he didn't have enough fuel to drive all his tanks from their rear area to the frontline at once (and was thus forced to spread them out close to the infantry), let alone tango with the Brits like he had done previously.

We know, now, that the Regina Marine (Italian Navy) was a minimal threat. It was suspected, then, that this was the case (the embarrassing incident of a RM BatDiv being run off by a squadron of RN light cruisers among other incidents).

But remember the situation in 1942. The Allies had been losing, often badly, all across the globe. Victories had been few an generally overshadowed by much more serious defeats. The Allies had also, again almost exclusively, been on the strategic defensive and reacting to Axis moves. Torch was an attempt to turn that around... which meant it was not an operation to run risks on. You run risks when you have to (not the case - safe options were available) or when the potential reward is great (not the case - a cheaper victory in Africa was worth little in the long run).

Amphibious warfare was also in its (relative) infancy at that point; most of the specialized equipment and tactics were untested notions or still being developed. For example, only a handful of LSTs and LCIs and no LSMs had been commissioned.

It was also not a given that the French forces in N. Africa would flip to the Allies (in fact there was fighting IOTL).

None of this says it would have been impossible to land at any place desired on the N. African coast, true. But with what the Allies knew and the situation there were in at the time such a landing simply wasn't worth the risk.


I thought about this for a bit. While it would be something Churchill could, under circumstances, accept (striking at the enemy's exposed underbelly and all that), I guess you have a point about the Allies not wanting to risk it. Things look so much clearer with 20/20 hindsight, no ?
 
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