Warships that should never been built?

Father Maryland

S. Marlowski said:
AdmiralUshakov1981.jpg

And here's the Sverdlov class Light Cruiser, a class of ship that might've been the state of the art in the early 1950s, but was became horribly obsolete by the end of the decade. The Soviets kept these ships until the 1980s, and even a few soldiered on until the late 1990s.
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I mean at least when built they were pretty much the only long range heavy Soviet surface ships. While of limited utility in a actual full scale WW2 by the 60's they were pretty useful in peacetime in showing the flag roles. The Soviets (who had built a number of destroyers and cruisers in the 1930s that while not the absolute best were generally OK) also kind of missed a generation or so of warship building thanks to WW2. I'd say the Sverdlovs were a lot like the early US predreadnoughts. Sort of obsolete and not the best but necessary learning experience to build something better later.
 
Workable Goblin

Workable Goblin

Not James Stockdale said:
The downmass and cross-range requirements for the purported satellite theft mission were what drove the size and weight of the wings, not the size of the payload bay or the TPS material, although NASA might have picked them up just so Vandenberg launches could do a once-around abort.
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Not so, either. Again, NASA was converging on the delta-wing configuration before the Air Force got involved, because the alternatives either had highly coupled body-lift systems (lifting bodies), such that even minor alterations in production could potentially force major changes in the spacecraft, or had very complex aerothermal interactions that could potentially cause vehicle failure (the DC-3 and similar straight-wing designs). The delta-wing configuration was much simpler and more clearly workable than either. Of course, the fact that it would have a large cross-range for polar orbit missions (including the satellite theft mission, but that was really just a manifestation of the need for high cross-range for a polar AOA) was a bonus, but as with the KH-9 it just gave NASA an excuse to do something they clearly wanted to do anyway.
 
Whiteshore

Whiteshore

As we've focused on surface ships, we haven't really considered submarines, so I would name the CSS Hunley (killed more Confederate than Union sailors) and the I-400 "Sen-Toku" class (technologically advanced but probably the last thing the IJN needed when they were completed).
 
Athelstane

Athelstane

Whiteshore said:
As we've focused on surface ships, we haven't really considered submarines, so I would name the CSS Hunley (killed more Confederate than Union sailors) and the I-400 "Sen-Toku" class (technologically advanced but probably the last thing the IJN needed when they were completed).
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In just answering the OP in its simplest form, you can certainly make some kind of case that the Hunley and the I-400's shoudn't have been built.

But the poor Hunley...I am brought right back to the concerns I expressed upthread on Friday. The early age of steel and steam warships (basically, 1860 to 1906, roughly) is such a target rich environment that we're left to consider dividing off that period from later naval history. But perhaps what it should do is force us to ask: How do we define a warship that should never have been built?

We can think of a number of ways to define it, can't we? Just a non-exhaustive list of possibilities:
  • The ship cost more in treaure and blood than it exacted from the enemy, or was guaranteed to do so if it ever did see combat;
  • The ship had no clear mission, and as a result failed to serve a useful mission;
  • The ship had a clear mission, but its design was intrinsically unsuited to fulfilling the mission;
  • The ship had a clear mission and a design suited to it, but its workmanship and materials were so shoddy that it failed to fulfill the mission;
  • The ship had a clear mission, suitabe design and workmanship, but was a poor use of scarce resources by its naval power. (You seem to be making this argument with the I-400.)
And it's even possible to have a ship which fulfills more than one of these. Take the Hunley. It clearly hits #1, but had poor design and (this being the Confederate Navy in the final months of the war, after all) shoddy workmanship. Frankly, I'm amazed that the damn thing actually worked at all, let alone actually sank an enemy warship.

But as I was saying the other day, the grim reality is that *most* warships of the 1860-1906 era pretty easily fail one or more of these tests. And I include even the Royal Navy in that realm. Because even when the navy in question could actually figure out a clear and worthwhile mission for a new ship class, it usually had little idea what the hell it should do for a suitable design for it, because steel and steampower and rapidly improving new artillery were all unfamiliar territory to naval architects. It's such a target-rich environment of an era. It's easier to actually identify warships that *were* successes.

And in fact, I think there's more that could be said here for possible value of warships in this period. Maybe the ship was a failure, but maybe it was a *useful* failure. The HMS Captain was a terrible, terrible design, but its deadly loss forced the Royal Navy to come to grips with its design failures (low freeboard and all that) the hard way. Experience is a hard school, but sometimes, it's a necessary one. Likewise, the Hunley: Had the Confederacy actually *won* (unlikely as that was), Hunley's tragic loss could well have been a valuable if expensive lesson in submarine design for the nascent Confederate Navy (at least, if they could actually get sufficient information on just what happened to it, which admittedly is not always possible with submarine losses, even in the modern era).
 
Whiteshore

Whiteshore

Athelstane said:
(You seem to be making this argument with the I-400.)
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More or less correct regarding the Sen Toku-class and how despite their innovative nature and their technical genius (had a range of 37,500 nm), the IJN probably needed few things less than a submarine aircraft carrier during their period of operation.
 
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McPherson

McPherson

Banned
Athelstane said:
  • The ship cost more in treaure and blood than it exacted from the enemy, or was guaranteed to do so if it ever did see combat;
  • The ship had no clear mission, and as a result failed to serve a useful mission;
  • The ship had a clear mission, but its design was intrinsically unsuited to fulfilling the mission;
  • The ship had a clear mission and a design suited to it, but its workmanship and materials were so shoddy that it failed to fulfill the mission;
  • The ship had a clear mission, suitabe design and workmanship, but was a poor use of scarce resources by its naval power. (You seem to be making this argument with the I-400.)
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By all those criteria...

USS Housatonic was clearly worth CSS Hunley's build and operation. Within the means and costs human, technical and financial, she inflicted harm out of proportion to expectable results. Follow-ons could and should have been better from lessons learned.

I-400s? Ehhhh. I don't think a case can be made.
 

Peg Leg Pom

Any submarine.
Underhand, underwater and damned un British. A menace to the free passage of trade, and it's impossible to prevent the loss of lives of civilian seamen.
 
McPherson

McPherson

Banned
Athelstane said:
And in fact, I think there's more that could be said here for possible value of warships in this period. Maybe the ship was a failure, but maybe it was a *useful* failure. The HMS Captain was a terrible, terrible design, but its deadly loss forced the Royal Navy to come to grips with its design failures (low freeboard and all that) the hard way. Experience is a hard school, but sometimes, it's a necessary one. Likewise, the Hunley: Had the Confederacy actually *won* (unlikely as that was), Hunley's tragic loss could well have been a valuable if expensive lesson in submarine design for the nascent Confederate Navy (at least, if they could actually get sufficient information on just what happened to it, which admittedly is not always possible with submarine losses, even in the modern era).
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/OnlineLibrary/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-h/ss1-z.htm
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https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/OnlineLibrary/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-h/ss1-z.htm
From wiki:
1580054604894.png
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• Public Domain
• File:CSS David drawing.jpg
• Uploaded: 15 November 2005

Discussion of US and Confederate efforts and models of same during the American Civil War.

USS Kathadin


Source: (here)

Not seen too clearly are the saddle bag ballast tanks below her armored turtleback that allowed her to adjust her freeboard height before she made her attack run. She was semisubmersible. The theory was that awash, her odd hull shape would cut through the water faster than when she was surfaced. It actually worked! Too bad she was an oven and the crew could not operate her semi-submerged. So... a failure.




Source (1898 Scientific American)

Source (USN and Hypwerwar)
What a STEEP learning curve.

BTW... every one of those previous bolos had to be built for the Americans to get to USS Holland. She was BEAUTIFUL.
 

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edgeworthy

I'm surprised that no one has suggested the Flower Class Corvettes yet. Anthony Williams makes a point, in The Foresight War, about how building bad warships, and weapons, even if the facility in question cannot produce anything else, uses up resources that can be better used elsewhere.

Although the Flowers might seem like they have some good points, in that they are quick and easy to build, and that they were never intended as oceanic escorts, something better could still have been built. The justifications for their construction never seem to stand up to criticism. The argument about small shipyards in particular fails quite spectacularly when you consider that the original designer, Smiths Dock Company, was able to scale up to 12,000 tons and the most prolific builder was Harland and Wolff, the largest shipyard in the country*.

An updated version of the WW1 Flower Class Sloops would probably have been better. They were built with the same considerations in mind, in that they should be built quickly and cheaply to mercantile standards in shipyards that had little to no experience of warship construction. They just turned out larger and faster, effectively they could have been close River Class Frigate equivalents 2 years early.

(*Edit: If I'm reading it correctly a hull using the dimensions of the original Flower class Sloops will fit through the locks of the Lachine Canal, just. So they probably can be built in all the same Canadian Shipyards as their later namesakes)
 
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tigercat

That's an Insect class Gunboat :)

I've always wondered why they didn't just update the Flower class sloops too.

HMS Albatross was probably a ship that was unnecessary. Too much politics in its conception and never really achieved it's full potential.
 
McPherson

McPherson

Banned
Flower Corvette vs. Flower sloops

1. Steel. (shortage) 40% more steel for the WWI vessels.
2. Time. (shortage) Larger ship with more curved hull plates = longer construction times and more skilled labor to build the sloops.
3. Money. (shortage) 1 and 2 aggravated by larger build crews and MORE TIME needed to get it built drives unit $ way up.
4. Propulsion system. (bottleneck). Scotch tube boilers are easier and quicker than fire tube boilers. Refer to 3.

That should read water tube boilers, not fire tube boilers.
 
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Athelstane

Athelstane

McPherson said:
The theory was that awash, her odd hull shape would cut through the water faster than when she was surfaced. It actually worked! Too bad she was an oven and the crew could not operate her semi-submerged. So... a failure.
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Yeah. Good example. This is the sort of thing that they really just had to build (given the lack of modern hydrodynamics knowledge, among other things) to figure out that it doesn't work.

Sooooo much experimentation in those years. Really, almost every ship class launched was an experiment of sorts.
 
Athelstane

Athelstane

McPherson said:
By all those criteria...

USS Housatonic was clearly worth CSS Hunley's build and operation. Within the means and costs human, technical and financial, she inflicted harm out of proportion to expectable results. Follow-ons could and should have been better from lessons learned.

I-400s? Ehhhh. I don't think a case can be made.
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It's an interesting way to think about the Hunley. Like I said, we ought to be impressed that it actually, amazingly, fulfilled its mission.

Still, a vehicle which appears to have less than a 50% chance of the crew surviving a mission would have to have success qualified in some way. Don't think those johnny rebs were signing up for a banzai charge.

As for the I-400's, I think Whiteshore's evaluation is what I was getting at:

Whiteshore said:
More or less correct regarding the Sen Toku-class and how despite their innovative nature and their technical genius (had a range of 37,500 nm), the IJN probably needed few things less than a submarine aircraft carrier during their period of operation.
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Not a horrible sub class per se - just not the best use of the IJN's scarce resources at that point in the war.
 
McPherson

McPherson

Banned
The I-400 was loud in sound shorts with flow noise and engine noise sources. It was also at the outer limit of submerged 2-d maneuver control for its size. The dive to operating depth and speed was ridiculously long (about 100 seconds.).. If caught down angle it could be engaged with one part of the hull (nose) below test depth and its tail sticking up with almost no rudder bite for turn out.

It was an easy kill for anybody to overrun with basic WW I ASW assets. I might say it was more suicidal to crew than a Hunley or an I-boat (which was also an exercise in "crash through which is the tendency of a submarine at speed in an emergency dive to carry forward and down with momentum through its maximum safe operating "test" depth.

About the only things the Americans learned from her was not to do when building a submarine.

The things which made a T boat and GATO survivable was the ability to drive down under momentum under positive control and turn in a crash dive were things that many other submarines could not do well or at all. The allied submarines which were best at this feature were the smaller British boats and most of the American classes. Dutch boats were especially good at this feature.

Not everything that makes a good sub, is easily discerned in the public data. Strength of battery bank, rudder steer control, screw bite and depth level out safety margin below "test" can tell one a lot about whether the sub is worth the build.

See here:

T-class

Type: Submarine
Displacement: 1,290 tons surfaced; 1,560 tons submerged
Length: 276 ft 6 in (84.28 m)
Beam: 25 ft 6 in (7.77 m)
Draught: 12 ft 9 in (3.89 m) forward
14 ft 7 in (4.45 m) aft
Propulsion: Two shafts: Twin diesel engines, 2,500 hp (1.86 MW) each
…………………………………….Twin electric motors 1,450 hp (1.08 MW) each Ratio 1.7 to 1
Speed: 15.5 kn (28.7 km/h; 17.8 mph) surfaced
………………9 kn (17 km/h; 10 mph) submerged (very low flow drag for a WW II boat.)
Range: 8,000 nmi (9,200 mi; 15,000 km) at 10 kn (19 km/h; 12 mph) surfaced with 131 tons of fuel
Complement: 48
Armament: 6 bow torpedo tubes
………………..4 external torpedo tubes
………………..16 torpedoes
…...………......QF 4 inch (100 mm) deck gun

==========================================================

GATO class

Type: Diesel-electric submarine
Displacement: 1,525 tons (1,549 t) surfaced
……………………..2,424 tons (2463 t) submerged
Length: 311 ft 8 in (95.00 m) – 311 ft 10 in (95.05 m)
Beam: 27 ft 3 in (8.31 m)
Draft: 17 ft (5.2 m) maximum
Propulsion: 4 × diesel engines driving electrical generators (Fairbanks-Morse, General Motors, or Hooven-Owens-Rentschler)
2 × 126-cell Sargo batteries
4 × high-speed electric motors with reduction gears (Elliott Company, General Electric, or Allis-Chalmers)
two shafts
5,400 shp (4,000 kW) surfaced
2,740 shp (2,040 kW) submerged Ratio of about 2 to 1 diesel to electric.
Speed: 21 knots (39 km/h) surfaced
…………...9 knots (17 km/h) submerged (US boat had less drag than a T boat!)
Range: 11,000 nautical miles (20,000 km) surfaced at 10 knots (19 km/h)[3]
Endurance: 48 hours at 2 knots (3.7 km/h) submerged[3]
…………………75 days on patrol
Test depth: 300 ft (90 m)
Complement: 6 officers, 54 enlisted men
Armament: 10 × 21-inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes
…………………..6 forward, 4 aft; 24 torpedoes
…………………..1 × 3-inch (76 mm) / 50 caliber deck gun
……………………Bofors 40 mm and Oerlikon 20 mm cannon

Balao Class (Gato with a THICK hide)

Type: Diesel-electric submarine
Displacement: 1,526 tons (1,550 t) surfaced, 2,391–2,424 tons (2,429–2463 t) submerged
Length: 311 ft 6 in–311 ft 10 in (94.9–95.0 m)
Beam: 27 ft 3 in–27 ft 4 in (8.3 m)
Draft: 16 ft 10 in (5.13 m) maximum
Propulsion: 4 × diesel engines driving electrical generators (Fairbanks-Morse or General Motors);
………………..2 × 126-cell Sargo batteries;[5]
…………………4 × high-speed electric motors with reduction gears or 2 × low-speed electric motors (Elliott Company or General Electric) on two shafts;
…………………5,400 shp (4,000 kW) surfaced,[1] 2,740 shp (2,040 kW) submerged Ratio ~ 2 to1
Speed: 20.25 knots (38 km/h) surfaced,[5] 8.75 knots (16 km/h) submerged
Range: 11,000 nautical miles (20,000 km) surfaced @ 10 knots (19 km/h)
Endurance: 48 hours @ 2 knots (3.7 km/h) submerged, 75 days on patrol
Test depth: 400 ft (120 m)
Complement: 10 officers, 70–71 enlisted men
Armament: 10 × 21-inch (533 mm) torpedo tubes
………………….6 forward, 4 aft, 24 torpedoes
……………….1 × 5-inch (127 mm) / 25 caliber deck gun
……………….Bofors 40 mm and Oerlikon 20 mm cannon

===================================================
Japanese I boat (submerged carrier)

General characteristics
Class and type: Type B1 submarine
Displacement: 2,584 tons surfaced
……………………..3,654 tons submerged
Length: 108.7 m (357 ft)
Beam: 9.3 m (31 ft)
Draught: 5.14 m (16.9 ft)
Propulsion: 2 diesels: 12,400 hp (9,250 kW)
Electric motors: 2,000 hp (1,500 kW). Ratio 6 to 1.
Speed: 23.5 knots (44 km/h) surfaced
……………8 knots (15 km/h) submerged (lots of drag)
Range: 14,000 nautical miles (26,000 km) at 16 knots (30 km/h)
Test depth: 100 m (330 ft)
Complement: 94 officers and men
Armament: 6 × 533 mm forward torpedo tubes; 17 torpedoes
………………..1 × 14 cm/40 11th Year Type naval gun
Aircraft carried: 1 Yokosuka E14Y floatplane
========================================
Japanese K boat (fleet sub)

General characteristics
Displacement: 1,630 long tons (1,656 t) surfaced
…...………………….2,602 long tons (2,644 t) submerged
Length: 105.50 m (346 ft 2 in)
Beam: 8.25 m (27 ft 1 in)
Draft: 4.60 m (15 ft 1 in)
Propulsion: 2 × Kampon Mk 1B Model 8 diesels, 2 shafts, 8,000 bhp
…...…...……….2 bx electric motors 1,800 shp submerged, Ratio 6 t0 1
Speed: 23.1 kn (42.8 km/h) surfaced
…………...8.0 kn (14.8 km/h) submerged
Range: 8,000 nmi (15,000 km) at 16 kn (30 km/h) surfaced
………………50 nmi (93 km) at 5 kn (9.3 km/h) submerged
Test depth: 80 m (260 ft)
Complement: 86
Armament: 6 × 533 mm (21 in) TTs, (6 × bow), 12 × Type 95 torpedoes
………………..1 × 120 mm (4.7 in) L/40 11th Year Type Naval gun
………………..2 × Type 96 25mm AA guns
Notes: 354.7 tons fuel

What good is high surface speed if you dive slow, cannot turn under water and are known to crash dive through test depth?

======================================================
General characteristics (Type VIIC)

Displacement: 769 tonnes (757 long tons) surfaced
……………………..871 t (857 long tons) submerged
Length: 67.10 m (220 ft 2 in) o/a[1]
…………..50.50 m (165 ft 8 in) pressure hull
Beam: 6.20 m (20 ft 4 in) (o/a)[1]
……......4.70 m (15 ft 5 in) (pressure hull)
Height: 9.60 m (31 ft 6 in)
Draft: 4.74 m (15 ft 7 in)
Propulsion: 2 × supercharged 6-cylinder 4-stroke diesel engines totalling 2,800–3,200 PS (2,100–2,400 kW; 2,800–3,200 shp). Max rpm: 470–490
…..…:...….2 x Siemens-Schuckert-Werke GU 343/38-8 electric motors, totalling 750shp and max rpm: 296 or 2 Garbe Lahmeyer RP 137/c electric motors, totalling 750shp and max rpm: or 560 kW. Ratio 5 to 1 *(see notes)
Speed: 17.7 knots (32.8 km/h; 20.4 mph) surfaced
……………7.6 knots (14.1 km/h; 8.7 mph) submerged
Range: 8,500 nmi (15,700 km; 9,800 mi) at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) surfaced
……………….80 nmi (150 km; 92 mi) at 4 knots (7.4 km/h; 4.6 mph) submerged
Test depth: 230 m (750 ft)
Calculated crush depth: 250–295 m (820–968 ft)
Complement: 44–52 officers & ratings
Armament: 5 × 53.3 cm (21 in) torpedo tubes (4 bow, 1 stern)
………………..14 × torpedoes or 26 TMA or 39 TMB mines
………………..1 × 8.8 cm SK C/35 naval gun with 220 rounds
…………………Various antiaircraft weaponry
================================================================

Notes: The Japanese and the Germans had strong surface engines and relied on their subs to fight on the surface. They did not pay much attention to underwater burst speed or maneuverability. The British and the Americans expected to fight submerged and built accordingly with strong battery banks and robust electric motors.

That has a direct operational correlation to loss of boat and MISSION once you dig into kill reports. The Axis boats were not able to turn out from under Allied ASW weapons. Allied boats could do the reverse better.

It also is another reason why I rank the ITALIANS as deadly ASW ADVERSARIES. They fought British boats in the Med with grossly inferior ASW weapons. The German boats may have been bells and whistles, but their poor underwater characteristics compared to British and American contemporaries is mostly why 2 of every 3 of them died versus 1 in every 6 American boats and 1 in every 3 British boats.

These are the lessons they don't teach you in the popular histories. The Type VII and the K-boat were death traps 66% PK death traps. The Gato and the T-boat gave you a better than 66% chance of returning home with a broom on your mast.
 
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