Warsaw Pact invasion routes?

Those are pretty low estimates.

Not really.

Red Storm Rising Estimates

3,000,000 NATO military personnel in direct combat

200,000 killed. 600,000 wounded

5,000,000 Warsaw Pact personnel (mostly Soviet) in direct combat

500,000 killed, 1,000,000 wounded

West German pre war civilian population about 60 million.

3% killed

1,800,000 killed.

East German civilians killed

200,000

Other non German civilians killed in the war.

500,000

Total 3.2 million

Add in 500,000 possible killed in "chaotic aftermath"

Possible maximum in nonnuclear, nonchemical war.

3.7 million max

For the Sir John Hacket Scenario (two nuclear attacks, heavy chemical weapons used, spillover conflict (I would add another Korean War as well).

Add. 1.5 million for the two nuclear attacks.

add another 1 million civilian for the chemical attacks

Add another 500,000 for overseas spillover conflicts.

You get about 6.7 million.

Unsure as how many more military fatalities would be suffered as a result of chemical attacks.

But a total in the Sir John Hackett (even including Korea which he does not do) would' probably not exceed 7.5 million killed.

Though for what is worth, that is 7.5 million people killed IN ONE MONTH more or less.
 
What about if no nukes (or only tacticals) are used, but both sides go hog wild with the chemical and biological weapons?

Biologicals aren't worth the trouble.

Tactical nuclears weapons would be far, far, far worse than any number of chemicals.

Chemical weapons are no where nearly as deadly or decisive OR deadly to civilian populations as even tactical nuclear weapons would be.

The Sir John Hackett "The Third World War" scenario pretty much allows the full range of Soviet chemical weapons to be used along with the U.S. response.

In general, I suspect that the Soviets would use chemical weapons more against NATO air bases, logics centers, and ports in order to impede air operations and the resupply of NATO forces. If they used them against frontline NATO troops they would impede their own forces.

On the other hand, I would figure that NATO chemical attacks would focus more on Warsaw Pact second echelon forces that were still behind the Inter German Border. To do otherwise would mean using chemical weapons on the very soil they were trying to defend.

Remember that for all the talk that "doctrine says we do this" or "doctrine says we do that" wars are ultimately fought for political purposes and it is politicians (not the field generals) who make those kinds of decisions.
 
What about a '61 or '62 invasion scenario?

That war could last far longer and would probably have higher death counts. What is your guys' opinion on this?
 
What about a '61 or '62 invasion scenario?

That war could last far longer and would probably have higher death counts. What is your guys' opinion on this?

Huge death toll in Europe, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere.

Relatively low death toll in the United States as the Soviets are really low on long range nuclear weapons.
 
Prove it.

The very existence of the Dead Hand System indicates a far better C3 infrastructure then what you are talking about.

Besides, you made the claim first. ;)

The Soviets didn't even have anything remotely equivalent to the "nuclear football" until the late 1980s (according to sources later published in Military History Quarterly).

That the Soviets didn't have a suitcase with copies of a good portion of their nuclear warplanning stuffed into it is no indication of the status of their C3 system.

Red Storm Rising Estimates

3,000,000 NATO military personnel in direct combat

200,000 killed. 600,000 wounded

5,000,000 Warsaw Pact personnel (mostly Soviet) in direct combat

500,000 killed, 1,000,000 wounded

West German pre war civilian population about 60 million.

3% killed

1,800,000 killed.

East German civilians killed

200,000

Other non German civilians killed in the war.

500,000

Total 3.2 million

Where are these from, by the by? They definitely are not in the book itself... and yes, I have read the book itself.

Chemical weapons are no where nearly as deadly or decisive OR deadly to civilian populations as even tactical nuclear weapons would be.

In five hours, 98-112 Iraqi aircraft using a mixture of mustard, phosgene, and possibly sarin gas killed as many civilians (15,000) as the Western Allies killed Berliners with thousands of sorties using conventional bombs in two years.

Not only does Central Europe have a lot more civilians concentrated in much smaller locations then the Iraqi-Iranian border, the various powers involved also have even deadlier chemical weapons in even greater quantities ready to go then Iraq did. The idea that high concentrations of military-grade chemical agents are "nowhere near as deadly" to civilian populations as low-yield nuclear warheads is fanciful.

Also, I caution using Hacketts book as a measurement it makes a whole bunch of changes to NATO that never occurred in IOTL so as to give NATO a better position.
 
The very existence of the Dead Hand System indicates a far better C3 infrastructure then what you are talking about.

.

The creation of the Dead Hand system (which was never fully automated) is proof that the Soviets were deeply concerned about the command and control of their nuclear weapons in a war.

Because Dead Hand was made to be capable of launching a retaliatory strike EVEN THOUGH existing Soviet C3 systems were destroyed or disrupted.

If the Soviets had any confidence in their C3 systems, Dead Hand was completely unnecessary.
 
Also, I caution using Hacketts book as a measurement it makes a whole bunch of changes to NATO that never occurred in IOTL so as to give NATO a better position.

Could you elaborate on this ON? Seriously. And what if the Hackett scenario had occurred in the 1989-1991 timeframe instead?

And what would be your estimate of the World War Three death toll assuming the Hackett scenario in the 1989-1991 time frame plus a conflict on the Korean peninsula thrown in as well.

Basically, combine the Hackett Scenario with Michael Palmers's "The War That Never Was"-which arguably is a better book.
 
This is very dependant on the scenario at hand. Say the tensions rise over the border of Germanies and a skirmish is fought. Regardless of which side started it the Soviet doctrine was that the offense is the best defense.

The Warsaw pact first echelon troops would have used several axis of attacks over the GDR border from all directions. Likely a large part of these would've been plain maskirovka to draw NATO away from intended schwerpunkts. Northern-German plain would probably be used for one of the main prongs as a large part of the shock forces were stationed there. These shock armies would puncture holes into opposing defense lines and allow second echelon troops to capitalise the weak points and drive into enemy depth. From this point on it gets interesting and more like a game of chess with all it's moves and counter-moves. The WP strategy was to avoid strong defenses and bypass them completely in their drive to NATO rear areas. This warrants heavy counter-moves by opposing NATO troops, namely counter offensives aimed at striking WP rear echelons and cracking the chain of command of the WP columns. Afterall the rigid command structure in red forces was easily exploitable. That is not to say that this wouldn't hold true also for some of the NATO members.

As with all wars, all plans will have to be changed depending on the situation at hand. Therefore it is only plausible to estimate some possible scenarios and mostly disregard most variables such as weather, chance, individual skills and pure luck.

I'd guess that Soviets would have begun with massive preparation fire along the front with a small diversionary strike and quickly changed to direct assault coupled with heavy use of paratroops where applicable to smoothen the ride. I'd say that the first pushes would be to the direction of Bremen bypassing Hamburg from the south and avoiding Elbe. Then Polish troops assisted with Soviets would go through Lübeck and try to reach the North-Sea, pinning British to Hamburg and it's environs. In the centre, it's anybody's guess but going for Bonn instead of heavily defended Frankfurt would kinda fit to the Soviet doctrine of politico-militaristic warfare. Just a guess though. All in all, reaching the Rhine is the classical scenario but where it could happen depends heavily on NATO. Anyway, i'm pretty sure that the reconnaissance parts of Soviet armed forces would reach Rhine in only a couple of days at best after the initial breakthrough. In the south it would all be about pinning Americans between Danube and the Alps.

In Scandinavia for the Soviets it would be about securing Kola peninsula and preventing overflights through Sweden and Finland. As DrakonFin already superbly pointed out the most likely scenario for Finland, I'll leave it at that. Sweden however is alot more unpredictable. I'm pretty sure that they would align themselves with the west from the very beginning and send troops to Finland in case the fight breaks out between Finns and Soviets. Soviets would then likely try to push for Helsinki to force Finns accepting their demands and also drive through Lapland to Narvik. However it's likely that Swedish and Norwegians would also cross Finnish border to meet and slow down the Soviet offensive. This would seriously strain the Soviet forces in the north as the Finnish and Norwegian terrain is bad tank country and not very well suited for large formations and would also require atleast 3:1 - 5:1 odds in numbers favoring the attackers. I don't really want to even take a guess how the WP would deal with Balkans, Greece and Turkey.
 
Anyway, i'm pretty sure that the reconnaissance parts of Soviet armed forces would reach Rhine in only a couple of days at best after the initial breakthrough. .

What makes you think there will be any initial breakthrough?

After all, the Soviets can't amass overwhelming numerical superiority against NATO unless they have complete or near complete tactical surprise.

Give NATO a month or even a couple of weeks warning time and in all likelihood NATO forces stop the Soviet advance cold and send it reeling back across the IGB with NATO forces in pursuit.

A former Colonel once told me at symposium offfered at out college (he had served many years with the U.S. Army throughout Western Europe that

"If NATO has two days or less warning, then their chances of stopping a Soviet invasion are only 10%.

If NATO has three days warming, their chances go up to 20%.

If NATO has four days warning, their chances go up to 30%.

If NATO has five days warning, their chances go up to 40%.

If NATO has six days warning, their chances go up to 50%

If NATO has seven days warning, their chances go up to 60%.

If NATO has eight days warning, their chances go up to 70%.

If NATO has nine days warning, their chances go up to 80%.

If NATO has ten days warning, their chances go up to 90%. "

He wouldn't go below 10% or above 90% because as he said "In war anything can happen".

Needless to say, NATO considered getting at least 7 days warning of an imminent Soviet invasion to be the Holy Grail of tactical intel in central Europe.
 
Sweden however is alot more unpredictable. I'm pretty sure that they would align themselves with the west from the very beginning and send troops to Finland in case the fight breaks out between Finns and Soviets. Soviets would then likely try to push for Helsinki to force Finns accepting their demands and also drive through Lapland to Narvik. However it's likely that Swedish and Norwegians would also cross Finnish border to meet and slow down the Soviet offensive. This would seriously strain the Soviet forces in the north as the Finnish and Norwegian terrain is bad tank country and not very well suited for large formations and would also require atleast 3:1 - 5:1 odds in numbers favoring the attackers. I don't really want to even take a guess how the WP would deal with Balkans, Greece and Turkey.

It is a mystery to me how long both Finland and Sweden would strive to keep up their neutrality in the face of war approaching between the WP and NATO. Naturally both would want to keep out of the war, and would further rationalize the situation so that their keeping neutral would act as something that would possibly stop a deterioration of East-West relations. Both the Finnish and the Swedish government would also want to act as mediators, possibly even together.

I have a feeling that Sweden wouldn't openly ally itself with NATO unless a) Finland is actually attacked by the Soviets which puts the safety of Finland into question, as well as Sweden's own or b) Finland caves in to Soviet demands, which would achieve the same.

Now, we can say for certain that Finland and Sweden would not want to go to war against each other in any circumstances. If Finland is attacked by the Soviets, it will work together with the Swedish in defence. Joint plans about the Ålands will go into action, Sweden provides Finland with weapons they have been holding in reserve for their neighbours, etc. How open the Swedish are about this at first would be uncertain; but eventually everybody would see both Finland and Sweden as NATO cobelligerents at least as Sweden's plans with NATO would also kick into gear.

It is pretty likely Swedish troops would cross the Tornio River into Finland, with Finnish blessing, to extend the depth of their defence before meeting the attacking Soviets. Even if Finland would abandon the defence of Lapland itself, some Finnish troops might fall back towards the Swedish border to join the defensive line forming there.

If the Soviets decide to take southern Finland, we might expect heavy conventional air attacks against Helsinki and surroundings from bases in Estonia and then an airborne assault to take the capital and nearby airfields, while the main Soviet force attacks through southern Karelia and Kymenlaakso. I have little idea what kinds of plans the Swedish would have for southern Finland apart from the Ålands. I fear in realistic circumstances the Swedish action in southern mainland Finland would limit to naval and air operations to help with a possible Finnish withdrawal from Uusimaa and Finland Proper, with limited landing of coastal units for rearguard action...

But then there is the question about what would Sweden do with Finland if the Finns cave into Soviet threats and acquiesce to a creeping Soviet takeover of the Finnish defence? That would put Stockholm (not to mention Helsinki) to a very unfortunate position, in which the Swedish and Finns would find themselves actually at war with each other... How would that play out?
 
But then there is the question about what would Sweden do with Finland if the Finns cave into Soviet threats and acquiesce to a creeping Soviet takeover of the Finnish defence? That would put Stockholm (not to mention Helsinki) to a very unfortunate position, in which the Swedish and Finns would find themselves actually at war with each other... How would that play out?

From a source of a former Swedish officer their military, at least in the North, would have sent in special forces to conduct asymmetric warfare against Soviet supply lines in Finnish territory with the assumed help of anti-Soviet elements of the Finnish population. These plans were mainly focused in Finnish Lappland AFAIK.
 

Kongzilla

Banned
How anti-Soviet was the Finnish Population. As soon as the tables start turning of the WP will countries like Hungary and Poland start revolting.
 
From a source of a former Swedish officer their military, at least in the North, would have sent in special forces to conduct asymmetric warfare against Soviet supply lines in Finnish territory with the assumed help of anti-Soviet elements of the Finnish population. These plans were mainly focused in Finnish Lappland AFAIK.

I can well see this happening, possibly even in other parts of Finland - especially the western coast that is within easy Swedish reach. It is certain that many Finns would disagree strongly with the government's actions and would be ready to help Swedish soldiers/agents/saboteurs. But then they would of course risk being charged with treason doing that...

The Finnish military would be under serious strain, as the generals and any lower officers would have to maintain a mobilized mainly conscript force cohesive in conditions that approach foreign occupation despite the facade of official Finno-Soviet friendship. How long it would take in actual war conditions that the Defence Forces start to fracture, first with passive resistance and gradually worsening desertion, then whole units and commands refusing to follow orders, going missing and possibly actually starting something like low-level guerrilla warfare against the Soviets?

Especially if the Finnish soldiers are forced into offensive action against Swedish units (the Air Force and Navy personnel would be likely be first to face this) they would be likely to disobey orders and become mutinous. Maybe we would see Finnish fighter pilots defecting with aircraft, forcing whole units to be grounded, and whole Navy ships leaving for Swedish ports, in turn necessitating such things as keeping ships at port, forming mixed units with Soviets or having Soviet "liaison" officers on Finnish ships to keep the men in line.

Åland would be one of the obvious flashpoints in the relationship between a neutral-about-to-go-NATO Sweden and de-facto-Warsaw-Pact Finland. What would the Swedish do if the Soviets demand a Red Navy and Air Force presence in the islands "to defend the interests of Finland and the Soviet Union in the northern Baltic against hostile incursions"? Would they in fact attack first to take over an unambiguously Finnish province if their protests about its traditional demilitarization go unheeded by Moscow? Or would they allow Soviet military presence, "sanctioned" by Helsinki, hanging like a sword within easy strike range to the capital?
 
How anti-Soviet was the Finnish Population.

Pretty anti-Soviet on average, especially in smaller towns and in the countryside. Resisting the Soviets would be less of a problem in terms of the national morale if the government does the "right thing" - that is, plunges Finland into war against the "friendly" Eastern neighbour. But if the government acts like the USSR's lapdog - what to do? Accepting, if grudgingly, the actions of a legal government and following its lead as a matter of course is a very Finnish thing to do. Here the government would be legal, by most definitions of the word, but it would be executing a policy that is abhorrent to a large part of the population. It is a surefire way to undermine morale and divide the Finnish people.
 

Kongzilla

Banned
It would be interesting to see Free Finnish Forces, the Finnish government stalls for time, Soviets decide to invade because they don't have time for this. Government orders the Finnish military to flee into Sweden or something.
 
What makes you think there will be any initial breakthrough?

After all, the Soviets can't amass overwhelming numerical superiority against NATO unless they have complete or near complete tactical surprise.

Give NATO a month or even a couple of weeks warning time and in all likelihood NATO forces stop the Soviet advance cold and send it reeling back across the IGB with NATO forces in pursuit.

A former Colonel once told me at symposium offfered at out college (he had served many years with the U.S. Army throughout Western Europe that

"If NATO has two days or less warning, then their chances of stopping a Soviet invasion are only 10%.

If NATO has three days warming, their chances go up to 20%.

If NATO has four days warning, their chances go up to 30%.

If NATO has five days warning, their chances go up to 40%.

If NATO has six days warning, their chances go up to 50%

If NATO has seven days warning, their chances go up to 60%.

If NATO has eight days warning, their chances go up to 70%.

If NATO has nine days warning, their chances go up to 80%.

If NATO has ten days warning, their chances go up to 90%. "

He wouldn't go below 10% or above 90% because as he said "In war anything can happen".

Needless to say, NATO considered getting at least 7 days warning of an imminent Soviet invasion to be the Holy Grail of tactical intel in central Europe.

I'm not saying he was wrong nor am I defending the WP, because frankly I'm not an expert on this subject. One could only guess where the Soviets would push for a breakthrough. Today it's known that with modern weaponry the wars like that would be highly dissimilar to the previous world wars. The frontlines would blur quickly as the fighting would be more brutal and fast paced. Also, most U.S. estimate's usually categorically place WP attack routes through North German plain, Fulda gap, and Hof corridor despite the fact that the Soviet offensive doctrine placed surprise over optimal terrain. This and the fact that WP probably had some similar calculations and wouldn't risk it past some critical amount of time.
I would also be cautious to assume that off the bat NATO could've stopped WP offensive cold in any situation. War does not work that way unless you know exactly where the opponent is going to strike and you have enought time to mass defenses or mount a solid counterattack. NATOs strategy in West European front didn't even call for that IIRC.

Thank you for bringing that up, always nice to know more about this subject and compare it to what us Finns have. :)
 
I'm not saying he was wrong nor am I defending the WP, because frankly I'm not an expert on this subject. One could only guess where the Soviets would push for a breakthrough. Today it's known that with modern weaponry the wars like that would be highly dissimilar to the previous world wars. The frontlines would blur quickly as the fighting would be more brutal and fast paced. Also, most U.S. estimate's usually categorically place WP attack routes through North German plain, Fulda gap, and Hof corridor despite the fact that the Soviet offensive doctrine placed surprise over optimal terrain. This and the fact that WP probably had some similar calculations and wouldn't risk it past some critical amount of time.
I would also be cautious to assume that off the bat NATO could've stopped WP offensive cold in any situation. War does not work that way unless you know exactly where the opponent is going to strike and you have enought time to mass defenses or mount a solid counterattack. NATOs strategy in West European front didn't even call for that IIRC.

Thank you for bringing that up, always nice to know more about this subject and compare it to what us Finns have. :)

Conventional wisdom for years has been that a conventional Soviet invasion of NATO nations would be "over in matter of weeks" at most.

Almost as quickly as a nuclear war anyway.

Why?

Because of three general assumptions

1) The Soviets overrun West German in two weeks and the war would be over.

2) The Soviets fall apart politically and militarily when they are unable to overrun NATO. So NATO wins in or around week four.

3) Both sides effectively run out of ammo, spare parts, and fuel after a week of fighting.

But I've heard from other people who were also experts on the subject (all current or former military) and they said point black that

"The supposed short World War III in central Europe is simply a myth. Unless something radical happened like one side completely collapsing or resorting to nuclear weapons, then the conventional war would last for YEARS (emphasis mine)".

One person summarized it this way.

"The Soviets would invade. NATO would halt the offensive within a week or two. NATO would counterattack. When the fighting reached the original borders, NATO supply problems would lead to them halting. The war would pause as both sides rearmed. The war would resume as the Soviets tried different venues of attack. NATO would halt the Soviets again and then attempt a counterattack.

With it obvious that the Soviets would continue to fight and that a NATO invasion would be even more devastating, the non Soviet Warsaw Pact nations would suddenly begin fighting with more enthusiasm and grind down the NATO counterattack.

"The Soviets would act to start trouble in the Middle East and Korea to draw off American forces. American forces in Europe would be without major reinforcements for awhile. The Soviets would use that opportunity to attack again."

The person spinning this scenario to me suggested that all the talk about both sides running out of weapons, munitions, spare parts and fuel is simply ridiculous because it vastly underestimates how quickly modern economies can retool to build staggering amounts of weapons.

For example, the U.S. can actually train more than 1,000,000 soldiers per year for the various armed forces. The U.S. is fully capable of building over 300 modern combat aircraft per month. And the U.S. is capable of even using its current shipyards in building Nimitz class aircraft carriers every 18 months (the largest and most complex U.S. warships).
 
The creation of the Dead Hand system (which was never fully automated) is proof that the Soviets were deeply concerned about the command and control of their nuclear weapons in a war.

Because Dead Hand was made to be capable of launching a retaliatory strike EVEN THOUGH existing Soviet C3 systems were destroyed or disrupted.

If the Soviets had any confidence in their C3 systems, Dead Hand was completely unnecessary.

Uh... no. The Dead Hand system was an insurance against a decapitation strike paralyzing the Soviet ability to retaliate by killing the individuals with nuclear launch authority.

If the Dead Hand is an indication that Soviet C3 systems were inadequate to launch-on-warning, then I suppose the same is true for the United States given the existance of such projects as Operation Looking Glass.

Could you elaborate on this ON? Seriously.

Well, for a start, Iran wasn't still under the Shah in OTL's 1985. ;)

And what if the Hackett scenario had occurred in the 1989-1991 timeframe instead?

Well, in IOTL, Soviet personnel quality and maintnence standards had been declined too the point where a NATO victory in the conventional phase of the war becomes not just possible, but likely.

It will be murderously bloody though, even if they find the pixie dust to keep it conventional.

And what would be your estimate of the World War Three death toll assuming the Hackett scenario in the 1989-1991 time frame plus a conflict on the Korean peninsula thrown in as well.

600-900 million world wide inside of six months, depending on the details. ;)

In terms of the conventional conflict, I actually would go with Hackett's numbers given the aforementioned problems the Warsaw Pact was suffering by then.

For the 79-83 time frame, I would say 1.5 times more with somewhat greater NATO casualties and somewhat lesser Warsaw Pact casualties. '83-'87 time frame I would say twice as many total dead, although how I would distribute them I am unsure.

Needless to say, NATO considered getting at least 7 days warning of an imminent Soviet invasion to be the Holy Grail of tactical intel in central Europe.

So something they had no expectation of happening at all. Especially since even once the intel is apparent, much of NATO can't actually do all that much until the individual member states agree.

The person spinning this scenario to me suggested that all the talk about both sides running out of weapons, munitions, spare parts and fuel is simply ridiculous because it vastly underestimates how quickly modern economies can retool to build staggering amounts of weapons.

For example, the U.S. can actually train more than 1,000,000 soldiers per year for the various armed forces. The U.S. is fully capable of building over 300 modern combat aircraft per month. And the U.S. is capable of even using its current shipyards in building Nimitz class aircraft carriers every 18 months (the largest and most complex U.S. warships).

What nonsense is this? The United States took months to mobilize for World War 2 and that was in a time when one COULD use the tools made for manufacture automobiles to make tanks instead. To illustrate: the Germans produced 2,000 military aircraft in 1939 while in 1983 the United States, using roughly the same amount of factory space, made 1,000 military aircraft.

Assuming a 3% daily loss rate from the initial world wide force (roughly the average for World War 2) of 10,000 US aircraft, that is a loss of 300 aircraft every day or 9,000 aircraft in a month. With only 83-84 replacements available in the same time span.
 
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