Anyone read Larry Bond's Vortex?
I'm surprised that nobody has mentioned Larry Bond's novel Vortex, which was based on a related premise. If you haven't read his book it is well worth the time, he's a better writer than Clancy and many of the tactical/strategic/geopolitical questions raised in this thread were featured in the book.
As Bond and superkuf point out, it's highly unlikely the Soviet's would send troops themselves (and Ceacescu wouldn't send Roumanians either) as that would unnecessarily risk dragging in the US. They'd use proxies, upgun the Cubans with more modern equipment and bring in as many fontline African state troops as volunteers that they can offload old tanks and artillery to. Maybe send in a strong contingent of advisors but basically act as the puppet masters for a Cuban sponsored 'liberation army'.
But if we do go with the original proposal then a Soviet MRD is not air-transportable, it would have to be shipped in, and the supply lines at sea kept open. The Soviet naval escorts accompanying the supply ships would easily ward off the South African navy with few or no casualties (the Soviets are not going to send their transports unguarded), any SA ship going to sea risks immediately being despatched by the Soviet SSNs watching every port. South African ASW was too limited to stop Soviet subs doing whatever they wanted. Talk of South African Canberra bombers doing anything is unrealistic, if the Soviets are going to send a division plus support troops to Angola they are also going to send some aircraft as well. Even if it was only a squadron or two of Migs, that will be enough to prevent a couple of aging Canberras staying in the air very long. At best the SA airforce would be looking to ward off strikes on SA bases and to contest the skies over southern South West Africa.
Ultimately the Soviets could act in southern Africa for only as long as the US was willing to let them. If the US government was unwilling to intervene at the start because of apartheid they would still despatch several task forces to remind the Soviets as to who controlled the sea lanes, and behind the scenes diplomacy would also make it clear that there was a line of "you may go up to here and no further". Even under the apartheid regime the West needed access to South Africa's minerals, any Soviet threat to that access would be deemed unacceptable and would trigger closure of Soviet supply routes by the USN. The Soviets would then have an option of halting their advance or risk WW3 (which of course they would not do).
So if I was an SA commander in this scenario I'd avoid set piece battles as much as possible as they would just get my troops pulverised by superior Soviet firepower. The units of the SA army even with G5s cannot compete with a fully equipped Soviet division in a slugging contest. Instead, delay the Soviet advance with blocking engagements along the restricted routes through Namibia (others have already mentioned these), ambush the supply lines using good old Boer-style commando tactics, possibly risk an airborne battalion in a heliborne assault on a major Soviet HQ or supply point. In short, play to South African strengths, minimise the opportunities of the Soviets bringing their firepower to bare in a conclusive battle and save my mobile units for a decisive counter attack when the Soviets have overextended and run low on supplies. Because I'd know that I'd only need to hang on until the Americans decide enough is enough and make the Soviets come to a halt, and try to get the US to make the no-go line somewhere north of the SA border.
I'm surprised that nobody has mentioned Larry Bond's novel Vortex, which was based on a related premise. If you haven't read his book it is well worth the time, he's a better writer than Clancy and many of the tactical/strategic/geopolitical questions raised in this thread were featured in the book.
As Bond and superkuf point out, it's highly unlikely the Soviet's would send troops themselves (and Ceacescu wouldn't send Roumanians either) as that would unnecessarily risk dragging in the US. They'd use proxies, upgun the Cubans with more modern equipment and bring in as many fontline African state troops as volunteers that they can offload old tanks and artillery to. Maybe send in a strong contingent of advisors but basically act as the puppet masters for a Cuban sponsored 'liberation army'.
But if we do go with the original proposal then a Soviet MRD is not air-transportable, it would have to be shipped in, and the supply lines at sea kept open. The Soviet naval escorts accompanying the supply ships would easily ward off the South African navy with few or no casualties (the Soviets are not going to send their transports unguarded), any SA ship going to sea risks immediately being despatched by the Soviet SSNs watching every port. South African ASW was too limited to stop Soviet subs doing whatever they wanted. Talk of South African Canberra bombers doing anything is unrealistic, if the Soviets are going to send a division plus support troops to Angola they are also going to send some aircraft as well. Even if it was only a squadron or two of Migs, that will be enough to prevent a couple of aging Canberras staying in the air very long. At best the SA airforce would be looking to ward off strikes on SA bases and to contest the skies over southern South West Africa.
Ultimately the Soviets could act in southern Africa for only as long as the US was willing to let them. If the US government was unwilling to intervene at the start because of apartheid they would still despatch several task forces to remind the Soviets as to who controlled the sea lanes, and behind the scenes diplomacy would also make it clear that there was a line of "you may go up to here and no further". Even under the apartheid regime the West needed access to South Africa's minerals, any Soviet threat to that access would be deemed unacceptable and would trigger closure of Soviet supply routes by the USN. The Soviets would then have an option of halting their advance or risk WW3 (which of course they would not do).
So if I was an SA commander in this scenario I'd avoid set piece battles as much as possible as they would just get my troops pulverised by superior Soviet firepower. The units of the SA army even with G5s cannot compete with a fully equipped Soviet division in a slugging contest. Instead, delay the Soviet advance with blocking engagements along the restricted routes through Namibia (others have already mentioned these), ambush the supply lines using good old Boer-style commando tactics, possibly risk an airborne battalion in a heliborne assault on a major Soviet HQ or supply point. In short, play to South African strengths, minimise the opportunities of the Soviets bringing their firepower to bare in a conclusive battle and save my mobile units for a decisive counter attack when the Soviets have overextended and run low on supplies. Because I'd know that I'd only need to hang on until the Americans decide enough is enough and make the Soviets come to a halt, and try to get the US to make the no-go line somewhere north of the SA border.