Warsaw Pact in SWAT...

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Anyone read Larry Bond's Vortex?

I'm surprised that nobody has mentioned Larry Bond's novel Vortex, which was based on a related premise. If you haven't read his book it is well worth the time, he's a better writer than Clancy and many of the tactical/strategic/geopolitical questions raised in this thread were featured in the book.

As Bond and superkuf point out, it's highly unlikely the Soviet's would send troops themselves (and Ceacescu wouldn't send Roumanians either) as that would unnecessarily risk dragging in the US. They'd use proxies, upgun the Cubans with more modern equipment and bring in as many fontline African state troops as volunteers that they can offload old tanks and artillery to. Maybe send in a strong contingent of advisors but basically act as the puppet masters for a Cuban sponsored 'liberation army'.

But if we do go with the original proposal then a Soviet MRD is not air-transportable, it would have to be shipped in, and the supply lines at sea kept open. The Soviet naval escorts accompanying the supply ships would easily ward off the South African navy with few or no casualties (the Soviets are not going to send their transports unguarded), any SA ship going to sea risks immediately being despatched by the Soviet SSNs watching every port. South African ASW was too limited to stop Soviet subs doing whatever they wanted. Talk of South African Canberra bombers doing anything is unrealistic, if the Soviets are going to send a division plus support troops to Angola they are also going to send some aircraft as well. Even if it was only a squadron or two of Migs, that will be enough to prevent a couple of aging Canberras staying in the air very long. At best the SA airforce would be looking to ward off strikes on SA bases and to contest the skies over southern South West Africa.

Ultimately the Soviets could act in southern Africa for only as long as the US was willing to let them. If the US government was unwilling to intervene at the start because of apartheid they would still despatch several task forces to remind the Soviets as to who controlled the sea lanes, and behind the scenes diplomacy would also make it clear that there was a line of "you may go up to here and no further". Even under the apartheid regime the West needed access to South Africa's minerals, any Soviet threat to that access would be deemed unacceptable and would trigger closure of Soviet supply routes by the USN. The Soviets would then have an option of halting their advance or risk WW3 (which of course they would not do).

So if I was an SA commander in this scenario I'd avoid set piece battles as much as possible as they would just get my troops pulverised by superior Soviet firepower. The units of the SA army even with G5s cannot compete with a fully equipped Soviet division in a slugging contest. Instead, delay the Soviet advance with blocking engagements along the restricted routes through Namibia (others have already mentioned these), ambush the supply lines using good old Boer-style commando tactics, possibly risk an airborne battalion in a heliborne assault on a major Soviet HQ or supply point. In short, play to South African strengths, minimise the opportunities of the Soviets bringing their firepower to bare in a conclusive battle and save my mobile units for a decisive counter attack when the Soviets have overextended and run low on supplies. Because I'd know that I'd only need to hang on until the Americans decide enough is enough and make the Soviets come to a halt, and try to get the US to make the no-go line somewhere north of the SA border.
 

MacCaulay

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I'm surprised that nobody has mentioned Larry Bond's novel Vortex, which was based on a related premise. If you haven't read his book it is well worth the time, he's a better writer than Clancy and many of the tactical/strategic/geopolitical questions raised in this thread were featured in the book.

This is AH.com. We're all about the Vortex.

As Bond and superkuf point out, it's highly unlikely the Soviet's would send troops themselves (and Ceacescu wouldn't send Roumanians either) as that would unnecessarily risk dragging in the US. They'd use proxies, upgun the Cubans with more modern equipment and bring in as many fontline African state troops as volunteers that they can offload old tanks and artillery to. Maybe send in a strong contingent of advisors but basically act as the puppet masters for a Cuban sponsored 'liberation army'.
In the initial post, I had the POD be the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale be a decisive South African victory that results in most if not all of the Cuban armour being destroyed. This would mean that there's no effective Cuban armour left in Angola to reinforce.
 
Sovs could then upgun the Cubans

Yes, but my suggestion was that the Soviets would need to supply the Cubans with new and more modern equipment anyway, so it's still the same situation. Either way, the original Cuban equipment wouldn't be used. If the Cubans lost too many vehicle crews in your scenario there are still plenty of reinforcements to call in from Cuba. Alternatively, just increase the pool of proxy crews by bringing in Libyans, or even Ethiopians. The quality would obviously be lower but that just means falling back on the age old Russian tactic of amassing superior numbers.

My main point, which others raised and Bond covered in his novel, is that sending in Soviet troops would be unrealistic. It's just going to greatly increase the risk of bringing in the US, and as soon as the Americans decide to intervene then the Soviets have two options; cease fire or fight WWIII. There's no way they could resupply troops in southern Africa in the face of a hostile USN so why follow that strategy? If they use proxy troops then they can tell the UN and western press that they are just supporting their fraternal socialist brothers to liberate the downtrodden masses from evil imperialists. Classic Soviet foreign policy. The US may still intervene, but it's a lower risk and would take longer to garner public support.

A SADF vs Cuban force armed with modern Soviet equipment and supported by frontline state troops scenario would still be interesting.
 

MacCaulay

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My main point, which others raised and Bond covered in his novel, is that sending in Soviet troops would be unrealistic. It's just going to greatly increase the risk of bringing in the US, and as soon as the Americans decide to intervene then the Soviets have two options; cease fire or fight WWIII.

I was thinking about that point at work, and I believe that history provides a wealth of examples to the contrary.

There was the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, which NATO stood by and let happen. There was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which was similarly met with no military reaction.

The numerous small scale air battles between Soviet and Israeli fighters in the early 1970s over the eastern Mediterranean while the Soviet air force was aiding the Egyptian air defence in the War of Attrition. That didn't provoke the US into action until the Israelis managed to steal a Red SAM radar in one piece.

The mechanized and airborne assault on Afghanistan in 1979 may have energized the CIA into an unprecedented covert supply operation, but it didn't result in a third world war.

The preparations for an invasion of Poland in 1981 didn't raise tensions dramatically, either.

What it comes down to, I suppose, is the question of whether or not the US would be willing to risk itself for South Africa. And I don't think it would. Not politically, and certainly not physically. Especially not if the Soviets were making it abundantly clear they had no plans on Pretoria, like the POD explains.
 
Originally posted by MacCaulay
I was thinking about that point at work, and I believe that history provides a wealth of examples to the contrary.
There was the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, which NATO stood by and let happen. There was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which was similarly met with no military reaction.
The numerous small scale air battles between Soviet and Israeli fighters in the early 1970s over the eastern Mediterranean while the Soviet air force was aiding the Egyptian air defence in the War of Attrition. That didn't provoke the US into action until the Israelis managed to steal a Red SAM radar in one piece.
The mechanized and airborne assault on Afghanistan in 1979 may have energized the CIA into an unprecedented covert supply operation, but it didn't result in a third world war.
The preparations for an invasion of Poland in 1981 didn't raise tensions dramatically, either.
What it comes down to, I suppose, is the question of whether or not the US would be willing to risk itself for South Africa. And I don't think it would. Not politically, and certainly not physically. Especially not if the Soviets were making it abundantly clear they had no plans on Pretoria, like the POD explains.

Yes, but most of those interventions happened in already established Soviet zone of influence. To stop the Soviets it would have taken a full scale war. The Soviets operated almost on their own ground, with very short supply lines. In Afghanistan, USA had no way to stop the Soviets with military means (no direct access). Soviet fighters in Egypt were irritating, but eventually not a danger to the existence of theIsraeland US influence there.
Meanwhile Soviet intervention in SWAT would have been something else completely. A relatively small Soviet force in Africa would have been supplied by sea, and US Navy would have been able to cut those very long supply lines whenever and wherever it wanted. In case of confrontation Soviet Expeditionary Force would have had no chance of victory, leaving USSR humiliated in world's opinion. No Soviet leadership would have risked that if the Americans decided to show their teeth. And no Soviet leadership would have risked a WW3 for Africa. OTOH, if Soviets had quietly promised US that they would keep away from SA itself, Washington might have let them try, sending only a USN Task Force to monitor the situation not to mention an army of spies and perhaps some discreet military help for SA.
 
I don't think the Soviets themselves would ever show up beyond their advisory and supply roles. I could see the Angolans getting something even better though-East Germans. Honnecker was always desperate for international credibility, and in the '70s and '80s from a public relations standpoint, one can't buy a better enemy than the apartheid regime. Enter the Volksafrikakorps!

As for Western reaction, greater Warsaw Pact and Cuban involvement in Southern Africa will correspond to increasingly larger amounts of various war material mysteriously falling off the truck right into the SADF's lap by hook or by crook. Maybe starting with a few hundred extra Milan anti-tank missiles for "Angolan freedom fighters" up to the point where I can see crated Mirage F1s being delivered in the middle of the night to replace war losses over the front. The US can just look the other way while the Gerald Bulls of the world do their thing.
 
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