War Scare of 1907 Turns Real

the 1907 9 October Hague convention basically says food fuel and coal and transit is ok, weapons ammo supply and basing is not, The 1899 convention is silent.

But both have a court of arbitration for matters in the pacific.

One of the reason why UK US wars after 1815 are really in the ASB section is that not only do the US and UK have a similar mechanism between themselves but they consistently use it and abide by decisions of the arbitrator.

Prior to that convention the UK would probably look on the merits of the case. So if the war began with a Japanese attack or act of aggression, the UK would probably veer towards more leniency in allowing a US fleet to base out of UK waters. If its just a dispute got out of hand more towards neutrality.

On the other hand with a a dispute getting out of hand neutrality could well end up with the USN actually being in the Philippines before the shooting starts.

A lot of the UK attitude would be on the merits of the case they are not obliged to support either side. The attitude to the Russinas is coloured by ) dont like Russia, b) shooting at fishing fleets means only the most grudging sort of neutrality is to be expected, and c) the point of the Japanese alliance to keep the Russians out of the Pacific. Its no guide to how the UK will behave to a US navy, unless it starts seeing IJN torpedo Boats everywhere.


Kaigun I think gives some view of the IJN war plans this early but frankly they are broke.
 
The problem with sending the US fleet to the Phillipines is the place was not well developed as a naval base. While contracts for fuel delivery could be made the place had only Spanish left overs for fleet support. This was another reason why the Orange plans favored not rushing off across the Pacific. Once the fleet arrived the clock would be running, & in a few weeks there would growing reasons send the ships off to somewhere with proper 'reliable' support facilities. Outside the US west coast I'm unsure where that might be.
 
My first thought is the other nations would go on with the convention. Maybe the US and Japanese representatives would show up too & throw spitballs at each other?
 
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The problem with sending the US fleet to the Phillipines is the place was not well developed as a naval base. While contracts for fuel delivery could be made the place had only Spanish left overs for fleet support. This was another reason why the Orange plans favored not rushing off across the Pacific. Once the fleet arrived the clock would be running, & in a few weeks there would growing reasons send the ships off to somewhere with proper 'reliable' support facilities. Outside the US west coast I'm unsure where that might be.

True but FDR put the fleet in Pearl where the admirals said it could not protect itself. If you re after a war Scenario you could have the US deploy to force the issue ( whatever that is) and the IJN ( which also has a ways to travel) try to defeat an isolated portion of the USN a la Port Arthur. or the Japanese still recovering from the Russian War being faced with a US build of the anchorage then base in the PI as the Murica tendency builds up and the USN seeks to free Taiwan from Japanese clutches.

Both sides have a hell of a time hurting each other quickly before the mandates and WW1/interwar build ups.

I think the 07 Hague really codifies what people thought reasonable especially regarding neutrals. I mean what's the USN going to do, demand basing rights in Hong Kong and bombrd if they don't get it. Bye Bye NY.

While the belligerents can cheerfully machinegun each other in the water if they want to the neutrals will behave as they see fit and the 07 convention is a reasonable norm.
 

Deleted member 94680

My first thought is the other nations would go on with the convention. Maybe the US and Japanese repress would show up too & throw spitballs at each other?
I think the 07 Hague really codifies what people thought reasonable especially regarding neutrals. I mean what's the USN going to do, demand basing rights in Hong Kong and bombrd if they don't get it. Bye Bye NY.

According to the Wiki article on The Hague Conventions (1899 & 1907): "The second conference was called at the suggestion of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904, but it was postponed because of the war between Russia and Japan."

So if it's Teddy R that calls for the '07 Convention (as it became) OTL who's going to call for the convention in this '07 ATL if the U.S. is at War?
 
It looks like the opening few months would be a cruiser war, while each side figures out how they will deploy their main fleet. Any experts able to comment on what any cruiser actions might look like in the opening weeks?
 
Does anyone know off the top of their heads the rule of law for combatant vessels fueling in third-party nation's ports? I vaguely remember something along the lines that a vessel of a nation at War can take on fuel (but nothing else?) and only stop for a limited period of time.

The Russians avoided most neutral ports, but had deals with the Hamburg-America Line that leased their colliers and sold them the coal in them.
Also they did stop at French ports.
 
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Does anyone know off the top of their heads the rule of law for combatant vessels fueling in third-party nation's ports? I vaguely remember something along the lines that a vessel of a nation at War can take on fuel (but nothing else?) and only stop for a limited period of time.

Is allowing the fuelling of these vessels considered a duty? i.e. would the British be able to allow the American fleet to fuel without 'breaking' their treaty with the Japanese, or would an American battleship taking on coal in Singapore effectively put Britain at War with Japan?
The Hague Convention of 1907 limits stays in neutral ports by belligerent warships to no more than 24 hours, and I believe establishes rules for when the ship may call at the same port again. I haven't checked, but I believe the pre-1907 standard was somewhere between 24 hours and 3 days. And I think the limit between calling returning to a neitral port was 1 month. As for feuling, I don't believe there was any obligation for a neutral power to allow the resupply of a belligerent warship. In fact, there was no obligation for the neutral power to even let the belligerent warship enter its waters and ports. It was entirely at the neutral power's discretion.

It looks like the opening few months would be a cruiser war, while each side figures out how they will deploy their main fleet. Any experts able to comment on what any cruiser actions might look like in the opening weeks?
As regards the OP, I recall there being a fair amount of discussion on this subject in the book War Plan Orange - a very interesting read in its own right, and my primary source for this subject- but it's been several years since I last read it. The Navy at the time alternated between camps of "thrusters" who wanted to immediately deploy the fleet to the Philippines, or at least the Eastern Pacific and those who wanted to wait and build up more slowly. From my memory, the Navy in 1907 was temporarily under the sway of the thrusters and that year's plan was to rush the fleet across the Pacific. At certain points there were also compromise ideas where a portion of the battleline and a troop convoy would be rushed across to the Philippines, while most of the fleet was built up. I also know that the US planners toyed with the idea of using deserted atolls in the German-owned Marianas to re-coal between bases. I think Kwajalein was the favored option. I'll check if my school library has War Plan Orange in the stacks - if so I will consult it and relay what it says.

Edit: added in a quote i missed first tiime round
 
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My recollection of War Plan Orange ( excellent book) is per Cap't Jack's. Cruiser operations are either bizarre, the Denvers are listed as having a schooner sail plan or mini battlefleet ops with AC's. The US problem is the Japanese do have position in the Western Pacific and enough of a naval superiority to liberate the PI and Guam unless the US commits major portions of its fleet early and risks defeat in detail.

But a lot really depends on what the cause is and keeping the RN out of it. The British interest is not having any war at all in which they have to pick between two friendly powers.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Even this early, choosing Japan over the United States would seem foolish, not least because the main purpose of the Anglo-Japanese alliance feels less valid with the start of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement.
The alliance wasn't terminated until the 1920s, and indeed was extended after the date you mention.
I think the likely response of the British might depend on who was seen as starting it!
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The Canadian plans from a few decades later were basically to launch a preemptive strike against cities like Detroit closer to the Canadian border hopefully providing much needed time to transport troops to Canada.
For what it's worth, the flash-to-bang time of a British army engaging in crash reinforcement of a troubled colony is a few weeks:



If we assume that the ships used are the same speed as that which OTL lifted 2 Bn, Queens SY (which is to say, taking from the 19th Oct to the 14th Nov to reach SA) then that's 26 days at sea to SA (which is 7800 NM). This rather neatly comes out at 300 NM a day, which implies 12.5 knots average speed. (Some will be quicker, some slower, so keep that in mind.)

Portsmouth to Halifax is 2,970 NM - so 10 days at sea, or a 16 day acceleration in the timeframe.

Portsmouth to Montreal is about the same - the difference is ~100 NM. We can assume that this is a 15 day acceleration in the timeframe.

Portsmouth to Quebec is about the same again.

And we can assume that the British will be able to land somewhere on the St Lawrence if it's frozen south of there. We'll use the same time as it would take to reach Montreal or Quebec.


So for the sake of argument, let's assume that the US attack begins on 10 Jan, and that the alarm was sounded by the British on the 7th. (This is chosen deliberately to match the Anglo Boer War date of month and relative warning time.)

So, from a 7 Oct movement order, here's when battalions arrived in South Africa.


3rd Battalion, Grenadier Guards 15th Nov
1st Battalion, Coldstream Guards 16th Nov
2nd Battalion, Coldstream Guards 12th Nov
1st Battalion, Scots Guards 13th Nov


2nd Battalion, Queen’s Royal Regiment 14th Nov
2nd Battalion, East Surrey Regiment 14th Nov
2nd Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment 8th Nov
2nd Battalion, Devonshire Regiment 15th Nov


2nd Battalion, Black Watch 13th Nov
1st Battalion, Highland Light Infantry 11th Nov
2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders 16th Nov
1st Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 18th Nov


1st Battalion, Rifle Brigade 20th Nov
1st Battalion, Durham Light Infantry 18th Nov
3rd Battalion, King’s Royal Rifles 24th Nov
2nd Battalion, Scottish Rifles 21st Nov


1st Battalion, Inniskilling Fusiliers 30th Nov
1st Battalion, Connaught Rangers 28th Nov
1st Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers 28th Nov
2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles 14th Nov


2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers 18th Nov
2nd Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers 18th Nov
1st Battalion, Royal Welch Fusiliers 13th Nov
2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers 12th Nov


1st Battalion, Royal Scots 1st Dec
2nd Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers 23rd Nov
2nd Battalion, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry 29th Nov
2nd Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry 1st Dec
1st Battalion, Welsh Regiment 22nd Nov
2nd Battalion, Northampton Regiment 14th Nov
1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders 28th Nov




And here's when they'd arrive assuming identical warning times and embarkation delays, but with a journey 15 days shorter.



3rd Battalion, Grenadier Guards 31st Jan
1st Battalion, Coldstream Guards 1th Feb
2nd Battalion, Coldstream Guards 28th Jan
1st Battalion, Scots Guards 29th Jan


2nd Battalion, Queen’s Royal Regiment 30th Jan
2nd Battalion, East Surrey Regiment 30th Jan
2nd Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment 24th Jan
2nd Battalion, Devonshire Regiment 31st Jan


2nd Battalion, Black Watch 29th Jan
1st Battalion, Highland Light Infantry 27th Jan
2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders 1st Feb
1st Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 3rd Feb


1st Battalion, Rifle Brigade 5th Feb
1st Battalion, Durham Light Infantry 3rd Feb
3rd Battalion, King’s Royal Rifles 9th Feb
2nd Battalion, Scottish Rifles 6st Feb


1st Battalion, Inniskilling Fusiliers 15th Feb
1st Battalion, Connaught Rangers 13th Feb
1st Battalion, Royal Dublin Fusiliers 13th Feb
2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles 30th Jan


2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers 3rd Feb
2nd Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers 3rd Feb
1st Battalion, Royal Welch Fusiliers 29th Jan
2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers 28th Jan


1st Battalion, Royal Scots 16th Feb
2nd Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers 8th Feb
2nd Battalion, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry 14th Feb
2nd Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry 16th Feb
1st Battalion, Welsh Regiment 7th Feb
2nd Battalion, Northampton Regiment 30th Jan
1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders 13th Feb



In other words, three-four weeks from alarm to feet-dry.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Now, in terms of the US and British Army.

The British are just going through the Haldane reforms, which create a ready expeditionary force of seven divisions of regulars.
Total US Army size: 65,000.
 
The alliance wasn't terminated until the 1920s, and indeed was extended after the date you mention.
I think the likely response of the British might depend on who was seen as starting it!

They weren't forced to choose between the States and Japan until around 1920, when they terminated it under American pressure. And the date I mentioned is only relevant in devaluing the alliance, but having to make the Tokyo-Washington choice this early is what really makes it more costly than OTL. Them cancelling the contracts they already had to supply the American fleet is making that choice publicly, and not worth it to keep Japan as an ally against a Russia that they're starting to ally with themselves. There's no benefit to cancelling the contracts, is what I was getting at.

Now, in terms of the US and British Army.

The British are just going through the Haldane reforms, which create a ready expeditionary force of seven divisions of regulars.
Total US Army size: 65,000.

Of course, the real reason you stopped by the thread.
 
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