War of the 6th Coalition Big Thread.

As most people here probably know, the War of the 6th Coalition was the last great Coalition War, the Hundred-Days having had no chance to succeed. It was also the war which ended the ambitions of the Napoleonic Empire.
It is generally separated in three campaigns :
-1812, the Campaign of Russia, with the battles of Borodino, Smolensk and the Berezina.
-1813, the Campaign of Germany, culminating in the Battle of Leipzig,
-1814, the Campaign of France, which was basically mop-up.

There are a number of PODs related to this Napoleonic War which could turn the tide, of which I will call attention on three :
- WI : French victory at Lepizig? This can be declined in whether it's a simple tactic victory, a decisive victory, or a victory achieved by the inadvertent killing of the enemy leaders (which almost happened IOTL)
- WI : French troops do capture Riga? The French didn't make a simple thrust for Moscow, but also wanted to make a similar thrust towards the North and St Petersburg. However, Riga didn't fall, and a French corps was twice stopped on the Neva river before reaching the capital of the Russian Empire.
- WI : Moscow doesn't burn.
 
The problem with Riga was two fold as i recall.

The troops involved were mostly Prussian, and they were not that enthusiastic about it. Basically looking to flip asap.

And the Royal Navy made coastal operations very difficult, running gunboats up the Daugava etc.
 
The problem with Riga was two fold as i recall.

The troops involved were mostly Prussian, and they were not that enthusiastic about it. Basically looking to flip asap.

And the Royal Navy made coastal operations very difficult, running gunboats up the Daugava etc.

I see. Could promising Prussia part of the Baltics (e.g. the Duchy of Courland) change this? It would then be in the direct interests of Prussia to take Riga.
 
As most people here probably know, the War of the 6th Coalition was the last great Coalition War, the Hundred-Days having had no chance to succeed. It was also the war which ended the ambitions of the Napoleonic Empire.
It is generally separated in three campaigns :
-1812, the Campaign of Russia, with the battles of Borodino, Smolensk and the Berezina.
-1813, the Campaign of Germany, culminating in the Battle of Leipzig,
-1814, the Campaign of France, which was basically mop-up.

There are a number of PODs related to this Napoleonic War which could turn the tide, of which I will call attention on three :
- WI : French victory at Lepizig? This can be declined in whether it's a simple tactic victory, a decisive victory, or a victory achieved by the inadvertent killing of the enemy leaders (which almost happened IOTL)
- WI : French troops do capture Riga? The French didn't make a simple thrust for Moscow, but also wanted to make a similar thrust towards the North and St Petersburg. However, Riga didn't fall, and a French corps was twice stopped on the Neva river before reaching the capital of the Russian Empire.
- WI : Moscow doesn't burn.

If french victory at Leipzig, be it by capturing the russian and prussian kings and general staff as they almost did by chance on the first day of the battle, or by actually winning the battle through better tactics which would surprise the coalition, then Napoleon is going to have one more opportunity to make an advantageous peace with his enemies.

The point is that he must understand that he has no choice but to give-up an enormous part of what he had conquered earlier if he wants it to be at last a sincere and really lasting peace.

Which of course means kissing Poland goodbye. Nappy must not try to roll Russia back to the Niemen frontier nor even to take back Berlin.

At that stage of the war, given the strength of the coalition that was by far the strongst he ever faced, he needs to satisfy the "big three", that is, by decreasing order of proximity (not of power), Austria, Russia and Britain. Prussia did not then matter that much and was some kind of junior partner of the big three in the coalition.

He needs first Austria because Austria was his natural ally and that, contrary to ex-post truth twisting, Austria only defected from Napoleon when it understood that he would never make the reasonable concessions that the post Russia campaign disaster demanded. Austria wanted a better share on 2 fields : Germany and Italy.

Russia will want France rolled back west of the Rhine.

And Britain will want to weaken napoleonic France as much as possible but, although it was the power that made everything possible to trigger wars on the continent, it was not the most decisive partner in making peace. What Britain will not compromise over, in this situation, is of course free and direct access to german markets, restoration of a Dutch State that is its natural gate to Germany.

So basically, I would say :
- Spain restored to the spainsh Bourbons,
- the kingdom of Italy made independant (for Napoleon to renounce his italian crown) with the whole of Tyrol handed back to the Habsburgs but which could gain extension over a part of the former papal States,
- Saxony maintained in its borders,
- Prussia gaining but a few compensations in Germany (Westphalia),
- restoration of a german confederacy without France as its hegemon but with Austria as its president, and with the outer guarantee of Russia, Britain and France,
- Austria gaining back all its hereditary german and Illyrian principalities,
- the italian Bourbons restored to the throne of Naples-Sicily,
- restoration of a Dutch State on the right bank of the Rhine.
- Russia annexing most of the grand duchy of Warsaw, a minority going to Prussia,
- and France limited to the Rhine border (including dutch Brabant) and its north italian annexations, maybe gaining a little compensation at the expense of western Switzerland.

And there is a bonus chance of making it a lasting peace if Napoleon announces that he will abdicate in favour of his son quite soon.
 
If french victory at Leipzig, be it by capturing the russian and prussian kings and general staff as they almost did by chance on the first day of the battle, or by actually winning the battle through better tactics which would surprise the coalition, then Napoleon is going to have one more opportunity to make an advantageous peace with his enemies.

The point is that he must understand that he has no choice but to give-up an enormous part of what he had conquered earlier if he wants it to be at last a sincere and really lasting peace.

Which of course means kissing Poland goodbye. Nappy must not try to roll Russia back to the Niemen frontier nor even to take back Berlin.

At that stage of the war, given the strength of the coalition that was by far the strongst he ever faced, he needs to satisfy the "big three", that is, by decreasing order of proximity (not of power), Austria, Russia and Britain. Prussia did not then matter that much and was some kind of junior partner of the big three in the coalition.

He needs first Austria because Austria was his natural ally and that, contrary to ex-post truth twisting, Austria only defected from Napoleon when it understood that he would never make the reasonable concessions that the post Russia campaign disaster demanded. Austria wanted a better share on 2 fields : Germany and Italy.

Russia will want France rolled back west of the Rhine.

And Britain will want to weaken napoleonic France as much as possible but, although it was the power that made everything possible to trigger wars on the continent, it was not the most decisive partner in making peace. What Britain will not compromise over, in this situation, is of course free and direct access to german markets, restoration of a Dutch State that is its natural gate to Germany.

So basically, I would say :
- Spain restored to the spainsh Bourbons,
- the kingdom of Italy made independant (for Napoleon to renounce his italian crown) with the whole of Tyrol handed back to the Habsburgs but which could gain extension over a part of the former papal States,
- Saxony maintained in its borders,
- Prussia gaining but a few compensations in Germany (Westphalia),
- restoration of a german confederacy without France as its hegemon but with Austria as its president, and with the outer guarantee of Russia, Britain and France,
- Austria gaining back all its hereditary german and Illyrian principalities,
- France limited to the Rhine border (including dutch Brabant) and its north italian annexations,
- the italian Bourbons restored to the throne of Naples-Sicily,
- restoration of a Dutch State on the right bank of the Rhine.
- and Russia annexing most of the grand duchy of Warsaw, a minority going to Prussia.
I don't think Napoleon would willingly agree to such a peace. However, would Napoleon being wounded or sick and unable to participate in negotiations result in such a peace?
Also, would France be able to keep the Latium and Catalonia?
I think the restoration of the Kingdom of Holland under a Bonaparte would be acceptable to France, but would it be acceptable to the other powers?
 
1 - Spain restored to the spainsh Bourbons,

2 - the kingdom of Italy made independant (for Napoleon to renounce his italian crown) with the whole of Tyrol handed back to the Habsburgs but which could gain extension over a part of the former papal States,

3 - Saxony maintained in its borders,

4- Prussia gaining but a few compensations in Germany (Westphalia),

5- restoration of a german confederacy without France as its hegemon but with Austria as its president, and with the outer guarantee of Russia, Britain and France,

6- Austria gaining back all its hereditary german and Illyrian principalities,
- the italian Bourbons restored to the throne of Naples-Sicily,

7- restoration of a Dutch State on the right bank of the Rhine.

8- Russia annexing most of the grand duchy of Warsaw, a minority going to Prussia,

9- and France limited to the Rhine border (including dutch Brabant) and its north italian annexations, maybe gaining a little compensation at the expense of western Switzerland.

1- Agree

2- Nope, it won't happen. It's too dangerous for Austria and to the Kingdoms of Sicily and Napoles to have an independent kingdom named Italy, also Sardinia would demand it's continental possessions.

3- It's hard for Saxony to be allowed to keep it's borders. One reason is that the Tsar promised Saxony to Prussia, but Metternich didn't want a Prussian controlled Saxony, so Saxony is going to lose some lands.

4- If by some compensation you mean as it happen as OTL then it's an agree.

5- Happened OTL it could happen in TTL

6- The german lands part would be hard but the Illyrian is a given also the Bourbon leading a Naples-Sicily would much argument between all parts

7- GB would demand a Dutch state with all Belgium included because it would be too dangerous to leave France with access to those ports. Especially Antwerp.

8- Agree

9- I guess you are using the Frankfurt proposals as you base but given that the Brits, the ones financing the war, wouldn't agree in the "Natural Borders of France", I dare say the Allies, even after not winning the battle, would try to advance towards France and impose, at least, the 1797 or more likely the 1791. The only one to defend the "natural borders of France" was Metternich and only because he wanted a strong France lead by Napoleon to counter the Prussia-Russia block.

I don't think Napoleon would willingly agree to such a peace. However, would Napoleon being wounded or sick and unable to participate in negotiations result in such a peace?

If Napoleon wound't agree the moderated terms Matteo posted then the allies would had just steamrolled towards Paris and enforce the 1791 borders on them, like in OTL.

Also, would France be able to keep the Latium and Catalonia?
I think the restoration of the Kingdom of Holland under a Bonaparte would be acceptable to France, but would it be acceptable to the other powers?

Neither of them would be acceptable. The only person in all of Europe to want the 1801 borders was Metternich all other allies wanted the 1791, especially the Brits because it took Belgium out of French hands.

Latium would go to the Pope and Catalonia back to Spain.

Holland would go to the House of Orange mainly because the Brits trusted them and because they wanted someone they could trust in control of the Netherlands. Of the other powers no one would mainly care much, Prussia had no interest in Holland and neither did Russia, only Austria would care and only because of the Austrian Netherlands.
 
1- Agree

2- Nope, it won't happen. It's too dangerous for Austria and to the Kingdoms of Sicily and Napoles to have an independent kingdom named Italy, also Sardinia would demand it's continental possessions.

3- It's hard for Saxony to be allowed to keep it's borders. One reason is that the Tsar promised Saxony to Prussia, but Metternich didn't want a Prussian controlled Saxony, so Saxony is going to lose some lands.

4- If by some compensation you mean as it happen as OTL then it's an agree.

5- Happened OTL it could happen in TTL

6- The german lands part would be hard but the Illyrian is a given also the Bourbon leading a Naples-Sicily would much argument between all parts

7- GB would demand a Dutch state with all Belgium included because it would be too dangerous to leave France with access to those ports. Especially Antwerp.

8- Agree

9- I guess you are using the Frankfurt proposals as you base but given that the Brits, the ones financing the war, wouldn't agree in the "Natural Borders of France", I dare say the Allies, even after not winning the battle, would try to advance towards France and impose, at least, the 1797 or more likely the 1791. The only one to defend the "natural borders of France" was Metternich and only because he wanted a strong France lead by Napoleon to counter the Prussia-Russia block.



If Napoleon wound't agree the moderated terms Matteo posted then the allies would had just steamrolled towards Paris and enforce the 1791 borders on them, like in OTL.



Neither of them would be acceptable. The only person in all of Europe to want the 1801 borders was Metternich all other allies wanted the 1791, especially the Brits because it took Belgium out of French hands.

Latium would go to the Pope and Catalonia back to Spain.

Holland would go to the House of Orange mainly because the Brits trusted them and because they wanted someone they could trust in control of the Netherlands. Of the other powers no one would mainly care much, Prussia had no interest in Holland and neither did Russia, only Austria would care and only because of the Austrian Netherlands.
I don't think you understand the POD. A victory at Leipzig means that they can't steamroll the French at all. It means that the French once again have the initiative. Also, the British haven't contributed in any significative way yet outside the Peninsular Campaign. They cannot make France lose Belgium. It's not 1815 where the full force of the continent was applied on France. Austria was still "neutral", at least non-belligerant, Prussia and Russia had lost a lot of their advanced forces. It is easy for Napoleon to make separate peace with the Russians, return the Illyrian States to Austria to pacify them, and move to crush the BEF in Spain will the full force of the Grande Armée which was still in good enough a shape to win at Leipzig.
 
I don't think you understand the POD. A victory at Leipzig means that they can't steamroll the French at all. It means that the French once again have the initiative. Also, the British haven't contributed in any significative way yet outside the Peninsular Campaign. They cannot make France lose Belgium. It's not 1815 where the full force of the continent was applied on France. Austria was still "neutral", at least non-belligerant, Prussia and Russia had lost a lot of their advanced forces. It is easy for Napoleon to make separate peace with the Russians, return the Illyrian States to Austria to pacify them, and move to crush the BEF in Spain will the full force of the Grande Armée which was still in good enough a shape to win at Leipzig.

It depends on your definition of "Victory at Leipzig".

If you mean Napoleon win by no doubt and crushes the opposition, then sure he can dictate all he wishes to the opposite side, the problem is that in Leipzig he his surrounded and the best he can hope for his a small victory and with that the Allied armies are kept intact.

This isn't the French army of 1812 full of veterans and with good gear, this are the Mary Luises a group of conscripts that had almost no training and barely enough weapons but that compensated that in courage and a near suicidal loyalty to Napoleon, but suicidal courage and loyalty can only take that far.

With the Allied armies intact Napoleon can't dream of imposing anything the best he can do is hope for the 1801 borders, given that Russia wouldn't make a separated peace, they wanted to impose the peace to insure that France would learn and stop destroying the balance of powers.

So no I didn't misunderstood the POD, even if France wins the battle the war is lost and everyone, except Napoleon, know that. The Frankfurt offer was only made because Metternich outmaneuvered the rest of the Allies and because he wanted a strong France lead by Napoleon to serve as a counterweight, no one else wanted a strong France, they wanted the pre-revolution France.

A defeat at Leipzig only prolongs the War, the Anglo-Portuguese-Spanish forces are still invading Southern France and Prussia-Russia-Austria-Sweden will still advance against Napoleon after recovering their forces, something they can but that Napoleon can't because France as reached it's limit in terms of manpower and gear.

At best France can hope for the 1797 border, and only with Metternich and Talleyrand doing all they can to manipulate the other powers to accept that, because there were red lines.

Prussia, Russia and GB were against the Rhine border.

GB was against France getting Belgium and OTL even thought of creating a Prussian lead North German Federation because they thought it was the only way to ensure that Northern Europe coasts would be controlled by someone that it wouldn't turn against them.

Russia would demand Poland and the Austrian Emperor would demand the French retreated from Italy.

This are the red lines, this was the main points the Allies demanded and that wound't see refused, France out of the Rhine, Belgium and Italy and the complete destruction of the Duchy of Warsaw.
 
In 1813 I thuink Napoleon's best chance is in the Spring Campaign following Lutzen and Bautzen but Napoleon's lack of cavalry and his poorly trained new conscripts heavily restricted his chances.

In the Autumn campaign the disasters of the Katzbach, Kulm, Dennewitz and Gross Beeren cancelled out Napoleon's victory at Dresden. The Trachenburg plan, refusing battle againt Napoleon and instead concentrating on confronting his Marshals such as Ney and MacDonald did the rest.

As for Leipzig Napoleon had a chance of winning at Wachau on the southern sectorn on October 16 but this was ruined by Marmon's defeat in th Northern sector. When the battle was renewed on the 18th the best Napoleon could have done was achieve a draw. He did hold most of his positions but, by the end of October 18 the battle was lost.

See Micheal M Leggiere two volume Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany and his volume Napoleon & Berlin
 
It depends on your definition of "Victory at Leipzig".
If you mean Napoleon win by no doubt and crushes the opposition, then sure he can dictate all he wishes to the opposite side, the problem is that in Leipzig he his surrounded and the best he can hope for his a small victory and with that the Allied armies are kept intact.
Well, Leipzig was decidedly the decisive battle. He had most of his troops there and most of the Russians, Swedes and Prussians too.
First of all, this is a defensive battle where the attackers have encirclement and troop count going for them. This means they will probably not leave until either the commanders are dead - which almost happened and could allow for a white peace or a peace at the price of Poland - or they've taken massive damage either in terms of casualties or morale.
Therefore, these are the conditions for a French victory at Leipzig.
Massive morale damage means the French can pursue and inflict additional casualties. Of course, France will have to make concessions, since 1812 had proved the Russian Bear was too much for France to invade, but they basically have the edge.
Massive casualties means the Coalition troops in Germany lose their numerical edge, France can recover its Elbe defense lines (Leipzig is in Saxony, therefore not so far from the Elbe). There too, France can get a correct peace.
This isn't the French army of 1812 full of veterans and with good gear, this are the Mary Luises a group of conscripts that had almost no training and barely enough weapons but that compensated that in courage and a near suicidal loyalty to Napoleon, but suicidal courage and loyalty can only take that far.

With the Allied armies intact Napoleon can't dream of imposing anything the best he can do is hope for the 1801 borders, given that Russia wouldn't make a separated peace, they wanted to impose the peace to insure that France would learn and stop destroying the balance of powers.
Of course not, he cannot impose anything, however with France in a position of relative strength, it might be possible to preserve what's left of French power through skillful negotiation (e.g. if he gets Talleyrand on the job)
So no I didn't misunderstood the POD, even if France wins the battle the war is lost and everyone, except Napoleon, know that. The Frankfurt offer was only made because Metternich outmaneuvered the rest of the Allies and because he wanted a strong France lead by Napoleon to serve as a counterweight, no one else wanted a strong France, they wanted the pre-revolution France.
Again Leipzig is the decisive battle. Winning it strengthens the French position because it means the Coalition cannot use its numerical advantage for a while.
A defeat at Leipzig only prolongs the War, the Anglo-Portuguese-Spanish forces are still invading Southern France and Prussia-Russia-Austria-Sweden will still advance against Napoleon after recovering their forces, something they can but that Napoleon can't because France as reached it's limit in terms of manpower and gear.
Let's assume Napoleon has come to terms with reality - all of Europe is up against a France which has lost its elite troops. France is already going to lose a lot of its military enthusiasm, since a whole generation of young men have been expended on the battlefields of Europe. In this context, Napoleon would not be able to declare war again if all the other powers of Europe remained in a defensive alliance.
Also, I repeat, at the time of Leipzig, Austria is still deliberately neutral. It only really joined the coalition after the French defeat at Leipzig. That's why the battle is also decisive in diplomatic terms.
At best France can hope for the 1797 border, and only with Metternich and Talleyrand doing all they can to manipulate the other powers to accept that, because there were red lines.

Prussia, Russia and GB were against the Rhine border.

GB was against France getting Belgium and OTL even thought of creating a Prussian lead North German Federation because they thought it was the only way to ensure that Northern Europe coasts would be controlled by someone that it wouldn't turn against them.

Russia would demand Poland and the Austrian Emperor would demand the French retreated from Italy.

This are the red lines, this was the main points the Allies demanded and that wound't see refused, France out of the Rhine, Belgium and Italy and the complete destruction of the Duchy of Warsaw.
So, let me recapitulate.
The English want France out of Belgium and Rhenania. Sure, but if their allies in East Europe make peace, they're screwed and won't count in the negotiations, unless they occupy Belgium and Rhenania.
The Prussians want France out of Rhenania. They are a minor power, which is very vulnerable to losing its capital again after the Battle of Leipzig.
Russia may want France out of Rhenania, but what they mostly want is France unable to attack them again, and additional buffer lands. This means Poland is prioritary over the French Rhinelands.
As for Italy, it's mainly an Anglo-Austrian concern. Since the Austrians aren't in the war yet, they could be easily bought into joining back the French over some concessions in Italy, which would bring balance back into the Coalition War. Typically, returning the Illyrian Provinces to Austria and the Latium to the Papal state would be quite big concessions for France, which wouldn't have to go all the way to dropping Piemonte and Liguria.
Catalonia would be a matter of France with the UK and Spain.
I think the Spanish would accept getting rid of the rebellious Catalonians if they could get rid of the Bonaparte on their throne and get their rightful King back.
It would create an uproar in England if the BEF happened to be squashed by the French army, which would certainly go in favor of making peace.

My conclusion is :
France could keep the Rhine Frontier and its Transalpine provinces, as well as possibly Catalonia, if it's capable of winning Leipzig, bring the Austrians back on the Napoleonic side with an Illyrian bribe, make peace with the Russo-Prussians (and the Swedes), and then squish the Ibero-British army in 1814.
 
I see. Could promising Prussia part of the Baltics (e.g. the Duchy of Courland) change this? It would then be in the direct interests of Prussia to take Riga.

Possibly, although the Treaty of Tilsit had been so harsh that Prussia was pretty much inherently hostile to France and looking for any reasonable chance to break loose and get her own back. Maybe combined with the return of Magdeburg and some of the historical Brandenburg territories west of the Elbe. Giving back more of Prussia's stuff might shift them to a more enthusiastic participation, but i think they would always be a fairweather friends, and if Russia looked like winning they would flip.
 
Possibly, although the Treaty of Tilsit had been so harsh that Prussia was pretty much inherently hostile to France and looking for any reasonable chance to break loose and get her own back. Maybe combined with the return of Magdeburg and some of the historical Brandenburg territories west of the Elbe. Giving back more of Prussia's stuff might shift them to a more enthusiastic participation, but i think they would always be a fairweather friends, and if Russia looked like winning they would flip.

I think Napoleon intended Tilsit to be a "this is what happens when you fuck with me" warning to Austria and Russia.
I don't think that aside from Spain early on (and even then) any of the French allies were anything but fair-weather friends. Just having them do their job would be sufficient.
I think your suggestion of returning stuff, perhaps in a less harsh treaty of Tilsit (only taking Poland from Prussia per example) or in a sale for France to fund its invasion of Russia?
 
Well, Leipzig was decidedly the decisive battle. He had most of his troops there and most of the Russians, Swedes and Prussians too.
First of all, this is a defensive battle where the attackers have encirclement and troop count going for them. This means they will probably not leave until either the commanders are dead - which almost happened and could allow for a white peace or a peace at the price of Poland - or they've taken massive damage either in terms of casualties or morale.
Therefore, these are the conditions for a French victory at Leipzig.
Massive morale damage means the French can pursue and inflict additional casualties. Of course, France will have to make concessions, since 1812 had proved the Russian Bear was too much for France to invade, but they basically have the edge.

There is a problem in that.

France at that point as very few cavalrymen, the reason Napoleon failed to crush the Allies in Spring was because he couldn't pursue because he lacked cavalry, so in Leipzig, even if he win and I admit that possibility, he will only be able to repel the attack and, if for some reason, he decides to pursue the enemy he will fail because of lack of cavalry to inflict serious damage to the enemy.


Massive casualties means the Coalition troops in Germany lose their numerical edge, France can recover its Elbe defense lines (Leipzig is in Saxony, therefore not so far from the Elbe). There too, France can get a correct peace.

The "massive casualties" you speak off would be at max seventy thousand out of a Coalition Army of 400,000 and the Coalition could accept that while the french couldn't lose 30,000 as they did OTL.

Going to the Elbe is impossible at this point. If he going further into Germany he is forcing bigger supply lines and with the Peninsular forces advancing against France he can't allow himself to keep his army in Germany with France in danger he will have to go back to the Rhine.

Of course not, he cannot impose anything, however with France in a position of relative strength, it might be possible to preserve what's left of French power through skillful negotiation (e.g. if he gets Talleyrand on the job)

He didn't trusted Talleyrand at this point and Talleyrand would accept terms Napoleon wound't. If he wanted Peace he would had sent Talleyrand to meet with Metternich so that the Armistice of Pläswitz could become a real peace.

Again Leipzig is the decisive battle. Winning it strengthens the French position because it means the Coalition cannot use its numerical advantage for a while.

To Leipzig to become decisive to Napoleon he as to be the one to encircle the enemy and not the other way around. Leipzig is only decisive to one side, because it allowed them to win the war more quickly, but for Napoleon it would only be a time delayer and a bargain chip during negations.


Let's assume Napoleon has come to terms with reality - all of Europe is up against a France which has lost its elite troops. France is already going to lose a lot of its military enthusiasm, since a whole generation of young men have been expended on the battlefields of Europe. In this context, Napoleon would not be able to declare war again if all the other powers of Europe remained in a defensive alliance.

Unfortunately the other powers would always see him as a threat and would demand that the French Army suffered restrictions on it's size and number of guns they could have.

Napoleon II can accept this, aka his regency can accept this, but Napoleon I would never.

Also, I repeat, at the time of Leipzig, Austria is still deliberately neutral. It only really joined the coalition after the French defeat at Leipzig. That's why the battle is also decisive in diplomatic terms.

For a neutral power to commit the entire army of Bohemia, some 115,000, at Leipzig and to suffer the greatest amount of casualties 34,000 it surely is amazing.

I tremble in fear of what would had happened if Austria (you know it's people, Emperor, aristocracy and army officers) was hostile to France.

So, let me recapitulate.
The English want France out of Belgium and Rhenania. Sure, but if their allies in East Europe make peace, they're screwed and won't count in the negotiations, unless they occupy Belgium and Rhenania.

The Brits are paying for the Coalition if they cut the money the other ones are easy pray to France and they know that, they will never go behind GB back because of that.

The Prussians want France out of Rhenania. They are a minor power, which is very vulnerable to losing its capital again after the Battle of Leipzig.
Russia may want France out of Rhenania, but what they mostly want is France unable to attack them again, and additional buffer lands. This means Poland is prioritary over the French Rhinelands.

A little problem is that the minor power as eighty thousand angry and vengeance seeking men at arms and that the Russian Emperor had pro missed to aid them in their demands.

Prussia and Russia are on bed at this for the better of for the worst.

Both agree that Poland must seize to exist, again.

On the Rhineland, Prussia wants it's lands back and according to the Treaties of Reichenbach the Coalition will protect and aid them on their claim to them, also a French Rhineland threatens Prussia and by existence his ally Russia.

As for Italy, it's mainly an Anglo-Austrian concern. Since the Austrians aren't in the war yet, they could be easily bought into joining back the French over some concessions in Italy, which would bring balance back into the Coalition War. Typically, returning the Illyrian Provinces to Austria and the Latium to the Papal state would be quite big concessions for France, which wouldn't have to go all the way to dropping Piemonte and Liguria.

Why do you say, again, that Austria wasn't at the war at that point?

The Treaties of Reichenbach signed on the June 27 made the Austrians commit themselves to the Coalition if Napoleon refused the peace offer. In Leipzig the peace offer was long refused and Austria is part of the Coalition.


Catalonia would be a matter of France with the UK and Spain.
I think the Spanish would accept getting rid of the rebellious Catalonians if they could get rid of the Bonaparte on their throne and get their rightful King back.
It would create an uproar in England if the BEF happened to be squashed by the French army, which would certainly go in favor of making peace

Spain accepting to get rid of Catalonia????!!!! They still haven't refused the idea to annex Portugal, and by that time we were independent for a very long time, and do you think they will just say "Sure just keep it. Oh, by the way do you want the Basque and Galicians? They are always making us troubles."

Jesus Christ mate but Ferdinand would never accept that. The poor excuse for a King would demand all of Spain, not part, all of it.

My conclusion is :
France could keep the Rhine Frontier and its Transalpine provinces, as well as possibly Catalonia, if it's capable of winning Leipzig, bring the Austrians back on the Napoleonic side with an Illyrian bribe, make peace with the Russo-Prussians (and the Swedes), and then squish the Ibero-British army in 1814.

That is your conclusion, and I respect that, but I disagree on it and have defend the why on the points above.

In the Spring Napoleon can win the War, but by Leipzig he as lost too many men and gear.
 
There is a problem in that.

France at that point as very few cavalrymen, the reason Napoleon failed to crush the Allies in Spring was because he couldn't pursue because he lacked cavalry, so in Leipzig, even if he win and I admit that possibility, he will only be able to repel the attack and, if for some reason, he decides to pursue the enemy he will fail because of lack of cavalry to inflict serious damage to the enemy.




The "massive casualties" you speak off would be at max seventy thousand out of a Coalition Army of 400,000 and the Coalition could accept that while the french couldn't lose 30,000 as they did OTL.

Going to the Elbe is impossible at this point. If he going further into Germany he is forcing bigger supply lines and with the Peninsular forces advancing against France he can't allow himself to keep his army in Germany with France in danger he will have to go back to the Rhine.



He didn't trusted Talleyrand at this point and Talleyrand would accept terms Napoleon wound't. If he wanted Peace he would had sent Talleyrand to meet with Metternich so that the Armistice of Pläswitz could become a real peace.



To Leipzig to become decisive to Napoleon he as to be the one to encircle the enemy and not the other way around. Leipzig is only decisive to one side, because it allowed them to win the war more quickly, but for Napoleon it would only be a time delayer and a bargain chip during negations.




Unfortunately the other powers would always see him as a threat and would demand that the French Army suffered restrictions on it's size and number of guns they could have.

Napoleon II can accept this, aka his regency can accept this, but Napoleon I would never.



For a neutral power to commit the entire army of Bohemia, some 115,000, at Leipzig and to suffer the greatest amount of casualties 34,000 it surely is amazing.

I tremble in fear of what would had happened if Austria (you know it's people, Emperor, aristocracy and army officers) was hostile to France.



The Brits are paying for the Coalition if they cut the money the other ones are easy pray to France and they know that, they will never go behind GB back because of that.



A little problem is that the minor power as eighty thousand angry and vengeance seeking men at arms and that the Russian Emperor had pro missed to aid them in their demands.

Prussia and Russia are on bed at this for the better of for the worst.

Both agree that Poland must seize to exist, again.

On the Rhineland, Prussia wants it's lands back and according to the Treaties of Reichenbach the Coalition will protect and aid them on their claim to them, also a French Rhineland threatens Prussia and by existence his ally Russia.



Why do you say, again, that Austria wasn't at the war at that point?

The Treaties of Reichenbach signed on the June 27 made the Austrians commit themselves to the Coalition if Napoleon refused the peace offer. In Leipzig the peace offer was long refused and Austria is part of the Coalition.




Spain accepting to get rid of Catalonia????!!!! They still haven't refused the idea to annex Portugal, and by that time we were independent for a very long time, and do you think they will just say "Sure just keep it. Oh, by the way do you want the Basque and Galicians? They are always making us troubles."

Jesus Christ mate but Ferdinand would never accept that. The poor excuse for a King would demand all of Spain, not part, all of it.



That is your conclusion, and I respect that, but I disagree on it and have defend the why on the points above.

In the Spring Napoleon can win the War, but by Leipzig he as lost too many men and gear.

Very well. That is your conclusion. While mine is different, I respect it and accept it.
 
Well, Leipzig was decidedly the decisive battle. He had most of his troops there and most of the Russians, Swedes and Prussians too.
First of all, this is a defensive battle where the attackers have encirclement and troop count going for them. This means they will probably not leave until either the commanders are dead - which almost happened and could allow for a white peace or a peace at the price of Poland - or they've taken massive damage either in terms of casualties or morale.
Therefore, these are the conditions for a French victory at Leipzig.
Massive morale damage means the French can pursue and inflict additional casualties. Of course, France will have to make concessions, since 1812 had proved the Russian Bear was too much for France to invade, but they basically have the edge.
Massive casualties means the Coalition troops in Germany lose their numerical edge, France can recover its Elbe defense lines (Leipzig is in Saxony, therefore not so far from the Elbe). There too, France can get a correct peace.

Of course not, he cannot impose anything, however with France in a position of relative strength, it might be possible to preserve what's left of French power through skillful negotiation (e.g. if he gets Talleyrand on the job)

Again Leipzig is the decisive battle. Winning it strengthens the French position because it means the Coalition cannot use its numerical advantage for a while.

Let's assume Napoleon has come to terms with reality - all of Europe is up against a France which has lost its elite troops. France is already going to lose a lot of its military enthusiasm, since a whole generation of young men have been expended on the battlefields of Europe. In this context, Napoleon would not be able to declare war again if all the other powers of Europe remained in a defensive alliance.
Also, I repeat, at the time of Leipzig, Austria is still deliberately neutral. It only really joined the coalition after the French defeat at Leipzig. That's why the battle is also decisive in diplomatic terms.

So, let me recapitulate.
The English want France out of Belgium and Rhenania. Sure, but if their allies in East Europe make peace, they're screwed and won't count in the negotiations, unless they occupy Belgium and Rhenania.
The Prussians want France out of Rhenania. They are a minor power, which is very vulnerable to losing its capital again after the Battle of Leipzig.
Russia may want France out of Rhenania, but what they mostly want is France unable to attack them again, and additional buffer lands. This means Poland is prioritary over the French Rhinelands.
As for Italy, it's mainly an Anglo-Austrian concern. Since the Austrians aren't in the war yet, they could be easily bought into joining back the French over some concessions in Italy, which would bring balance back into the Coalition War. Typically, returning the Illyrian Provinces to Austria and the Latium to the Papal state would be quite big concessions for France, which wouldn't have to go all the way to dropping Piemonte and Liguria.
Catalonia would be a matter of France with the UK and Spain.
I think the Spanish would accept getting rid of the rebellious Catalonians if they could get rid of the Bonaparte on their throne and get their rightful King back.
It would create an uproar in England if the BEF happened to be squashed by the French army, which would certainly go in favor of making peace.

My conclusion is :
France could keep the Rhine Frontier and its Transalpine provinces, as well as possibly Catalonia, if it's capable of winning Leipzig, bring the Austrians back on the Napoleonic side with an Illyrian bribe, make peace with the Russo-Prussians (and the Swedes), and then squish the Ibero-British army in 1814.

I doubt Napoleon could have won Leipzig. Certainly not on the 18th. On the 16th perhaps If Marmont holds in the North and Napoleon achieves a decisive victory in the south then perhaps. But this will be a tactical victory only and not enough to win the cmpaign which was already lost by then

After Dresden a French victory in 1813 was possible but thn came Kulm, the Katzbach, Dennewitz and Ney's failure to take Berlin. The sum of these is what caused Napoleon's strategic defeat.

The best chance of a French victory in 1813 came at the end of the spring campaign when Napoleon advanced into silesia. Agreeing to the armistice allowed th time to rebuild the Russian and Prussian armies and to bring Austria into the war. Whle Napoleon had a chanc of winning thwe autumn campaign this opportunity was ruined tjhanks to the failures of Ney and MacDonald as shown in Leggiere's histories of the campaign
 
I doubt Napoleon could have won Leipzig. Certainly not on the 18th. On the 16th perhaps If Marmont holds in the North and Napoleon achieves a decisive victory in the south then perhaps. But this will be a tactical victory only and not enough to win the cmpaign which was already lost by then

After Dresden a French victory in 1813 was possible but thn came Kulm, the Katzbach, Dennewitz and Ney's failure to take Berlin. The sum of these is what caused Napoleon's strategic defeat.

The best chance of a French victory in 1813 came at the end of the spring campaign when Napoleon advanced into silesia. Agreeing to the armistice allowed th time to rebuild the Russian and Prussian armies and to bring Austria into the war. Whle Napoleon had a chanc of winning thwe autumn campaign this opportunity was ruined tjhanks to the failures of Ney and MacDonald as shown in Leggiere's histories of the campaign

OK. Should the Leipzig POD be changed and split :
WI : France wins the 1813 Spring Campaign in Germany
and
AHC : France wins the 1813 Autumn Campaign in Germany and South France/Iberia
?
 
Well, Leipzig was decidedly the decisive battle. He had most of his troops there and most of the Russians, Swedes and Prussians too.
First of all, this is a defensive battle where the attackers have encirclement and troop count going for them. This means they will probably not leave until either the commanders are dead - which almost happened and could allow for a white peace or a peace at the price of Poland - or they've taken massive damage either in terms of casualties or morale.
Therefore, these are the conditions for a French victory at Leipzig.
Massive morale damage means the French can pursue and inflict additional casualties. Of course, France will have to make concessions, since 1812 had proved the Russian Bear was too much for France to invade, but they basically have the edge.
Massive casualties means the Coalition troops in Germany lose their numerical edge, France can recover its Elbe defense lines (Leipzig is in Saxony, therefore not so far from the Elbe). There too, France can get a correct peace.

Of course not, he cannot impose anything, however with France in a position of relative strength, it might be possible to preserve what's left of French power through skillful negotiation (e.g. if he gets Talleyrand on the job)

Again Leipzig is the decisive battle. Winning it strengthens the French position because it means the Coalition cannot use its numerical advantage for a while.

Let's assume Napoleon has come to terms with reality - all of Europe is up against a France which has lost its elite troops. France is already going to lose a lot of its military enthusiasm, since a whole generation of young men have been expended on the battlefields of Europe. In this context, Napoleon would not be able to declare war again if all the other powers of Europe remained in a defensive alliance.
Also, I repeat, at the time of Leipzig, Austria is still deliberately neutral. It only really joined the coalition after the French defeat at Leipzig. That's why the battle is also decisive in diplomatic terms.

So, let me recapitulate.
The English want France out of Belgium and Rhenania. Sure, but if their allies in East Europe make peace, they're screwed and won't count in the negotiations, unless they occupy Belgium and Rhenania.
The Prussians want France out of Rhenania. They are a minor power, which is very vulnerable to losing its capital again after the Battle of Leipzig.
Russia may want France out of Rhenania, but what they mostly want is France unable to attack them again, and additional buffer lands. This means Poland is prioritary over the French Rhinelands.
As for Italy, it's mainly an Anglo-Austrian concern. Since the Austrians aren't in the war yet, they could be easily bought into joining back the French over some concessions in Italy, which would bring balance back into the Coalition War. Typically, returning the Illyrian Provinces to Austria and the Latium to the Papal state would be quite big concessions for France, which wouldn't have to go all the way to dropping Piemonte and Liguria.
Catalonia would be a matter of France with the UK and Spain.
I think the Spanish would accept getting rid of the rebellious Catalonians if they could get rid of the Bonaparte on their throne and get their rightful King back.
It would create an uproar in England if the BEF happened to be squashed by the French army, which would certainly go in favor of making peace.

My conclusion is :
France could keep the Rhine Frontier and its Transalpine provinces, as well as possibly Catalonia, if it's capable of winning Leipzig, bring the Austrians back on the Napoleonic side with an Illyrian bribe, make peace with the Russo-Prussians (and the Swedes), and then squish the Ibero-British army in 1814.

I agree with almost all what you stated except a few points.

One, except if I misunderstood you, seems a mistake to me.
Austria was no longer neutral. It had joined the 6th coalition at the end of the Pleisswitz armistice, in August 1813 and it participated in the battle of Leipzig.

An other is Catalonia. The french were on the defensive and were in retreat, although resisting quite well.And they needed to give something significant to the british in order to have them accept genuine peace with France keeping the whole of Rhineland. Spain was symbolically very important to Britain since it was the only place in the european continent where it fought a significant land war against Napoleon.

Napoleon would better trade a status quo ante bellum over the spanish territory against compensations in the spanish colonial empire.
 
OK. Should the Leipzig POD be changed and split :
WI : France wins the 1813 Spring Campaign in Germany
and
AHC : France wins the 1813 Autumn Campaign in Germany and South France/Iberia
?

Alternatively one of the following

1 After Bautzen Napoleon pursues the Russo-Prussian army into Silesia and there forces a third battle which he wins forcing eithr their withdrawl into Poland or a split with the Russians retiring into Poland and the Prussians into Prussia. Hard to achieve due to the poor French cavalry and the exhausted state of the army but possible.

2 In the autumn campaign MacDonaldwinsthe Battle of the Katzbach (IOTL a disaster for MacDonald) Ney wins the Battle of Dennewitz and takes Berlin. Vandamme manages to avoid the disaster of Kulm and traps Schwarzenburg's army as it retires from Dresden

3 In Spain Joseph and Jourdan avoid complete disaster at Vittoria

While the above is certinly possible it will be ard to achieve given the state of the French army at the time, particularly in Grmany. However, the Russians, Prussians and Austian were in a poor state. The Trachenburg Plann was the bst thing they could have done. Given that Napoleon's Marshals were rarely capable of effectve independent commnd of multi corps forces .e. Ney and MacDonald it proved impossible to couter the Allied strategy wit theresult that the French were worn down and finally forced into battle on Allied terms at Leipzig.

That ias why I consider Napoleon's best chance was in the Spring Campaign while Austria still remained neutral.
 
Alternatively one of the following

1 After Bautzen Napoleon pursues the Russo-Prussian army into Silesia and there forces a third battle which he wins forcing eithr their withdrawl into Poland or a split with the Russians retiring into Poland and the Prussians into Prussia. Hard to achieve due to the poor French cavalry and the exhausted state of the army but possible.
I see. I would probably see an Autumn Campaign afterwards being necessary either way to take Berlin.
What would the peace look like after that?
2 In the autumn campaign MacDonaldwinsthe Battle of the Katzbach (IOTL a disaster for MacDonald) Ney wins the Battle of Dennewitz and takes Berlin. Vandamme manages to avoid the disaster of Kulm and traps Schwarzenburg's army as it retires from Dresden
It's a lot of battles to win...
3 In Spain Joseph and Jourdan avoid complete disaster at Vittoria

While the above is certinly possible it will be ard to achieve given the state of the French army at the time, particularly in Grmany. However, the Russians, Prussians and Austian were in a poor state. The Trachenburg Plann was the bst thing they could have done. Given that Napoleon's Marshals were rarely capable of effectve independent commnd of multi corps forces .e. Ney and MacDonald it proved impossible to couter the Allied strategy wit theresult that the French were worn down and finally forced into battle on Allied terms at Leipzig.

That ias why I consider Napoleon's best chance was in the Spring Campaign while Austria still remained neutral.

I see. OK.
 
I see. I would probably see an Autumn Campaign afterwards being necessary either way to take Berlin.
What would the peace look like after that?

It's a lot of battles to win...


I see. OK.

You need to read

1 Napoleon and BerlinMichael v Leggiere
2 Napoleon and the Struggle for Germany (2 volums. Same author. Volume 1 covers the Spring Campaign. Volume 2 the autumn campaign. Main focus of this history is the Army of Silesia.

As we find from Leggiere's very detailed analysis at the end of the Spring Campaign the Russo - Prussian army under Wittgenstein was in big trouble at the end of he spring campaign and needed the armistice to regroup and bring the Austrians into the war Austria needed to mobilise and a couple of months were required for this.

However, the French army, largely new conscripts, was also i a pretty dreadful state. Napolen also needed te summer to sort this out. Perhaps he did not realise how bad things were in Wittgenstein's army at the end of the Spring Campaign. The lack of a good French Cavalry probably had much to do with this.

It was probably Napoleon's decision to agree to an armistice that lost him his best chance of a victorious 1813 campaign
 
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