War of Lost Opportunities

From von Hoffmans memoirs:

Lets say that after the March 1918 offensive is stopped, the Germans give up further offensives in the West and begin negotiations, offering reasonable terms (Hoffman suggests liberating Belgium and giving up parts of Lorraine). In the meantime securing Salonika and Palestine with extra forces. (He advocates overthrowing the Bolshevik regime at some point in May or June 1918 as well).

If the Germans did this April 1918, started negotiations, took steps to bar the east and south and put Russia in order, could they secure at least a compromise peace (instead of a dictated peace like Versailles)

Reference:

http://www.allworldwars.com/The-War-of-Lost-Opportunities-by-von-Hoffmann.html#XVIII

"At the moment when the General Headquarters saw that they would not get Amiens, that they had not been able to break through the enemy's front, they ought to have realized that a decisive victory on the Western front was no longer to be expected. If this first attempt, which had been made with the best forces they possessed, had failed, every succeeding attack that could only be made with ever diminishing forces, would likewise have no chance of success. On the very day on which the General Headquarters gave the order to cease the attack on Amiens, it was their duty to apprise the Government that the time had arrived to proceed to peace negotiations, and that there was no longer any prospect of finishing the War with a decided victory on the Western front."
 

raharris1973

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let's get the discussion on!

I'd say the Wallies still could physically force the Germans into a Versailles-like peace, but their political will to persist in doing so is less than certain.
 
I guess the question is at what point do people refuse to go over the top, by going public with reasonable peace proposals can Germany force Britain/France to deal.

France is already there probably. If the Germans offer Metz and the French keep the colonies they already took from Germany and Belgium is liberated. Maybe its hard to convince people to attack. (of course the Americans are probably willing to go for a while so they could sit back and see what they can do).

Britain already has their colonies they took, Belgium liberated, the Germans certainly would be willing to have naval limitations as part of a treaty (50% of Britain, 50 total submarines or something like that). Morale better than the French so could push attacks for a while if necessary though.

American is a wildcard, and certainly fresh and willing but really can't do much on their own until September/October.

The big concern for Britain and France is that Germany just goes round 2.0 in ten years and if they got to keep significant gains in the east maybe Germany is that much stronger. Britain probably doesn't have to worry so much, removing any German colonies as potential submarine bases, and probably securing Palestine and southern Mesopotamia reduces security concerns for a while. France has a lot to worry about though.

If there was a peace in the west, Germany would probably bankrupt herself trying to control things in the east and prop up whatever is happening in Austria/Hungary.
 
I guess the question is at what point do people refuse to go over the top, by going public with reasonable peace proposals can Germany force Britain/France to deal.

Field Marshall Haig was distinctly worried about this.

In a diary entry on 2 Jan 1918 he records having advised King George V that his soldiers "representative of all classes of the nation" understood that Britain had gone to war to liberate Belgium and preserve France as an independent power, and were willing to fight for this, but "They care nothing whether France should have Alsace or Italy Trieste" and would take it very hard if, after the enemy had conceded Britain's original war aims, they were asked to go on fighting for such lesser objectives. He did not actually use the m-word, but was almost certainly thinking it.
 
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France would be very worried about another war with Germany in 10 to 20 years. They would want reassurances that this would be unlikely. This would include the abolition of the Germany monarchy and Germany to become a western style democratic state. Certainly a limit to the size of the German army would be on the cards although this would be more than the 100k of Versailles. France is also going to want significant reassurances from the US and the British that should another war arise they will both join France's defence (effectively a NATO style alliance 3 decades early).

The British would also be happy with the France deal above, especially if it came with restrictions to the size of the German fleet. I suspect so would the US as it spreads democracy and gets the war over before large scale US causalities start to be suffered. However if the French demand more like war guilt and reparations which is likely would the other allies support this and also would the Germans go for it.

I don't think any of them go for peace if a condition is Germany gets a free hand in the east even if its against the threat of communism. I also suspect that some of the negotiators on the allied side are going to insist on an independent Poland and Baltic States as part of the deal.
 
France would be very worried about another war with Germany in 10 to 20 years. They would want reassurances that this would be unlikely. This would include the abolition of the Germany monarchy and Germany to become a western style democratic state. Certainly a limit to the size of the German army would be on the cards although this would be more than the 100k of Versailles. France is also going to want significant reassurances from the US and the British that should another war arise they will both join France's defence (effectively a NATO style alliance 3 decades early).

I can see Germany agreeing to significant naval reductions, its a luxury fleet anyway, their colonies are gone, and perhaps there are eastern gains to manage anyway that require no fleet. The army seems to integral to the German state, its history and politics, to really force restrictions on.

I could see Kaiser Wilhelm abdicating even in favor of the Crown Prince, as far as abandoning the Monarchy, its hard to see the Junkers classes giving up their power like that voluntarily, better to do even more desperate gambles than have that happen. (Of course the very fact that Germany started this war, millions are dead, thousands are maimed and have to be taken care of, and all they ended up with was a stinky compromise peace means that a revolution will likely happen anyway.) Its going to take some very unselfish and foresightful German leadership to say "this is in the best interest of our nation and people at large"

Germany is going to want to keep some gains in the east to compensate for the loss of colonies and whatever France gets, it is certainly not going to give up stuff to an independent Poland. Maybe Lithuania is quasi German controlled, maybe Finland (German princes), maybe something weird like the Crimea. Agree the Allies are not going to want to see Germans in Kiev (or Moscow) or Baku.
 

Deleted member 1487

From von Hoffmans memoirs:

Lets say that after the March 1918 offensive is stopped, the Germans give up further offensives in the West and begin negotiations, offering reasonable terms (Hoffman suggests liberating Belgium and giving up parts of Lorraine). In the meantime securing Salonika and Palestine with extra forces. (He advocates overthrowing the Bolshevik regime at some point in May or June 1918 as well).

If the Germans did this April 1918, started negotiations, took steps to bar the east and south and put Russia in order, could they secure at least a compromise peace (instead of a dictated peace like Versailles)

Reference:

http://www.allworldwars.com/The-War-of-Lost-Opportunities-by-von-Hoffmann.html#XVIII

"At the moment when the General Headquarters saw that they would not get Amiens, that they had not been able to break through the enemy's front, they ought to have realized that a decisive victory on the Western front was no longer to be expected. If this first attempt, which had been made with the best forces they possessed, had failed, every succeeding attack that could only be made with ever diminishing forces, would likewise have no chance of success. On the very day on which the General Headquarters gave the order to cease the attack on Amiens, it was their duty to apprise the Government that the time had arrived to proceed to peace negotiations, and that there was no longer any prospect of finishing the War with a decided victory on the Western front."
So what happens to H-L that makes the Germans willing to do this? Neither would ever willingly offer that. It's nice of Hoffmann to acknowledge that in hindsight (I have his books too), but that ignores the realities of their soft dictatorship and psychologies that prevented it from being viable.
 
Couldn't the Entente just suppress the news that Germany made an offer and keep going until they get what they want?
 
It's nice of Hoffmann to acknowledge that in hindsight (I have his books too), but that ignores the realities of their soft dictatorship and psychologies that prevented it from being viable.

I kind of wondered that too. Its the old classic memoir where somebody tries to justify things after the fact (when you have millions of dead and wounded and defeat, there is much explaining to do). It would certainly have to be H-L that realize that he war is unwinnable and do what is best for their country. If not March, then After Georgette, or after the August Amiens counterattack (perhaps an opportunity for the Kaiser after Ludendorf's fit). Many people in German leadership thougt the war was unwinnable after a point.
 
Couldn't the Entente just suppress the news that Germany made an offer and keep going until they get what they want?
I guess these kind of things would appear in the neutral press. Then there was the whole propaganda leaflet route (the Allies were better at that though).
 
IMHO once the Americans are in, and especially once you get in to 1918 and US troops being to arrive in large numbers, the morale of the British and French is boosted significantly. The plan was no later than spring 1919 there were to be 2 million soldiers in the AEF for offensive, and of course many more in the pipeline. Even with no eastern front to worry about, the Germans are going to be swamped. A-H is still disintegrating internally and the Ottomans are on their last legs by by late fall 1918. The time for a white peace is before the USA enters the war, certainly before they have troops in Europe - that is when French morale is at its lowest and there are mutinies. Britain also would be receptive then. Germany has to be willing to give up all colonies, and return to prewar borders in the west. I think their gains in the east would be tolerated as Russia has pretty much collapsed. A-H and Ottomans have to be thrown under the bus.

After the US comes in the British and French see victory in the distance - manpower, money, and at least basic equipment. No reason to accept anything less than victory.
 
After the US comes in the British and French see victory in the distance - manpower, money, and at least basic equipment. No reason to accept anything less than victory.

If you do like Hoffman suggests, stop attacking, save supplies, shore up the back door in Salonika and Italy with a few divisions (Palestine is mentioned but unsure how practical that is to reinforce).
Then although the Allies are sure to win with USA help in 1919 as you say, they have hundreds of thousands of extra casualties and another year of war to do it. Perhaps that is some leverage to force a compromise peace

I agree with Derwit that this peace gets a whole lot easier if the Allies are dealing with a democracy in Germany. Hoffman thinks Germany will have to give up bits of Lorraine in 1918 (I think all of Alsace Lorraine, loss of colonies and naval limitations would bring the Allies to the table any time before the collapse of the Salonika front September 1918 if dealing with democratic leaders, Germany would at least keep her eastern boundaries and maybe gain something out east, German army restrictions would be a lot less than OTL.

Austria is in trouble going forward as a country but is Italy really in a position to demand much more than Trieste right away if lines are still on Piave river at the armistice. Perhaps more will be seized if AH breaks apart.

Ottomans are going to have to give up what the have already lost, Palestine and southern Mesopotamia for sure.
 
A-H is falling apart by 1917, even in a relatively white peace they will not last in the prewar configuration. How much Italy gets compared to OTL, other than Trieste some parts of Southern Austria that are Italian speaking majority possibly. The Ottomans have huge internal problems...by mid-late 1917 they can kiss Palestine goodbye, Arabia, and southern Mesopotamia - if the Greeks move in I can see the Kurds piling on to make Kurdistan, very messy. The UK, I think, Will want the oil of Northern Iraq either directly or concessions from a Kurdish entity. Sykes-Picot is already on the books by mid-late 1917.
 

raharris1973

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Field Marshall Haig was distinctly worried about this.

In a diary entry on 2 Jan 1918 he records having advised King George V that his soldiers "representative of all classes of the nation" understood that Britain had gone to war to liberate Belgium and preserve France as an independent power, and were willing to fight for this, but "They care nothing whether France should have Alsace or Italy Trieste" and would take it very hard if, after the enemy had conceded Britain's original war aims, they were asked to go on fighting for such lesser objectives. He did not actually use the m-word, but was almost certainly thinking it.

You know in the Hoffmann scenario, this could go both ways-

Germany comes to a peace in the west, and to most Germans the war to defend the fatherland is over. So, when requiring troops or military operations to control conquests and uphold puppets in the east, a lot of German troops refuse to serve or mutiny, possibly leading to revolution at home.

....on the other hand, there may be enough mercenary types and ultrapatriotic volunteers, who could find hunting insurgents in the east a fun sport, and they may be adequate to deal with whatever they face. The guys who really don't want to serve can stay at civilian life at home and don't need to be conscripted.

So what happens to H-L that makes the Germans willing to do this? Neither would ever willingly offer that. It's nice of Hoffmann to acknowledge that in hindsight (I have his books too), but that ignores the realities of their soft dictatorship and psychologies that prevented it from being viable.

I would give the OP license to have Ludendorff decide differently. After all, while stubborn through most of 1918, Ludendorff got really discouraged by various events in August, September, October and November 1918. And in the end, he said the government needed to seek an armistice, instead of keeping the fight going until the Allied armies were besieging the "Ludendorff-bunker".
 
You know in the Hoffmann scenario, this could go both ways-

Germany comes to a peace in the west, and to most Germans the war to defend the fatherland is over. So, when requiring troops or military operations to control conquests and uphold puppets in the east, a lot of German troops refuse to serve or mutiny, possibly leading to revolution at home.

....on the other hand, there may be enough mercenary types and ultrapatriotic volunteers, who could find hunting insurgents in the east a fun sport, and they may be adequate to deal with whatever they face. The guys who really don't want to serve can stay at civilian life at home and don't need to be conscripted.

Events after Nov1918 would suggest that the latter is more likely.

Incidentally, the only case I can think of where a victorious power had a revolution is Italy, where significantly the revolution came from the Right. Indeed, even in the defeated ones, left-wing risings generally got squelched pretty rapidly once hostilities had ended. Could we be looking at a German Mussolini?
 
Remember that the German plans in the east in 1917/18 were NOT Generalplan Ost. Poland would come back as an independent country, although definitely a German client, likewise the Baltic States. Independence for Finland would be supported. The Ukraine would also be "independent" probably under some German prince as a monarch. For all of these countries you'd see a much lighter hand than the Tsarist regime. The Germans, I expect, will be perfectly OK with Polish, Ukrainian, Estonian, etc languages being the "primary" languages in these places. Naturally German will be a more or less mandatory language for anyone educated. I expect there will be folks who will be unhappy with the boundaries of the re-established countries, folks who are unhappy with economies that are heavily aligned with Germany and likewise foreign policies close to lockstep with Germany. Having said that most people will be happy with reestablished national identities, using their native language in schools and universities instead of Russian, removing the heavy hand of the Orthodox Church.

Given that these areas will feel more "liberated" than "conquered", the need for occupation forces would be more in the line of maintaining order than fighting serious partisan insurgencies. Constabularies and limited (meaning not large enough or well enough equipped to bother the Germans) military forces will come in to being in these countries pretty rapidly. Given the way the Russian Imperial Government forced Russification with language and religion on minorities the locals will know the difference between meh and worse. Unless the Germans get stupid and become as repressive as the Russians, there will be a lot of acceptance - remember it is neither Generalplan Ost nor an attempt to incorporate large sawthes of Eastern Europe in to some new Großdeutschland.
 
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