I remember reading that the governments of Germany and Russia opted to enter the war to distract their people from the ongoing agitation for political reform. In Germany, for example, the Kaiser was able to secure the support for the war of the Social Democrats in the Reichstag (who obviously believed it would be over by Christmas).
While, as I said, there's a strong case for that in post-1905 Russia, in other countries including Germany the
reverse may in fact be true. The system put in place by Metternich was of course intended to safeguard Europe's elites from The Revolution

eek:!!), and it did this by trying to prevent wars and get the monarchies to work together against revolutionary agitation.
Of course, his system unravelled and Europe was briefly a diplomatic free-for-all where the best man (who was called Bismarck) won; but Herr Bismarck himself instituted a new system intended to keep the peace, and wasn't well known for getting on well with socialists. He also fought small, limited wars, never on a "revolutionary" basis.
So the consistent theme is that European leaders don't want general war in case it brings about some unwelcome social developments; and of course it eventually did. So why did everything blow up over Serbia, whereas other Balkan Crises since the 1880s had all gone out with a fizzle?
The reasons are many and complex, involving railway timetables and all that, but I've read (in AJP Taylor's
Struggle for Mastery in Europe) that one reason was precisely
because the socialists, in Germany and Austria in particular, were considered to be nice and patriotic and unlikely to start revolutions. Apparently, although it seems to good to be true, an Austrian minister dismissed fears of revolution by asking who would lead it, with all the top men respectable parliamentarians: "Mr.Bronstein over in the cafe Cental?"
And it must be pointed out that pre-war, German socialists didn't menace the Wilhelmine order of things with raised fist and red flag; they voted the naval expenses.
The Russians were also interested in gaining access to a warm-water port in the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles, which would likely necessitate a war with Austria and Turkey (at least) to extend their influence into the Balkans.
That's an interesting one.
"To the Straits!" became the rallying-cry after the Ottomans entered the war, in large part to dismantle a mechanism (the Armenian Reform Package) put in place in 1913 with British agreement that basically confirmed what the Russians had been saying since the 1830s: they needed pre-eminent influence in the Ottoman Empire to secure themselves at the Straits.
On the other hand, the Russians stuck up for Serbia (Pan-Slavism could be switched on and off at will: the Tsar's government once
asked the Ottomans to invade Bulgaria) partly because the creation of a pro-Austrian regime there (and Bulgarian gratitude for Macedonia, with German commercial interests in the country already growing and relations with Russia poor) combined with German kings of Romania and Greece and the Berlin-Baghdad railway would lock Russian influence out of the Balkans and threaten the Straits.
So the interests existed, but it would be wrong to speak of simple Russian aggression and ambitions. What makes the start of WW1 so tragical and farcical is that
everybody felt they were reacting to a mortal threat to their own interests.
The British, as I understand it, were concerned with the expanding industrial power of Germany (who were producing more steel and nearly as much coal at this point) as well as the increasing power of the High Seas Fleet. Of course, the actual justification for the British expedition was a pre-existing treaty with Belgium - I'm not actually familiar with the terms of this agreement, but I'm pretty sure I read somewhere that Britain wasn't actually obliged to intervene.
Definitely. "Rape of Belgium!" was as handy - and deceitful - a slogan as "Slavic Brothers!". Britain and France both violated Greek neutrality quite shamelessly during the war.