Notes:
(a) As before, these numbers have in general been increased to reflect the extra preparation time for both sides. Also note that the Germans don’t have to leave anything in their eastern border, as it is protected by the puppet Poland.




Yet another reason that puppetising Poland into a client state is infinitely better than making it the General Government reservation for insane Generplan Ost. But did the Germans not have to leave some troops to garrison the client state of Poland? I'm sure they would have left some soldiers to prop up Marshal Rydz's puppet government.
 
Another awesome update. Eagerly waiting to see how this different Battle of France goes. Also not sure if this has been asked before, but what is the status of the Nazi jet program ITTL? IS it receiving more, or maybe less, funding and attention than in OTL?

So far, the jet program has been subject to somewhat contradictory forces. On one hand, in TTL German weapons development is substantially closer to the American and Soviet emphasis on large amounts of good enough equipment as opposed to smaller amounts of cutting edge models which are however of questionable reliability. For aircraft, this means a greater emphasis on emerging piston planes such as the Fw 190. On the other hand, without Goring's and Udet's mismanagement, and with Wever in charge, there are in effect more resources for development as a whole. The net result is that jets are about where they were in OTL.

Yet another reason that puppetising Poland into a client state is infinitely better than making it the General Government reservation for insane Generplan Ost. But did the Germans not have to leave some troops to garrison the client state of Poland? I'm sure they would have left some soldiers to prop up Marshal Rydz's puppet government.

They did leave some, of course, but not substantially more than they left in other client states (such as Slovakia or Romania) for most of the war.
 
They did leave some, of course, but not substantially more than they left in other client states (such as Slovakia or Romania) for most of the war.
So we can imagine the Polish armies are being formed in the mold of allied Romanian and Hungarian armies? What are the status of Poles in the Reich, racially I mean?
 
They did leave some, of course, but not substantially more than they left in other client states (such as Slovakia or Romania) for most of the war.

Romania is a client state? I think you mean Czechia right? I thought Romania was a formal ally like Hungary, not an outright puppet like Slovakia, Poland, and Czechia. A small degree of difference to the Nazis I guess.
 
Romania is a client state? I think you mean Czechia right? I thought Romania was a formal ally like Hungary, not an outright puppet like Slovakia, Poland, and Czechia. A small degree of difference to the Nazis I guess.

I think he's comparing to OTL.
 
So we can imagine the Polish armies are being formed in the mold of allied Romanian and Hungarian armies?

Quite right. And, small spoiler, greater participation on the part of Axis allies is one of the ways the German situation will be improved compared to OTL in a certain conflict down the road.

What are the status of Poles in the Reich, racially I mean?

About the same as it was under the Second Reich, some discrimination, but nothing nearly as bad as historically.

Romania is a client state? I think you mean Czechia right? I thought Romania was a formal ally like Hungary, not an outright puppet like Slovakia, Poland, and Czechia. A small degree of difference to the Nazis I guess.

I think he's comparing to OTL.

TRH is correct, I was using the phrase "client state" rather loosely to include closely linked, small allies. Basically, Poland's situation is that it is generally allowed internal autonomy, but is expected to subordinate its foreign policy to that of Germany and align itself in defense matters, which at this time means acting as a buffer with the Soviet Union. It also engages in cooperative trade when such opportunities are available, such as selling grain to Germany to assist in circumventing the blockade in return for technical assistance (rather like the trade taking place under the terms of the Molotov-Neurath Accords, although that of course is larger in scale and more significant in an overall sense).
 
I have to admit I like this plan a lot. The risky thrust through the infrastructurally challenged Ardennes don't have to achieve much. Question is what kind of havoc the Germans can make of the advancing French and British without the mobile French reserve. Its not easy to see a large scale encirclement, at least not early in the war, but the French (and British? They were stationed way to the west) will have to hurry east, then west under Luftwaffe attacks and suffer heavily. When Belgium falls and the initial thrust runs out of steam, its a decimated French defense, although not to the degree of OTL. If the Germans reestablishes Belgian airports quickly enough, then they might continue along the channel coast or attempt a flanking move west of Paris (coupled with an eastern pincer?).
The major beauty for an overall axis victory compared to OTL is that the channel ports are lost just a bit ahead of the realization that the battle is lost. Well played.
 
I have to admit I like this plan a lot. The risky thrust through the infrastructurally challenged Ardennes don't have to achieve much. Question is what kind of havoc the Germans can make of the advancing French and British without the mobile French reserve. Its not easy to see a large scale encirclement, at least not early in the war, but the French (and British? They were stationed way to the west) will have to hurry east, then west under Luftwaffe attacks and suffer heavily. When Belgium falls and the initial thrust runs out of steam, its a decimated French defense, although not to the degree of OTL. If the Germans reestablishes Belgian airports quickly enough, then they might continue along the channel coast or attempt a flanking move west of Paris (coupled with an eastern pincer?).
The major beauty for an overall axis victory compared to OTL is that the channel ports are lost just a bit ahead of the realization that the battle is lost. Well played.
This is the key change that has to be made from the Schlieffen plan, instead of Paris being the target of the German advance the target has to be the channel ports (at least initially).
 
This is the key change that has to be made from the Schlieffen plan, instead of Paris being the target of the German advance the target has to be the channel ports (at least initially).
I guess one of the most "to the point" criticisms of my TL were the Germans prepare for war against Britain is how you make them take the defeat of France for granted. ITTL they wouldn't so the key will be to defeat the French. However, this plan, which does make sense against France, will by default place the German right flank between the BEF and the Channel ports.
That why I think it is well played.
 
I have to admit I like this plan a lot. The risky thrust through the infrastructurally challenged Ardennes don't have to achieve much. Question is what kind of havoc the Germans can make of the advancing French and British without the mobile French reserve. Its not easy to see a large scale encirclement, at least not early in the war, but the French (and British? They were stationed way to the west) will have to hurry east, then west under Luftwaffe attacks and suffer heavily. When Belgium falls and the initial thrust runs out of steam, its a decimated French defense, although not to the degree of OTL. If the Germans reestablishes Belgian airports quickly enough, then they might continue along the channel coast or attempt a flanking move west of Paris (coupled with an eastern pincer?).
The major beauty for an overall axis victory compared to OTL is that the channel ports are lost just a bit ahead of the realization that the battle is lost. Well played.

You raise a number of pertinent issues here. For now, let me say that the net effect of these factors, along of course with the similarity of TTL's plan to the Schlieffen Plan, will be, in certain ways, to make what is to follow resemble a mechanized version of the events of 1914, although of course with substantially different results.

This is the key change that has to be made from the Schlieffen plan, instead of Paris being the target of the German advance the target has to be the channel ports (at least initially).

Quite correct.

I guess one of the most "to the point" criticisms of my TL were the Germans prepare for war against Britain is how you make them take the defeat of France for granted. ITTL they wouldn't so the key will be to defeat the French. However, this plan, which does make sense against France, will by default place the German right flank between the BEF and the Channel ports.
That why I think it is well played.

I don't think it's beyond the realm of possibility to have the Germans think about how to fight Britain after a French defeat before it has occurred. After all, Germany did (for all intents and purposes) defeat France rapidly during the Franco-Prussian War, and came close to defeating France again in the opening of World War I, when Britain and Russia were both in the war on France's behalf, which was not the case during the beginning of World War II as far as Russia went.
 
No, mot impossible. However, unless the defeat of France is taken for granted, its hard to divert large ressources away from that goal and hard to have other priorities tactically.
But you didn't have to do that.
 
No, mot impossible. However, unless the defeat of France is taken for granted, its hard to divert large ressources away from that goal and hard to have other priorities tactically.
But you didn't have to do that.
With the Germans basically fighting zero other fronts (have a division or two in Denmark and a few in allied Norway), they can concentrate their entire army to defeating France. This will increase the likelihood of a victory.
Regarding Britain, getting them to the negotiating table is the preferred and only real outcome if victory is to be achieved. Even with the isolationist strain the US will come to Britain's aid if Sealion is attempted.
 
What's happening in the Pacific BTW? I know the Third Reich is (gasp) protagonist of this TL, but seeing as it's called 'axis victory'...
 
No, mot impossible. However, unless the defeat of France is taken for granted, its hard to divert large ressources away from that goal and hard to have other priorities tactically.
But you didn't have to do that.

Ah, we fully agree then. It is certainly true that the defeat of France would clearly be the top priority of any German leadership in World War II and the one towards which the bulk of available resources would be allocated.

With the Germans basically fighting zero other fronts (have a division or two in Denmark and a few in allied Norway), they can concentrate their entire army to defeating France. This will increase the likelihood of a victory.
Regarding Britain, getting them to the negotiating table is the preferred and only real outcome if victory is to be achieved. Even with the isolationist strain the US will come to Britain's aid if Sealion is attempted.

The US will (to an extent) come to Britain's aid in any case. As I said before, if it had been my intention to do away with US help for Britain entirely, I would have had Taft win in 1940.

What's happening in the Pacific BTW? I know the Third Reich is (gasp) protagonist of this TL, but seeing as it's called 'axis victory'...

The Second Sino-Japanese War is continuing to drag on inconclusively. The Japanese leadership is of course intensely frustrated at the support given to China by the Anglo-French and others as they were in OTL, but as there has of yet been no defeat of France by Germany, Japan has not moved into Indochina and no embargo has been placed against it.

A mechanized Schlieffen Plan... that makes me even more excited to see the Battle of France

I'm glad to hear it.:) The next update will be out on Sunday.
 
With the Germans basically fighting zero other fronts (have a division or two in Denmark and a few in allied Norway), they can concentrate their entire army to defeating France. This will increase the likelihood of a victory.
Regarding Britain, getting them to the negotiating table is the preferred and only real outcome if victory is to be achieved. Even with the isolationist strain the US will come to Britain's aid if Sealion is attempted.

Britain could be invaded if necessary, but not for a long time. To invade Britain, Germany would have to win their other wars against France and the USSR, as well as conquer the Suez Canal and control at least part of the Middle Eastern oil fields. With their problems on the continent solved, if Britain hasn't negotiated yet, they could use the resources of the entire continent of Europe (preferably under German control or influence by now), and build up their Navy at a faster rate than Britain can. After about 10 years of naval buildup (say by 1950-1955 if they won the war on mainland Europe by 1941-42), they would be capable of invading Britain. This is consistent with the time it would take for the completion of the OTL Plan Z that envisaged a similar buildup (except in this case Germany would have more resources at their disposal because they have won their continental European wars). However, this is of course the slowest option, and it would be much more preferable to bring Britain to the negotiating table.

EDIT: Forgot to add, at some point after (maybe before) their victory in Europe, the Germans (and their allies/puppets) would also have to take Malta and Gibraltar with naval and airborne forces. This isn't to cut off British shipping- in fact it would have no effect because the British had already sent their shipping around Africa ever since WWII started. The purpose of taking the 2 outposts would be to allow Germany's own economy, logistics, and trade routes to run more efficiently by removing those 2 territories as thorns in Germany's side. It would allow German ships to pass freely between the Western Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Atlantic. That the Germans would gain experience in amphibious assaults is just a bonus.
 
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Britain could be invaded if necessary, but not for a long time. To invade Britain, Germany would have to win their other wars against France and the USSR, as well conquer the Suez Canal and control at least part of the Middle Eastern oil fields. With their problems on the continent solved, if Britain hasn't negotiated yet, they could use the resources of the entire continent of Europe (preferably under German control or influence by now), and build up their Navy at a faster rate than Britain can. After about 10 years of naval buildup (say by 1950-1955 if they won the war on mainland Europe by 1941-42), they would be capable of invading Britain. This is consistent with the time it would take for the completion of the OTL Plan Z that envisaged a similar buildup (except in this case Germany would have more resources at their disposal because they have won their continental European wars). However, this is of course the slowest option, and it would be much more preferable to bring Britain to the negotiating table.

Now that sounds like an interesting TL, or at least updates, a Britain panicking and trying to prepare as a victorious Germany starts its shipbuilding program. That, and a defeated Soviet Union trying to prepare for Round 2
 
Britain could be invaded if necessary, but not for a long time. To invade Britain, Germany would have to win their other wars against France and the USSR, as well as conquer the Suez Canal and control at least part of the Middle Eastern oil fields. With their problems on the continent solved, if Britain hasn't negotiated yet, they could use the resources of the entire continent of Europe (preferably under German control or influence by now), and build up their Navy at a faster rate than Britain can. After about 10 years of naval buildup (say by 1950-1955 if they won the war on mainland Europe by 1941-42), they would be capable of invading Britain. This is consistent with the time it would take for the completion of the OTL Plan Z that envisaged a similar buildup (except in this case Germany would have more resources at their disposal because they have won their continental European wars). However, this is of course the slowest option, and it would be much more preferable to bring Britain to the negotiating table.

EDIT: Forgot to add, at some point after (maybe before) their victory in Europe, the Germans (and their allies/puppets) would also have to take Malta and Gibraltar with naval and airborne forces. This isn't to cut off British shipping- in fact it would have no effect because the British had already sent their shipping around Africa ever since WWII started. The purpose of taking the 2 outposts would be to allow Germany's own economy, logistics, and trade routes to run more efficiently by removing those 2 territories as thorns in Germany's side. It would allow German ships to pass freely between the Western Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Atlantic. That the Germans would gain experience in amphibious assaults is just a bonus.

Now that sounds like an interesting TL, or at least updates, a Britain panicking and trying to prepare as a victorious Germany starts its shipbuilding program. That, and a defeated Soviet Union trying to prepare for Round 2

Very interesting analysis. As far as future events in the TL... some of these will occur.
 
As promised, I have revised losses for the Norwegian campaign in accordance with Gudestein's input in post 309. British losses are now 15 destroyers, two light cruisers, a heavy cruiser, and a battlecruiser to all causes. The damaged category now includes an aircraft carrier. German losses also include eight submarines. Of course, thoughts on the realism of these numbers or any other aspect of the plot are welcome. Otherwise, I wish everyone a good rest of the weekend, and stay tuned for tomorrow's update!
 
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