SwampTiger
Banned
The French created several Corps Francs used during the Phoney War and later the Groups Frances de Motorise' de Cavalrie for raiding, delaying actions and reconnaissance.
What if the 1930s the British army decide be it as an experiment or a need decide to create a special task force wholly dedicated to doing missions that are beyond regular line troops?
The problem with that is I think most of the 1930 British line infantry would be capable of such actions? We are talking a very small professional long trained force with war experienced NCOs and officers....its only after dilution in late 30s that it would show?Perhaps the British take more serious note of the Storm Troopers in late WW1 and decide to stand up a 'Commando' troop in every Infantry battalion - ie a Patrol sized unit capable of conducting the difficult type of missions
The problem with that is they will be sent to Norway so miss the decisive show...... but on the other hand they might win in Norway?It's not what these Commandos do in the Battle of France that's going to shake things up, they're just light infantry, it's what they do during the Phoney War.
Someone in the RN remembers to Gallipoli fiasco and decides that if they have to do something like that again they'll do it right. They also remember the Zeebrugge raid and train the Royal Marines for such things. Army Raiders are trained for mountain warfare after experience on the North West Frontier. The two combined would be perfect for Norway.My thinking is that a small elite light infantry unit is perfect for the Norway operation especially if they have trained to get on and off ships properly? (even better if they know how to load them)
Someone in the RN remembers to Gallipoli fiasco and decides that if they have to do something like that again they'll do it right. They also remember the Zeebrugge raid and train the Royal Marines for such things. Army Raiders are trained for mountain warfare after experience on the North West Frontier. The two combined would be perfect for Norway.
That's to easy to actually force any learning, any British force including sailors with a few SMLEs and rowing boats will win that if the county class 8" guns are supporting them (or rather persuading the Pirates not to stand and fight)....Landing techniques can be practiced and perfected on the China Station combating pirates.
Does it have to be the Army? Have the Inter-Service Training and Development Centre (ISTDC) with it's remit to develop methods and equipment for amphibious and combined operations established a few years earlier than our timeline and it be maintained. On the amphibious side of things it's decided to convert the 'Red' Royal Marines into something similar to modern Royal Marines.
Good point but I was originally envisaging the Commandos doing Commando things to help the ultimate aim of keeping the pocket open, rather than being on the frontline fighting alongside the regulars.
No, I’d say it’s a pretty good example because as far as I’m aware, the fallschirmjägers all suffered their highest casualties when deployed in the frontline as “fire brigades” as opposed to raiding and behind-the-line activities.
They did remember it and studied it extensively during the interwar era.Someone in the RN remembers to Gallipoli fiasco and decides that if they have to do something like that again they'll do it right. They also remember the Zeebrugge raid and train the Royal Marines for such things. Army Raiders are trained for mountain warfare after experience on the North West Frontier. The two combined would be perfect for Norway.
I think the issue is that the British misread the lessons of the Gallipoli campaign, not to copy the article verbatim, but its worth quoting extensively:
The Use, Misuse, and Non-Use of History: The Royal Navy and the Operational Lessons of the First World War
Author(s): David MacGregor
Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 603-616
However taking some relevant points:
the Royal Navy and Marines, as well as the British Army, devoted a great deal of effort between the wars to the study of landings and combined operations. The negative impact of Gallipoli was more insidious; it did not discredit amphibious warfare, it distorted it. With that tragedy constantly in mind, British amphibious thinkers thought too much about it, and in the process fell prey to an unwarranted pessimism. In their zeal to avoid the problems of Gallipoli, they failed to understand and overcome them.The aforementioned Anderson report that proposed further study of amphibious warfare in 1919, also commented that opposed landings were "doomed to failure unless we revolutionize our methods" and that surprise had become crucial. Anderson's counterpart at the Navy Staff College, Reginald Drax, declared that successful landings demanded "perfect secrecy." In 1928, the Navy Staff College analysis of a combined operations exercise in Scotland also concluded that surprise was essen- tial. And in a 1934 exercise report, Home Fleet Commander-in-Chief Lord Cork and Orrery conceded that "a great deal more investigation and experiment will be necessary before it can be affirmed that it is possible in these days to land a division on an open beach against opposition." 7The problem was that all this analytical effort, firmly grounded in the Gallipoli experience, rested on some highly suspect assumptions. Thanks to Gallipoli, British planners assumed future amphibious assaults would have to be smaller and simpler, possess the element of surprise, and take place only after dark or at dawn. Moreover, many students of the subject continued to question whether amphibious assaults were practicable at all. They claimed the development of new defensive weapons such as machine guns, modern artillery, and aircraft made opposed landings impossible in modern times. This distorted, if not actively hostile, view of amphibious warfare proved a serious handicap.As a result of this pervasive pessimism, combined operations manuals called for tactical surprise and landing under the cover of darkness wherever possible, on the assumption that assaulting a well-defended beach was hopeless. The 1931 manual devoted an entire chapter to surprise and secrecy, as did the 1938 revised edition. Theoretical and practical exercises generally involved only small numbers of ships and troops (usually a few companies), landing unopposed under cover of darkness with surprise on their side. Post-mortem analysis invariably confirmed the view that surprise was essential, and that even then assault landings were a very unreliable instrument.
What if the 1930s the British army decide be it as an experiment or a need decide to create a special task force wholly dedicated to doing missions that are beyond regular line troops?
A task force of commandos at light company strength and armed with the latest weapons is created and trained for raids, assassinations, destroying structures behind enemy lines and destroy obstructions (like tanks and such) before an offensive or delay an enemy counter offensive?
How effective would the commandos be at France and world war two in general?
How influential would they be as the war continues
Would the branch survive post world war two and beyond?
What weapons would the commandos be equipped with?
**Giggle**I really like the idea of the Northwest Frontier being the birthing ground of these “Scouts” or Commandos. My patchy knowledge of the 20s and 30s on the NWF would suggest that a specialised light infantry/reconnaissance/counterinsurgency unit would be incredibly useful. Obviously, if these units are successful, there’s plenty of places around the Empire that could benefit from them.
**Giggle**
Are helicopters invented at the same time? Cause that’s what’s permitted Special forces and air assault teams generally to be so useful in the 21st century NATO and Pakistan OPs on either side of the Durant line. And the USSR in the 1980’s In Afghanistan.
Sending lightly armed teams into the mountains on foot or even in armoured cars, is... you know what, keep them on base and shoot them yourself, same outcome, and less trouble.
Helicopters to land troops and resupply them. And exfil when needed. Drones for near continuous surveillance and data links giving the troops real time data on enemy movements. NVD to make them effective at night. Gunships to pound anything which is getting too much. And PGM armed a/c on patrol waiting to hit anything the Hinds/Apaches/Cobras can.not handle.
**eye roll** back at you.So there were no special forces pre the invention and implementation of the helicopter and the drone?
Ok mate, I’ll be sure to let the SOE, OSS, Rangers, Marine Raiders, Brandenburgers and Chindits know, I’m sure they’ll find it most amusing.
**eye roll**
**eye roll** back at you.
I said SF in NWF, not generally. You have given the examples of units which operated in the European countryside, Pacific Islands. Chindits operated in Burma, and had massive air support, hell they even saw the first use of helicopters.
None of them have any sort of bearing on operating in the mountains of the Afghan frontier.
There are few worse things you can do in the Hindu Kush than send small squads of men into those mountains on foot or vehicles. The worst terrain to operate in, in the world. A force would quickly find itself with enemy on the left, right. As well as above, and below.
Best case scenario, they get “kidnapped”, and are released on payment of a ransom.
Worse case senario, you get their bones back a few months later.
There is a reason the British, and before them the Mughals, moved in large groups in the mountains and generally ceded most of the area outside major supply routes, and strategic passes. Guys who could fight their way out. Even then casualties were regular.
Even in the modern era, people who were overconfident and half assed it, lost badly. See US Special Forces and Operation Anaconda.