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This timeline is based on the premise of Germany taking an east first strategy. The PoD is that Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colmar_Freiherr_von_der_Goltz) becomes Chieff of the German general staff.

Note: This TL is NOT a Germanwank even if it'll seem that way at first.




Von Schlieffen Goes East




Chapter I: Making Plans, 1905-1914



Today, it is a well known historical fact that the German military minds considered a west first strategy in the upcoming European war which was considered inevitable at the time, an estimation which later turned out to be quite true, even if armchair political analysts of today argue that World War I could have been avoided if the various leaders had understood what was at stake for their countries. It was not to be and the alliance system in Europe would soon drag the continent into a war which would change the face of the European continent forever, or so it seemed. The alliance system of the time dates back to the 19th century; in 1879, Germany and Austria-Hungary became allies against their greatest perceived opponents, Russia and France, and were joined by the Kingdom of Italy due to ties between Germany and Italy and not so much any love or good feelings for the Habsburgs whom they had fought against to become independent. It was initially signed as a purely defensive alliance and received the nickname “Central Powers” since the three members were positioned in central Europe and wedged between their opponents of the then Dual Entente consisting of Russia and France. The Entente started with the creation of the so-called Franco-Russian alliance in 1891 which was enabled by the end of the Three Emperor’s League as a result of irreconcilable differences between Austria-Hungary and Russia over influence in the Balkans and also the unfavourable outcome to the Berlin Conference in which Bismarck had supported the interests of Austria-Hungary, leading to the end of France’s diplomatic isolation (Britain was still in “Splendid Isolation” during this time period). Thusly, the carefully woven diplomatic web that Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor, had created to diplomatically isolate France came crashing down as Russia sought France and vice versa for an ally against the Central Powers. The Central Powers consisting of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy left both Russia and France vulnerable. In 1888 Russia managed to obtain cheap loans from the Paris Bourse which helped rebuild the technologically deficient Russian army. In 1891 the French fleet paid a visit to the Russian port and naval base of Kronstadt and was warmly welcomed by Tsar Alexander III of Russia and this also marked the first time the Marseillaise was played in Russia which had previously been considered a criminal offence. Franco-Russian ties were strengthened even more when the Germans did not renew the Reinsurance Treaty between Russia and Germany. The alliance was created on 1892 and finalized in 1894 to remain in place until the Triple Alliance ceased to exist. The Entente Cordiale was created when Great Britain became allies with France. They came out of their isolation out of fear for growing the growing economic and military power of Germany as Wilhelm II was building a growing navy which, the British feared, would one day contest their dominance over the seas and because Germany was becoming the dominant power in Europe, upsetting the balance of power. The existence of the Entente Cordiale severely undermined Germany’s dominance in Europe and also partially influenced German military thinking of the early 20th century.

The initial plans were all devised by Count Alfred von Schlieffen who was a field marshal, strategist and between 1891 and 1906 Chief of the German General Staff as the successor to Count von Waldersee who had become a persona non grata to the young Kaiser due to his ties with the dismissed chancellor Bismarck. Initially he favoured a swift strike at France. In the plan the fall of Paris was scheduled to be after 39 days and the capitulation of France after 42 days after which the bulk of the German army would be transferred to the east before the “Russian Steamroller” could descend on East Prussia and threaten the entire eastern border, including the economically important region of Silesia. The plan envisioned a rapid German mobilization, disregard for the neutrality of neutral countries, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands, and an incredibly strong right wing sweeping southwest through Belgium in a wide encircling move. “The last man on the right would brush the Channel with his sleeve” as Von Schlieffen once put it eloquently. The central and left wings would maintain a defensive posture in Lorraine, the Vosges and the Moselle region. The Germans capitalized on breakthroughs in communications and transport and would march quickly before the French could adequately respond. The plan envisaged not the capture of industry, but the capture of most of the French army in a decisive envelopment battle, essentially the same strategy used in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The plan however left the dangerous temptation of a double envelopment as inspired by Hannibal’s Battle of Cannae which would logistically overextend the German army and it’s arguable whether or not it would have worked. 91% of the German army would have attacked France in this plan, leaving 9% to defend Germany’s long eastern frontier against the Russians which, according to Von Schlieffen’s estimates, would need six weeks to mobilize. Count Von Schlieffen however had failed to take into account modernizations to the Russian army between 1905 and 1914 among other things. Fortunately the plan, which had begun to circulate in late 1905 and was supposed to be Germany’s general war plan in the event of a general European war, was ditched by the new Chief of Staff who saw it as unworkable as Von Schlieffen had left several flaws in his plan.

The first and foremost problem was the infrastructure in Belgium and northern France which was not designed to handle such a colossal troop movement, it simply lacked the capacity for it. If the plan was executed, German logistics would be really strained and the narrow space would constrict the envisaged enormous troop movement. Furthermore, the Russian army had made several modernizations to its army and increased its infrastructure, helped by French investment, enabling the Russian army to mobilize quicker and fight more effectively. Also, the new Chief of Staff, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, took into account Belgian resistance more and theorized that the forts around Liège and Namur would be severe choking points which could easily upset Von Schlieffen’s meticulously planned offensive as they could resist the Germans until the arrival of siege guns and because they commanded the bridges over the Meuse. Their destruction could conceivably delay the Germans for several days, allowing the French to regroup. The largest obstacle in Goltz’s mind was the violation of Belgian neutrality which might or might not be seen as a casus belli in London and would alienate neutrals. Even if Germany won, as unlikely as it seemed for the reasons mentioned above, the Royal Navy still outnumbered the “Kaiserliche Marine” and could conceivably blockade Germany and provide funds and weapons for resistance in Europe, much like they had done during the Napoleonic Wars.

Goltz’s new plan was somewhat unpopular although it would later prove to fit in exactly with how the war would start, Russian aggression. Goltz envisioned that a long two-front war was inevitable, considering Germany’s geographical position and France’s will to take revenge and many other factors. He stressed how France had, even when they were losing, summoned a the will for a Volkskrieg and that expecting a quick victory over France in future wars was unrealistic. He created a Russia First Strategy, which is wrongly attributed to his predecessor, in an attempt to capitalize on Russia’s backwardness and weakness of their army at the time, It was a risk though; Goltz knew that at some point Russia would become too strong to beat which is perhaps why Germany let the war start when they did (they could easily have stopped it by having the Austrians back down) but he wanted to exploit Russia when it was at its weakest. The plan did see opposition, most notably from many of his underlings. They feared that Germany would be drawn into the vast strategic depth of the Russian plains, stretching the Heer thin and stretching their supply lines with scorched earth tactics like had happened to Napoleon who had been subsequently defeated. Goltz took that into account and planned to take Poland and the Baltic states, defeating the bulky, slow Russian army in several quick battles instead of playing Russia’s game and wage a war of attrition. From that position Germany could threaten the capital of St. Petersburg and the loss alone would be a blow to morale, not to mention the fact that quite some of Russia’s grain came from Poland. Then the Germans would offer peace terms. During the campaign which was projected to take at least one year (more likely 18 months to three years), Germany would defend on the western border in to be constructed border fortifications. The short western border had the Vosges as a strong natural defence and the border forts that were built up to 1914 strengthened this barrier. In the event of a breakthrough there still was the Rhine as an even more potent natural barrier. Goltz also hoped for a French violation of Belgian or Swiss neutrality although France would have had to be desperate to have come to that decision. Goltz also started to lay the foundations for Germany’s war stockpiles in anticipation of this war. He knew that the Royal Navy could easily blockade German ports and that ammunition and nitrate stockpiles would dwindle quickly and he began to hoard nitrates which were needed for ammunition production along with the creation of potent border fortifications on the Franco-German border which is where France would obviously attack since they wanted to regain Alsace-Lorraine. He also vested a lot of interest in the “Haber process” which could be used to synthesize the necessary nitrates. Germany was one of the first countries to recognise its importance.



Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, Chieff of the German general staff 1906-1917

Many wonder what would have happened if the intended successor of Von Schlieffen, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, had indeed succeeded him as Chief of Staff. As late as 1906 he came up with an only slightly modified Von Schlieffen plan as an objection against Goltz’s plan. The most famous piece of counterfactual history regarding this subject is perhaps the bookwork written by Peter G. Tsouras known as “Von Schlieffen goes West”. In it Germany indeed goes ahead with the Von Schlieffen Plan, leading to a declaration of war from Britain. Germany fails to capture the French army in an envelopment due to a series of contributing factors: Belgian resistance, British aid, several miscommunications in the German command structure and the need to send forces east to defend against Russia which mobilized quicker than anticipated upon. Germany fought in several naval engagements as well which were indecisive, leading to Germany attempting to use submarines (referred to as U-boats) in unrestricted submarine to end the war with Britain, leading to an American declaration of war in 1917. Germany forced Russia into a revolution by sending Lenin back and uses the freed up forces for one last-ditch offensive known as the Spring Offensive conducted by Ludendorff who by then controlled Germany, together with Hindenburg, as a personal military dictatorship. The offensive broke the German army and failed to achieve final victory before the arrival of significant American reinforcements. On November 11th 1918, the Germans surrendered and a harsh peace was imposed on Germany after so many years of war. The so-called Weimar Republic which had risen after the Kaiser’s flight to the Netherlands, was unable to stop the rampant hyperinflation, political divisions, communist fuelled unrest and hatred against themselves. The republic was burdened with the loss and was seen as the culprit, more so since Germany traditionally wasn’t used to full democracy. It was easy to exploit a weak, soft government. In 1933, a demagogue named Adolf Hitler, a former corporal, rose to prominence by using the system and established a totalitarian regime with his National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) which was based on nationalism, anti-Semitism and militarism. He unleashed a world war and genocide upon the world which was to horrible to describe and was only defeated by 1945. Whether it could really have happened, we will never know but the real World War I started in the exact same way.

In 1908 Bosnia-Herzegovina had been annexed by Austria-Hungary which didn’t go down well in Serbia and neither did it in Russia which traditionally supported its Slavic ally out of Pan-Slavism and as a counter against Habsburg influence in the Balkans. Since Bulgaria virulently resisted Russian patronage, Russia’s attention had shifted towards Serbia. Serbia needed a big ally to realize its dream for a united South Slav Kingdom. There were several causes for the great war. Imperialistic rivalry in Africa was a big contributor as Germany vied to gain a bigger colonial empire there, much to the dismay of France and Britain which were the dominant colonial powers. Militarism was another cause along with the arms race between the European powers, specifically Britain and rising star Germany. Many countries were strongly militarized as a war was expected and welcomed as a way to settle old scores and establish or maintain the status of one’s country as a great power. This was strongly influenced by the inherent nationalism of the day and militarism fuelled this as long as the army contributed to the national pride so they strengthened each other. The alliance system which caused the domino effect which dragged Europe into the war was also a strong factor along with the belief that the fatherland would only come out better as any existing irredentist claims would be settled. Fear of the growing industrial giant Germany was also a strong factor in decision making in 1914. If this Germany would be allowed to dominate the continent, there was no telling what the Germans could do. The trigger was the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke and heir to the Habsburg throne, on June 28th 1914. Vienna, suspecting Serbia was behind it, issued an ultimatum with ten demands to Belgrade to diplomatically undermine Serbia after Emperor Wilhelm II had given the Habsburgs a blank cheque; in other words: he would support them no matter what which explains why they felt strong enough to declare war (they would never fight Russia by themselves and would have backed down even at the risk of losing face). Serbia accepted all but two demands and the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on July 28th 1914, setting off the long awaited war. Russia ordered a mobilization a day later as it couldn’t allow Austria-Hungary to eliminate their influence in the Balkans for both geostrategic and ideological reasons. Germany issued an ultimatum, demanding that Russia stood down. Germany started to mobilize in response as did France. Germany declared war on Russia August 1st but the Germans reneged on the decision to expand the declaration of war to France and instead declared war on just Russia (and later Serbia as a symbolic gesture). France instead declared war on Germany on August 2nd. The Great War, World War I or the Alliance-Entente War as it is known, had begun.
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