Von Rundstedt in Stalingrad

"A question that I put to many generals was: "Do you think that Germany could have avoided defeat after Stalingrad?" Rundstedt's reply was: "I think so, if the commanders in the field had been allowed a free hand in withdrawing when and where they thought fit, instead of being compelled to hold on too long, as repeatedly happened everywhere." While Rundstedt himself was not on the Eastern front after 1941, his position gave him more detachment of view. Moreover, the fact that he never took an optimistic view throughout, while having unique experience of high command on both fronts, gives a particular value to his opinion on the broad issue. When putting the same question to the generals who stayed in the East, I found them much more definite. All felt that Russia's offensive power could have been worn down by elastic defense - if they had only been allowed to practise it."

'The Other Side of the Hill' - Liddell Hart. Chapter: 'After Stalingrad'.

Based on this testimony, if Rundstedt was in charge of the sixty army, would he manage to evacuate the sixty army in time? (even if he had to disobey Hitler's orders to stand and fight)
 
Given his personally it's likely he ends up bitching about the Bohemian Corporal and ends up standing and fighting as he would view it as a lawful, but stupid order.

At around the same time Rommel in Egypt figured out to reclassify Hitler's order 'victory or death' as an advisory notice.

Rundstedt might do something similar, but it's just as likely he ends up standing and dying.
 
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Deleted member 1487

"A question that I put to many generals was: "Do you think that Germany could have avoided defeat after Stalingrad?" Rundstedt's reply was: "I think so, if the commanders in the field had been allowed a free hand in withdrawing when and where they thought fit, instead of being compelled to hold on too long, as repeatedly happened everywhere." While Rundstedt himself was not on the Eastern front after 1941, his position gave him more detachment of view. Moreover, the fact that he never took an optimistic view throughout, while having unique experience of high command on both fronts, gives a particular value to his opinion on the broad issue. When putting the same question to the generals who stayed in the East, I found them much more definite. All felt that Russia's offensive power could have been worn down by elastic defense - if they had only been allowed to practise it."

'The Other Side of the Hill' - Liddell Hart. Chapter: 'After Stalingrad'.

Based on this testimony, if Rundstedt was in charge of the sixty army, would he manage to evacuate the sixty army in time? (even if he had to disobey Hitler's orders to stand and fight)
If he had tried I think Hitler would have had him executed and potentially he'd be putting 1st Panzer army in danger of being cut off in the Caucasus. Pulling back from Stalingrad probably would have resulting in a fair amount of equipment loss too. But had they pulled it off, it probably would have saved them a lot of problems in the winter of 1942-43. Still they'd have to abandon all their gains in the Caucasus and along the Don river too, otherwise the Italians and Hungarians would have been wiped out as per OTL in Operation Saturn.

Given his personally it's most likely he ends up bitching about the Bohemian Corporal and ends up standing and fighting as he would view it as a lawful, but stupid order.

At around the same time Rommel in Egypt figured out to reclassify Hitler's order 'victory or death' as an advisory notice.

Rundstedt might do something similar, but it's just as likely he ends up standing and dying.
Remember Rundstedt was fired in 1941 for retreating from Rostov without Hitler's consent, he might have disobeyed. Paulus was certainly one who would never disobey.
 

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Remember Rundstedt was fired in 1941 for retreating from Rostov without Hitler's consent, he might have disobeyed. Paulus was certainly one who would never disobey.

Wasn't that part of the reason von Paulus got his Field Marshall's baton? No German (Prussian) Field Marshall had ever surrendered, so it was kind of an honour thing for vP to keep on fighting?

Worked out alright for him, didn't it? Not like most of the poor buggers he gave up...
 
Wasn't that part of the reason von Paulus got his Field Marshall's baton? No German (Prussian) Field Marshall had ever surrendered, so it was kind of an honour thing for vP to keep on fighting?

Worked out alright for him, didn't it? Not like most of the poor buggers he gave up...

It was the reason he got it a day before he surrendered. Hitler expected him to swallow a bullet which he viewed as the honorable thing and was shocked that he didn't kill himself.
 

Deleted member 1487

Wasn't that part of the reason von Paulus got his Field Marshall's baton? No German (Prussian) Field Marshall had ever surrendered, so it was kind of an honour thing for vP to keep on fighting?

Worked out alright for him, didn't it? Not like most of the poor buggers he gave up...
I mean yeah that is right, but Paulus apparently only cared when it was his life on the line.
 

Sir Chaos

Banned
Another question is, what happens if von Rundstedt, or whoever, manages to evacuate?

Alan Clark, in "Barbarossa", makes a very good point, I think: If Sixth Army had been evacuated, that would have gotten the Axis about 300,000 troops, most of which were in a fairly sorry state - but at the same time, it would have freed up ONE MILLION Soviet troops, which were still in a far better state, for use elsewhere. What could Stalin, or his generals, have done with one million troops, ready to strike the Germans elsewhere in a winter offensive? Retreat from Stalingrad may well have meant a disaster elsewhere.
 

Rubicon

Banned
Wasn't that part of the reason von Paulus got his Field Marshall's baton? No German (Prussian) Field Marshall had ever surrendered, so it was kind of an honour thing for vP to keep on fighting?

Worked out alright for him, didn't it? Not like most of the poor buggers he gave up...
No von in Paulus name, just because you're a German officer you don't get a von attached to your last name.

Also Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt wouldn't be in command of the sixth army, he'd be in command of Heeresgruppe B instead of (the then) Generaloberst von Weichs.
 

Deleted member 1487

Another question is, what happens if von Rundstedt, or whoever, manages to evacuate?

Alan Clark, in "Barbarossa", makes a very good point, I think: If Sixth Army had been evacuated, that would have gotten the Axis about 300,000 troops, most of which were in a fairly sorry state - but at the same time, it would have freed up ONE MILLION Soviet troops, which were still in a far better state, for use elsewhere. What could Stalin, or his generals, have done with one million troops, ready to strike the Germans elsewhere in a winter offensive? Retreat from Stalingrad may well have meant a disaster elsewhere.
1 million Soviet troops in 1942 were not really the equivalent of 1 million German troops in open maneuver battle. Plus logistics are at issue too.
 

Deleted member 1487

No von in Paulus name, just because you're a German officer you don't get a von attached to your last name.

Also Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt wouldn't be in command of the sixth army, he'd be in command of Heeresgruppe B instead of (the then) Generaloberst von Weichs.
Would Hitler have let Rundstedt get away with that order and would Paulus even follow it?
 
Based on this testimony, if Rundstedt was in charge of the sixty army, would he manage to evacuate the sixty army in time? (even if he had to disobey Hitler's orders to stand and fight)

Propably not.

By November Sixth army has lack of transportation, fuel or mobile reserve, its fully committed and preparing to spend the winter in Stalingrad. So to have some chance of retreating to a defensible line it would need to pick up on Soviet preparations for Operation Uranus and correctly guess its aim, extract panzer divisions from Stalingrad to form a mobile reserve then prepare retreat well in advance.

By the start of the Soviet counter offensive its too late, let alone when the encirclement is complete. Also Hitler will propably forbid retreat from Stalingrad.
 

Deleted member 1487

Propably not.

By November Sixth army has lack of transportation, fuel or mobile reserve, its fully committed and preparing to spend the winter in Stalingrad. So to have some chance of retreating to a defensible line it would need to pick up on Soviet preparations for Operation Uranus and correctly guess its aim, extract panzer divisions from Stalingrad to form a mobile reserve then prepare retreat well in advance.

By the start of the Soviet counter offensive its too late, let alone when the encirclement is complete. Also Hitler will propably forbid retreat from Stalingrad.
An evacuation like what Rundstedt talked about would likely happen in October when the build up started and was reported.
 

Rubicon

Banned
Would Hitler have let Rundstedt get away with that order and would Paulus even follow it?
von Rundstedt was still one of the few officers that actually intimidated Hitler (which is likely the real reason why he was benched for two years). He'd probably get away with it the same way as he did with the fall back from the Mius river. That is firing von Rundstedt and then afterwards approve of the retreat.

Yes he would, Paulus was a very obedient officer. He might question if Hitler had approved of the orders, but he wouldn't break the chain of command at that point.
 
That is the idea, Rundstedt ignore Hitler and retreats without caring about his punishment

I think that would be doable if Rundsted was able to present retreat as de-facto after it had already happened, but to save 6th in any kind of fighting force would require retreat well before counter attack, which would require Hitlers permission, which was not coming.
 
Perhaps the question is what would a "big name" proven general do earlier in 1942 with the 6th army? Would they allow the 6th to get bogged down in street fighting. Would a general Hitler liked/ admired/tolerated be able to find a different option and see it through so 6th Army is not only a fighting force come the winter it also hasn't burned tens of thoughsands of Germany's best troupes and replacements in a battle of attrition which only helps Russia.
 
Perhaps the question is what would a "big name" proven general do earlier in 1942 with the 6th army? Would they allow the 6th to get bogged down in street fighting. Would a general Hitler liked/ admired/tolerated be able to find a different option and see it through so 6th Army is not only a fighting force come the winter it also hasn't burned tens of thoughsands of Germany's best troupes and replacements in a battle of attrition which only helps Russia.

Most of them would have tried to bypass the city altogether if they felt they couldn't get a quick knock out blow.
 
Some questions:

1) Do the Germans absolutely have to reach Volga?
-Stalingrad is the only possible place to do it. Distance between Don and Volga is only 60 km and there is a supply railway to Lukhansk, so if protecting the Caucasus flank requires Volga then it HAS to be done in Stalingrad

2) Lets say that Rundstedt realizes that city cannot be taken with a quick decisive blow and calls off the attack in September or October, would he then retreat to Don?
- Digging into an open plane with both flanks exposed and main supply depots west of Don is not an ideal position for the winter

3) What would happen to Army group A?
-Offensive towards Grozny and Astrakhan was called off in the beginning of October, AG A was at the very end of its logistical rope. Would it be possible for Soviets to launch counter offensive against it?
 
He might have, he might have not. During similar (albeit more extreme) circumstances in the Rhineland in early 1945 he failed to follow basic military logic to withdraw over that river and use it as a natural barrier, but instead stood and fought as per Hitler's orders not to surrender a single yard of German territory. The result: his forces were crushed up against the Rhine and cut to pieces, costing the Wehrmacht nearly half a million men and shortening the war considerably.
 
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