Von Blomberg convinces Hitler to rationalize armament production

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Germany fought a 4 year war only 20 years before WW2, in fact Hilter got a medal in this long war. Germany, and all industrialised economies for that matter, are perfectly able to sustain long wars at a certain level its just that the level at which Japan can sustain a long war isn't nearly high enough to defeat the US.

WW1 was less technologically developed and countries were not subject to massive air assaults on their industry and other key production elements
 

Coup D'etat

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Germany fought a 4 year war only 20 years before WW2, in fact Hilter got a medal in this long war. Germany, and all industrialised economies for that matter, are perfectly able to sustain long wars at a certain level its just that the level at which Japan can sustain a long war isn't nearly high enough to defeat the US.
It's not just matter of "sustaining" a long term war, it's about sustaining a long term war and still have a reasonable chance of winning.
 
Aktarain, bombing wasn't a war winner until very late in the game, but I take your point.

Coup, Germany was theoretically capable of defeating the Soviet Union and holding off the Western Allies in a long war, but of course theory didn't match practice.
 
Aktarain, bombing wasn't a war winner until very late in the game, but I take your point.

Never said it was, but it was an important factor as it forced countries to keep a portion of their air defences at home, influenced their strategic mobility etc.
 

Coup D'etat

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Aktarain, bombing wasn't a war winner until very late in the game, but I take your point.

Coup, Germany was theoretically capable of defeating the Soviet Union and holding off the Western Allies in a long war, but of course theory didn't match practice.
No, Germany was never "theoretically" capable of holding off the USA, UK, and the USSR in a long war. It did not have the military-economical potential to do so.
 
No, Germany was never "theoretically" capable of holding off the USA, UK, and the USSR in a long war. It did not have the military-economical potential to do so.

Theoretically it could knock out SU in 1941 + 1942 mop up, move forces to West to prevent invasion and force some sort of compromise peace on UK before US entered the war fully (Army in Luftwaffe not being gutted on Eastern Front they'd be a formidable force). With both SU and UK out of the picture US would see no benefit to continue the war in Europe and would concentrate on Pacific.

Theoretically.
 

Coup D'etat

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Theoretically it could knock out SU in 1941 + 1942 mop up, move forces to West to prevent invasion and force some sort of compromise peace on UK before US entered the war fully (Army in Luftwaffe not being gutted on Eastern Front they'd be a formidable force). With both SU and UK out of the picture US would see no benefit to continue the war in Europe and would concentrate on Pacific.

Theoretically.
Yes, in other words, the war worked for Germany only when the real decisive actions occur within a short time after the start of the war. Which is why the German strategy employed OTL made perfect sense. If it had to face the full might of the UK, US, USSR, it would lose.
 
Yes, in other words, the war worked for Germany only when the real decisive actions occur within a short time after the start of the war. Which is why the German strategy employed OTL made perfect sense. If it had to face the full might of the UK, US, USSR, it would lose.

Indeed. It's classical war of maneuvre vs war of attrition question.
 
So my question to you all is what if von Blomberg convinces Hitler in 1934 to focus on fixed price multi-year contracts to take advantage of economies of scale and incentive-ize arms manufacturers to produce more units for less cost, rather than the OTL contracts (cost-plus) that incentive-ized raising costs and minimized production?


More unstable international situation convinces Hitler more re-armament is needed perhapse.

Hitler annexes Austria in 1934 (possibly Mussolini started a war with Ethiopia few months earlier), the Soviet-Union replies by invading estonia and latvia.

Or Japan starting a war with the Soviet-Union and Poland joining, Hitler is convinced Poland could get its ass kicked and Germany face a red invasion very soon or might turn against Germany after the fight with the Soviet-Union is over.

I don't think that's an actual myth.

It's that Germany never expected or planned to fight such a massive war for as long as they did. Germany's leaders based their decisions on the assumption that they would have a nice short and limited "Silesian war" (Poland in 1939), that an accomodation could be reached with Britain as fellow nordic when Germany did plan a major war in 1942, and that the Soviet Union would collapse in 6 months. Based on their assumptions, Hitler and Germany based their economic decisions in a way to balance the needs for those limited, short term wars, and other considerations (like Hitler's obsession that the Dolchstosslegende meant that German civilians needed to be assured of good times or would turn against him).

This was the general problem with all the Axis countries. Japan never thought the Marco Polo Bridge Incident would mean an 8 year war with China, and it thought the US would agree to a negotiated peace after 6-12 months. Italy thought the war would be over in a few months when Mussolini declared war on France and Britain.

In contrast, all the Allied countries assumed the war would be prolonged and require mass mobilization of society to insure victory. Nationalist China always intended to drag the war out as long as possible. Both Britain and France assumed they would never several years of military build up before they could launch a successful attack on Germany. The US likewise expected a very long war. Only the Soviet Union possibly expected a short war where they were the offensive power, but by 1942 pretty much expected it would take years to end (in contrast, Hitler still thought Soviet reserves were basically gone in late 1942 and that the war in the east would be over soon).

Because of their different conceptions of how long the war would last, each side made vastly different decisions on how to husband their resources.

It was only after Stalingrad that it really sinked into Hitler's mind that he was in for a long, bloody struggle that meant the entire German society needed to be enrolled for "Totaler Krieg" or that he should abandon chimerical wishes that Germany should divert resources to building a surface navy to prepare for a future war with the USA.

Trufax. Thus, what is needed for the OP is to convince Hitler early there is going to be a long, bloody struggle.
 
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No, Germany was never "theoretically" capable of holding off the USA, UK, and the USSR in a long war. It did not have the military-economical potential to do so.

By the time the US entered the war in late 1942 Britain and Germany had been fighting for 4 years and Germany and the Soviet Union had been fighting for more than 2 years. The battle of the Atlantic, which Germany fought with about 10-15% of her armed forces, wasn't won until 1943 and the Italian campaigns were a slow slog until very late in the war. This is what is meant by holding the WAllies at bay.
 

Coup D'etat

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By the time the US entered the war in late 1942 Britain and Germany had been fighting for 4 years and Germany and the Soviet Union had been fighting for more than 2 years. The battle of the Atlantic, which Germany fought with about 10-15% of her armed forces, wasn't won until 1943 and the Italian campaigns were a slow slog until very late in the war. This is what is meant by holding the WAllies at bay.
Well, first of all the US did not enter the war in late 1942. Obviously it takes time to for the inevitable defeat of Nazi Germany, just because Germany was able to achieve some degree of military success doesn't mean they could "theoretically" maintain the 1941-1942 situation indefinitely.
 
What did the US do of significance in Europe prior to Operation Torch?

By "some degree of military success" do you mean defeating France in weeks, capturing the Balkans in weeks and getting within 17km of Moscow after the largest encirclements in history despite utterly inadequate logistical support?
 

gaijin

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Yes that would be some degree of success. Not complete success because despite these early wins they still had their collectie faces kicked in. All the victories upto December 41 mean very little in the big strategic picture when the UK, the US and the USSR are faced against the Germans.
It's like a small guy in a barfight win three helps angels getting in the first few punches. Might make you feel good in the beginning but he will still lose.
 
Even if Germany is able to produce more, and at a greater rate -recalling of course that at times Germany already outproduced major nations, and gained industry of conquered states - you must still look at resources, and what is being produced. Having more cars, tanks, or planes seems nice but the ability to fuel, and arm them becomes a serious issue. More over so what if Germany made a few hundred more tanks a year? It was facing serious industrial power from three sides, propping up allies, and fighting a multifront war under the leadership of a man whose mind was against flexibility.

Indeed even in 1941 the German fuel situation wasnt great.

Now, we have to consider the fact that if the Germans keep up break-neck arms production. The British and French will re-double their own efforts. As will the Soviets, who would be far less likely to be cought off guard by a German attack unlike OTL.
 
Indeed even in 1941 the German fuel situation wasnt great.

Now, we have to consider the fact that if the Germans keep up break-neck arms production. The British and French will re-double their own efforts. As will the Soviets, who would be far less likely to be cought off guard by a German attack unlike OTL.

By 1939 Germany was loosing the arms race. They had an advantage of an early start but others were running faster.
 
Indeed even in 1941 the German fuel situation wasnt great.

I've read that even capturing the Mid East or the Caucus won't help the domestic fuel issues in Germany, they weren't set up to import large amounts of fuel from these places.
 
I've read that even capturing the Mid East or the Caucus won't help the domestic fuel issues in Germany, they weren't set up to import large amounts of fuel from these places.

Not to mention withdrawing armies have a nasty tendency to wreck stuff they leave behind. From what I gather oilfields that were destroyed in Cauccassus by Soviets weren't repaired until 1950s
 
I know the Soviets totally destroyed a hydroelectric dam in 1942, it was an admission that they wouldn't be back for a long time.

But anyway back to topic. How much more stuff does Nazi Germany need to defeat the Soviet Union in a close run thing by spring 1943? (leaving aside the political stupidity)In my mind they lacked the strategic reach due to poor logistics and their encirclements weren't thick enough. Both of these could be addressed by more trucks for supply and motorised infantry divisions, Germany built 164,000 trucks in 1940-1 and bought tens of thousands (20,000?) from France whereas Britain built 212,000.

How many more trucks could Germany and it's conquests have built in 1940-1 with these different contracts? 300,000?
 
I know the Soviets totally destroyed a hydroelectric dam in 1942, it was an admission that they wouldn't be back for a long time.

I think you mean one close to Kiev in 1941?

But anyway back to topic. How much more stuff does Nazi Germany need to defeat the Soviet Union in a close run thing by spring 1943? (leaving aside the political stupidity)In my mind they lacked the strategic reach due to poor logistics and their encirclements weren't thick enough. Both of these could be addressed by more trucks for supply and motorised infantry divisions, Germany built 164,000 trucks in 1940-1 and bought tens of thousands (20,000?) from France whereas Britain built 212,000.

How many more trucks could Germany and it's conquests have built in 1940-1 with these different contracts? 300,000?

That still leaves problem of strategic supply. Once Germany got deep in SU they simply couldn't haul enough stuff to supply troops. More trucks require more fuel, more fuel requires more trains and those simply weren't there. Railroads in SU simply weren't enough to haul stuff forward. More trucks will simply mean higher logistical demands and when those can't be met they'll simply stop. And be abandoned when soviet counter offensive starts as there would be no fuel to move them back.
 
Van Creveld states that many divisions in the first wave of Barbarossa didn't get their allocation of mechanised transport until up to 10 days before the start of the attack. Perhaps the contracting changes mean better production curves, so that these divisions get their allocation of trucks in May and Barbarossa can be launched a few weeks earlier, as soon as the ground is hard enough. This won't require any more fuel than OTL. Perhaps even moreso truck production curves could mean that these divisions could receive 10% more than their OTL allocation of trucks, so that as well as being able to attack a few weeks earlier they will have 5% greater reach and a more robust supply line.
 
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