VK36.01 in 1942

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
Does anyone have an idea how quickly production could be transitioned from the VK3601 to the Panther?

If you assume that all German mains tank factories had converted to VK36.01 by mid 43, then you have MAN, DB, MNH, Demag, Henschel Alkett, Krupp, etc all producing it. starting with MAN, the parent company, and to minimise production disruption, you would probably switch one main factory at a time. You could be producing only Panthers by early 44 with minimal loss of volume.
By that time (mid 43) the VK36.01 would probably be using the engine and gearbox intended for the Panther anyway.
OTL Henschel stopped producing PzIII in July42 and delivered the first production Tiger I that same month, so each factory you convert will probably cost you less than a month of its production.
But remember I'm a rifleman, not an engineer. I might be prone to oversimplifying.
Regarding production volume, here are the figures for 1941, medium tanks only:
Germany, 1673 PzIII, 467 PzIV. With 540 StuG you get 2680 AFV. It looks good until you see that GB had built, in the same year:
762 Covenanter, 655 Crusader, 1038 Matilda, 1621 Valentine and 690 Churchill, for a total of 4766 AFV. And it was Germany who was fighting the USSR...
Simply put, there are some 3000 tanks missing in Germany 41 production plans, and the lack of them made, among other factors, their goals in the USSR unattainable.
 
An earlier Kursk won't work. Using a different design does not change the problems that come with switching over production too a totally new design. At best, there will be more VK36.01 on May 4th, 1943 then there were Tigers on May 4th 1943, but fewer then there would be (for either design) on July 4th 1943.

The ratio in quantity tanks will be changed insignificantly, and the ratio in other categories (manpower and artillery) would not change at all.

The Soviets only realized that Kursk was the target on April 18th, which was mere weeks before May 4th.

The Soviets identified the Kursk salient as the likely point of a German offensive pretty much as soon as the front had stabilized in late-March. The preliminary defensive preparations began around March 27th and all out efforts began after Stalin accepted Zhukov's recommendation between April 12th to 15th. This was supported by partisan reconnassiance and radio intercepts. The intel from Lucy merely confirmed what the Soviets had already figured out. By May 4th the defenses were largely already completed and manned, much of the work from then until July 4th was focused on improving the previously constructed fortifications and fielding additional forces.

Attacking from only the south of the bulge also hamstrings the Germans even more, as an offensive from only one direction allows the Soviets to focus larger forces on halting such a drive.
 

Deleted member 1487

By May 4th the defenses were largely already completed and manned, much of the work from then until July 4th was focused on improving the previously constructed fortifications and fielding additional forces.

You seriously expect us to believe that within two weeks of issuing the orders to dig in the July levels of fortifications were ready all across the front when they had only one rail line to supply the whole bulge? They could have built up a line of field works, but they could not have laid the concrete bunkers, minefields, razor wire, and brought in the massive amounts of artillery/AAA/AT guns the defensive scheme called for. I think you are seriously overestimating the strength of Soviet defensive preparations as of May 4th. I'm not saying they weren't significant, but they were nowhere near the levels of July.
Even the extra armor hadn't really arrived until June.
 

Deleted member 1487

Panther production by MAN took half a year from prototype to first operational vehicles (which still had problems). But you have to take into consideration that VK3601 was designed by Henschel, Panther by MAN Pz IV by Krupp. In production of Panther and Pz IV other factories and companies were later involved and numbers, especially for Panther never reached planned numbers.
My guess is 3-6 month for all others manufacturers involved. But at the same time production of older tanks will decrease and production of newer will be only slowly increasing. It took Germans a year to double production for Panther OTL but they were able to triple the production of Pz IV from 1942 to 1943.

My opinion is they needed something they can quickly manufacture and sent to combat. Updated Pz IV in higher numbers quickly and stick with them, maybe go to Panther little bit later. But they need to increase production of Pz IV in 1940/41 no in 1943.

If they jump from Pz III and Pz IV to something like VK 3601 and later again to Panther, they may be even in bigger mess as OTL.

Look at US and Soviets, they manufactured their Shermans and T-34 in huge quantities and went only with relatively small changes (adding some armor, changing a turret/ gun). Look at Israelis, they created Super Sherman by mating WWII Sherman with French tank gun which was further development of Panther gun and the tank was really successful against Arab's T-34. Even more upgunned Sherman was able to deal with T-54/55.
I never said they would stop producing the Pz IV; remember the Nibelungerwerk only officially opened in 1942, so it could be tooled up for the VK3601 while the other producers kept on with the Pz IV or switched to it.

If you assume that all German mains tank factories had converted to VK36.01 by mid 43, then you have MAN, DB, MNH, Demag, Henschel Alkett, Krupp, etc all producing it. starting with MAN, the parent company, and to minimise production disruption, you would probably switch one main factory at a time. You could be producing only Panthers by early 44 with minimal loss of volume.
By that time (mid 43) the VK36.01 would probably be using the engine and gearbox intended for the Panther anyway.
OTL Henschel stopped producing PzIII in July42 and delivered the first production Tiger I that same month, so each factory you convert will probably cost you less than a month of its production.
But remember I'm a rifleman, not an engineer. I might be prone to oversimplifying.
Regarding production volume, here are the figures for 1941, medium tanks only:
Germany, 1673 PzIII, 467 PzIV. With 540 StuG you get 2680 AFV. It looks good until you see that GB had built, in the same year:
762 Covenanter, 655 Crusader, 1038 Matilda, 1621 Valentine and 690 Churchill, for a total of 4766 AFV. And it was Germany who was fighting the USSR...
Simply put, there are some 3000 tanks missing in Germany 41 production plans, and the lack of them made, among other factors, their goals in the USSR unattainable.

I'm not advocating for a total switch to a new tank; that would take too long and be too costly in terms of lost production and machine tools. Instead new factories like the Nibelungenwerk would focus on the VK3601 until the Panther G/F came online and then switch over. The existing Pz IV production would continue and expand, replacing the Pz II, III, and 38(t) eventually.
http://translate.google.com/transla...u=http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nibelungenwerk
 
You seriously expect us to believe that within two weeks of issuing the orders to dig in the July levels of fortifications were ready all across the front when they had only one rail line to supply the whole bulge?

Not July-level, necessarily, but the overall framework which the July-level was built. Of course, the Germans won't be anywhere near their July level in offensive strength either so it more then evens out.

In any case a delay in May is inevitable and not just because the Germans simply won't be ready. There were some rather unexpected heavy rains at the time that were a additional reason for the delay until June 12th.

They could have built up a line of field works, but they could not have laid the concrete bunkers, minefields, razor wire, and brought in the massive amounts of artillery/AAA/AT guns the defensive scheme called for.
And the Germans will be lacking the tanks that those additional bunkers, minefields, and anti-tank weapons were needed too halt.

I think you are seriously overestimating the strength of Soviet defensive preparations as of May 4th.
At minimum, I am overestimating the Soviet defensive preparations as you are overestimating the strength of German forces on May 4th.

I'm not saying they weren't significant, but they were nowhere near the levels of July.
They were at sufficient levels to stop a German attack in May, though.

Even the extra armor hadn't really arrived until June.
Given that none of the German panzer divisions had even a 100 tanks until June, the Soviets won't even need extra tanks if the Germans attack so early. Hell, Guderian was hoping to equip every Panzer division with 400 tanks and he never even achieved half of that goal.

As it was, the Soviets produced somewhere in the range of 2,600 T-34s alone over the course of March and April, on top of their already existing tank strength. The Germans in the mean time produced less then half that number (~1,000) of total tanks in the same period of time.

I'm not advocating for a total switch to a new tank; that would take too long and be too costly in terms of lost production and machine tools. Instead new factories like the Nibelungenwerk would focus on the VK3601 until the Panther G/F came online and then switch over. The existing Pz IV production would continue and expand, replacing the Pz II, III, and 38(t) eventually.

So only a marginal increase in tank production that does not alter the force ratios in enough of a manner to make any difference.
 
Wiking proposed something like that, when he suggested that the VK36.01(H) was rapidly accepted into production, in a thread started a few days ago.


Which I just bumped...
 
Kursk

Hi Wiking

Kursk is probably the wrong battle for this tank, since it was arguably the one battle were the Tiger made the most sense. The intensity of the action meant that a lot of it was under 500m, and the Tiger ability to sustain frontal hits from 76,2mm guns at close range allowed the Tiger units to amass huge scores.
The one moment when early avaiability of the VK36.01 would have made the most impact was if it allowed adicional well equiped PzD to deploy in time to prevent Uranos from succeding. If you can have enouth tanks by late 42 to put an extra four PzD under AG B (without weakening Model's IX Army in AG Centre, who was about to face Mars) and cascade down the older PzIV and III to strenghen the Romanian forces, you might have something big.
If you rethink the German 1943 game plan without Citadel, having larger numbers of VK36.01 rather than Tigers+Panthers will then be a sound choice.
For Citadel, more Tigers for the tank killing role, backed by large numbers of 105mm armed StuH for the defence supression role would be the ideal mix.
Of course going for the VK36.01 as a MBT and cancelling the Panther and Tiger will get you in trouble if the T34/85 and critically IS2 programs go on as OTL...
But that will be in 1944 by wich time the war will be long decided...

You probably regard an early citadel as a large enough game changer, but Manstein might be hugely overplaying its importance in his "Lost Victories". A May attack will mean less prepared defences, and less tanks on both sides, but it will also mean the germans will have more lmited supplies for a sustained battle, and that even a win will not be likely to be decisive. The Russian build up also meant that the bulk of the russian forces were placed within rangeof the german attack and exposed to the german tactical advantage. The Germans didn't do much better in the defensive after Citadel was canceled then they did during the offensive phase.
Yes, 3601 was option for Uranus; but, we know about Manstein : when he captured Crimea with 11th army , he Not commanded " Operation Blau", he was transfered to St. Petersburg ; this was major mistake by OKH , and lead to defeat. In time of Uranus, 19.11.42' ,Manstein was still not in power about army group South; Tiger - 1 sow action BEFORE Uranus, but in stupid Peterburgs front(if this terrain will be good for Tigers, Soviet be able to break blockade before it arrived, with KV-heavy tanks). If Stalingrad was key-strategic goal, Manstein and Tigers may be transfered with 11th army on left flank,instead of Italian 8.army (italians may be best in Greece 42' ), also army group E ordered to witdraw from Greece immediatly and positioned between 6.th and 4.th-panzer army,well covered right flank , kept Romanian troops to holding back positions, no facing with каћуша-rocket launchers. General Halder argued for this flanks 3 or 4 mounts before Uranus started, and OKH did nothing about this Romano-Italian flanks.This was crucial mistake. ( Tigers also newer be sent to DAK in Africa,etc)
 
Last edited:
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top