Virginia borders after a negotiated peace in the ACW

I guess its possible that the CSA can throw its weight around and make demands that stick, but it seems to me that they are already getting the very big concession of negotiations with independence and anything above that is gravy.

It would be politically difficult for any administration, even one with a mandate to end the war, to cede ground that Union troops have "bought with their blood."

Honestly, my guess is that negotiations break down and you end up with a long period of de facto peace with the armies in place where they are, with the frontlines later being regularized at some much later peace conference.
 
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Unless we get dangerously close to ASB territory (great military victory for the CSA including a confederate occupation of Washington DC) the most likely scenario for a CSA independence is a less successful 1864 campeign season for the Union (no successful Atlanta campeign) and McClellan winning the presidency. But this is still going to leave large swaths of CSA territory in Union hands (all of Kentucky, most of Tennessee and West Virginia, about half of both Mississippi, Louisiana and Arkansas, northern Alabama, the north-eastern coastal regions of North Carolina, in Virginia everything north of the Rappahannock as well as the coast and in Florida those coastal forts that remained in Union hands throughout the war), so a lot of bargaining chips in peace negotiations.

The first Union offer will most likely be a status quo one, i.e. borders along the front lines. From there on it will be diplomatic bargaining, i.e. the CSA giving up its' claims to Kentucky, Missouri, the Indian Territory and New Mexico in exchange for occupied parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas and Alabama. Rather easy to come to terms about this. The harder parts in the negotiations will be the questions of Tennessee and North as well as West Virginia. But since the Union by virtue of holding those areas still wields the bigger stick and due to the fact that the Restored Government of Virginia in Alexandria does really represent pro-Union Virginians the Confederacy will be forced to yield the counties north of the Rappahannock as a cordon sanitaire for the Union capital in exchange for the occupied coastal areas of Virginia and North Carolina and possibly also some West Virgianian counties as well as some concessions regarding Tennessee.

Despite the fact that the Union part of Virginia wouldn't be much bigger than Rhode Island it will most likely remain a state of its' own with Alexandria as its' state capital if for no other than for legalistic reasons.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I guess its possible that the CSA can throw its weight around and make demands that stick, but it seems to me that they are already getting the very big concession of negotiations with independence and anything above that is gravy.

The Confederacy won't really have any weight to throw around. The key problem for the Union in an 1864 peace-through-exhaustion scenario is that the Northern public is demanding peace, so they have to come away with a peace treaty of some kind. But the South won't be in any position to make much in the way of demands, since their own political and economic situation requires that they, too, come away with a peace treaty. The North is making the biggest concession of all simply by negotiating in the first place (and thereby acknowledging the independence of the Confederacy) and the South knows it.
 
What good is that stick when it has become too heavy to wield?
While, with a less successful 1864 campeign season, the Union will be significantly more war-weary than IOTL, from a purely material POV she will still have ample resources to continue the war pretty much indefinately, at least at a low level intensity, i.e. digging in and holding conquered ground, while the South, even absent a successful Atlanta campeign and a subsequent March to the Sea, won't have the ability to dislodge Union forces from their territory in any relevant extent. Even ITTL by late 1864 the Confederacy will be economically shattered, the ever tightening Union blockade and control of the Mississippi depriving it of any meaningful revenues and the possibility to raise funds to continue the war internally, just like their manpower reserves, all but exhausted, so the South will be left with little choice but to accept whatever reasonable terms the Union will offer them lest they overbid their hand and in the end lose everything by reigniting the northern fighting spirit with their from a Union POV utter intransigence.
 
While, with a less successful 1864 campeign season, the Union will be significantly more war-weary than IOTL, from a purely material POV she will still have ample resources to continue the war pretty much indefinately, at least at a low level intensity, i.e. digging in and holding conquered ground, while the South, even absent a successful Atlanta campeign and a subsequent March to the Sea, won't have the ability to dislodge Union forces from their territory in any relevant extent.

The problem isn't whether or not the Union has the material resources to continue the war. The problem is that the Union, by choosing Confederate independence as preferable to war, is no longer willing to mobilize those resources - and if I'm not mistaken, enlistments in the US army, unlike the Confederate soldiers, are not "for the war" to boot. Which means that digging in and holding conquered ground only works for - at a maximum - into ~1867 or so (possibly '68)

This is observing that recruiting is going to fall off heavily in these circumstances, so new regiments - while perfectly capable of being formed - aren't going to take their places.

You might say that the CSA will never last that long, but see below.

Even ITTL by late 1864 the Confederacy will be economically shattered, the ever tightening Union blockade and control of the Mississippi depriving it of any meaningful revenues and the possibility to raise funds to continue the war internally, just like their manpower reserves, all but exhausted, so the South will be left with little choice but to accept whatever reasonable terms the Union will offer them lest they overbid their hand and in the end lose everything by reigniting the northern fighting spirit with their from a Union POV utter intransigence.

Just as the thirteen colonies had little choice but make peace on any terms they could get?

They were economically bankrupt by the mid point of the war. They had trouble raising men (more as a matter of the former than a shortage in the sense the CSA is experiencing, but it didn't matter to the armies why they couldn't enroll soldiers). France up to 1781 was practically fighting a war that was incidental to American independence so far as its help put weight on the scales.

And yet they persevered for another four years.

Obviously the situation is not identical, but if we're talking about a peace party winning, we're looking at Virginia more or less in the same situation as 1863, Georgia comparable, and the Carolinas possibly better (due to troops being moved to make the Army of the James) than the year before.

Ignoring Florida as generally nonproductive, and focusing on this area as the Missisippi-Alabama area is able to send little and the Transmississippi is entirely cut off.

Not a good basis for "win", but too much to simply fold in another few months if the position of the armies (and thus destruction) is looking it was back in spring of 1864.

If the Union was willing to "reignite the war", it would be far simpler, less embarrassing and more effective to solve the issue of Washington's security by reabsorbing Virginia and the rest of the Confederacy than to sit on the Rappahannock, with the army's morale withering away, and hope that the CSA would rather have the mountain counties of West Virginia than northern Virginia.

So if the Union is not willing to do the former, assuming it can do the latter without difficulty just because it still has ample reserves of men, money, and supplies is missing the element of morale.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The problem isn't whether or not the Union has the material resources to continue the war. The problem is that the Union, by choosing Confederate independence as preferable to war, is no longer willing to mobilize those resources - and if I'm not mistaken, enlistments in the US army, unlike the Confederate soldiers, are not "for the war" to boot. Which means that digging in and holding conquered ground only works for - at a maximum - into ~1867 or so (possibly '68)

Not only that, but the North cannot continue to pay for the vast army indefinitely. Even its financial resources were not inexhaustible and inflation in the North (while peanuts compared to inflation in the South) was beginning to bite into the Northern economy. If a political decision had been made to no longer pay the price in blood and treasure to subjugate the South, the Northern people - and the bond market - will expect the leadership in Washington to get things as back to normal as possible as quickly as possible.
 
Not only that, but the North cannot continue to pay for the vast army indefinitely. Even its financial resources were not inexhaustible and inflation in the North (while peanuts compared to inflation in the South) was beginning to bite into the Northern economy. If a political decision had been made to no longer pay the price in blood and treasure to subjugate the South, the Northern people - and the bond market - will expect the leadership in Washington to get things as back to normal as possible as quickly as possible.

Yeah. I think it would be more a matter of trade than inflation in itself, but given how the greenback's value reflected confidence in Union victory, it would be bad enough to make people holler.

Not something an administration that was specifically elected in rejecting the policy of the Republicans would be able to bear easily.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Yeah. I think it would be more a matter of trade than inflation in itself, but given how the greenback's value reflected confidence in Union victory, it would be bad enough to make people holler.

Not something an administration that was specifically elected in rejecting the policy of the Republicans would be able to bear easily.

Moreover, demobilization of the army combined with an inevitable influx of freed slaves desperate to escape the Confederacy will flood the labor force exactly when the drying up of wartime manufacturing contracts reduces the number of available jobs. The United States is in for some significant economic trouble.
 
The Confederacy won't really have any weight to throw around. The key problem for the Union in an 1864 peace-through-exhaustion scenario is that the Northern public is demanding peace, so they have to come away with a peace treaty of some kind. But the South won't be in any position to make much in the way of demands, since their own political and economic situation requires that they, too, come away with a peace treaty. The North is making the biggest concession of all simply by negotiating in the first place (and thereby acknowledging the independence of the Confederacy) and the South knows it.

I think it much more likely that a narrow majority of the public is demanding peace and that most of that narrow majority are convinced that peace is compatible with the preservation of the Union. Which was, after all, the official position even of the Democratic peace wing, let alone of McClellan. Since most of the soldiers were not demanding peace at any price and since the North continued to have the money and means to make war, there is not much pressure on a hypothetical McClellan administration to reach a deal at any price. I agree that the mere fact of negotiation with the *possibility* of independence is an enormous concession and I don't see many more concessions being made on top of that.
 
I think it much more likely that a narrow majority of the public is demanding peace and that most of that narrow majority are convinced that peace is compatible with the preservation of the Union. Which was, after all, the official position even of the Democratic peace wing, let alone of McClellan. Since most of the soldiers were not demanding peace at any price and since the North continued to have the money and means to make war, there is not much pressure on a hypothetical McClellan administration to reach a deal at any price. I agree that the mere fact of negotiation with the *possibility* of independence is an enormous concession and I don't see many more concessions being made on top of that.

If you've conceded that independence is a possibility, you've conceded the whole point of the war anyways. Is McClellan, or Horatio Seymour, or Pendleton, or whoever supposed to go back to the northern public and say "We offered them independence, but we're going to carry on the fight to make sure the border is the Rappahannock rather than the Potomac?" Or "we broke off negotiations since they wouldn't make the border the Rappahannock. Onwards to Richmond!" I just don't see it; that's not something Northerners are going to think is worth dying for. Besides which: why would the Peace Democrats want to annex northern Virginia? Incorporate an area where the majority of the population is opposed to you? Reconstruction was hard enough in OTL, and there wasn't a reasonably large, reasonably well-armed sympathetic nation a few miles away in OTL. As for D.C.: it'd be easier to just include a provision saying "no artillery in range of D.C." Hell, it'd be easier just to move the capital; if you want to salvage national pride (not that there's any point to that when you've already given up half the country), you could always just keep D.C. as the de jure capital and move day-to-day operations elsewhere (I'll give Turtledove some credit for that one).
 
If you've conceded that independence is a possibility, you've conceded the whole point of the war anyways. Is McClellan, or Horatio Seymour, or Pendleton, or whoever supposed to go back to the northern public and say "We offered them independence, but we're going to carry on the fight to make sure the border is the Rappahannock rather than the Potomac?" Or "we broke off negotiations since they wouldn't make the border the Rappahannock. Onwards to Richmond!" I just don't see it; that's not something Northerners are going to think is worth dying for. Besides which: why would the Peace Democrats want to annex northern Virginia? Incorporate an area where the majority of the population is opposed to you? Reconstruction was hard enough in OTL, and there wasn't a reasonably large, reasonably well-armed sympathetic nation a few miles away in OTL. As for D.C.: it'd be easier to just include a provision saying "no artillery in range of D.C." Hell, it'd be easier just to move the capital; if you want to salvage national pride (not that there's any point to that when you've already given up half the country), you could always just keep D.C. as the de jure capital and move day-to-day operations elsewhere (I'll give Turtledove some credit for that one).

No one was really conceding independence as a possibility. They utter limits of what they were willing to do--and this is the peace faction of the Democratic party, mind--is negotiate without requiring the South to concede to Union first. You're arguing that the Peace Democrats logically must have had attitudes that OTL they didn't have. When argument meets reality, reality wins.

But McClellan was the actual candidate. His position was that the war should continue until the South was defeated, but that the Union should insist on Union alone and jettison abolition. Basically his campaign position was that he would be a more competent war president than Lincoln would. The evidence is that his position was genuine. He wasn't secretly a peace democrat. He repudiated the plank in the party platform that called for an armistice and negotiations without requiring Union as a pre-condition. Further, even if the Democrats win a majority in either house, the peace faction itself won't have a majority. A voting coalition of Republicans and McClellan Democrats would be able to provide all the legislative support he'd need.

So if McClellan can be brought to negotiate with the possibility of independence at all, his hands are by no means tied. The South is basically having to make a hard sell to convince him to accede to independence, which means they are are in no position to make demands of any kind.

This notion that if the Union gets tired enough of war that it makes peace feelers, then it is going to accept peace at any price, is absurd.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
But McClellan was the actual candidate. His position was that the war should continue until the South was defeated, but that the Union should insist on Union alone and jettison abolition. Basically his campaign position was that he would be a more competent war president than Lincoln would. The evidence is that his position was genuine. He wasn't secretly a peace democrat. He repudiated the plank in the party platform that called for an armistice and negotiations without requiring Union as a pre-condition.

He only repudiated the peace plank AFTER Atlanta had been captured by Sherman. Had Atlanta remained in Confederate hands, McClellan might well as sung a different tune.
 
This notion that if the Union gets tired enough of war that it makes peace feelers, then it is going to accept peace at any price, is absurd.

Except that there is no reason for the Union to be willing to send peace feelers to the Confederacy if it is willing to keep fighting - it gains absolutely nothing by ending the war on any other terms than victory, and quibbling over northern Virginia is no way to hide the humiliation of defeat.

"Union without ending slavery" was the official war goal at least until late 1862 and I doubt it ever truly changed OTL. So McClellan has to be able to somehow convince people that he'd be better at that than Lincoln - and if he's going there, well, he has no reason to send peace feelers.
 
No one was really conceding independence as a possibility. They utter limits of what they were willing to do--and this is the peace faction of the Democratic party, mind--is negotiate without requiring the South to concede to Union first. You're arguing that the Peace Democrats logically must have had attitudes that OTL they didn't have. When argument meets reality, reality wins.

I will note that a different war situation at the time of the DNC could yield a different nominee. But even assuming McClellan: as Anaxagoras mentioned, McClellan's repudiation of the peace platform conveniently occurred after Atlanta fell. The worst the war situation is for the Union, the likelier he is to endorse the peace platform. He was after all, a politician (and better at that than being a general; which admittedly isn't saying much).

If there is a McClellan Presidency, two things are most probably true: (1) the public is wearier of war than OTL and (2) the Confederacy is not approaching military collapse on Election Day. If that wasn't the case, the public wouldn't be so war weary and wouldn't elect McClellan. Finally, if there are serious peace negotiations, a third thing must be true: the Confederacy must not be nearing military collapse on Inauguration Day either. If it was, McClellan would just continue the war to a successful conclusion.

Given that situation: if the North offers peace, it's probably because they really are unwilling to continue to fight. And they'd expect it to take at least a year, and probably more, to subdue the South successfully, if they think the South can be subdued at all (they'd be overestimating the South, but it's perception that counts). So maybe they aren't thinking "peace at any price", but they'll be willing to pay a pretty high price.

But let's assume a scenario I think is unlikely: McClellan wins and the public mindset on Election Day really is that they'd be willing to restart the war if the Confederates insisted on independence at the negotiating table. I'm not sure that after months and months of peace, that'd still be their opinion. These would be months in which Johnny has come home, or if in the South at least isn't being shot at. Months without casualty reports; months where the economy is moving to a peace footing. And if McClellan really did offer the Confederates independence, but broke off negotiations because of Alexandria or northern Virginia: that won't enthuse the Northern public either. If anything it'll make them even warier: why fight to preserve the Union, when the Commander-in-Chief is apt to stop the war whenever the enemy offers him sufficient territory?

And as I said in my prior post: I don't see what the North gains out of annexing Alexandria, or Northern Virginia, or slivers of the Confederacy in general. There are easier, less bloody ways to protect the capital, and annexing Southern territories while the Confederacy still exists just invites a whole host of problems. And as Elfwine says, it's not like you can spin doctor holding onto Alexandria as "We won!"
 
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Except that there is no reason for the Union to be willing to send peace feelers to the Confederacy if it is willing to keep fighting - it gains absolutely nothing by ending the war on any other terms than victory, and quibbling over northern Virginia is no way to hide the humiliation of defeat.

"Union without ending slavery" was the official war goal at least until late 1862 and I doubt it ever truly changed OTL. So McClellan has to be able to somehow convince people that he'd be better at that than Lincoln - and if he's going there, well, he has no reason to send peace feelers.

Mostly I agree that McClellan isn't going to send out peace feelers, unless its for political reasons to satisfy the peace faction in his own party.

But if he does, he won't accept peace at any price. People aren't binary like that. People who have experience with bilateral negotiations (my experience comes in the litigation context) know that negotiations very often get hung up on 'details' that are less important than the over-all benefit of the negotiation succeeding. That's human nature, and there are solid game theoretic reasons and therefore solid adaptive reasons why human nature would be that way.
 
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