Views on Niall Ferguson's analysis of WW1

And of course we know what a German victory in the east entailed. Ethnic cleansing of Poles, confiscation of foodstuffs, weird plans to colonize the Crimea...

Requisitioning of food isn't unlikely given how tight belts were in Germany herself.

As to colonising the Crimea, European powers were colonising all over the place in that era. No particular reason why the Crimea should be exempt. Admittedly, some of its population was white, but not all.

Ethnic cleansing of Polish border areas was certainly both crazy and inhumane - if carried out. However, it's by no means clear that it ever would have been, given that few Germans showed much eagerness for living the life of farmers in eastern Prussia. Population movement was all the other way. There was talk of settling ethnic Germans from the Russian interior, but these too, if they chose to leave home at all, would probably soon have found that they could live better in Essen as labourers for Krupps. The Second Reich was not the Third. It couldn't just resettle its people by decree.
 
My main reason for finding claims about large-scale ethnic cleansing of Poles by the Germans in WWI difficult to believe is that those areas of the German Empire which held a large Polish minority or majority before the start of WWI still did so at the end of it; if ethnic cleansing had taken place, then it would have made the most sense for Germany to deport the Poles from inside its own borders first, as simply shuffling around Polish population inside the conquered territory would serve no useful purpose.


They tried that on a small scale before the war. A "colonisation society" was formed to buy up land owned by ethnic Poles, and settle Germans on it.

The whole thing was a complete fiasco. More German farmers offered to sell their land than Polish ones. Life as a farmer out on Germany's eastern border was no bed of roses, and there was a steady drift of population both from country to town (as elsewhere) and from east to west. Even if Poles were willing to sell out, Germans didn't want to buy.

The idea was revived in 1918, as part of plans to annex a broad strip of land along Germany's eastern border. Being a conquered enemy population, the inhabitants of Russian Poland could be compelled to leave - but Germans could not be compelled to enter. As mentioned in my last message, the whole thing would probably have fizzled out simply for lack of willing German settlers - as of course it deserved to do.
 
But the war itself changed attitudes a great deal. I mean, who in Britain would have given weapons to Estonian independence fighters in 1914? ;) For one thing, Germany wasn't a military dictatorship until 1916. It was ruled by sane conservative statesmen who were too busy maintaining an odd political balance to go off and do something that would have raised a great many heckles in the other countries. The German government had, however, been giving vague support to groups that tried to settle Germans in the Prussian east since Bismarck; these just failed miserably.

But during war, needs must, and everybody became rather densensitised to violence. Nationalist views got an airing from Germany's military government and for another thing Germany marched into Russian Poland and found it blasted - thanks to the ongoing war and the Russian scorched-earth tactics, of course, but the experience of enormous numbers of young men going into what appeared to be the dangerous and savage lands east of Germany gave a lot of force to what had previously been the fairly obscure nationalist talking-point of drang nach osten.

Well, Germany had only gotten into Poland in 1915, the Silent Dictatorship had only taken full power in 1916, and Germany was all the while fighting a total war, directing all available resources to the urgent task of winning - and fielding Polish auxilliary and allied troops.

I'm not saying it was done, I'm saying the idea was discussed in German state documents.

In this case I will concede that the idea might have seen more serious consideration than I believed. So far, however, it doesn't look to me that any actual ethnic cleansing took place, contrary to claims. Whether it would have done so after Germany won the war is up to debate, although I think Mikestone delivered some sensible arguments why it either wouldn't, or would be abandoned shortly.

And like I said, Oberost was still no fun. Look at Hetmanate Ukraine, or Kurland, where Germany proved entirely unable to dispense with a group of aristocrats who thought that Wilhelmine Germany itself circa 1918 was far too liberal; the same gang briefly looked like ruling Estonia and Latvia.

I don't think any kind of military occupation has ever been "fun", no matter where or when, but I think I understand what you mean, though I think that the state Germany was in by then certainly didn't help matters any.

Well, as I said to begin with, there's strict and no agreed-upon definition of "militarism". Does it mean pride in an armed force, or does it require the political independence and power of that armed force? Germany was very much a country where the army proved to be a political power, which wasn't the case in the other countries, even in Russia.

I think it would also depend on how "political power" is defined. The arrangement in Germany might have been more formal/official, but I had the distinct impression that, for example, the Royal Navy also wielded a more than considerable amount of social and political clout and influence, though perhaps much more subtly than the army in Germany.

He wasn't the emperor, he was the heir to the throne (and as far as Hungary was concerned a dangerous political type), and while I often say that Austria was a more secure polity than people often think, that doesn't mean that everybody within its borders was furiously devoted to the royal family.

Ah, my mistake for getting his status confused. However, I don't think it makes much of a difference for my point; an imprtant member of the state had just been assassinated by a group of terrorists backed by a rogue/enemy state (which is what most Austro-Hungarians and Germans undoubtedly saw it as), so it's not surprising that AH was aggressive in its demands against Serbia.

The horrible situation in Serbia had much broader causes than that, including the bloody-minded tenaciousness of the Serbian army itself, one of the nastier insurgencies and counter-insurgencies of the war, famine, and a typhus epidemic, not all of which were caused by the Austrian authorities. But the said authorities were doing nothing to help the situation, and Royal Serbia lost a larger portion of its population in WW1 than Yugoslavia in WW2.
No doubt that the lack of sophisticated counter-insurgency techniques did nothing to help the situation. IIRC the only powers who had any real experience in counter-insurgency (beyond "burn the village and kill them all!" techniques) were the British and Americans, from their wars against the Boers/Spanish, respectively.

- Kelenas
 
Additionally I have tried to find a neutral source about ethnic cleansing performed by the Germans during WWI, but so far I found nothing that didn't refer to the events of WWII instead.QUOTE]

You will find none. - Nevertheless, the 'Protection Belt' (AKA border strip) was kind of accepted official German policy opposite Poland. If a Polish state was created, this belt along the German-Polish border was to be subtracted from Polish territory, the population to be resettled in Poland, and the belt to be newly settled by Germans.
Intention was to insulate the Prussian Poles from the 'wild' Poles in Poland.

Obviously, this never was translated into reality. In 1916, the Central Powers created the Polish Kingdom, and no 'Protection Belt' was activated.

And one wonders where these German settlers should have come from. - But until the final days of the war, this idea was revived again and again.

And today it's a darling argument of our dear friend the jingo-Poles, 'proving' how really bad the Kaiserreich already was.
 
Because that would be a supremely stupid thing to do, things like that don't just happen overnight.
And again, it was a hung parliament.



Oops, yeah, 45, had India stuck in my head.
The labour remained pretty anti-empire even during tory times in power.

Between 1945 and 1951 they formed a majority government. Beside India and Palestine, which had become untenable, there was no major instance of decolonization in that time.

However, I don't think it makes much of a difference for my point; an imprtant member of the state had just been assassinated by a group of terrorists backed by a rogue/enemy state (which is what most Austro-Hungarians and Germans undoubtedly saw it as), so it's not surprising that AH was aggressive in its demands against Serbia.

Except that's not how it happened at all. Why will this myth about 1914 not die? A-H had been spoiling for a war against Serbia for several years and made a calculated effort to prevent any satisfactory but peaceful solution after the assassination.

You will find none. - Nevertheless, the 'Protection Belt' (AKA border strip) was kind of accepted official German policy opposite Poland. If a Polish state was created, this belt along the German-Polish border was to be subtracted from Polish territory, the population to be resettled in Poland, and the belt to be newly settled by Germans.
Intention was to insulate the Prussian Poles from the 'wild' Poles in Poland.

Obviously, this never was translated into reality. In 1916, the Central Powers created the Polish Kingdom, and no 'Protection Belt' was activated.

And one wonders where these German settlers should have come from. - But until the final days of the war, this idea was revived again and again.

And today it's a darling argument of our dear friend the jingo-Poles, 'proving' how really bad the Kaiserreich already was.

The primary purpose of the Border Strip means that the idea would have been carried out even in the absence of German settlers to replace the expelled Poles.
 
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The primary purpose of the Border Strip means that the idea would have been carried out even in the absence of German settlers to replace the expelled Poles.

Nay, it was just a 'good' idea (in the mind of many contemporary Germans), but nobody had a clue how to carry it out. - Otherwise, it would have been done in 1916/17. - This inability to execute a necessary ethnic cleansing is a nice indicator on how 'backward' the Kaiserreich still was. The political elites still were thinking in 19th century categories - and hadn't yet arrived in the age of 20th century totalitarism, except perhaps Ludendorff...
But even Ludendorff, at the peak of his influence in 1917/18, wasn't able to implement the 'Protection Belt'.
 
"Mass becomes immobile: it cannot maneuver, and therefore cannot win victories, it can only crush by sheer weight...A conscript mass, whose training has been brief and superficial, is 'cannon fodder' in the worst sense of the word, if pitted against a small number of practiced technicians on the other side." - Hans von Seeckt (from The Germany Army 1933-1945 by Mathew Cooper)

This has applied since at least Cannae.
 
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If that simplistic idea were true the Chinese would have won both Opium Wars and the Russians would have been in Berlin by January 1915.

:rolleyes: There must be some level of quality but it doesn't have to be equal. 5 million x .005 capability is still negligible, while 5 million x .5 capability is not.
 
:rolleyes: There must be some level of quality but it doesn't have to be equal. 5 million x .005 capability is still negligible, while 5 million x .5 capability is not.

Incorrect. A society with more troops can and does lose to armies with smaller ones. If quantity were all it took, the Soviet-Finnish War would have been the Two Weeks' War and the USSR would have found it's best to be careful what you wish for. Quantity on its own is as much a handicap as anything else. The key point is to use it effectively, which is what the the winners in wars do.

Russia's steamroller never worked in WWI. When given the mobility to use overwhelming force as opposed to wasting its manpower running to stay in the same place that turned WWII into the crowning moment of awesome for the Soviet Union. There is no army which has ever relied on sheer manpower that ends up actually winning. To illustrate the point, the Battle of Fredericksburg is dependence on quantity's quality. The Overland Campaign is effective use of quantity's quality. See the difference?
 
Incorrect. A society with more troops can and does lose to armies with smaller ones. If quantity were all it took, the Soviet-Finnish War would have been the Two Weeks' War and the USSR would have found it's best to be careful what you wish for. Quantity on its own is as much a handicap as anything else. The key point is to use it effectively, which is what the the winners in wars do.

It wasn't the Two Weeks War because the Finnish army was substantially better in quality, but the Soviets did eventually win that war, and they won it because they had vastly more men and resources to apply. To argue otherwise is to argue against reality.
 
It wasn't the Two Weeks War because the Finnish army was substantially better in quality, but the Soviets did eventually win that war, and they won it because they had vastly more men and resources to apply. To argue otherwise is to argue against reality.

Actually it was the Two-Months' war because the original Soviet general charged with it, Voroshilov, was an incompetent barely able to count to 21 without dropping his pants. The moment the very competent Timoshenko took over Finland collapsed like a house of cards. Finnish *leadership* was better in quality but the Soviet improvement that happened so rapidly was simply the result of competent leadership.

If Douglas MacArthur were held the ideal of US generalship you could also attribute US victories in the Pacific War to spamming Japan with ships and production, not to having the better strategy and use of those resources.
 
I disagree that the German Army, in the end, was better than the British Army. I'd say that by the time of the 100 Days in 1918, the British Army was the best in the world.
 
It wasn't the Two Weeks War because the Finnish army was substantially better in quality, but the Soviets did eventually win that war, and they won it because they had vastly more men and resources to apply. To argue otherwise is to argue against reality.

Suggest you take a look at the quote by von Seeckt I posted.

Raw and useless men in numbers merely provide a target rich environment.
 
By todays european standards, all 1914 nations were ridicously militaristic and nationalist.

Can't say if Germany was less militaristic than the others but it was less militarised than people think today and less militarised than France was.
(If you compare the numbers of soldiers per population, policemen per population, defense spending as part of total spending and the regularity with which the military was used to crush strikes & demonstrations).

I think it is impossible to say which army was "best" as they operated under different "constraints". The Americans lacked experience, the Germans and Russians lacked food and equipment, the British had both.
 
Nay, it was just a 'good' idea (in the mind of many contemporary Germans), but nobody had a clue how to carry it out. - Otherwise, it would have been done in 1916/17. - This inability to execute a necessary ethnic cleansing is a nice indicator on how 'backward' the Kaiserreich still was. The political elites still were thinking in 19th century categories - and hadn't yet arrived in the age of 20th century totalitarism, except perhaps Ludendorff...
But even Ludendorff, at the peak of his influence in 1917/18, wasn't able to implement the 'Protection Belt'.

All that says is the 2nd Reich, unlike the 3rd, wasn't foolish enough to divert resources from its war effort to ethnic cleansing. It's not like expelling people is some sort of art or science, just look at what the Ottomans were doing in remote eastern Anatolia at the same time with minimal expense.
 
By todays european standards, all 1914 nations were ridicously militaristic and nationalist.

Can't say if Germany was less militaristic than the others but it was less militarised than people think today and less militarised than France was.
(If you compare the numbers of soldiers per population, policemen per population, defense spending as part of total spending and the regularity with which the military was used to crush strikes & demonstrations).

I think it is impossible to say which army was "best" as they operated under different "constraints". The Americans lacked experience, the Germans and Russians lacked food and equipment, the British had both.

Of course Germany also had a much bigger population and economy than France did so it didn't need to be as militarized as France was to keep itself secure.
 
All that says is the 2nd Reich, unlike the 3rd, wasn't foolish enough to divert resources from its war effort to ethnic cleansing. It's not like expelling people is some sort of art or science, just look at what the Ottomans were doing in remote eastern Anatolia at the same time with minimal expense.

If the Ottomans were able to perform ethnic cleansing during the war with minimal expenses, then shouldn't the Germans have easily been able to do the same? Especially after they made peace with Russia in '17?

- Kelenas
 
If the Ottomans were able to perform ethnic cleansing during the war with minimal expenses, then shouldn't the Germans have easily been able to do the same? Especially after they made peace with Russia in '17?

- Kelenas

Didn't they end up losing the war? To the point that if Sevres had gone in it would have virtually exterminated the majority of Turks in Turkey?
 
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