Views of the Battle of Manzikert

[trajen777]

. If you read some of the early historians you get the “complete destruction of the Byzantine Army”. Newer interpretations attest to minimal losses. Losses were focused on the right flank and some of the center, while the left flank and the reserve withdrew with no losses. In addition many reports have the southern covering forces never involved in the fight and a significant force sent to forage into Georgia

The most plausible event seems to be: (And remember Romanus had defeated the Turks twice before over 3 years)

• Romanus advanced to Manzikert for a base to attack the Turks in Persia with lets say 60,000 men. He did not realize that the Turkish army was in Syria not Persia. He needed a victory to keep his crown
• He captures manzikert and sends forces South to cover his flank and capture another town (lets say 12,000 (most reports) these forces after learning of the Turk advance with draw West, not in support of Romanus, without telling Romanus of the Turkish advance.
• Romanus sends 17,000 ( Treadgood) into Georgia to find supplies
• The Turks appear
• He fights an all day battle in good order but the light Turk Calvary cannot be pinned down. The Turks inflict few causalities because of the long range fighting. Foot bowman (majority of Byzantine Infantry) shooting from a stable platform should keep the Turkish light cavalry at great distance.
• When Romanus reverses direction at days end there is confusion in the ranks.
• The reserve which was stationed to crush any forces which encircle the first line does not support Romanus but withdraws with the flank forces.
• The right flank had received some damage from the fighting – the Left was basically untouched. A portion of the center is encircled.

So you have 60,000 – 24,000 detached troops = 36,000. Figure 2,000 flanking support troops and 5,000 camp troops leaves 29,000 troops left. Suppose the first and 2nd line are equal in strength so 14,500 per line and each of the two lines have three parts so 4,800 each. So the rear and left flank withdraw + camp with virtually no causalities = 9,600 left and lets be aggressive and suppose the Right flank gets hit with 20% losses (very high for this stage of warfare). So casualties would be for the Right flank 4,800 *20% = 960 + lets assume 80% of center killed or captured: 4,800 *.8 =3,840 and lets assume ½ of these were captures and released with Romanus or 1,920.

So we end up with 960 from the Right and 1,920 from the Center killed = 2,880 in total. Even if you said the entire center (4,800 + ½ right 2.400) and ½ of the right were killed you still have 7,000 killed out of 60,000 in the fight.

The real disaster was the revolution after.

This is how I see the Battle. Any other views ?

Thanks

 

[regiggii]

Seems plausible.

They never can seem to agree on the numbers here-Durant quoted 100,000 Byzantines(!!) vs only 15,000 Seljuks(yeah right-w/ one camel tied behind our backs...), I think Colin McEvedy tossed around a figure like 40,000 vs. 30,000 or less, Treagood is right around the 25,000 or so for each number. Again, no one really knows.

Just how good a leader was Romanus, anyways? He did have a decent record up until this debacle.

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

Diogenes had not won any real battles against the Seljuks, just checked some raiding forces. Manzikert would have been the first real test, and as it turned out, the army was not quite ready.

The destruction of the army was total. While not that many were killed in the actual battle, a large number apparently died in the resulting pursuit, and units just disappeared.

The catastrophe of Manzikert was the dispersion of the Tagmata, military units that could trace themselves continuously for 1,000 years - positions in them were often passed from father to son, and after Manzikert, the cadres to train new recruits no longer existed. This plus the rapid loss of the Anatolian recruiting grounds radically diminished the quality and size of the Byzantine army.

Diogenes was a decent general, not a great one, and was apparently prone to depression and was not a very pleasant man.

Arp Arslan did not want to fight, had no interest in conquering Anatolia, and expected to lose the battle. If the army had been a bit more trained and experienced, he most likely would have, which might have bought Diogenes time to repair the empire's defenses.

Of course then you'd have about 200 years until the Mongols showed up. That would be the last major hurdle, and if they made that one there's no reason to believe they wouldn't still be around today.

 

[regiggii]

Good points.

But you never know--Europe had plenty of potential threats-Hapsburgs, Anjou, guys like Stephen Dushan, Hungary, etc. etc. Of course it would have been pretty cool to have some sorta Byzantine state around here today---the 200 years of Ghengis to Tamerlane esp would not have been easily avoided.