Vietnam, a unwinnable war?

[TDM]

Your correct, we fought the war on the enemies terms, we should have fought it on our terms. Land reform, anti corruption, along with civil defense programs were the key to pacifying the countryside. by 1973 the VC were effectively gone, the South was conquered by the NVA. By then it was too late, the U.S. Congress had cut off aid to the South, and left them to their fate. The Left in America had determined the Vietnam War was a morality play, with the U.S. as the bad guys, so the South had to lose.

The thing is the first and third sentences are related, the war was unpopular partly because of the way we choose to fight it. The stabbed in the back by the left really is a cliché at this point. The reality was we'd been there for considerably longer than we fought either Korea or WW2 for, it didn't look like we would win. More importantly our tactics weren't even looking likely to lead to a win and our reason for being there was increasingly seen as weak compared to their reason to fight us. And the "because communism in SEA" was less and less accepted as a blanket justification at home for increasing death tolls on either side.

Also we fought the war on the enemies terms suggests that they forced our hand in how we chose to fight . By that's not really true, were weren't prisoners forced to fight how we did. Yes they did their best to create a situation that didn't conform to how we would have preferred to fight but well everyone does that, but out choices were our own. and frankly we made some shit ones.

Also on the VC being effectively gone is also not really true simply because the VC were pretty much able to re-constitute themselves after suffering losses (and frankly the difference between VC and NVA was often just a uniform anyway). I.e. the VC weren't needed by the north as much to beat the south after we withdrew, although they were there.

 

[TDM]

That's the whole point. When the U.S. first intervened with ground troops in 1965, they should've pushed up the A Sau Valley, and then into Laos, to cut the HCM Trail. Military leaders wanted to do just that, but the theoretical neutrality of Laos prevented them from doing it. The U.S. fought hard to hold onto that area during the war, in the hope they could use it as the jumping off point for that war winning offensive. If they had done that the insurgency in the South would've dried up in 1966. That's what the NVA feared the most, so they deployed their strongest forces there. In 1971 when the ARVN pushed into Laos during Operation Lam Son 719 the NVA used everything they had to stop them, because they realized that was their strategic point of vulnerability. They understood if the HCM Trail was cut the war would be lost.

Problem with that is it escalates the war, and frankly while there might be short term benefits there will be long term repercussions. You can't separate the tactics and strategy on the ground from the global politics (if for no other reason we're there because of global politics)

Hell a war winning offensive suggests an invasion of North Vietnam that was never on the cards because again it would have escalated the conflict beyond the bounds we had ourselves set.

Now you can argue that means we artificially increased the difficulty of the task we set ourselves and yes I'd agree. But it was the reality of the situation and we knew it going in and it didn't change. We were always going to have to win this war in South Vietnam.

 

[Belisarius II]

The thing is the first and third sentences are related, the war was unpopular partly because of the way we choose to fight it. The stabbed in the back by the left really is a cliché at this point. The reality was we'd been there considerably for longer than we fought either Korea or WW2 for, it didn't look like we would win, more importantly out tactics weren't even looking likely to lead to a win and our reason for being there was increasingly seen as weak compared to their reason to fight us. And the "because communism in SEA" was less and less accepted as a blanket justification for increasing death tolls on either side.

Also we fought the war on the enemies terms suggests that they forced our hand in how we chose to fight . By that's not really true, were weren't prisoners forced to fight how we did. Yes they did there best to create a situation that didn't conform to how we would have preferred to fight but well everyone does that, but out choices were our own. and frankly we made some shit ones.

Also on the VC being effectively gone is also not really true simply because the VC were pretty much able to re-constitute themselves (and frankly the difference between VC and NVA was often just a uniform anyway). I.e. the VC were needed by the north to beat the south after we withdrew.

Yes the war became increasingly unpopular in the U.S.. There is a shelf life for any American War, which is why I said they should've cut the HCM Trail in 1965, not 1968 when an escalation wasn't political viable. By the time Nixon came into office withdrawal was the only practical option. Saying the Left cut off aid to South Vietnam isn't a stabbed in the back theory, it's a simple statement of fact. In 1975 the ARVN ran out of ammo, spare parts, fuel & lubricants. Most of the air force was grounded for lack of spare parts. They were defeated by an onrush of T-34's rolling into Saigon.

Many of those who opposed the war thought what happened in 1975 was a just, and moral end to U.S. involvement. Many took pleasure at the humiliation of the United States, and thought nothing of the suffering that lay ahead for the People of South Vietnam, what mattered was that they were proven right, that intervention had failed. What Happened in Cambodia was a side drama, that they blamed on the U.S. for bombing Communist Base Camps in the boarder areas during the Nixon Administration. Somehow Nixon was responsible for what Pol Pot did. So yes many on the Left viewed the Vietnam War as a morality play, rather then a struggle for the future of a nation.

 

[GauchoBadger]

Again look at your map. The DMZ along the 17th Parallel, start there, and drive west into Laos, until you reach the Thai border. Form a line along defensible terrain, and that blocks the North Vietnamese from reaching the South, or Cambodia. Your right holding South Vietnam's 800 mile borders with Laos, and Cambodia is impossible, and raiding into the border areas is futile, but creating a 150-175 mile defensible line is a long term solution. As for destabilizing Laos, and Cambodia they had already been invaded by the North, keeping them from falling to Communist forces would've been far better for them then what happened to them in the OTL. Nothing could have been worse then the Killing Fields of Cambodia, the Communists almost destroyed the Khmer People, and culture.

We have to take into account the nature of guerrilla war in these circumstances. The US and ARVN prepared themselves for a conventional war, expecting the VC to eventually concentrate their forces for a decisive battle as was the experience from Korea. That did happen unexpectedly in the Tet Offensive, but the VC were able to regroup and recover, and besides that, the rebels very rarely took the bait:
Rural guerrilla warfare strategy relies on small groups of fighters dispersing around the countryside and the population, staying under the radar for most of the time, recruiting new members and gathering intel. When the enemy would send patrol parties, the rebels would quickly descend upon the weakest groups, ambushing and overwhelming them with local superiority and then proceeding to capture their weapons and equipment. Overall, the process would continue piecemeal, snowballing into larger and better equipped guerrilla groups capable of fighting more enemy parties (though not being too cumbersome) and even using various means to seize the strategic hamlets that were set up to isolate the peasantry, given the valuable military treasure that was safeguarded in them. Guerrilla fighters would not attempt to hold territory for extended periods of time, instead preferring to stay fluid and nomadic as their opponent stretched their resources thin trying to occupy as much land and infrastructure as they could.
Having the US and ARVN set up a defensive perimeter on the western frontier with Cambodia and Laos could technically have concentrated forces where they were needed, but to be fair, America and SV were in a catch-22 with regards to fighting the guerrilla war. That disposition would come with its own disadvantages, namely that the VC would be able to build and maintain the Ho Chih Minh and Sihanouk trails unimpeded, and also that it's quite a lot more frontier to police than, say, the Korean DMZ. The terrain is uneven, which would make building fortifications difficult, and at the south, the SV-Cambodia frontier is cut through by the Mekong river system.

 

[Belisarius II]

Problem with that is it escalates the war, and frankly while there might be short term benefits there will be long term repercussions. You can't separate the tactics and strategy on the ground from the global politics (if for no other reason we're there because of global politics)

Hell a war winning offensive suggests an invasion of North Vietnam that was never on the cards because again it would have escalated the conflict beyond the bounds we had ourselves set.

Now you can argue that means we artificially increased the difficulty of the task we set ourselves and yes I'd agree. But it was the reality of the situation and we knew it going in and it didn't change. We were always going to have to win this war in South Vietnam.

Agreed we set the stage for our own defeat. The U.S. Military is trained to fight decisive battles, not indefinite wars of attrition. We have tapes of LBJ talking to McNamara in 1965 saying the war was militarily unwinnable. If they thought that in 1965 why the hell did they go in to begin with? By spreading our forces out trying to defend a border 850 miles long, we let the enemy set the scale, and timing of the battles. We were on the strategic defense simply trying to counter their blows, and getting bogged down in the counter insurgency fight. With the enemy able to endlessly reinforce themselves in the South at some point the U.S. would get tired, and go home.

 

[Workable Goblin]

Having the US and ARVN set up a defensive perimeter on the western frontier with Cambodia and Laos could technically have concentrated forces where they were needed, but to be fair, America and SV were in a catch-22 with regards to fighting the guerrilla war. That disposition would come with its own disadvantages, namely that the VC would be able to build and maintain the Ho Chih Minh and Sihanouk trails unimpeded, and also that it's quite a lot more frontier to police than, say, the Korean DMZ. The terrain is uneven, which would make building fortifications difficult, and at the south, the SV-Cambodia frontier is cut through by the Mekong river system.

Belisarius II is specifically saying that the United States and ARVN should not set up a defensive perimeter on the western frontier and should not fight a guerrilla war (or at least not the way they were fighting it) but should invade Laos to extend the DMZ across the Laotian panhandle to the Thai border. This would greatly reduce the amount of frontier involved, although the ruggedness of the terrain would still be an issue (but not the Mekong, since that flows farther south), and it would specifically allow U.S. forces to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I'm not sure that it would work, mind you--it would still do nothing about the Cambodian route since that could be reached by sea--but their proposal is different than the one you're critiquing.

 

[GauchoBadger]

Belisarius II is specifically saying that the United States and ARVN should not set up a defensive perimeter on the western frontier and should not fight a guerrilla war (or at least not the way they were fighting it) but should invade Laos to extend the DMZ across the Laotian panhandle to the Thai border. This would greatly reduce the amount of frontier involved, although the ruggedness of the terrain would still be an issue (but not the Mekong, since that flows farther south), and it would specifically allow U.S. forces to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I'm not sure that it would work, mind you--it would still do nothing about the Cambodian route since that could be reached by sea--but their proposal is different than the one you're critiquing.

Wait, wasn't that just what the US tried to do IOTL?

 

[TDM]

Yes the war became increasingly unpopular in the U.S.. There is a shelf life for any American War, which is why I said they should've cut the HCM Trail in 1965, not 1968 when an escalation wasn't political viable.

Such an escalation wasn't politically viable from the very beginning, remember we have to ramp up our OTL presence in South Vietnam in 1965 as is

By the time Nixon came into office withdrawal was the only practical option. Saying the Left cut off aid to South Vietnam isn't a stabbed in the back theory, it's a simple statement of fact. In 1975 the ARVN ran out of ammo, spare parts, fuel & lubricants. Most of the air force was grounded for lack of spare parts. They were defeated by an onrush of T-34's rolling into Saigon.

Right but you were inferring the left had made this a morality play earlier than that

Many of those who opposed the war thought what happened in 1975 was a just, and moral end to U.S. involvement. Many took pleasure at the humiliation of the United States, and thought nothing of the suffering that lay ahead for the People of South Vietnam, what mattered was that they were proven right, that intervention had failed.

I agree some did indeed relish it in that way. But that's not relevent to any of the points I was making. You will always get "bad winners', but frankly it's not like we didn't get a lot of "bad losers" making their own spurious ideologically driven excuses here as well.

What Happened in Cambodia was a side drama, that they blamed on the U.S. for bombing Communist Base Camps in the boarder areas during the Nixon Administration. Somehow Nixon was responsible for what Pol Pot did. So yes many on the Left viewed the Vietnam War as a morality play, rather then a struggle for the future of a nation.

I don't know what you saying here, sorry?

It may have been a side drama as far as your concerned for you point but it was very much a thing that happened and escalation was always the worry. They blamed us for bombing the bases because we bombed the bases. I don't get your point about Pol Pot being Nixon's fault, it's rather more complicated than that. However if you point is that's what some left leaning people liked to claim and losing in Vietnam was karma for that then well OK but so what, people claim all sorts of things all the time. We're talking about the reality of the situation.

On that last bit you complain about the left using this as a morality play with their values as the hero, but frankly you could say the same about the west's existential war against the threat of communism in SE Asia (and south America)

All in all you seem to be swapping between talking about what actually happened and countering what you've seen some self identifying lefty say that annoyed you. There not really the same things.

 

[Workable Goblin]

Wait, wasn't that just what the US tried to do IOTL?

No, there were a lot of attempts to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail with techo-gadgetry, but no ground forces in Laos. Officially, Laos was "neutral," so the U.S. presence was more like the pre-'64 status quo in Vietnam, i.e. advisors, special forces, and aircraft. Not regular Army or Marines.

 

[TDM]

Agreed we set the stage for our own defeat. The U.S. Military is trained to fight decisive battles, not indefinite wars of attrition. We have tapes of LBJ talking to McNamara in 1965 saying the war was militarily unwinnable. If they thought that in 1965 why the hell did they go in to begin with?

Because 1965 was already a different situation from what they were going for when they first went in. But they quickly fell victim to the sunk cost fallacy. Of course in this case the sunk cost wasn't just resources and lives, but ideology and international prestige. But equally it's not that simple either sometimes things don't go your way exactly as you'd like and you do persevere at a cost.

By spreading our forces out trying to defend a border 850 miles long, we let the enemy set the scale, and timing of the battles. We were on the strategic defense simply trying to counter their blows, and getting bogged down in the counter insurgency fight. With the enemy able to endlessly reinforce themselves in the South at some point the U.S. would get tired, and go home.

I absolutely agree. But the alternative (general invasion into Laos and N.Vietnam), might in theory solve that issue but it will create other ones*. That's my point. My point is also the US knew this from the very beginning so it was never going to happen. So we can sit here and say oh well if they'd done 'A' it would have solved a problem, all we like, but if they were never going to do 'A' for other reasons it's moot as a realistic option.

Untimely the US were not looking to get into conquering SEAsia for capitalism situation


*that is now war on two countries and giving promoting a more unified response, it will escalate things in Cambodia, you likely bring Thailand in in some fashion since they're now the anchor point for you new lines. China is very much going to react to a massive escalation into what they see as their general sphere, and people around the world will point to "American neo colonialism" and you know what it will very much look like that no matter what the rationale is. US deployment will have increase to cover all that. You've basically turned a 'oh it's not a war war we're just helping out ally with a internal policing/security action' into a general regional war. No one likes general regional wars, certainly not during the cold war, when proxy wars are supposed to be safe way to slowly manage a global confrontation without it spilling over. (One of thd lessons of Korea was that it's really hard to keep a war contained when there are interested parties)

 

[GauchoBadger]

No, there were a lot of attempts to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail with techo-gadgetry, but no ground forces in Laos. Officially, Laos was "neutral," so the U.S. presence was more like the pre-'64 status quo in Vietnam, i.e. advisors, special forces, and aircraft. Not regular Army or Marines.

I see. Skimming through some articles going around, it looks like the US refused to commit its own troops to attack the HCT out of fear that Laos' remaining neutrality would be broken, as even the pro-western regime was suspicious of them. Laos flipping decisively to the reds would have made it hard for the US and ARVN to have held the trail for long, it seems?

 

[Belisarius II]

We have to take into account the nature of guerrilla war in these circumstances. The US and ARVN prepared themselves for a conventional war, expecting the VC to eventually concentrate their forces for a decisive battle as was the experience from Korea. That did happen unexpectedly in the Tet Offensive, but the VC were able to regroup and recover, and besides that, the rebels very rarely took the bait:
Rural guerrilla warfare strategy relies on small groups of fighters dispersing around the countryside and the population, staying under the radar for most of the time, recruiting new members and gathering intel. When the enemy would send patrol parties, the rebels would quickly descend upon the weakest groups, ambushing and overwhelming them with local superiority and then proceeding to capture their weapons and equipment. Overall, the process would continue piecemeal, snowballing into larger and better equipped guerrilla groups capable of fighting more enemy parties (though not being too cumbersome) and even using various means to seize the strategic hamlets that were set up to isolate the peasantry, given the valuable military treasure that was safeguarded in them. Guerrilla fighters would not attempt to hold territory for extended periods of time, instead preferring to stay fluid and nomadic as their opponent stretched their resources thin trying to occupy as much land and infrastructure as they could.
Having the US and ARVN set up a defensive perimeter on the western frontier with Cambodia and Laos could technically have concentrated forces where they were needed, but to be fair, America and SV were in a catch-22 with regards to fighting the guerrilla war. That disposition would come with its own disadvantages, namely that the VC would be able to build and maintain the Ho Chih Minh and Sihanouk trails unimpeded, and also that it's quite a lot more frontier to police than, say, the Korean DMZ. The terrain is uneven, which would make building fortifications difficult, and at the south, the SV-Cambodia frontier is cut through by the Mekong river system.

Again your giving a good account of the Communist strategy for the guerrilla war. What your not taking into account is the flow of men, and material into the South along the HCM Trail. Without those supplies, and reinforcements the insurgency is small potato's. Cutting the Trail in Laos, ends the need to fight along the whole South Vietnamese Boarder. All you have are indigenous VC, and the ARVN could handle them with little trouble. Fighting regimental sized battles with the VC was a big undertaking. Many tens of thousands of the men who fought the guerrilla war came down the trail from the North, as did most of their supplies. The kind of peoples war your talking about never happened. Tet was supposed to set off a national rising, it never happened, because most of the country was hostile, or indifferent.

 

[Belisarius II]

Belisarius II is specifically saying that the United States and ARVN should not set up a defensive perimeter on the western frontier and should not fight a guerrilla war (or at least not the way they were fighting it) but should invade Laos to extend the DMZ across the Laotian panhandle to the Thai border. This would greatly reduce the amount of frontier involved, although the ruggedness of the terrain would still be an issue (but not the Mekong, since that flows farther south), and it would specifically allow U.S. forces to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I'm not sure that it would work, mind you--it would still do nothing about the Cambodian route since that could be reached by sea--but their proposal is different than the one you're critiquing.

Thanks for clarifying my point for me. Yes the Cambodian supply route is a problem. In a lengthier post on another thread I talked about the USN taking more active measures to prevent arms shipments by sea. Imposing cargo inspections was something well within the means of the USN, Coast Guard, and ARVN Navy. If Cambodia wanted U.S. Aid they'd have to submit to inspection requirements.

 

[TDM]

Thanks for clarifying my point for me. Yes the Cambodian supply route is a problem. In a lengthier post on another thread I talked about the USN taking more active measures to prevent arms shipments by sea. Imposing cargo inspections was something well within the means of the USN, Coast Guard, and ARVN Navy. If Cambodia wanted U.S. Aid they'd have to submit to inspection requirements.

This is good example of the law of unintended consequences. Because why its certainly physically possible for the US to do that, you basically talking about boarding international ships (possible in international waters) and threating Cambodia a county you are ostensibly trying to support in ist own post colonial civil war . It's false threat anyway the US wants to supply Cambodia with aid so it can keep Cambodia on it's side of the line.

 

[marathag]

think the fact that the North Vietnamese adopted economic reforms within ten years of winning the war shows that while being communists they could be pragmatic

After the old leadership had retired.
There would be little reform from the original gang being in charge, say had they taken all of Vietnam in 1954.
There would have been country wide 'land reform' with all the ethnic cleansing and 're-education' for those that didn't flee the country.

 

[marathag]

Ok I'm off the soapbox. I suggested that the way to win the war was to look at a map, and cut the HCM Trial, with ground troops.

Extend the DMZ across Laos, than pretend that Laos had any control of their territory.

 

[marathag]

frankly the difference between VC and NVA was often just a uniform anyway). I

Except where were they born? The Southern Cadres were near eliminated by 1971, from both Tet and then Phoenix.
Numbers then made up by Northerners.

 

[BiteNibbleChomp]

Honestly doubting that this 'invade Laos and build a Maginot Line' idea would work, because it really ignores the fundamental problem (as it was from the US side) about Vietnam: the people in NV had a cause and believed in it - theirs was a war of national liberation, the communist government had policies that a sufficient section of the population believed in. SV on the other hand, did not - apart from a vague "we're better than the communists" line, SV never really stood for anything. A lot of the population, not knowing what horrors the communists would inflict, were apathetic (or worse) about the government, corruption was worse than rampant, and indeed the actions of a lot of the elite give across a vibe of "how much can we squeeze out of Uncle Sam" much more than they do "let's actually make even a token effort to care about this country". NV saw the fight as one of vital national interest, and was prepared to fight for as long as it took to achieve that (30 years is enough proof, right?). SV did not. Just based on that, NV is going to win out eventually.

'Eventually' is the key word - the Laos Maginot Line can be set up, sure, but then what? The NVA is going to be poking and prodding all along the line constantly to look for a weak spot, so the entire line will need to be heavily fortified. Which means a lot of US troops (ARVN won't cut it long term... look at the 1972 battles). Eventually you'll run into the problem of 'we have half a million American boys in that godforsaken place accomplishing nothing but getting killed' and calls will come out for the troops to be brought home. The moment that happens, the NVA fills the void. All those supplies you supposedly blocked by cutting the HCM trail? Yeah those were instead waiting in warehouses in Hanoi and jungle camps not far from the Laos Maginot Line being stockpiled for this moment. Apart from those that were lost when you initially cut the HCM trail, you've done nothing to stop them coming in.

Only ways around the problem are the following:
- Escalate the war somehow to the point that NV ceases to be a possible threat - whether this be nuclear strikes, a ground invasion, or possibly a Linebacker-type air offensive in the early 60s (I emphasise possibly here). Of course, any such action is going to have consequences elsewhere, almost all of them worse than a defeat in Vietnam.
Or - Somehow make the people of SV care about SV as a distinct country. With the right leaders, the right reforms, it is possible with a POD in the 1950s (South Korea eventually formed a distinct identity that people thought was worth fighting for...). Unfortunately both were lacking, and while Vietnamisation tried to do this it was far, far too late. After 1963, it's not going to happen.

Strongly recommend Max Hasting's Vietnam to anyone who hasn't read it.

- BNC

 

[marathag]

I see. Skimming through some articles going around, it looks like the US refused to commit its own troops to attack the HCT out of fear that Laos' remaining neutrality would be broken, as even the pro-western regime was suspicious of them. Laos flipping decisively to the reds would have made it hard for the US and ARVN to have held the trail for long, it seems?

Laotians could not have kept out the PAVN, even had they the desire to try.
Their Neutrality was a sad joke.

 

[marathag]

SV never really stood for anything. A lot of the population, not knowing what horrors the communists would inflict, were apathetic

Until Tet.
The mass graves at Hue got their attention. After that point, ARVN recruitment went up, as did with the RF/PF Militia.
But even before that, there were plenty of Refugees from the North, who knew exactly what Ho had innthe works.