Victory over Britain: An alternate World War 2

As mentioned, there are two issues here: 1. searching for the preferred numbers and 2. working them, i.e. coming forth with preferred interpretations.

As to 1., Bungay of course uses multiple sources, not one, and we know all too well that attributing the downing of one aircraft to one specific source is in many cases not an exact science; there can be multiple claims, there can be fog of war, there are wrecks that lie at the bottom of the Channel and won't show what downed them. In this particular instance, when it comes to choosing between 8, the figure of British fighters downed by Bf 110s which is stated by the latest and most comprehensively researched book, and 6, which is stated by a previous source, you choose 6.

As to 2., let's see:
2.1 One Bf 110 was an unarmed recon aircraft. So what? There are two possibilities. The first is that it was bounced: decisively damaged, if not utterly destroyed, before the pilot even saw who was firing at him. That happened, often, and to both sides. A Bf 110 should have been less prone to this thanks to the second pair of eyes, but it happened to them, too. And - if this is what happened, then an armed Bf 110 would have fared no better.
The second alternative is that the pilot saw the enemy coming, but was unable to flee. Now, of course the British would have engaged this loner with at least a couple of fighters, if not a flight. So what do you think an armed Bf 110 would have done? Turned and tried to face its opponents? No, it would have fled - or tried to. So, again, no difference.
2.2 Two Bf 110s collided into each other "in operations". Daintily worded. So what is it, did they collide while desperately trying to evade enemy fire? This is something that happened to all models of fighters, but I wouldn't be surprised if it happened more often to Bf 110s, what with their poor maneuverability and their usual tactics of sticking close together. If so, I'd say the enemy had a hand in their demise. Or did they collide while peacefully travelling over the Channel? If, so unless they were already damaged by the enemy (in which case, again, the enemy had a hand in their demise), then at least this tells us something about the quality of the Bf 110 pilots, and/or machines.
2.3 Several of the Bf 110s were used for ground attack. And? What's the point? Several of the Hurricanes downed at this time were being used for shooting at bombers, not to engage enemy fighters. Yet you do count them, don't you?
2.4 Some of the Bf 110s were downed by AA fire or over Germany. Again, so what?

The final point bears on the comprehension one has of the overall issue. Nobody is interested in comparing fighter-vs-fighter performance; it's the sort of useless never-ending discussion about "who had the best tank?", etc.
The issue is the overall campaign and its objectives. It was Germany against Britain, not the German fighter arm against Fighter Command. The Germans had bombers and used them, the British had bombers and used them; just like the use of bombers by Germany had effects on the British fighter force, because the British had to counter the enemy bombers, so the use of bombers by Britain had effects on the German fighter force. Indeed, NJG 1 was born exactly that month, subtracting aircraft from the main German effort, because the British also had Bomber Command and preferred, after trial and error (and slaughter) to use it at night.
But even if we choose to leave aside the night operations over Germany and occupied countries, the core issue is that the Luftwaffe was in campaign at this time, out to erode the British fighter force. Make no mistake, the small merchantmen in the Channel were attacked only because the British would have to send fighters out to defend them, and because Hitler had not yet allowed air attacks directly on British soil.
So the success of the German effort has to be measured in terms of British fighters downed.
And if we want to measure, within the German effort, the success of an individual model of aircraft, the Bf 110, we have to look at how many British fighters the Bf 110s downed (that's 6).
On the other hand, if we want to make a cost/effect assessment, we have to look at the price the Germans were paying for that effort. Overall, they were faring well, nobody denies that, and the proof is that the British discontinued cargo convoys across the Dover Straits in daylight.
But if we want to assess the cost one specific German fighter, the Bf 110, was paying, then that cost has to be factored in terms of Bf 110s lost. Note nobody claimed that the figure of 27 represented Bf 110s downed solely by British fighters: I defined it as Bf 110s that were "lost". That's the price this model of aircraft was paying, having to show for it - 6 enemy fighters it downed.

Bottom line: use the figure of 8 British fighters if you wish. Remove the 3 Bf 110s downed over Germany if you wish. The remainder is not just German but also ...germane, and 24:8 still is 3:1, still pretty bad.

And, I'll stress once again, this is the time in which the Germans were faring well. Later on, the Bf 110s would easily go down in numbers, and got to get used less and less - with good reason.
 
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As mentioned, there are two issues here: 1. searching for the preferred numbers and 2. working them, i.e. coming forth with preferred interpretations.

Yes you’re right it does come down to interpretation…

Your figures – Bf110s lost is 27, RAF fighters lost is 6: Ratio of 4.5 to 1

Bungay’s figures – Bf110s lost is 22, RAF fighters lost is 6: Ratio of 3.7 to 1 (rounded up to 4 to 1 in the book, P. 201)

My figures (revised after further research) – Bf110s lost is 20, RAF fighters lost is 8: Ratio of 2.5 to 1.

I’ve attached my notes for scrutiny so that you can see how I got to those figures.

As to 1

Bungay of course uses multiple sources, not one, and we know all too well that attributing the downing of one aircraft to one specific source is in many cases not an exact science; there can be multiple claims, there can be fog of war, there are wrecks that lie at the bottom of the Channel and won't show what downed them. In this particular instance, when it comes to choosing between 8, the figure of British fighters downed by Bf 110s which is stated by the latest and most comprehensively researched book, and 6, which is stated by a previous source, you choose 6.

I think you’ve hit on one of the problems here, mainly that your mind is closed to new information regarding the Battle of Britain. The Most Dangerous Enemy is a well researched book but relies mostly on previously published books rather than going back to contemporary sources. The big change in Bungay’s writing is that he then draws, sometimes controversial, conclusions that run contrary to previous authors.

Since its publication some 17 years ago there have been all manner of books brought out some are good some not so good. To mention a couple of the better ones is James Hollands book which covers the Battle of France and Britain giving a better context to the events of 1940 as a whole and one by Patrick Bishop that gives a more detailed account of the events without drawing his own conclusions. Both are excellently researched and written and both are newer than Bungay’s book. In recent years Red Kite have brought out two incredible series of books, the Luftwaffe Crash archive and The Battle of Britain Combat Archive; if you have more than a passing interest in the Battle of Britain or the air war over Britain these should be a must read, they are excellent and full of very useful information. As well as these there are books listing Fighter Command claims, Fighter Command losses and Coastal Command losses all published after The Most Dangerous Enemy. There is even now a full list of Luftwaffe combat claims online for anyone to view, though it is in a very raw form and contains many duplications and errors and needs some work to interpret, luckily the BoB Combat Archive series includes Luftwaffe claims that makes that interpretation far easier.

To get back to Bungay’s sources regarding losses etc. here is an extract from ‘The Most Dangerous Enemy’:

The second key publication appeared just after The Hardest Day and set new standards of accuracy and detail as far as losses were concerned. This was The Battle of Britain Then and Now, edited by Winston Ramsey for After the Battle Publications…

…However, the greatest value of The Battle of Britain Then and Now is in the 400 or so pages detailing all the aircraft and aircrew losses of both Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe compiled over many years by Peter Cornwell, who also supplied the data used by Price in the Hardest Day and Battle of Britain Day…

…Peter Cornwell kindly made available to me a list of corrections and additions he has compiled over the intervening twenty years, though these are relatively minor, a tribute to the thoroughness of his original efforts.

Peter Cornwell’s tables are the main source of Fighter Command and Luftwaffe losses used in this book, but have been supplemented by John Foreman’s Battle of Britain – The Forgotten Months (Air Research, 1988) and Fighter Command War Diaries, Vols I and II, published in 1996 and 1998 respectively. These are arranged differently, and usefully give details of the claims made by each squadron.

Obviously this is not the full text from the book, I’m trying to save a bit of space and have included the relevant bits. In my copy of The Most Dangerous Enemy this can be found on pages 428 and 429.

Effectively the figures used by Stephen Bungay are compiled from the information taken from The Battle of Britain Then and Now. No extra information about the months of July to October can be taken from The Forgotten Months (full title The Forgotten Months, November and December 1940) as this concentrates on the period after the Battle of Britain. The Fighter Command War Diaries do include figures of aircraft lost but includes no detail. The most useful part is that it also lists claims by squadron. The only information that Bungay has that I have no access to is the list of amendments provided by Peter Cornwell.

I haven’t just been “searching for the preferred numbers and working them, i.e. coming forth with preferred interpretations.” I’ve gone back to the main source used by Bungay and supplemented it with additional information not available to Bungay at the time he wrote his book. Yes I have not interpreted the information in the way Bungay has, mainly because I have more recent data made available since his book was published not because I am trying prove whatever point it is you think I’m trying to prove. [/QUOTE]


As to 2., let's see:

2.1 One Bf 110 was an unarmed recon aircraft. So what? There are two possibilities. The first is that it was bounced: decisively damaged, if not utterly destroyed, before the pilot even saw who was firing at him. That happened, often, and to both sides. A Bf 110 should have been less prone to this thanks to the second pair of eyes, but it happened to them, too. And - if this is what happened, then an armed Bf 110 would have fared no better.

The second alternative is that the pilot saw the enemy coming, but was unable to flee. Now, of course the British would have engaged this loner with at least a couple of fighters, if not a flight. So what do you think an armed Bf 110 would have done? Turned and tried to face its opponents? No, it would have fled - or tried to. So, again, no difference.

I was just trying to provide a little extra information but this aircraft has been included in the combat losses.

2.2 Two Bf 110s collided into each other "in operations". Daintily worded. So what is it, did they collide while desperately trying to evade enemy fire? This is something that happened to all models of fighters, but I wouldn't be surprised if it happened more often to Bf 110s, what with their poor maneuverability and their usual tactics of sticking close together. If so, I'd say the enemy had a hand in their demise. Or did they collide while peacefully travelling over the Channel? If, so unless they were already damaged by the enemy (in which case, again, the enemy had a hand in their demise), then at least this tells us something about the quality of the Bf 110 pilots, and/or machines.

These have not been included as the losses occurred over France and not during or following combat. No conclusion can be drawn about the quality of pilots in much the same way as no conclusion can be drawn about the quality of RAF pilots that had accidents in the air or on the grounds, accidents happened to both sides.

2.3 Several of the Bf 110s were used for ground attack. And? What's the point? Several of the Hurricanes downed at this time were being used for shooting at bombers, not to engage enemy fighters. Yet you do count them, don't you?

Again this was provided as additional information and losses have been included as combat losses were the cause was via combat with enemy fighters.

2.4 Some of the Bf 110s were downed by AA fire or over Germany. Again, so what?

This is a bit of a throw away ‘so what’. It’s rather important to set rules surrounding the statistics you use and how the data is interpreted. I don’t want to include losses of aircraft that were lost to ground fire where there was no interference from fighter aircraft in much the same way as I haven’t included aircraft lost in other theatres of combat i.e. in the sky above Germany/occupied Europe. Unless you want to include the additional losses caused by the Bf110 to RAF commands other than Fighter Command?

Training Command lost 2 aircraft to Bf110 – Hawker Hart K6485, Fairey Battle P6616.

Bomber Command lost 2 aircraft to Bf110 – Wellington R3210, Wellington R3165.

Coastal Command lost 5 aircraft to Bf110 – Sunderland N9028, Hudson N7305, Hudson N7242, Hudson N7224, Hudson N7282.

So if we include the 3 Bf110 lost over occupied Europe and the 9 additional RAF aircraft lost the ratio would drop to 1.4 to 1.

The final point bears on the comprehension one has of the overall issue. Nobody is interested in comparing fighter-vs-fighter performance; it's the sort of useless never-ending discussion about "who had the best tank?", etc.

Yes I hear what you’re saying but there obviously is an interest in some quarters, Bungay mentions ratios so often as do members of this forum. The only time people seem to lose interest or say it’s not important is when someone challenges the ratios they believe to be true.
 

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So if we include the 3 Bf110 lost over occupied Europe and the 9 additional RAF aircraft lost the ratio would drop to 1.4 to 1.

Figures are important, and statistics and math analyses of them can be a way to help us understand the context and the facts better.
Or, as in the case above, they can be entirely misleading.

Keep your eyes on the ball. The ball is the strategic objective of the campaign.

The most important figures in the Battle of Britain are those related to British fighters (numbers of main fighters, i.e. Spitfires and Hurricanes, available, number of pilots, number of new fighters produced per month etc.). From the POV of the German effort, the most important figure is the number of British fighters destroyed (or not produced if they had focused on factories producing fighters that they could effectively attack). Since as a matter of fact the Germans were pretty ineffective in destroying British fighters on the ground, much of this boils down to the number of British fighters destroyed in air combat.

It should be obvious why this figure is important: the Germans were out to achieve air superiority, so that either they could launch Seelöwe, or at least Seelöwe could become a credible threat (and bring about a political change of mind in the Parliament). To do that, the Germans had to destroy the British fighters.

Bombing small cargo ships in the Channel was a way to force the enemy in the air. Attacking radar bases mattered only if that made destroying more enemy fighters easier. And, finally, downing British bombers over Germany only mattered insofar as the British bombers were helping the British to conserve their fighters.

So one side of the equation is certainly the number of British fighters destroyed.

On the other hand, who was trying to destroy that target? The whole Luftwaffe. Counting only the German fighters is absurd; had the Germans only sent fighters over Britain, Fighter Command was under orders to ignore them. The Germans had to send bombers, too. The whole number of German aircraft "expended" in order to achieve that number of British fighters destroyed is the toll the Germans were paying to achieve their strategic objective.
This is doubly true if we have a view to the endgame, which we, as amateurs of alternate history, value even more than true, professional historians. Because the endgame is Seelöwe; the Germans cannot just destroy Fighter Command and call it a victory; they have to do that and still have enough aircraft to maintain air superiority over Southern England and to keep the Royal Navy away, hit ground targets, interdict the British Army's lines of resupply, transport the paratroops etc. etc. etc.
So overestimating the importance of the kill ratio of fighters versus fighters only means fundamentally misunderstanding the entire issue, both of the historical Battle of Britain and of the hypothetical Seelöwe operation.

So what about those British bombers downed over Germany? Do those losses help the Germans establish air superiority over England? No.
On the other hand, what about those Bf 110s downed over Germany? Do those losses hinder the Germans in the achievement of their strategic objective? Well, consider that up until the end of June 1940, most of the subunits of the NJG 1 - the first German Geschwader entirely intended for night interception - had been equipped with Bf 110s or with Bf 109s, and that most of their pilots had had no training as to night fighters: they had received the normal training as daylight fighter pilots. Even the few pilots that were members of the experimental night fighting Staffeln that already existed, of course had previously been daylight fighter pilots.
No small loss for the forces that were out to destroy the British fighters in the air, somewhere else.

Naturally, at least in theory - and we're interested in these theories more than straight historians, being interested in alternate history - Goering might have decided, upon launching Seelöwe, that the I. and III. Gruppen of NJG 1, those that in September were still equipped with Bf 109s and Bf 110s, should have abandoned their training and new duties, and sent them to fight over the white cliffs.
It's a possibility - for those fighters of that unit that had not already been lost in the German skies, of course. Those were gone for good.

Now, everybody can pick and choose which figures to consider important. For my part, I feel that I have reitererated my case for the second time. Apparently this happens a lot with threads on this topic, as some posters either ignore the issues or don't seem to understand them the first time around. I have neither time or the inclination to keep explaining and rephrasing and elaborating; I am confident that most readers will have by now understood the point.
I will of course reply to further posts, if they contain new and meaningful material.
 
Apparently this happens a lot with threads on this topic, as some posters either ignore the issues or don't seem to understand them the first time around.

...or deliberately misunderstand, misrepresent or ignore information that doesn't support their pre-established view/agenda.
 
Just to recap:

Step One – Poster one says “The Bf 110s, over the same time, downed 6 enemy fighters and lost 27 of their own - an unfavorable kill ratio of 4.5:1.”. Obviously poster one feels this is important to the discussion.

Step Two – Poster two replied with “For the Bf110 there were 8 RAF losses and 17 Bf110 losses which gives a ratio of 1 to 2.1.” and “In the listings from The Battle of Britain Then and Now the Bf110 was said to be the cause of eight Spitfires and Hurricanes giving a ratio of 1 to 2.1 as opposed to 1 to 4.5.”

Step Three – Poster one suggests that Poster one is being dishonest in their research and Poster two points out that the main source used is the same as the one used by Stephen Bungay in his book ‘The Most Dangerous Enemy’.

Step Four – Poster one suggests again that Poster two is being dishonest in their research and says “Nobody is interested in comparing fighter-vs-fighter performance; it's the sort of useless never-ending discussion about "who had the best tank?", etc.”, which is a bit of a contradiction as it was Poster one that raised this particular issue in the first place.

Step Five – Poster two provides evidence that the sources used in their research were the same as those used by Stephen Bungay plus additional sources that were not available to Bungay at the time of writing his book. In addition Poster two provides transparency in the form of a 12 page document showing why they came to the conclusions they did relating to Bf110 losses etc.

Step Six – Poster one ignores 98% of Poster two’s reply and the 12 page document to concentrate on a single sentence which was originally intended to show that including German losses in the skies above Germany/Occupied Europe is not desirable.

2.4 Some of the Bf 110s were downed by AA fire or over Germany. Again, so what?

This is a bit of a throw away ‘so what’. It’s rather important to set rules surrounding the statistics you use and how the data is interpreted. I don’t want to include losses of aircraft that were lost to ground fire where there was no interference from fighter aircraft in much the same way as I haven’t included aircraft lost in other theatres of combat i.e. in the sky above Germany/occupied Europe. Unless you want to include the additional losses caused by the Bf110 to RAF commands other than Fighter Command?

Training Command lost 2 aircraft to Bf110 – Hawker Hart K6485, Fairey Battle P6616.

Bomber Command lost 2 aircraft to Bf110 – Wellington R3210, Wellington R3165.

Coastal Command lost 5 aircraft to Bf110 – Sunderland N9028, Hudson N7305, Hudson N7242, Hudson N7224, Hudson N7282.

So if we include the 3 Bf110 lost over occupied Europe and the 9 additional RAF aircraft lost the ratio would drop to 1.4 to 1.

So this is where we get to now…

Figures are important, and statistics and math analyses of them can be a way to help us understand the context and the facts better.

Or, as in the case above, they can be entirely misleading.

Keep your eyes on the ball. The ball is the strategic objective of the campaign.

Again a contradiction, you provide figures, they are contested, you say they are not important and now you’re saying they are with the proviso that it doesn’t matter what
I say because I’m trying to twist things even though I have provided full transparency of how I came to the conclusions I did. What might be interesting is if you looked at the document I posted which contains extracts from three useful sources and provide me with your own conclusions.

The most important figures in the Battle of Britain are those related to British fighters (numbers of main fighters, i.e. Spitfires and Hurricanes, available, number of pilots, number of new fighters produced per month etc.). From the POV of the German effort, the most important figure is the number of British fighters destroyed (or not produced if they had focused on factories producing fighters that they could effectively attack). Since as a matter of fact the Germans were pretty ineffective in destroying British fighters on the ground, much of this boils down to the number of British fighters destroyed in air combat.

It should be obvious why this figure is important: the Germans were out to achieve air superiority, so that either they could launch Seelöwe, or at least Seelöwe could become a credible threat (and bring about a political change of mind in the Parliament). To do that, the Germans had to destroy the British fighters.

Bombing small cargo ships in the Channel was a way to force the enemy in the air. Attacking radar bases mattered only if that made destroying more enemy fighters easier. And, finally, downing British bombers over Germany only mattered insofar as the British bombers were helping the British to conserve their fighters.

So one side of the equation is certainly the number of British fighters destroyed.

On the other hand, who was trying to destroy that target? The whole Luftwaffe. Counting only the German fighters is absurd; had the Germans only sent fighters over Britain, Fighter Command was under orders to ignore them. The Germans had to send bombers, too. The whole number of German aircraft "expended" in order to achieve that number of British fighters destroyed is the toll the Germans were paying to achieve their strategic objective.

This is doubly true if we have a view to the endgame, which we, as amateurs of alternate history, value even more than true, professional historians. Because the endgame is Seelöwe; the Germans cannot just destroy Fighter Command and call it a victory; they have to do that and still have enough aircraft to maintain air superiority over Southern England and to keep the Royal Navy away, hit ground targets, interdict the British Army's lines of resupply, transport the paratroops etc. etc. etc.

So overestimating the importance of the kill ratio of fighters versus fighters only means fundamentally misunderstanding the entire issue, both of the historical Battle of Britain and of the hypothetical Seelöwe operation.

I totally agree in the most part which is why I questioned your flippant objection to me not including fighters lost over Germany/Europe in the calculations by pointing out in a rather tongue in cheek, sarcastic manner by showing what would happen if all losses were included.

Where I don’t agree is that the end game was Sealion, the end game in my mind was air superiority over south eastern England which would allow the Germans to make their next move which I actually think would result in an extension of the air war rather than an attempted invasion. However that’s a side issue and just my own opinion.

So what about those British bombers downed over Germany? Do those losses help the Germans establish air superiority over England? No.

On the other hand, what about those Bf 110s downed over Germany? Do those losses hinder the Germans in the achievement of their strategic objective? Well, consider that up until the end of June 1940, most of the subunits of the NJG 1 - the first German Geschwader entirely intended for night interception - had been equipped with Bf 110s or with Bf 109s, and that most of their pilots had had no training as to night fighters: they had received the normal training as daylight fighter pilots. Even the few pilots that were members of the experimental night fighting Staffeln that already existed, of course had previously been daylight fighter pilots.

No small loss for the forces that were out to destroy the British fighters in the air, somewhere else.

Naturally, at least in theory - and we're interested in these theories more than straight historians, being interested in alternate history - Goering might have decided, upon launching Seelöwe, that the I. and III. Gruppen of NJG 1, those that in September were still equipped with Bf 109s and Bf 110s, should have abandoned their training and new duties, and sent them to fight over the white cliffs.

It's a possibility - for those fighters of that unit that had not already been lost in the German skies, of course. Those were gone for good.

Again this is a side issue and shouldn’t be that big a deal but I believe there are some fundamental points that need raising.

Firstly only two of the losses I mentioned were to aircraft of NJG1 both of which were definitely brought down by Bf110. The rest were brought down by day fighter units primarily over or close to Norway.

Secondly NJG1 was originally formed on 22nd June 1940 becoming fully operational in July. Originally using the Bf110 and Do17 (for training purposes) with other aircraft types added later. The units transferred had previous night fighter experience in fact the unit that became III/NJG1 had been used primarily for night fighting.

Now, everybody can pick and choose which figures to consider important. For my part, I feel that I have reitererated my case for the second time. Apparently this happens a lot with threads on this topic, as some posters either ignore the issues or don't seem to understand them the first time around. I have neither time or the inclination to keep explaining and rephrasing and elaborating; I am confident that most readers will have by now understood the point.

I will of course reply to further posts, if they contain new and meaningful material.

Fair enough you don’t have to reply to anything you don’t want to.
 
...or deliberately misunderstand, misrepresent or ignore information that doesn't support their pre-established view/agenda.
Just so that you know my pre-established view is that people underestimate the seriousness of the Battle of Britain and how close things were to a British defeat.

My agenda is to research the losses on both sides as thoroughly and objectively as possible to see if I can find any mathematical patterns, something I've been doing for the past five years.

My aim is to produce a series of algorithms based on the data I have at hand that will predict the outcome of any given period of air combat to see what minor or major changes would be needed to alter the course of the battle. I'm probably about 75% there and currently working on the effects of RAF squadron experience on the loss rates of British fighters.

Any questions please ask...
 
Just so that you know my pre-established view is that people underestimate the seriousness of the Battle of Britain and how close things were to a British defeat.

My agenda is to research the losses on both sides as thoroughly and objectively as possible to see if I can find any mathematical patterns, something I've been doing for the past five years.

I'm no historian, so this might be the proper way to proceed, but from a Scientific approach, this seems like you've pretty much determined the conclusion (that people underestimate the seriousness and how close it was to a British defeat), and you're gathering evidence regarding that.

I'm used to the pattern of: Make a theory. Make a prediction based on that theory. Test that prediction against experiments/observations.

I've probably misunderstood, so feel free to ignore me.
 
I'm no historian, so this might be the proper way to proceed, but from a Scientific approach, this seems like you've pretty much determined the conclusion (that people underestimate the seriousness and how close it was to a British defeat), and you're gathering evidence regarding that.

I'm used to the pattern of: Make a theory. Make a prediction based on that theory. Test that prediction against experiments/observations.

I've probably misunderstood, so feel free to ignore me.
No need to ignore, you make a very valid point. What I'm trying to discover is if there is a tipping point regardless of whether my own personal view is correct or not based on known facts.
 
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