As mentioned, there are two issues here: 1. searching for the preferred numbers and 2. working them, i.e. coming forth with preferred interpretations.
As to 1
Bungay of course uses multiple sources, not one, and we know all too well that attributing the downing of one aircraft to one specific source is in many cases not an exact science; there can be multiple claims, there can be fog of war, there are wrecks that lie at the bottom of the Channel and won't show what downed them. In this particular instance, when it comes to choosing between 8, the figure of British fighters downed by Bf 110s which is stated by the latest and most comprehensively researched book, and 6, which is stated by a previous source, you choose 6.
The second key publication appeared just after The Hardest Day and set new standards of accuracy and detail as far as losses were concerned. This was The Battle of Britain Then and Now, edited by Winston Ramsey for After the Battle Publications…
…However, the greatest value of The Battle of Britain Then and Now is in the 400 or so pages detailing all the aircraft and aircrew losses of both Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe compiled over many years by Peter Cornwell, who also supplied the data used by Price in the Hardest Day and Battle of Britain Day…
…Peter Cornwell kindly made available to me a list of corrections and additions he has compiled over the intervening twenty years, though these are relatively minor, a tribute to the thoroughness of his original efforts.
Peter Cornwell’s tables are the main source of Fighter Command and Luftwaffe losses used in this book, but have been supplemented by John Foreman’s Battle of Britain – The Forgotten Months (Air Research, 1988) and Fighter Command War Diaries, Vols I and II, published in 1996 and 1998 respectively. These are arranged differently, and usefully give details of the claims made by each squadron.
As to 2., let's see:
2.1 One Bf 110 was an unarmed recon aircraft. So what? There are two possibilities. The first is that it was bounced: decisively damaged, if not utterly destroyed, before the pilot even saw who was firing at him. That happened, often, and to both sides. A Bf 110 should have been less prone to this thanks to the second pair of eyes, but it happened to them, too. And - if this is what happened, then an armed Bf 110 would have fared no better.
The second alternative is that the pilot saw the enemy coming, but was unable to flee. Now, of course the British would have engaged this loner with at least a couple of fighters, if not a flight. So what do you think an armed Bf 110 would have done? Turned and tried to face its opponents? No, it would have fled - or tried to. So, again, no difference.
2.2 Two Bf 110s collided into each other "in operations". Daintily worded. So what is it, did they collide while desperately trying to evade enemy fire? This is something that happened to all models of fighters, but I wouldn't be surprised if it happened more often to Bf 110s, what with their poor maneuverability and their usual tactics of sticking close together. If so, I'd say the enemy had a hand in their demise. Or did they collide while peacefully travelling over the Channel? If, so unless they were already damaged by the enemy (in which case, again, the enemy had a hand in their demise), then at least this tells us something about the quality of the Bf 110 pilots, and/or machines.
2.3 Several of the Bf 110s were used for ground attack. And? What's the point? Several of the Hurricanes downed at this time were being used for shooting at bombers, not to engage enemy fighters. Yet you do count them, don't you?
2.4 Some of the Bf 110s were downed by AA fire or over Germany. Again, so what?
The final point bears on the comprehension one has of the overall issue. Nobody is interested in comparing fighter-vs-fighter performance; it's the sort of useless never-ending discussion about "who had the best tank?", etc.
So if we include the 3 Bf110 lost over occupied Europe and the 9 additional RAF aircraft lost the ratio would drop to 1.4 to 1.
Apparently this happens a lot with threads on this topic, as some posters either ignore the issues or don't seem to understand them the first time around.
2.4 Some of the Bf 110s were downed by AA fire or over Germany. Again, so what?
This is a bit of a throw away ‘so what’. It’s rather important to set rules surrounding the statistics you use and how the data is interpreted. I don’t want to include losses of aircraft that were lost to ground fire where there was no interference from fighter aircraft in much the same way as I haven’t included aircraft lost in other theatres of combat i.e. in the sky above Germany/occupied Europe. Unless you want to include the additional losses caused by the Bf110 to RAF commands other than Fighter Command?
Training Command lost 2 aircraft to Bf110 – Hawker Hart K6485, Fairey Battle P6616.
Bomber Command lost 2 aircraft to Bf110 – Wellington R3210, Wellington R3165.
Coastal Command lost 5 aircraft to Bf110 – Sunderland N9028, Hudson N7305, Hudson N7242, Hudson N7224, Hudson N7282.
So if we include the 3 Bf110 lost over occupied Europe and the 9 additional RAF aircraft lost the ratio would drop to 1.4 to 1.
Figures are important, and statistics and math analyses of them can be a way to help us understand the context and the facts better.
Or, as in the case above, they can be entirely misleading.
Keep your eyes on the ball. The ball is the strategic objective of the campaign.
The most important figures in the Battle of Britain are those related to British fighters (numbers of main fighters, i.e. Spitfires and Hurricanes, available, number of pilots, number of new fighters produced per month etc.). From the POV of the German effort, the most important figure is the number of British fighters destroyed (or not produced if they had focused on factories producing fighters that they could effectively attack). Since as a matter of fact the Germans were pretty ineffective in destroying British fighters on the ground, much of this boils down to the number of British fighters destroyed in air combat.
It should be obvious why this figure is important: the Germans were out to achieve air superiority, so that either they could launch Seelöwe, or at least Seelöwe could become a credible threat (and bring about a political change of mind in the Parliament). To do that, the Germans had to destroy the British fighters.
Bombing small cargo ships in the Channel was a way to force the enemy in the air. Attacking radar bases mattered only if that made destroying more enemy fighters easier. And, finally, downing British bombers over Germany only mattered insofar as the British bombers were helping the British to conserve their fighters.
So one side of the equation is certainly the number of British fighters destroyed.
On the other hand, who was trying to destroy that target? The whole Luftwaffe. Counting only the German fighters is absurd; had the Germans only sent fighters over Britain, Fighter Command was under orders to ignore them. The Germans had to send bombers, too. The whole number of German aircraft "expended" in order to achieve that number of British fighters destroyed is the toll the Germans were paying to achieve their strategic objective.
This is doubly true if we have a view to the endgame, which we, as amateurs of alternate history, value even more than true, professional historians. Because the endgame is Seelöwe; the Germans cannot just destroy Fighter Command and call it a victory; they have to do that and still have enough aircraft to maintain air superiority over Southern England and to keep the Royal Navy away, hit ground targets, interdict the British Army's lines of resupply, transport the paratroops etc. etc. etc.
So overestimating the importance of the kill ratio of fighters versus fighters only means fundamentally misunderstanding the entire issue, both of the historical Battle of Britain and of the hypothetical Seelöwe operation.
So what about those British bombers downed over Germany? Do those losses help the Germans establish air superiority over England? No.
On the other hand, what about those Bf 110s downed over Germany? Do those losses hinder the Germans in the achievement of their strategic objective? Well, consider that up until the end of June 1940, most of the subunits of the NJG 1 - the first German Geschwader entirely intended for night interception - had been equipped with Bf 110s or with Bf 109s, and that most of their pilots had had no training as to night fighters: they had received the normal training as daylight fighter pilots. Even the few pilots that were members of the experimental night fighting Staffeln that already existed, of course had previously been daylight fighter pilots.
No small loss for the forces that were out to destroy the British fighters in the air, somewhere else.
Naturally, at least in theory - and we're interested in these theories more than straight historians, being interested in alternate history - Goering might have decided, upon launching Seelöwe, that the I. and III. Gruppen of NJG 1, those that in September were still equipped with Bf 109s and Bf 110s, should have abandoned their training and new duties, and sent them to fight over the white cliffs.
It's a possibility - for those fighters of that unit that had not already been lost in the German skies, of course. Those were gone for good.
Now, everybody can pick and choose which figures to consider important. For my part, I feel that I have reitererated my case for the second time. Apparently this happens a lot with threads on this topic, as some posters either ignore the issues or don't seem to understand them the first time around. I have neither time or the inclination to keep explaining and rephrasing and elaborating; I am confident that most readers will have by now understood the point.
I will of course reply to further posts, if they contain new and meaningful material.
Just so that you know my pre-established view is that people underestimate the seriousness of the Battle of Britain and how close things were to a British defeat....or deliberately misunderstand, misrepresent or ignore information that doesn't support their pre-established view/agenda.
Just so that you know my pre-established view is that people underestimate the seriousness of the Battle of Britain and how close things were to a British defeat.
My agenda is to research the losses on both sides as thoroughly and objectively as possible to see if I can find any mathematical patterns, something I've been doing for the past five years.
No need to ignore, you make a very valid point. What I'm trying to discover is if there is a tipping point regardless of whether my own personal view is correct or not based on known facts.I'm no historian, so this might be the proper way to proceed, but from a Scientific approach, this seems like you've pretty much determined the conclusion (that people underestimate the seriousness and how close it was to a British defeat), and you're gathering evidence regarding that.
I'm used to the pattern of: Make a theory. Make a prediction based on that theory. Test that prediction against experiments/observations.
I've probably misunderstood, so feel free to ignore me.