Victory of the USSR in the Cold War: National Bolshevism as the ideology of the New Right.

I was visited by the following idea: what if in this world a number of ultra-nationalists can take advantage of various forms of national Bolshevism as a banner. I note that here it is rather a collective term than the name of a specific ideology.
Original National-Bolshevism (Ustryalov)
In one of his early program works, Ustryalov formulates a basic for his political theory position: "the humanity of this era exists and develops under the sign of statehood. The national personality, the "national idea", like any spiritual monad, requires a certain unity for its manifestation. A single holistic principle must bind together the complex diversity that the historical life of this or that "people" is. And the state was such a unifying, formalizing, binding principle "[36]. Later Ustryalov will formulate it even more sharply: "For the patriot this common supreme goal is formulated by the old Roman saying:" the welfare of the state is the supreme law ". The principle of the state good consecrates all the means that the political art chooses to carry it out. "[37] It must be said that this is an atypical position for the Russian thinker, among whom there were more anarchists and anti-government members, and leftists and "rightists" (from Bakunin to Tolstoy), or at least supporters of the "liberal weakening of the state" . However, Ustryalov's etatism, as we have already noted, is not deprived of its predecessors in the Russian tradition: he himself points to Pestel and Herzen, to the late Slavophils Danilevsky and Leontiev, we will point to his immediate teachers Struve, Novgorodtsev, EN Trubetskoy. However, even closer to Ustryalov Hegel, precisely from his understanding of the state - as the highest form of manifestation of the national spirit - Ustryalov and repulsed: "States - the same organisms, endowed with soul and body, spiritual and physical qualities. The state is the supreme organism on earth and Hegel was not completely wrong, calling it "the earthly god" [38]. (here there is no "departure from Orthodoxy", we will recall that Hegel called the god "historical spirit", hence the true meaning of this phrase Ustryalov: the state is the earthly embodiment of the historical national spirit).

Ustryalov seeks to rehabilitate the notion of imperialism, which in the political vocabulary, beginning with the nineteenth century, began to be perceived purely negatively. The empire is the highest form of state development, it embraces a multitude of peoples, thus having a culturally diverse substrate as a substance, it best protects the peoples entering it. It is not imperialism as such that is bad, but imperialism that treats the peoples of the periphery of the empire in a barbaric way, instead of cultural mutually enriching dialogue and cooperation, practicing violence and robbery (later in the late period of creativity Ustryalov will, on this basis, oppose the Soviet great power, which combines the principle a single strong state and a fraternal union of peoples, and the Western great power, which is what imperialism actually calls itself and which is based on zapadcentristism, xenophobia, is despicable to non-European peoples and a gross violation of their interests [39]). By itself, imperialism, understood precisely as the great power, striving for the creation of large, multinational states is fully in line with the spirit of the times (Ustryalov notes that the twentieth century is the century of imperialism, each nation that feels creative forces, creates its own, original "imperialism "- English, German, American, Turkish, finally, Russian). Moreover, imperialism is completely natural, since it is connected with the inalienable, essential features of the state: "every state has a practical imperative: strive for expansion, be powerful if you want to be great! Here is not only the voice of a biologically natural and valuable instinct, here the dictates of moral reason, the covenant and the demand of the historical spirit "[40]. We should not be surprised at the assertion about the moral and cultural imperative of imperialism; for Ustryalov the great empire is organically and necessarily connected with a great culture ...

World history and international politics are formed by the clash of various "imperialisms", which in fact are a competition of national ideas. Some empires are born, others are dying, small states pass from one sphere of influence to another, having long lost their independent significance ... Ustryalova is fascinated by this picture of struggle, death and birth, blood and suffering, from which grow flowers of culture, wild beauty of living life standing outside our schemes, the clash and interweaving of styles, cultures. He sees in the changes of the political landscape the "seal of the highest wisdom", "the verdict of the historical spirit" - and here we feel the influence on Ustryalov not only of Hegel, but also of the German romanticist and aesthetic Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as his Russian "fellow spirit" , but only the Orthodox, K. Leontief.

Ustryalov resolutely disagrees with the opinion that the factor of the territory is not significant: "... it is deeply mistaken that one who regards the territory as a" dead "element of the state indifferent to his soul, he writes in the article" The Logic of Nationalism ", I am ready to say more likely , the opposite - it is the territory is the most valuable and significant and valuable part of the state soul, despite its seemingly "grossly physical" nature. "[1] And, we think, it's hard not to acknowledge the rightness of N.V. Ustryalov. Precisely because the state is a single organism, where all its elements are bound by an inner living connection-territory, people and power, it is inconceivable that significant damage is done to one of these elements, namely, the territory without irreparable damage to the whole: "for a statesman ... "loss of territory" is always a "loss of living power", the withering away of "part of the soul" [2]. This idea of Ustryalov is as obvious a mark as, alas, incomprehensible to many contemporary figures, even calling themselves patriots (like the well-known I.Safarevich, who in his fateful 1991 in his articles in Our Contemporary rejoiced over the "liberation of Russia from non-Russian territories "), as well as their predecessors from the White emigres who objected to Ustryalov: that the merit is not great-the Bolsheviks restored the imperial Russian statehood ... However, any unbiased person who is alien to the overlapping of the anticommunist emo s, yet we should think, recognize the integrity of any phenomenon, including our Russian civilization. And from this it follows directly that Russia will not be the same-Russia of great literature, Russia's unique intelligentsia, Russia's tense Orthodox worldview, Russia's heightened sense of "social truth," without natural territorial acquisitions, without Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltics. Cut off to the modern wretched borders of living flesh of Russia is unlikely to be able to the same creative heights that Russia knew the Great Power - both at the stage of the Empire, and at the stage of the USSR. Just like a man who has lost his arms and legs, turned into a helpless invalid, will never be the same person as he was before this misfortune: physical injury will inflict a severe wound on his psyche, change his attitude, worldview (the difference is only that the crippled man will never become physically full, as far as the state is concerned, the territories "cut off" from him, with the due political will and the assertiveness of the rulers, with the people's readiness to sacrifice for the sake of the fatherland, can " and back, but the process will be long-term and complex) ... And one more confirmation of this is the cultural barrenness of a new, "democratic Russia," which could not generate anything remotely close to the level of, let's say, classical Russian or Soviet literature, with all the "freedoms" and "uncensored." In fact, do not compare the same Sholokhov, Pasternak, Zamyatin and ... some Sorokin there.

Moreover, as N.V. Ustryalov: "Only a" physically "powerful state can have a great culture. The souls of the "small powers" are not deprived of the opportunity to be elegant, noble, even "heroic", but they are organically incapable of being "great." This requires a great style, a large scale, a large scale of thought and action "[3]. Indeed, those who oppose the "great state" and "culture" (and this is what our liberals are fond of doing, arguing in the spirit that it is necessary to develop the economy and culture to collect lands than to collect lands) offer a false antinomy, because even according to the school definition, culture is everything that is created by human activity, speaking generally, by the people, by the nation, and this includes not necessarily spiritual, but also material achievements. Hence, the creation of statehood is exactly the same phenomenon of culture, social and national creativity as the creation of a literary tradition, original painting, architecture. And, strictly speaking, there is no one without the other, history shows that if a nation is experiencing a creative upsurge, if its forces are large and energy splashes over the edge, then this manifests itself in art, and in philosophy, and in science, and finally in politics, in state building. The stages of state take-off always correspond more or less to the stages of the heyday of the arts and sciences: in the golden age of imperial Rome there was also the golden age of Roman poetry, the age of Virgil, Horace, Ovid, German romanticism and German idealism only a short time ahead of Bismarck's great-power rush and the rise of the 2nd Reich Finally, the Bolshevik gathering of Russian lands and the revival of a great and mighty Russia under the USSR name also led to the "second life" of the Silver Age (Mayakovsky, Pasternak, Yesenin, Klyuyev, Tsvetaeva, .), But only in a few decades - in fact rise of Soviet culture - prose "villagers" Rasputin Astafieva, Belova, poetry Yevtushenko and Voznesensky, Kuznetsov and Mezhirova, philosophy and Ilyenkov Lifschitsa critics Kozhinova and Sarnow, etc. etc. And those of the liberals who admire the poetry of the "sixties" and curse the Soviet system, it should be understood that without the state energy and will of Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Felix Dzerzhinsky, there would be no creativity Yevtushenko with Astafyev, and even Solzhenitsyn and Brodsky , because they, being opponents of the Soviet political regime, were flesh from the flesh of the products of Soviet culture and, as they say, of Soviet discourse. Just like without the eagles of the Roman legions, there would be no Horace, but without the glorious victories of Napoleon-Hugo and Balzac.

At different stages of its history, the state can have a different ideology: until 1917, for example, the ideology of Russia was a kind of monarchic Russian nationalism diluted by Orthodox slogans and European ideological borrowings, after 1917 it was replaced by "Marxism-Leninism", more precisely, vulgarized Marxism. But the ideology, according to Ustryalov, is secondary to the very existence of the state organism: if the state itself, its territory, its natural geographical boundaries, the style of the people and civilization itself, and therefore with ideology, no matter how "alien" it is, is preserved , soon there will be a "miraculous transformation", "ingrowing into the soil". As soon as Russia becomes itself a geopolitically-great Eurasian empire, any of its ideologies will shift into a kind of healthy "Russian nationalism", if only it is vital and reflects some features of the national character: "... one should never declare the" new national power "for" non-national " that her ideology abruptly diverges from the usual ideology of the old authorities. New time puts forward new sides of the national face of the country ... "[4]. Ustryalov predicts the "Russification of communism," his transformation from a "German thing" into Russian and Russian ideology and political practice, and here he was absolutely right. Already the Bolsheviks were militant atheists, opponents and slanders of the "old regime", imperial Russia, and gradually, as Bolshevism grew into "Russian soil", it became saturated with the "Russian spirit": the special place of the Russian Orthodox Church (it is difficult to deny that, after the 1940s, Orthodoxy in the USSR, although it was in an ambiguous position, was still tolerated, whereas to the various Protestant and neo-Protestant sects the position of the Soviet state was irreconcilable), and respect for the ancient glorious commanders from Dmitry Donskoy and Alexander Nevsky to Suvorov and Kutuzov, and even officer shoulder straps and Christmas trees ... And today the "national turn of communism" that Stalin produced almost under the pressure of historical circumstances in modern Russian communism (G. Zyuganov, Yu. Belov and others) acquires the features of theory and doctrine.

The opposite, by the way, is also true: the most patriotic ideology will not save the country and its culture and identity if the country remains chopped, crippled, deprived of its natural geopolitical status, and if the "ideologists" reconcile with this. Modern Russian liberals of Putin's generation seem to have "grown" to some patriotic ideas, but the stressed absence of the notorious "imperial ambitions", that is, of a healthy great-power instinct, brings everything to nothing.

The second most important element of the state is power. To this Ustryalov approaches quite pragmatically and dialectically, he is convinced that there are no universal, best ever and everywhere political regimes, each epoch makes relevant and in demand any of them: The Middle Ages are a monarchy, New time is a parliamentary republic. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Western bourgeois, formal democracy exhausted itself and approached a disastrous crisis for it: "... a new era is coming ... Formal democracy everywhere is going through twilight, almost turns into its own opposite," [5] Ustryalov writes in a work that and is called "The crisis of modern democracy." The essence of the twilight of formal democracy is that its main ideals have faded-the "human rights" and the "sovereignty of the people", the so-called "great principles of 1789". "... freedom and human rights?" Exclaims Ustryalov. - About this formula has long had time to grow moss! ... the more freedom, the less equality. " Not being a socialist, Ustryalov recognizes some truth of socialism in the fact that civil freedom is an empty sound in a society with a deep financial stratification, where some can use the freedoms promised by law, while others do not, where "free press", "free elections" are sold and bought . The result of this is the gravitation of society away from freedom - to equality, solidarist and socialist ideologies.

"Everything for the people and everything through the people - ironically repeats Ustryalov's old slogan, stating the crisis of parliamentarism - How simple it is in words and how difficult it really is" [6]. In fact, the arithmetic majority of electors, even if the elections are honest and irreproachable, which never happens in our time, will not constitute the "will of the people". Really no "will of the people" and does not rule in modern states, "the vanguards of the social strata: the industrial and financial bourgeoisie, the workers, the peasantry, are really ruling. The focus of modern politics is beyond the walls of parliaments. Politics makes an initiative minority ... Not an election ballot, but a "scepter of sharp steel," although without royal arms, is now in the order of the day "[7]. The hour is not far off when these elites will completely get rid of the shackles of formal democracy or turn it into an unimportant propaganda facade - Ustryalov prophesies, and again the accuracy of his forecasts is amazing.

Caesarism - so Ustryalov characterizes this new political system, which was born in the throes of the twentieth century in the West and in the East, and beyond which, according to the Harbin thinker, is the future, whether we like it or not. He describes it as follows: "History seems to be trying to reproduce certain features of the state of enlightened absolutism, only, of course, in an essentially new expression ... The individualism of the nineteenth century ... goes into the etatism of XX." 8 This one is democratic in its own way and even superdemocratic, but not in the sense of formal, representative democracy. It is built on the rejection of the masses from power and on transferring it to "an active vanguard, an initiative minority ... usually completed by an initiative figure ..." [9]. Examples of such Caesarism Ustryalov considers the power of the Bolsheviks in Russia, the fascists in Italy. But this phenomenon is not limited to those regimes to which the label "totalitarian" is now molded into place and inappropriately. Ustryalov finds a slow and peculiar transformation into the Caesarism of "democratic" England: "and even in England it is not difficult to reveal, in essence, a similar process, but only in other forms of flexible decent forms that are peculiar to the English state genius" [10]. The same is true in the US, Roosevelt's regime, according to Ustryalov, already has Caesarism, although it is covered by the phraseology of democracy and false decorations of the parliament. (Incidentally, let's not forget, formally the parliament existed both in the USSR and in the Nazi Reich). In his article "Ways of synthesis (to the knowledge of our era)" [11] Ustryalov analyzes in detail the American ideocracy and holds, we think, a completely justified parallel between the Roosevelt and fascism in the economy: "speaking of the ideocratic dictatorship, it is no longer sufficient to limit the field of observation to Bolshevism and fascism. To some extent, the American experience of Roosevelt should be brought here. Not descending, however, from the track of democratic statehood, it is nevertheless illuminated by the light of the new time and represents a kind of attempt of a legal revolution from above. Contrary to the primordial "spirit" of American democracy, the state occupies commanding heights of economic activity, becomes the supreme controller of the national economy ... It can not be overlooked that the reform program of the "blue eagle" essentially approximates, in general, the socio-economic attitudes of fascism. The same principle of "public-private" economy, managed, or rather, coordinated economy, the same idea of interclass cooperation, and even in many ways similarly external formulations of the problem "[12].

It should be noted that Ustryalov would not be a pragmatist if he did not say that he does not consider Caesarism the best and ideal system: "The breath of modern Caesarism ... is not a revelation of perfection. But I do not give him away for a moment. I'm just stating his cash. I can clearly see that it is more deeply and organically than it seems to many now "[13]. To supporters of formal democracy, terrifying cruelty and victims of early forms of Caesarism, Ustryalov suggests recalling the blood, filth and anguish that accompanied the establishment in Europe of the same formal democracy 200 years ago: recall the Jacobin terror, the bloody colonial policy of "enlightened" European democracies, and his compatriots , Russian, Ustryalov recalls the incompetence and incapacity of Kerensky's democracy that brought Russia to the abyss of social chaos.

So, the October Revolution in Russia put forward, according to Ustryalov, our Motherland among the advanced powers of the world and in the field of the political structure and its construction. Therefore, Ustryalov and the ridiculous shouts of emigrant liberals who gasp and moan about Russia losing "democracy", "parliament", "separation of powers", this political antiquity, the rubble of the eighteenth century, which, in fact, is rejected by the West itself, is hidden somewhere and but somewhere openly and explicitly: "How can it be seen that Russia, instead of seeking for its own way out in agony, apprehended by its deepest minds and painfully groped by its great revolution, shows that instead she must prostrate before lin yuschimi Western canon, cross out their culture and their revolution, in order to get a more "peaceful democratic constitution?" [14] - exclaims Ustrialov, and now we may well share his surprise and indignation "backwardness of the spirit of the times" and political blindness sorts of liberals; all the more, the situation of the beginning of the 21st century perfectly confirms Ustryalov's forecast that the state should be strengthened more and more, even under the false hymns of "democracy" and "human rights".

Finally, the third element of the state is the people. In modern literature, one can come across the view that Ustryalov began as a Russian nationalist, and at the end of his life came to the apologetics of the multinational Soviet Union [15]. This is not entirely true. Ustryalov immediately, even in his earlier program articles, proclaimed that the highest form of the state is the Empire - a multinational formation, and that although any Empire should have a "tribal core", nevertheless, it can not and should not be an instrument of the narrow nationalism of the metropolis: not only the people create the state, but the state creates the people, unites many nationalities, weaving their historical destinies and cultures. This is the tendency of the development of modern states: "Perhaps, initially the state was associated with the tribe, race, nationality. But over time ... the state has acquired an independent, self-sufficient significance. Unity on the principle of breed, tribe ... being too narrow and poor, was replaced by a unity of a higher order "[16].

Ustryalov's doctrine of revolution is probably one of the most original and significant parts of his national-Bolshevik heritage. Thanks to him, Ustryalov can safely be put on a par with the most prominent domestic and foreign researchers of the phenomenon of the revolution - from Joseph de Maistre to Pitirim Sorokin. The basis of Ustryalov's approach to the revolution is dialectics. This means, as we have already noted, that Ustryalov does not seek to "squeeze" the revolution into formal logical schemes or, even more so, to "speak" of it with propaganda spells and incantations, by no means, he accepts it as a fact of reality, complex, internal contradictory and paradoxical , as everything in our world, and seeks to explore its internal contradictions and the resulting development.

Being a conservative, N.V. Ustryalov, of course, treated the revolution as such rather negatively than positively, and called for, where possible, to make the necessary social changes in a peaceful, evolutionary way. "... I am very far from revolutionary romanticism and I am not inclined to admire the specific appearance of the Russian revolution," Ustryalov writes in the article "Ignis sanat", "there is much in this guise of bad, dark, repulsive, much that must be overcome" [17] . And this is understandable, because for the conservator of the statist there is nothing more painful and terrible than contemplating the spectacle of the fall of the native state. However weak and painful it may be, it was, in fact, a kind of bracing that kept people from internal suicidal strife, and external enemies from the temptation of military intervention. Without the state, the social element begins to "walk" completely unhindered, and the external enemy is more and more daring, eventually reaching direct territorial grips. The revolution in the period of destruction always puts the nation on the edge of catastrophe and destruction, and if we regard it as a medicine, then it must be realized that this is a medicine that can kill, and therefore it must be used only in case of emergency: "it follows its (revolutionary explosion - RV) prevent until the last minute, without losing hope to do without it ... "[18].

But let us remind you that these words belong to the founder of national Bolshevism, one of the first among the white emigrants who accepted the October Revolution. There is nothing strange here, because Ustryalov - once again emphasize this - professes dialectics. The revolution is a fait accompli, Ustryalov points out, eliminating it and pretending that it was not there means falling into the worst of illusions, closing our eyes to the objective nature of the revolutionary catastrophe: "In Russia, before February, everything was screaming about the impending revolution. And those who wisely foresaw her horrors, wanted to prevent it, felt a tragic impotence to do it. Accumulated, swollen evil demanded an exit, struggle, the organism spontaneously demanded its destruction "[19]. No, instead of hiding from the revolution in the cozy fog of propaganda spells, any sane conservative will strive to help the Motherland recover from the fever of the Revolution, overcome its most egregious and extremist deviations, preserve all the best from the old regime, which, of course, will be in demand as soon as the initial indiscriminate nihilism is over. The revolution, fortunately, in most cases - is not the death of the social, but of the state organism, and the disease, after which, if healing occurs, the state will become even stronger, even more powerful, even more terrible for the enemies. Revolution is created by revolutionaries, but in itself it is the work of Historical Intelligence. Revolutionaries can clog their heads with any utopian theories, the Hegelian cunning historical Intelligence will still "deceive" them and turn them into simple tools for the improvement and exaltation of the same, albeit a renewed national state: "For all its gloomy vices ... it (the Russian The revolution - RV) carries with it a great promise - that in the healing fire a new Russia is born, which is Budi, (the italics of Ustryalov - RV), and which reeks of us, free from Russia's sins, vulgar, though deeply connected with its unity with bstantsii, dear memories, the unity of a great soul ... "[20].

In a number of other articles, Ustryalov develops these ideas, and, on the basis of generalizations of the experience of the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution of 1917, creates a special, still not obsolete and very heuristically fruitful theory of revolutions, which crowns his doctrine of the state, supplementing and concretizing the concept of Caesarism .

According to her, the main condition for the Revolution to be non-fatal, so that the destructive tornado ends with the birth and development of a new statehood is the popular character of the Revolution, its social depth, so to speak. "Great revolutions are always organically and genuinely national, no matter what ideas they are inspired, no matter what elements they use for their celebration," Ustryalov writes in his article "Lost and Returned Russia - as opposed to revolts, coups and simple dynastic" revolutions "... they are popular i.e. they capture the whole country ... they are extreme, and they inevitably deepen to a pure idea ... then becoming the active force of an entire historical epoch "[21]. You need to be a blind person or a very biased person so as not to see the depth of the French genius in the revolution of the Jacobins or the Russian national scope in the Bolshevik revolution. However, everything that touches the life-giving keys of the national spirit acquires a creative character; That is why the great revolutions, unlike the "revolutions" of the subtle, intellectual stratum, "alien to the people (such as the February Revolution of 1917 or the counterrevolution of 1991) are, in the highest sense of the word, creative. If they destroy, it is only in order to build a new statehood in a cleared place, a new society which, due to the unity of historical and cultural soil, will soon lose the "skin of extremism" from itself and will acquire national features. The February revolution led only to the collapse of the country, the actual dissolution of the army, the situation of anarchy and social chaos, the "liberal reforms" of the 1990s ended the same - Great Russia is divided into many states, most of which became Western satellites, the economic crisis has reached the level catastrophe, no post-Soviet regime is in fact legitimate in the eyes of the post-Soviet peoples. And let's compare with those with the permission to say "revolutions" the Great October 17th, which gave rise to one of the world's superpowers, returning glory to the Russian great power and Russian civilization!

Ustryalov also proposes a scheme for the development of any revolution: "Jacobinism-Thermidor Bonapartism," which resembles the Hegelian dialectical triad: "thesis-antithesis-synthesis."

"Jacobinism" is the period of the destruction of the old state, accompanied by the liberation of the social element, the most terrible disgraces and extremes, including unrestrained and blind terror and the appearance on the "historical stage" of the society's criminals - criminals, lumpens, psychopaths. During Jacobinism, risky political and economic experiments are carried out, the state and society most of all break away from their national tradition and become groundless. The extremist utopias dominate, which, of course, can not be accomplished, but people who are intoxicated with the fluid of the revolution, as a rule, simply can not notice it [22]. In the Russian Revolution, the period of Jacobinism is, of course, 1918-1920, the time of the Red Terror, the bloody supremacy of the Cheka, the raids of the food detachments ... However, the terror and dictatorship of Russian Jacobinism, like the French revolutionaries, had a positive value for the country: they helped to keep the revolutionary state and to resist foreign interventionists who, in case of their victory, were ready to dismember Russia and turn it into their satellite.

Thermidor is a period of internal, organic counter-revolution. Extremes and excesses of the revolution are not destroyed from outside - by the supporters of the old regime, but from within, by the revolutionaries themselves, who, tired of the utopian fever, are finally turning to constructive state-national construction. The "thesis" of the revolution, according to the law of dialectics, turns into an "antithesis", in the place of punishers, businessmen come to the place, "civilized" diplomats and ministers take the place of the maximalist commissioners ... "The revolution is reborn, remaining itself, [23] writes Ustryalov, - in the degeneration of the tissues of the revolution, in the transformation of the souls and hearts of its agents "[24]. Thermidor does not put an end to the gains of the revolution and does not mean returning "back" to the old-regime reality (although it seems to many ultrarevolutionaries), he simply, according to Ustryalov, reveals the true objective goals and tasks of the revolution, which the leaders themselves, who are captives of extremist utopias, are often misunderstood (the French Thermidor brings to the historical stage the big bourgeois - the true "creator of the French Revolution", for which the Robespierres and Marats, without understanding it, cleared the way from the wreckage feudal absolutism, the Russian Thermidor showed the world to the Russian peasant - the foundation of the Soviet revolution, which was "proletarian" only in the programs of the Bolsheviks, it was on his world-feeling that the "Soviet project" was built, and it was for him that the revolution dared the aristocracy and class barriers.

The Russian Thermidor begins by Ustryalov with the suppression of the Kronstadt mutiny, which was the last surge of revolutionary, destructive energy. Ustryalov warmly greets the Leninist NEP. No matter how the Bolsheviks explain it, according to Ustryalov, the NEP is the actual recognition of the utopian nature of the communist experiment in the economy and a return to "normal", mixed, private-cooperative-state management. Ustryalov admires at the same time the political flexibility of Lenin, who managed to become both a Jacobin and a Thermidor of the Russian revolution (Robespierre was prevented from making an excess of ideological dogmatism, an inability to feel the "change in the situation," and a guillotine, to which Robespierre sent enemies of revolutionary France without an account, and which he himself ended his days).

Following the "economic Brest" Ustryalov expects "Brest political". The "Leninist, revolutionary guard" will increasingly recede into the background, and in its place will come a young, already a revolutionary generation, thinking not in terms of Marxist scholasticism but in the categories of Russian national consciousness, not as phantoms of the world revolution, but as practical tasks of economic recovery of its own own homeland.

Finally, the third stage of the revolution is Bonapartism. It is a synthesis of the revolutionary nationalism of Jacobinism and the "opportunism" of the Thermidor. Bonapartism brings the last surge of the revolutionary "style", but only to finally destroy the last hotbeds of revolutionary destructive energy, to finally consolidate and "pacify" the postrevolutionary state. Ustryalov wrote about the essence of Bonapartism in letters to Titov and Avdoshchenkov from 1929: "... what is the essence of Bonapartism? ... It is a bunch of genuinely revolutionary juices, purified from the romantic impurities of a utopia with one side and from an old regime belch on the other. It is the stabilization of the new social interests created by the revolution ... This is the reaction that saves and consolidates the revolution, according to the Scriptures: it will not come to life, or it will not die. "[25]

Bonapartism, at the same time, and the synthesis of the opposites of the prerevolutionary and postrevolutionary states, it returns the "country that was ill with the revolution" to the path of its national existence, but, of course, at its new qualitative level (not for nothing, the royalist and traditionalist Joseph de Maistre admired the victories of Napoleon, seeing in them the revival of the greatness of France by kings, and the white emigre philosopher Fedotov wrote that under Stalin, as if the old times - with Christmas trees, shoulder straps of officers, normal, gymnasium-type schools "Experimental" and avant-garde educational institutions, with the glorious names of Nevsky and Suvorov in government newspapers, instead of the vicious rinsing of Russian shrines by revolutionary cosmopolitans).

Bonaparte, coming after the Thermidorians, bears an imperial scope and ambition and, if successful, an unprecedented expansion of power, and even of the borders of the state.

Bonaparte of the Russian revolution, of course, Stalin. Ustryalov warmly welcomes his idea of "building socialism in one country" (which, as we have already seen, was influenced in part by, among other things, Ustryalov himself), he is pleased to accept the defeat of factions in the party, the so-called "left" and "right" "Of the opposition. Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin - the personification of the anti-national, cosmopolitan course in the party, Stalin's victory for Ustryalov is the victory of national Bolshevism over international Bolshevism, the victory of Russia over the "Internationale" in the collective sense of the word. Ustryalov failed to live up to the second half of the 1940s, to see the restoration of the patriarchate in the USSR, the end of the persecution of the church, the Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the situation of the second superpower in the world, would give him even greater grounds for parallels between Stalin and Napoleon. But, in any case, the export of the Revolution beyond Russia at the expense of its "freezing" in the homeland Ustryalov predicted accurately. "Napoleon, as is known," bound the revolution in France and stirred it up in Europe "(V. Hugo). He called himself and was in fact - "Brutus for kings and Caesar for the revolution." If so, then the Soviet Napoleon, - Caesar of October, - can not fail to become Brutus at the same time for the world bourgeoisie (the Ustryalov-RV cursive), "he wrote in the article" The Foreign Exchange "[26].

Moreover, Stalinism, according to Ustryalov, is an organic Russian form of Caesarism. As already mentioned, from the point of view of the Harbin thinker, the whole world civilization in one way or another comes from a degenerate and outmoded formal democracy to a strong leader-state. The current spirit of world politics brings to the forefront not parliaments, not inter-party squabbles, but individual, legitimate politicians in the eyes of their own people, heads of powerful states. The response of Germany and Italy to the epochal challenge of Caesarism, according to Ustryalov - Mussolini and Hitler, the response of Britain and the US - Churchill and Roosevelt, Russia's response - Stalin. Moreover, only Stalinism is genuine, authentic Caesarism: the English and American regimes hypocritically cover themselves with the dilapidated rags of formal democratic institutions and phraseology, Italian and German, flirting with socialist ideas, are a special form of political expression of plutocratic, capitalist groups. Stalinism, on the other hand, is genuinely suffered by the peoples of Great Russia in the fire and blood of its Great Revolution, which means that in reality it is not in official newspaper articles, but essentially national and national (to modern lovers of anyone who sympathizes with a strong state, to write down "fascists" , we will point out that Ustryalov was one of the most harsh and irreconcilable opponents of fascism and National Socialism).

Thus, Stalinism not only crowns the dramatic but also the heroic path of the Russian revolution, it at the same time fits perfectly into the world paradigm of politics, and in this sense there is, according to Ustryalov, a very timely and progressive phenomenon.

In the conclusion of the story about the Ustryalov conception of the Revolution, we can not say a few words about Ustryalov's attitude to the ideology of this Revolution-Bolshevism. Obviously, being an Orthodox conservative, Ustryalov could not accept the basic theoretical positions of Bolshevism and Marxism: atheism, historical materialism, that is, the reduction of ideology, state, culture to the "economic basis," the class theory, the doctrine of the world revolution. At the same time, it would be an exaggeration to say that Ustryalov did not see any positive features in the theory of Bolshevism at all, and "accepted" it only because, due to some historical accident, it was Bolshevism that started to be inadequate, but ideological self-expression of the Russian, national revolution in essence. Far from being external anti-religious and materialistic Bolshevism, in fact, Ustryalov points out, he is closer to the Christian ideal than other post-democratic, Caesarist ideologies-for example, fascism and National Socialism. The ideas of Bolshevism-social justice, brotherhood, the creative transformation of nature, are part of the range of Christian ideas, whereas fascism, with all its "compromises" with the historical church, feeds on a pagan and even frankly anti-Christian worldview. Bolshevism is unconsciously a religious and pro-Christian ideology. "Speaking aphoristically, in the Soviet life, Bergson prevails over Marx, and Marx himself on the Leninist palette looks" almost Bergson. " In the Bolshevik will to the new land and to the new sky, all the prerequisites for a genuinely labor, religious and creative relationship to the world and to man are swelling - while the old petty-bourgeois, intellectual atheism still bubbles and bows in the Bolshevik intellect, "Ustryalov wrote in the article "Ways of synthesis" [27]. Ustryalov hopes that it is precisely these features of Bolshevism that will allow him to reborn with the dialectical self-development of the Revolution into national Bolshevism, into one of the new versions of the Russian idea. And in the second half of the 1930s, as we have already noted, Ustryalov notes with satisfaction that Stalin has switched from Bolshevism to National Bolshevism.

Finally, another part of the doctrine of National Bolshevism is the economic concept. The difference between national Bolshevism from vulgar Marxism and from liberalism is also in the fact that National Bolshevism regards the economy as a dependent, subordinate sphere. The interests of the state and the nation for Ustryalov are certainly higher than the economic interests of certain classes or even the purely material prosperity of the whole society. In principle, Ustryalov is opposed to socialism in the field of economy (but not in politics, here, as we recall, according to Ustryalov, socialism, however, contrary to its stateless ideal, embodied the advanced form of state structure - Caesarism). It was precisely in economic theory that the Harbin thinker retained most of all continuity with the right-wing Cadets. He considers the most optimal form of management to be private, not denying the possibility of coexistence with others, that is speaking, speaking in modern language, for the multistructure of the economy. Ustryalov notes with satisfaction that the degeneration of Bolshevism in the political sphere was followed by its degeneration in the economic field. In 1918, the Bolsheviks rejected the utopian and extremist slogans of an immediate world revolution and a unilateral cessation of the war, became defencists and statesmen, in 1921 the Bolsheviks abandoned the model of "war communism" and recognized the right to live behind the trading elements that had been hiding under the spell. "... The famous NEP is the forerunner of the economic recovery of the country ..." [28] Ustryalov writes in the article "Lost and Returned Russia" and concludes in the same paradoxical conclusion that the Russian revolution ultimately fulfilled ... Stolypin's dream of a "strong master" and more Moreover, only the revolution could realize it, because "the historical Stolypin, who was closely associated with the local class and old absolutism" [29], could never have done this. By the way, modern apologists P.A. Stolypin would have liked to listen to this paradoxical but profound thought of Ustryalov: indeed, Stolypin's tragedy was not only that he tried to carry out bourgeois reform among peasants with a clearly communal mentality, but also because the state itself is Russian because of the huge number feudal atavism, gradually prevented economic renewal.

The Soviet leaders - from Lenin to Bukharin - who, as already mentioned, closely followed the journalism of Ustryalov, for that they would accuse him of petty-bourgeoisness, but Ustryalov ... will enthusiastically accept this accusation. The petty bourgeois for Ustryalov is not a caricature of a parasite from Soviet propaganda, but it is a strong master who, in the opinion of the thinker, is replacing revolutionary fanatics and whose historical purpose is to economically revitalize a country devastated by interventions, civil war and extreme economic experiments in the spirit of "military communism". "The future is for economically progressive, economic-creative elements," Ustryalov declares in his article "A Reply to the Left (on Loyal Cooperation in New Russia)," and he completes his thought: "... the human material that is the focus of the new Russia is emerging. This is first and foremost a peasant producer, "a strong economic peasant" ...... this is a new generation of business executives, business people from workers, co-operators ... "[30]. Ustryalov protects even the kulak, but the Soviet fist, who is a patriot of his Soviet homeland, a loyal Soviet citizen, fulfilling all obligations to the state. Despite the paradoxical nature of this thought Ustryalova, she is not without logic. Soviet propaganda of the era of collectivization tried to imagine the kulak or Nepmen as an enemy of Soviet power, dreaming of the return of the old order, of an "intraconsistent whiteguard" (and the same stamp is repeated by the current anti-Soviet, anti-communist propaganda, only by changing the estimates to the opposite). But in reality everything was much more complicated. Ustryalov stresses that the kulaks, the Nepmen, the cooperator are the same creations of the Revolution, the representatives of the new Russia as a worker or poor: "In the majority, they came out of the revolution ..." [31]. They are even more worthy of the title of Soviet and post-revolutionary class than the top of the Bolsheviks - the so-called "Leninist Guard", which for the most part consists of "the people of old Russia", from the intelligentsia of the imperial period, living, like the whole Russian intelligentsia, with phantoms and romanticism and not feeling the "living life" (Lenin, according to Ustryalov, was among them a rare exception). And in fact, why would the kulaks and Nepmen want the return of the old authorities? For what, that returned old-regime landowners and the former bourgeoisie took away their land and stores? Already the experience of the French Revolution showed that the most violent resistance of the Restoration is provided by the "new rich" class that emerged and got rich as a result of the Revolution (in fact, the French revolutionary bourgeoisie, after all, gradually undermined the royal power that had returned from the bayonets of the interventionists, and after two revolutions in France again returned to the republic). Ustryalov particularly emphasizes the benefits of cooperation between "new business executives", and broad sections of the non-communist intelligentsia, with communists for the government and their loyalty to Soviet power. [32] Nationalist Bolshevism Ustryalov also perceives as "the second Soviet ideology" intended for broad non-partisan masses who do not accept communism, but who accept the Revolution and the Soviet government that they are, patriots of the Soviet Motherland. It is not necessary that the "new bourgeoisie" is meant here, it includes both employees and non-communist intelligentsia. "We could consider the mood of these circles to be an honorable task for ourselves ... But being sincerely ready ... for the closest business work with the Soviet authorities, we allow ourselves to remain with our own view on ... the historical role of the great Russian revolution that we acceptable, but not quite as it should be in the respected "ABC of Communism," "Ustryalov writes in his article" Smenovekhizm. " It is easy to guess that, under a different understanding of the great Russian revolution, it means understanding it as a great, national revolution that has spilled out the creative powers of the Russian people and other peoples of Russia, which has renewed Russia for new, even greater achievements than in the past, including in the region economy, and not necessarily according to the "socialist" theses put forward in the party articles: "... the new Russia is born not according to the canons of party orthodoxy, but according to the laws of the real, peasant-labor revolution with the Soviet power and the Communist Party in about the chapter, but with its own content ... And if so ... then in the new Russia there is a place not only for the Communists ... Not only doctors, engineers and agronomists, but also specialists of more scrupulous regions can now apply their abilities and knowledge to the cause - with confidence that their work will not be wasted for the Motherland "[34].

But it should be repeated again: the economy for Ustryalov - in second place. If the interests of the state, its strengthening and growth require the abolition of private property so extolled by Ustryalov and the total introduction of public and state property so widely condemned by him, then he is also ready to welcome this. Therefore, in the 1930s, Ustryalov, a passionate admirer of the NEP, who had recently renounced his dithyrambs as a private owner, fervently supported the Stalinist policy of collectivization, since a state in a hostile environment is forced to save itself so extreme measures, and hence all the people from foreign enslavement (remember, Stalin's famous phrase: "if we for 10-15 years at any cost do not reach the technical level of the West, we will be dashed").
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Sorelianism - National-Syndicalism

"You got Communism in my Fascism! No, you got Fascism in my Communism!"

What It Is
A proto-Fascist ideology based off of the writings of French Syndicalist philosopher Georges Sorel (1847-1922), it is a synthesis of Nationalism and Syndicalism. Sorelianism hates with a passion the new ideas that came out of the 18th century: The Enlightenment, democracy, universal suffrage, individual rights, an elected government, secularism, pluralism, questioning of authority, and so on. Sorel concluded that looking at Marxism from a Proletariat point of view had failed, so Marxists should examine the "Super-Structure" of society instead of the people. Sorel arrived at the fact that the cornerstones of society are religion, law, and government control, and that protecting these institutions as part of revolutionary theory is more important than individual lives.

Sorel proposed a centralized empire that has a Syndicalist economy mixed with Anarchist elements but is incredibly conservative. It was his belief that the "imperialist working class" will lead the charge to destroy the Bourgeoisie in a general strike, and will then proceed to enforce their will and establish a "new aristocracy" for the betterment of civilization. By purging the Bourgeoisie and the entirety of intellectualism along with them, an Ubermensch ideology will emerge to lead humanity into a Golden Age. Sorel considered all other ideologies to be oppressive by nature, and Sorelianism as the only ideology of the truly free.

As Collectivist Villains
The complete destruction of the ideas of individualism is kind of a giveaway on this one, what with the 1984-esque levels of authoritarian elitism and control. Sorelianism was well received by both Socialists, Integralists and Fascists, and Mussolini at one point personally credited Georges Sorel for being one of the main inspirations for Fascism. Sorelianism is the government personification of Nietzscheism in many ways: the strong rule the weak for the good of all, and the strong only help others as a nationalistic duty. In practice Sorelianism would be a highly destabilizing force, as it makes no issue of hiding its complete disgust with all other ideologies. Although militarism would not be encouraged as an element of Sorelianism, the military would still be amply used.

As Collectivist Good Guys
Sorelianism, to its credit, does (paradoxically) have a liberty streak in it, as Sorel partially embraced Anarchism. While the central authority would have complete control in a Sorelian state, the economy would still be partially autonomous in the form of unions, factories, and other means of production being managed by the workers. Communes that are generally independent but answerable to the central authority are acceptable. Sorel felt that the American-style "warrior-individualism, animated by the spirit of liberty" was worth emulating on an individual level.


Proletariat violence... is at the service of the immemorial interests of civilization.
The name Strasserism came to be applied to the form of Nazism that developed around the Strasser brothers. Although they had been involved in the creation of the National Socialist Program of 1920, both called on the party to commit to "breaking the shackles of finance capital". This opposition to "Jewish finance capitalism", which they contrasted to "productive capitalism", was shared by Hitler himself, who borrowed it from Gottfried Feder.

This populist and antisemitic form of anti-capitalism was further developed in 1925 when Otto Strasser published the Nationalsozialistische Briefe, which discussed notions of class conflict, wealth redistribution and a possible alliance with the Soviet Union. His 1930 follow-up Ministersessel oder Revolution (Cabinet Seat or Revolution) went further by attacking Hitler's betrayal of the socialist aspect of Nazism as well as criticizing the notion of Führerprinzip. Whilst Gregor Strasser echoed many of the calls of his brother, his influence on the ideology is less, owing to his remaining in the Nazi Party longer and to his early death. Meanwhile, Otto Stasser continued to expand his argument, calling for the break-up of large estates and the development of something akin to a guild system and the related establishment of a Reich cooperative chamber to take a leading role in economic planning.

Strasserism therefore became a distinct strand of Nazism that whilst holding on to previous Nazi ideals such as palingenetic ultranationalism and antisemitism, added a strong critique of capitalism and framed this in the demand for a more "socialist-based" approach to economics.

However, it is disputed whether Strasserism was a distinct form of Nazism. According to historian Ian Kershaw, "the leaders of the SA [which included Gregor Strasser] did not have another vision of the future of Germany or another politic to propose". The Strasserites advocated the radicalization of the Nazi regime and the toppling of the German elites, calling Hitler's rise to power a "half-revolution", which needed to be completed.
Very interesting post. Are you the writer of this article?

It would be fascinating to consider what might happen if Ustryalovism became the Soviet ideology in the 1930s.

It is unlikely - Ustryalov himself wrote that Stalin is too revolutionary -
Farewell, antediluvian, underground, genuine revolutionism! Hello, new, beautiful, great state loyalty! Long live zeal instead of the heart and quote instead of the head! Glory to the eternal words of the statement: "taken unanimously." <...> We go further. Well, well, the party is revolutionary and obezdozhena and moribund. But her "master"? Yes, there's a catch. Now her leadership is still of an old-revolutionary style. Stalin formally implemented Thermidor and formally prepared the Brumaire. Well, in essence? The most interesting stage of our great revolution begins. Organizationally, the revolution has been killed. Politically, she lives; - Let them be camphor injections, but they live. Moreover: we are now experiencing a period of late, artificial extremism, almost a relapse of the peasant civil war. The country is in a fever. Stalin himself is a man of the "brain" and "iron cohort," a man of revolutionary will and an old underground. Now the whole question is whether this person will be able to give the country a real Thermidor and a real Brumaire. If so, it will color itself a great and brilliant period of Russian history. If not, he will perish by the Russian Robespierre; most of all, one fine day his own donkeys, eager for quiet stalls, will bark. <...> Donkeys need stories. But the prophet, their leader, should be her intimate and direct attorney. Till now - three years - Comrade Stalin was it. Is it also suitable for the next stage? It would be nice to answer yes. I'm afraid, however, that history will say no: he is too "honest" for Bonaparte ... and somewhat old-fashioned. Although ... wait and see. "
No ... Oh, I forgot the link.

Wow. Someone posted all that to their twitter?

It is unlikely - Ustryalov himself wrote that Stalin is too revolutionary

Well, I can't see someone outside the party influencing Bolshevik ideology in the 30s. So we'd either need to have Ustryalov join the party during the civil war and become an ideologue for Stalin or we'd need someone with similar ideas rise to a similar position. In either case, whatever ideology resulted would have to show due deference to Stalin and Lenin and be more enthusiastic about the revolution itself.

Hmmmm. You know... I wonder if some sort of Ustryalovism could become the main ideology of a Russia where the Bolshevik revolution in October/November hadn't happened? Lately I've been considering such a scenario, where Russia democratically moves from the Provisional Government to being ruled by the Soviets who in turn are dominated by the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and SRs. I could see an ideology like this gaining popularity during the 1930s as a more open and democratic Russia suffered from the Great Depression...


Deleted member 14881

I could see in a situation where Ustryalov defects to the Bolsheviks in mid-revolution I can see him getting a job within the party and being an ideologue for the Soviet Union. But to have a more direct analogue to Bonapartism you would need an Red Army Junta. After all, Ustryalov thought Stalin was too revolutionary. Although a TL in which the USSR becomes more Nazbol or in this case Leninist-Ustryalovist would be interesting. If Stalin isn't a perfect fit could Fyodor Sergeyev be the Napoleon?
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Fyodor Sergeyev
Comrade Artem? No - this is one of the real Bolsheviks, fought for the working class in Australia. Bonaparte of the Russian Revolution will be one of Stalin's expelled or Generals of the Second World War.

As for the army - not all fit. We need people like Zhukov or Konev.

Deleted member 14881

Comrade Artem? No - this is one of the real Bolsheviks, fought for the working class in Australia. Bonaparte of the Russian Revolution will be one of Stalin's expelled or Generals of the Second World War.

As for the army - not all fit. We need people like Zhukov or Konev.

When you say Stalin's expelled do you mean the purged military officers or the purged party members? A post-WW2 military coup would be difficult to pull off well since isn't that what the Commissars and the NKVD are designed to prevent?

Let's say Ustraylov defects to the Bolsheviks circa 1919 or 1920 and becomes an ideologue for the USSR whats stopping him from getting purged anyway. I could see him trying to make Soviet rhetoric more to his liking, but if he thinks Stalin is too "infected with Jacobinism" then he is going to be disappointed.
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When you say Stalin's expelled do you mean the purged military officers or the purged party members? A post-WW2 military coup would be difficult to pull off well since isn't that what the Commissars and the NKVD are designed to prevent?
In fact, the military was an influential force in the Soviet state apparatus.

Deleted member 14881

In fact, the military was an influential force in the Soviet state apparatus.

True, however being influential in the Soviet hierarchy is one thing. However planning and succeeding with a coup is another. What did you think of my Ustralyov defects to the Bolsheviks but still gets purged idea. I'm working on a scernario that is making a National Bolshevik USSR possible.
True, however being influential in the Soviet hierarchy is one thing. However planning and succeeding with a coup is another. What did you think of my Ustralyov defects to the Bolsheviks but still gets purged idea. I'm working on a scernario that is making a National Bolshevik USSR possible.
I'll be glad to help!