Financial constraints were never a major limitation for France. In the
period from 1918 to 1935 France spent on defense a larger percentage of
its gross domestic product then any other great power. Although Germany
spent more than France in its defense expenditures after 1936, much of the
cost was due to the fact that Germany was purchasing new stocks of basic
equipment, while the French Army already had considerable equipment
stocks at its disposal. Still, France did not readily accept a position behind
Germany and the French increased their defense budget from 12.657
billion francs in 1935 to 14.848 in 1936, 21.235 in 1937, 28.976 in 1938 and
93.687 in 1939. One can conclude that the French defense system did
not suffer from inadequate financing.
Of course, France could have spent more money on its defense needs. But
more money would not have necessarily resulted in a better state of
preparation for war. One cannot see how large financial resources might
have resulted in any fundamental changes in any of the defense sectors.
More money would not have resulted in the development of more modern
vehicles, a different doctrine or wider acceptance of mobile concepts of
war, or encouraged decentralized command and control relationships. In
short, France’s economical and financial situation in the interwar period
was adequate and certainly was not the source of disastrous defeat of 1940.