Victory at Waterloo

Personally I find the *if Napoleon won Waterloo he was bound to lose against the Austrians and Russians* to be painfully tedious. Mainly because there is so rarely a timeline about it, its just given as fact and then all complexity is abandoned.

I accept its very possible. It might even be likely. The truth is however that the coalitions argueably should have defeated France almost every single time and yet failed rather spectactually on numerous occasions. If they have to bring Napoleon to battle then in everything is in flux, little is as subject to chance as battle in the Napoleonic era. Have the right person killed by some stray fire and anything can happen. If Napoleons opponents are too cautious to risk a decisive battle without overwhelming superiority, as they were in 1814, then Napoleon has potentially several months to raise fresh French forces to continue the struggle.

Lets assume that Waterloo is not just a victory, but a crushing victory. How isn't a major concern, a sudden panic for one reason or another is perfectly possible. A rout turning into an out and out massacre certainly wouldn't be unprecedented. If both the British and Prussians are crushed they are out of it for atleast the medium term. This view that the British would just write it off as a loss and shell out yet more gold for the allies might be too simplistic, parliament could certainly have a major shock at the news with potentially demoralising consequences.

On the otherhand this view that it would somehow result in the Pax Britannica being still born seems false. The continental powers are still not going to launch a major challenge to RN or industrialise at any greater speed regardless of whether Napoleon survives or not. The situation where the industrialised British have a quasi informal empire over most of the globe shall remain.

What would victory at Waterloo do for Napoleon? Well nothing is good for a myth like success. If many people in France (and Belgium and throughout Europe) were half-hearted about Napoleon's return and felt he was certain to be finished a brilliant and total victory is likely to convince them otherwise. In many ways Napoleon has been in retreat and his 'myth' has been being stamped on since 1812. If this is a second Austerlitz or Jena then once again he is riding high.

While the coalition may have been convinced they had to crush Napoleon they hadn't yet moved to the stage where they could say 'no matter the cost'. They didn't want to secure some Pyrric victory which would allow their rivals to pocket all the worthwhile spoils. Wasn't there a serious risk of war breaking out between the powers before Napoleons return? Those thoughts won't vanish completely. In the face of this defeat they are more likely to come to the fore than suddenly recede in a display of European solidarity.
 
Please read my previous posts. The point is that Napoleon has a chance is the prussian army is desroyed as a fighting force AND if the victory causes a change in the british government, which will then not be inclined to waste english taxes in an infinite cycle of wars.

The thing is though, the Prussian Army only clashed on the French flank, the British, Belgians, and Dutch fighting on the centre and taking up the majority of the French resources. If Napoleon had managed to repulse the British, he then would have had to deal with a Prussian Army that was just turning up, in a much fresher condition than the French. Napoleon just might have been able to repulse them but such was the condition of his troops, I find it very doubtful over whether he could have destroyed the Prussian Army.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Personally I find the *if Napoleon won Waterloo he was bound to lose against the Austrians and Russians* to be painfully tedious. Mainly because there is so rarely a timeline about it, its just given as fact and then all complexity is abandoned.

I accept its very possible. It might even be likely. The truth is however that the coalitions argueably should have defeated France almost every single time and yet failed rather spectactually on numerous occasions. If they have to bring Napoleon to battle then in everything is in flux, little is as subject to chance as battle in the Napoleonic era. Have the right person killed by some stray fire and anything can happen. If Napoleons opponents are too cautious to risk a decisive battle without overwhelming superiority, as they were in 1814, then Napoleon has potentially several months to raise fresh French forces to continue the struggle.

Lets assume that Waterloo is not just a victory, but a crushing victory. How isn't a major concern, a sudden panic for one reason or another is perfectly possible. A rout turning into an out and out massacre certainly wouldn't be unprecedented. If both the British and Prussians are crushed they are out of it for atleast the medium term. This view that the British would just write it off as a loss and shell out yet more gold for the allies might be too simplistic, parliament could certainly have a major shock at the news with potentially demoralising consequences.

On the otherhand this view that it would somehow result in the Pax Britannica being still born seems false. The continental powers are still not going to launch a major challenge to RN or industrialise at any greater speed regardless of whether Napoleon survives or not. The situation where the industrialised British have a quasi informal empire over most of the globe shall remain.

What would victory at Waterloo do for Napoleon? Well nothing is good for a myth like success. If many people in France (and Belgium and throughout Europe) were half-hearted about Napoleon's return and felt he was certain to be finished a brilliant and total victory is likely to convince them otherwise. In many ways Napoleon has been in retreat and his 'myth' has been being stamped on since 1812. If this is a second Austerlitz or Jena then once again he is riding high.

While the coalition may have been convinced they had to crush Napoleon they hadn't yet moved to the stage where they could say 'no matter the cost'. They didn't want to secure some Pyrric victory which would allow their rivals to pocket all the worthwhile spoils. Wasn't there a serious risk of war breaking out between the powers before Napoleons return? Those thoughts won't vanish completely. In the face of this defeat they are more likely to come to the fore than suddenly recede in a display of European solidarity.

Pre 1809 the French indeed often performed some surprising results, outwitting enemies greatly superior in numbers and sometimes also in quality of the individual soldier. The French simply were better in manoeuvring large forces in the field - achieving superiority where the battle was and giving a damn about all the other places.

By 1815 that disparity had long since passed, the allies had learned a lot and generally fought along the same operational doctrines and with staff systems at least as efficient as the French. The Prussian Generalstab system won fame and by late Nap. wars the Austrian General Quartiermeisterstab also was both professional and efficient, and all (perhaps except the Zar) had learned that a certain amount of caution usually paid off vs. the French. This did not make it impossible for the French to win battles, but decisive victories like Ulm, Austerlitz or Jena/Auerstedt would be extremely unlikely. IOW campaigns would be attritional and the biggest guy would eventually win - even if loosing al the battles.

Next France by 1815 was scraping the bottom resource wise - actually French demographics broke already then, WWI only added the final drop, and finances were in shambles too.

The other European countries of course were exhausted too, but mainly the former French allies. Austria, despite having gone broke in 1811, probably in 1815 fielded the best army ever by the Empire, and the Bavarians, despite having been involved almost continously and loosing most of the army in 1812, in 1815 fielded the biggest army yet - 50.000 men in splendid order and appearance.

The French army of 1815 probably was better than the "Marie-Louises" of 1814, but had no quality edge over the allies.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Pre 1809 the French indeed often performed some surprising results, outwitting enemies greatly superior in numbers and sometimes also in quality of the individual soldier. The French simply were better in manoeuvring large forces in the field - achieving superiority where the battle was and giving a damn about all the other places.

By 1815 that disparity had long since passed, the allies had learned a lot and generally fought along the same operational doctrines and with staff systems at least as efficient as the French. The Prussian Generalstab system won fame and by late Nap. wars the Austrian General Quartiermeisterstab also was both professional and efficient, and all (perhaps except the Zar) had learned that a certain amount of caution usually paid off vs. the French. This did not make it impossible for the French to win battles, but decisive victories like Ulm, Austerlitz or Jena/Auerstedt would be extremely unlikely. IOW campaigns would be attritional and the biggest guy would eventually win - even if loosing al the battles.

Next France by 1815 was scraping the bottom resource wise - actually French demographics broke already then, WWI only added the final drop, and finances were in shambles too.

The other European countries of course were exhausted too, but mainly the former French allies. Austria, despite having gone broke in 1811, probably in 1815 fielded the best army ever by the Empire, and the Bavarians, despite having been involved almost continously and loosing most of the army in 1812, in 1815 fielded the biggest army yet - 50.000 men in splendid order and appearance.

The French army of 1815 probably was better than the "Marie-Louises" of 1814, but had no quality edge over the allies.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

A large part of the French pre-1808 success was the 2 years the "Army of England" spent drilling and preparing for their invasion. When turned towards Austria they were incredibly well drilled and trained troops, on a par with British regulars (probably better in fact). However the campaigns of 1805-8 spent those troops, and Napoleon left what remained in Spain.

The new army formed for his 1809 campaign was primarily undertrained raw recruits, with a vast increase in the scales of artillery to compensate. While some state that his opponents had learnt his art by the time of Wagram (partially true), it's equally true that the French Army of 1809 was a pale shadow of the 1805 army. The vast storm columns were compensation for the French lack of quality.

Increasingly Napoleon became dependent on the well trained regular armies of his absorbed client states (especially Poland, who alone were ca 1/7th of the Imperial Forces).

In 1815, it is reckoned by many better than me that Napoleon's Armee du Nord was the best quality army he'd handled since 1806. However, he largely continued the tactics developed for his army after 1808.

Napoleon had 326 National Guard Bns (mostly 4-500 strong) being drilled, as well as the reserve battalions of the line etc. Given a little longer he may have gained half a million poorly drilled troops.

Although perhaps he should have gone earlier and assisted Murat....
 
Why fight the inevitable

A French victory at Waterloo while possible wasn't probable. Napoleon wasn't the man he had been nor was his army. What Napoleon may have wanted was a negotiated peace favorable to France, but this wasn't likely. The only European power that had any respect for Napoleon in 1815 was Britain. Most of the troops under Wellington's command were Dutch and German, not British. Britain was broke and had designated the bulk of its army (and Irish reserves) for operations in America when Napoleon broke out of Elba. (Talk about bad timing.) As others have pointed out here, the Prussians and Russians were tired of having to fight the French and would have punished France for any short-term victory in the field. A French victory at Waterloo may well have meant a Prussian occupation, not a British one. Wellington and the British did show respect for the French. Could the same have been said for a Prussian occupation? Would the Dutch, Austrians and British (along with her Saxon allies) have come to France's rescue from a harsh and vengeful occupier? Maybe. Could this have led to a military east-west divide in Europe? Would Italy have been sympathetic to a revived French cause? Would America, at peace with Britain, have joined her former enemy if that meant coming to the defense of France? One thing's for sure, there would have been Hell to pay for a French victory at Waterloo. "The only victories which leave no regret are those which are gained over ignorance." -- Napoleon Bonaparte.
 
Strangest thing...I was just thinking about Naploean. He would probably just be dumb enough to attack either Russia or Englanfd.
 
Napoleon is defeated by Austria and Russia and they rewrite the map of Europe. Britain stays out of Europe and concentrates on her empire
 
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