Vichy France and Fascist Italy v The British Empire

cumbria

Banned
Before the decision to invade Great Britain had been made, the German Naval Staff prepared a general program for base expansion and ship construction designed to make Germany a pre-eminent naval power in the Atlantic. In plans prepared for conferences with Hitler on 20 June and 11 July, the Navy advocated annexation of Iceland and its exploitation as a naval and air base; development of bases either in the Azores or in both the Canary and Cape Verde Islands; creation of a large united German colonial empire in central Africa; and construction of an Atlantic battleship force that would neutralize British and American naval power. In his discussion with Hitler on 11 July, the commander in chief of the German Navy, Admiral Erich Raeder, pointed out the particular importance of Dakar as a base for conducting warfare in the Atlantic. Hider at this time seems to have gone no further toward approving these proposals than expressing a desire "to acquire one of the Canary Islands from Spain in exchange for French Morocco." Until he decided to invade England, Hitler himself seems to have taken comparatively little interest in plans for expansion into Africa or extension of German naval power in the Atlantic. His brief interest in Iceland expired when he was told by his advisers that it would be impossible to construct airfields there. As already noted, Great Britain had begun a military occupation of Iceland on 10 May, and by the end of July relatively strong British and Canadian contingents had been brought in to defend the island-a factor that undoubtedly also contributed to the German decision not to attempt its invasion.
The other measures advocated by the German Navy became more attractive to the Nazi Fuehrer, primarily as adjuncts to a showdown fight with Great Britain. Fortunately for the United States, Hitler seems to have had very little realization of the strategic significance of German bases in French West Africa and on the eastern Atlantic islands for their own sake. Germany's military attache in the United States during the prewar period, General Friedrich von Boetticher, stated after the war that, following the fall of France in 1940, he had stressed in his reports the strategic significance of controlling the South Atlantic-African-Red Sea belt. But, he added, Hitler and his intimate advisers
. . . had no clear idea of the geographical requisites for a world war. The significance of the British Empire's life-line through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, and the importance of the Middle East were not grasped at the time .... There was also no clear idea of the strategic significance of the narrowing of the Atlantic Ocean between Brazil and Africa, and of the land and air routes across central Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.
On 10 July the German Air Force began its assault in force on Britain. After 16 July the German Army and Navy staffs worked feverishly on invasion plans, for they realized that an invasion must either take place in the early fall or be postponed at least until the following spring. At the same time, the Germans attempted to secure a revision of the armistice arrangements with France in order to obtain French consent to the establishment of German bases in southern France and along the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts of French North Africa. From their beginning Hitler appears to have viewed the preparations for a full-scale Atlantic war with misgivings. On 13 July General Halder recorded in his journal:
...the Fuehrer is greatly puzzled by Britain's persisting unwillingness to make peace. He sees the answer (as we do) in Britain's hope on Russia, 'and therefore counts on having to compel her by main force to agree to peace. Actually that is much against his grain. The reason is that a military defeat of Britain will bring about the disintegration of the British Empire. This would not be of any benefit to Germany. German blood would be shed to accomplish something that would benefit only Japan, the United States and others.
Very quickly Hitler came to the conclusion that Britain's reason for continuing the war was its hope for aid from the United States and the Soviet Union. He discounted the ability of the United States to render much aid to Britain, and he assumed that the British did also; the Russians were another matter. As of 21 July, the Nazi Fuehrer felt that Britain's obduracy could best be overcome by confronting the British with a political front embracing Spain, Italy, and the Soviet Union.
Ten days later, after the German Army and Navy had presented their blueprints for an invasion of England, Hitler arrived at a very different decision. While the Army and Navy told him that they could undertake an invasion in September, provided that Britain had been sufficiently softened up by air bombardment, that the Germans had gained air superiority over the invasion area, that the weather was extremely favorable, etc., etc., it was rather clear that neither the German land nor sea forces had any stomach for the invasion project. Neither did Hitler. The alternative to invasion was a long, drawn-out effort to reduce the British Isles by air and submarine action, which would take at least a year or two. Again observing that Britain's hope for survival lay in the prospect of aid from the Soviet Union and the United States, Hitler came to the conclusion that by beating the Russians first he could knock out both props that sustained the British: by eliminating the Soviet Union as a Far Eastern power, he would enormously strengthen the power of Japan, and by thus increasing the peril to American interests in the Pacific, would stay any American intervention in the European war. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, initially the partner-in-conquest of Nazi Germany, had shown increasing signs of restiveness and distrust since the fall of France. "With Russia smashed," Hitler is reported to have said, "Britain's last hope would be shattered." Therefore, the Fuehrer concluded: "Russia's destruction must . . . be made a part of this struggle. Spring 41.
Despite Hitler's stated decision on 31 July 1940 to turn against the Soviet Union, preparations for the English invasion went on during August and early September, the period of the "Battle of Britain." But the German Air Force did not knock out British airpower, the first and most important prerequisite for a successful invasion. In mid-September Hitler virtually decided on the indefinite postponement of the invasion of Great Britain, though at the same time he ordered a continuance of invasion preparations and kept these in motion until mid-October. The air bombardment of Britain was also maintained, but on a diminished scale after October .
 
Despite Hitler's stated decision on 31 July 1940 to turn against the Soviet Union, preparations for the English invasion went on during August and early September, the period of the "Battle of Britain." But the German Air Force did not knock out British airpower, the first and most important prerequisite for a successful invasion. In mid-September Hitler virtually decided on the indefinite postponement of the invasion of Great Britain, though at the same time he ordered a continuance of invasion preparations and kept these in motion until mid-October. The air bombardment of Britain was also maintained, but on a diminished scale after October .

And why did the german airforce not destroy the RAF? Because Hitler ordered the attacks against them to cease and instead focused his attention on bombing cities to force the British to accept his surrender terms. Had he ever been serious about an invasion then he would not have diverted his planes and would have continued to attack purely military targets.
Also, no matter what the German generals may have said about increasing their ship building etc there was no realistic way that they could have done it in the given time frame. It takes months to build a ship at least, so any invasion (which would require huge numbers of ships) would be put back for years as they waited for new construction to become available. Which would also have given the British more time to rebuild their army and prepare defences.
Lets not forget that during D-day the allies had over 6000 ships, most of which were supply vessels. The nazis had nothing like this available and so wouldnt be able to supply their troops even assuming that they landed. And that was in doubt given that they had no landing craft or troop transports and only had available a fleet of flat bottomed river barges that only a madman and an idiot would send over the open seas. If it was tried then they would suffer massive casualties from even the lightest of bad weather, something that the English Channel is famous for.

Furthermore the D-day landings took years of planning and preparation, and while yes they were intending to attack a fotified coast line an operation of this size is not something you can pull together overnight. So not starting to plan the operation until mid 1940 would mean it would be virtually impossible to launch it within 6 months. It took 6 months of planning before operation barbarossa and that was a straight forward land assault!

Look at it this way, to launch a successful sea invasion you need four things:
the ability to transport a sufficient invasion force to the landing zone,
the ability to supply that force once it has landed,
air superiority,
the ability to protect the invasion force and its supply lines from enemy naval attack.
The nazis made a short token effort to gain air superiority, and never possesd the other 3 at all.

All in all Operation Sealion was nothing more than a smokescreen to try and encourage the British to surrender and seek a peace treaty. It was never a realistic threat to worry about (although this may not have been obvious at the time).

Even had Hitler been serious about an invasion, strategically it would have been a stupid decision to make given the state of the world at the time. Actually it would go beyond stupid!
Britain was no longer an immediate threat. They couldnt invade mainland europe for years due to their material losses in France, and their navy didnt pose much direct threat to Germany itself. Why waste time and effort on someone thats not a threat anymore when you have the USSR sat right on your borders?
Any plans concerning Gibraltar, Malta and control of the Med are minor side-shows and the manpower requirements for these would not prevent an invasion of Russia at the same time. Your argument that had these agreements been reached then there would have been a delay in the attack on russia dont make sense. you certainly wouldnt need 4 million troops, 4000 tanks etc to take gibraltar!
 
"All in all Operation Sealion was nothing more than a smokescreen to try and encourage the British to surrender and seek a peace treaty. It was never a realistic threat to worry about (although this may not have been obvious at the time)."

Preparations for Sealion were also meant to impress Stalin that Hitler was busy in the West.

What was that that cumbria posted? From one of Norman Goda's books? I like cumbria's ideas about drawing in the French. They were very reluctant and ultimately refused German requests for developing facilities in Morocco. But maybe if the Germans had gained control of Spanish Morocco and made the French trade route from Marseille and through the Straits of Gibraltar secure from British harrassment, that might have opened Morocco.

Alien and Sedition Bat Alien and Sedition Bat on
August 6th, 2010, 03:59 PM wrote:

"The one feasible thing in this cockamamie scheme is that the Germans could gain sub havens on the Moroccan coast, but I doubt the French would agree to German troops in Morocco, and the Germans can't get troops to Morocco on their own--they have no transport. Perhaps a token force to man anti-aircraft guns over a few harbors? Even a token force would enrage Franco and make him even less willing to join the war.

Let's say the Vichy French help the U-boats in all of French West Africa. Well, in OTL the Free French took French Equatorial Africa pretty quickly. The Brits and the FF tried to take Dakar in a hastily planned attempt, failed, and didn't try again. But the prospect of U-boat havens would cause them to try again and do it right, like at Madagascar. My guess would be FF, South African, and native troops marching north and taking Dakar from the land side with bombardment from the sea by the RN."

South African troops would have to have been diverted from their historical use in East Africa and North Africa. Any other diversions? So would there be a subsequent drive up the West African coast toward Morocco?
 
Hitler after the fall of France first looked to an invasion of England, then intervention with Italy, then to Franco and action in Gibraltar and finally after being denied action on all these fronts decided finally to attack the USSR in December 1941.

Incorrect.
The army was told in early September that Russia was going to be attacked and started detailed planning accordingly.
 
That is indeed the case and some thing that played on his mind.
But the options of attacking in 1942 also has the possitives.
North Africa could be all in Axis hands.
The Middle East may have been over ran.
Turkey and Spain may come into the war.
Etc.

You really havent been paying attention, have you? :p

NA in axis hands. Big fat hairy deal....
Middle East overrun in months. *sigh* Using WHAT for a transportation network? Camels? Logistics rules here....
Turkey and Spain, not being entirely stupid. will keep both sides hoping they will just as in OTL while not having any intention of getting involved.
 
Indeed as British Admiral Somerville said about Operation Catapult "...the biggest political blunder of modern times and will rouse the whole world against us...we all feel thoroughly ashamed..."
"Every member of the Senate approves Churchill's course and applauds his courage in preventing the use of the French Navy by Hitler. It was the fear that this step would not be taken that shook the confidence of some as to the power of British defence"- Senator Key Pittman
"Now that the French fleet has been dealt with, the British are no longer talking about 'beleaguered Great Britain', but are professing pity for Hitler on the 'beleaguered continent'" - Brigadier Robert Lee, American military attache in London.
 
Astrodragon wrote:

"NA in axis hands. Big fat hairy deal...."

But that would eventually make Torch much more difficult if not impossible.
 
No, it would mean that once the British and American fleets controlled the Med an even larger number of Axis troops are herded into the POW camps. The major result is that France is treated as a defeated enemy at the end of the war.
 
No, it would mean that once the British and American fleets controlled the Med an even larger number of Axis troops are herded into the POW camps. The major result is that France is treated as a defeated enemy at the end of the war.

I won't discount the ultimate outcome of the war you predict, but there is something to cumbria's suggestion that Hitler could have coaxed more cooperation out of the French. They would have been, and indeed were a near useless ally to have in northwest Africa. It was poor strategy to leave the Axis rear guarded solely by the French. After fighting was finished in France, Hitler tried to be a peacemaker, successfully throwing a wet towel on Spanish aspirations for French northwest African territory but not Mussolini's fantasies. And he tried to keep friendly relations with all three Latin friends but IMHO that was a mistake. He should have invaded Spain, but that's another thread :)
 
Spain had no such aspirations as both the Spanish and Franco himself remembered the Rif War(1921-1926) which took the efforts of 300,000 French and Spanish troops only too well.

Franco's demands on French territory, along with gigantic levels of economic support, most of which Spain would have required had it entered the war, had the sole purpose of raising the bar too high for Hitler to even consider it. In fact, after the meeting which Hitler left stating he would prefer having teeth removed than a repeat, Franco further raised his requirements in the very slight case he hadn't already demanded too much.

Hitler could not have coaxed more out of the French. Once he stole Alsace-Lorraine, without even bothering to have the change mentioned in the armistice(!), there was no chance of France becoming friendly. And then there would be the small problem of improving relations with France requiring Hitler permitting France to begin rearming...so France would be the golden goose of the occupation zones but no more.
 
Ideas that Hitler could get more from France, or have an allied Spain, even assuming for a moment Franco goe temporarily insane, founder on one unavoidable point.
France was an economic basket case after 1940 not because Germany wanted it to be - they rather liked the idea of France building stuff for them (granted, they werent going to pay for it, but still..), because Germany simply couldnt supply the oil and coal necessary to allow French industry (and farming) to produce at anything near pre-war levels.
Franco was getting fed from NA. Germany was so short on food production that even in the existing occupied countries there wasnt enough food - so adding another 30 million Spaniards is going to be SO helpful. Franco knew this, and wasnt going to do more than the bare minimum to make Hitler hope he would soon ally with him.

Thanks to the irremediable problems of not enough oil or coal (and food, some to that), any increase in the size of the population Hitler has to treat as allies is likley to simply make the whole shaky structure collapse.
Of course, I guess you could somehow expect a France starving and without power to be a grateful and loyal ally, but somehow I doubt this.

Indeed, given that one of the reasons the Italian fleet stayed in harbour so much was lack of fuel, having additional French warships is rather pointless (untell you plan on towing them with rowing boats....)
 
There is a tale that Stohrer, the German ambassador at Madrid, on a visit to the offices of Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister Beigbeder (the day in June after the Spanish unilaterally began a military occupation of Tangier which included a full military parade, Falangist salutes and anti-French demonstrations in the evening) found him in a planning session for an invasion of French Morocco. There were negotiations in September between France and Spain in which even substantial cessions of territory in French Morocco were rejected by Franco. Moroccan nationalist leaders received active encouragement from Spain against French rule. Beigbeder's successor in October at Foreign Affairs, Serrano Suner, insisted that the fall of France offered unprecedented opportunities for Spanish territorial expansion in Africa. Spanish writers justified this with the usual irredentist claims common in the 1930s.

Franco had more than aspirations, he demanded French Morocco, Oran, and more. On the other hand, Hitler had big plans for Morocco: eight airfields near Casablanca plus unrestricted use of all ports and railways, but Franco responded to German demands with nothing other than an offer of a 99 year lease to Germany for the port at Mogador. Hitler and company wanted to treat Spain in a semi-colonial manner and couldn't tolerate such an attitude from Franco which was especially manifest at Hendaye.

Hitler and Ribbentrop threw a wet blanket on Franco's aspirations because they wanted to keep the French onside. So they made it plain that Spain could only get a minor border adjustment. That was the real reason Franco balked at letting the Germans have a crack at Gibraltar. Morocco after all was from where Franco sprang to power. It was very important to him. Suner attested that his brother-in-law would gladly have entered the war in return for possession of Morocco.
 
Top