Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty's battlecruiser squadrons were sunk

Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty's battlecruiser squadrons were sunk at the Battle of Jutland , with only loss on the German side being 1 BattleCruiser and some minor ships .
The Battlecruiser Fleet under David Beatty: six battlecruisers, four fast Queen Elizabeth-class battleships, 14 light cruisers and 27 destroyers was sunk as they ran into the German High sea Fleet and the German Battlecruiser squadrons.

How Bad would this setback be for the British government and the moral of the Royal Navy .
I attempted to read the thread, but gave up at the end of the first page, so this has probably been said already.

I think the Germans couldn't sink the entire BCF. IIRC Lion had a lucky escape early on in the Battle Cruiser Action. If she had blown up like Indefatigable and Queen Mary I think there's a good chance that New Zealand, Princess Royal and Tiger would have been sunk before Evan-Thomas came to the rescue. Depending upon how quickly that happened Hipper might have had time to pick off some of the cruisers and destroyers as they fled.

However, after that the course of the battle is likely to have changed beyond recognition. There's probably a different Race to the North because Evan-Thomas probably covers the retreat of the BCF's surviving cruisers and destroyers rather than being led by Hipper into the main body of the High Sea's Fleet. If Hipper decides to chase them the HSF will be further behind when he meets the Grand Fleet. Then the GF might be able to concentrate its fire on Hipper's battle cruisers and knock them all out before Scheer arrives. Furthermore as Scheer is further behind and further south he might decide that Hipper is beyond help and turn back while he can. Plus as all the ships are likely to be in different positions he might not find himself trapped between the GF and his escape routes. Though this probably means that the British don't loose the Invincible and 3 armoured cruisers.

However, if Scheer decides to quit while he is ahead and order Hipper to break off the chase then he can return to Germany with no ships sunk and others less badly damaged than OTL, while the British have lost 6 out of 10 battle cruisers (that is including HMAS Australia which didn't take part in the battle) instead of 3 out of 10.

The only way I think that they could have sunk the Queen Elizabeths is if Hindenburg had been completed in time to participate in the battle of Jutland so that Beatty's 6 battle cruisers were wiped out even faster (which would enable Hipper to pick off more cruisers and destroyers too) and the Germans got some lucky hits on the 5th Battle Squadron before Evan-Thomas realised that he was outnumbered.

The Germans had still, "Assaulted their gaoler but were still in gaol," but they were in much better shape for a second assault having no ships sunk and none seriously damaged. While the British had lost more capital ships and still had to rectify the faults that the battle had revealed. I think the Germans would use this temporary advantage for more raids on the British East Coast. IOTL the Germans did attempt a raid on Sunderland on 19th August 1916.

I think it's unlikely that all 27 of the BCF's destroyers would have been sunk. However, if they had been that might effect the U-boat war in 1917. IOTL destroyers were taken from the Grand Fleet to escort convoys. ITTL there may be no destroyers to spare. Edit. It would have been a net loss of 19 destroyers because the Grand Fleet lost 8 destroyers in the OTL battle including 2 during the battle cruiser action.
 
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I think it's unlikely that all 27 of the BCF's destroyers would have been sunk. However, if they had been that might effect the U-boat war in 1917. IOTL destroyers were taken from the Grand Fleet to escort convoys. ITTL there may be no destroyers to spare.

The issue with bagging all the light ships (light cruisers and destroyers) is most likely the HSF would have run out of ammunition first, remember a 4% hit rate at combat ranges is outstanding and most ships did not even come close. While a destroyer cannot absorb that many 11 inch rounds you still need to land them on target to take effect. Still getting a goodly number would have been potentially disastrous for the RN in the long term.
 
As well as the battle cruiser Lützow, the Germans also lost the pre-dreadnought Pommern, 4 light cruisers and 5 destroyers. In terms of ships the loss of the light cruisers was more serious than the loss of the Pommern because the Germans didn't have enough light cruisers to screen the HSF IOTL and had to resort to using destroyers for scouting at Jultand.

If these ships survive the TTL Jutland that's a thicker screen of light cruisers for the HSF afterwards. It also means they are available to back up the destroyers in raids on the Dover Patrol or the Norwegian Convoys.

According to the Wikipaedia page German personnel losses were 2,091 to 2,101 from the ships that were sunk at Jutland IOTL. That included 839 from the Pommern, which was a more serious loss than the ship itself.
 
These are the British capital ships completed from January 1916 to the end of the war IOTL.
28/02/1916 Valiant - present at Jutland
28/02/1916 Malaya - present at Jutland
31/03/1916 Revenge - present at Jutland
31/05/1916 Royal Oak - present at Jutland
31/05/1916 Royal Sovereign - missed Jutland (IIRC due to faulty machinery)
31/08/1916 Repulse
30/09/1916 Renown
31/12/1916 Resolution
31/01/1917 Courageous
31/01/1917 Glorious
31/07/1917 Furious
30/09/1917 Ramillies - completion delayed to diversion of turrets to battle cruisers and monitors IIRC
31/05/1920 Hood​

If the British had lost more capital ships at Jutland they are likely to have tried to speed up the completion of Resolution, Ramilies and Hood. They would have also put more effort into the other 3 Hood class and might have tried to complete the second Chilean battleships as a battleship instead of as the aircraft carrier Eagle.

However, that could only be done by cutting back on other warships (which would not be an option if more cruisers and destroyers had also been sunk), merchant ships which wasn't a good idea even before the German 1917 U-boat offensive or reducing munitions production for the Army, which was undesirable too.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Blondie.

The Germans cannot sink British supply ships if they are not present on the trade lanes west of Britain (about 6000->7,000 nautical miles cruising range). The only WW I weapon they have that can do that is the U-boat. So... there will be a submarine campaign to starve the British war machine. This happens despite what you claim as justification and "success" of the HSF. And to ask the rather obvious question... If the HSF was a pure fleet in being, why offer battle or try to whittle down the Grand Fleet in a series of raids and ambushes? Ingehof and Scheer do not conform in act to what you claim was the German naval policy. They wanted to establish presence and command of the sea in the Mahanic sense.

As for keeping the British away from the Helgoland Bight; mines, torpedo boats and the airplane are sufficient enough. The coastal guns are already in place.
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Do not overthink it.

P.S. The actions in the Western Pacific, while they bear a striking resemblance to WW I, require only that one party make a treaty mistake about IRBM's (Russia) and then we'll see if the area denial strategy has a ghost of a chance of working. My educated guess is that when the ASATS fly and the Beidou constellations go dark, that it will be Mahan as usual.

The problem is not that I am over thinking it. My analysis is actually quite simple. The problem is that the "facts" you believe are simply false.

The problem is that you are reading post war literature, not prewar writings. The after the fact, often CYA, writings don't reflect the reasons. Take something more recent. Think about Bush/Cheney/Obama. If you want to know why the USA did what it did after 9/11, you need to look mostly at stuff written before 9/11 combined with statements in the early months of the war. This is gives you an accurate picture, and what I have done. The other way is to read the justifications of Bush and Friends post war. This give an inaccurate picture, and appears to be where you are sourcing your ideas from. So we need to go over things in chronological order. And not apply ideas not thought of after the war to during or before the war.
  • The naval bills were passed as a reaction to the Boer war, ego, and lesson from the Franco Prussian war. The job of the fleet was to do things like keep the British fleet out of the Baltic Sea. This goal was 100% accomplished.
  • The concept of a U-boat type war (non-cruiser rule) merchant war was unthinkable. i.e. People did not think about it. The only person that I found who predicted that all the rules were to be ignored was a German housewife who wrote a short but interesting book analyzing future wars.
  • The concept of blockading neutrals was also unthinkable. Read Captain Mahan. He has a chapter in his book showing why it was impossible to blockade Germany as long as Germany did not invade the Netherlands. Everyone assume the Germans would be able to get unlimited imports via the neutral Dutch. As people assumed Germany could not blockade all French Ports. Or British Ports. AMC type warfare was basically a survivable nuisance for all.
  • The Germans had a small submarine force. It was so unimportant that one prewar analysis of submarines just skips the Germans since the Germans are so insignificant.
  • German U-boats were an odd build. They were building as the war started long range diesel boats that had no doctrinal usage for the range. Most likely as a reaction to the safety issue of Kerosene/Gasoline. When you flip these engines to diesel, you get much longer ranges for the same space/weight.
  • If you look at German U-boat patrol pattern and sinkings, the Germans spent most of the war with their U-boats not hunting merchants. There was a few months around the Lusitania and then the part in 1917 and after. The Germans were seeking a decisive surface win. If they get this win, then the Germans keep up the pattern for at least long enough (less than 6 months more) for Russia to fall apart before USW is seriously considered.
  • Then we get the interesting discussion of how Germany wins on land. Not if.

Now as to why offer battle. The Germans did not offer battle as a strategy until 1916. And then only briefly In this year, the Austrians were struggling in the east. Verdun and the Somme were going on. The Italians were attacking constantly. The Germans switched strategies briefly and went for a quick win. If the Germans had been winning on land from the beginning, then the HSF will not leave port unless the UK parks the Grand Fleet in the German Blight or the UK does amphibious operations against Germany proper.

There is also the issue of you are misunderstanding Mahanic. You are arguing something called Mahan Strategy which is really how the Japanese used his strategy. Mahan is still alive in this time period, so we don't have to guess what he thought. We can just read his analysis of future war in Europe. It is not filled with decisive battle predictions. Mahan recognized that different powers had different needs and would give different recommendations for different countries. Complete with different strategies.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
These are the British capital ships completed from January 1916 to the end of the war IOTL.
28/02/1916 Valiant - present at Jutland
28/02/1916 Malaya - present at Jutland
31/03/1916 Revenge - present at Jutland
31/05/1916 Royal Oak - present at Jutland
31/05/1916 Royal Sovereign - missed Jutland (IIRC due to faulty machinery)
31/08/1916 Repulse
30/09/1916 Renown
31/12/1916 Resolution
31/01/1917 Courageous
31/01/1917 Glorious
31/07/1917 Furious
30/09/1917 Ramillies - completion delayed to diversion of turrets to battle cruisers and monitors IIRC
31/05/1920 Hood​

If the British had lost more capital ships at Jutland they are likely to have tried to speed up the completion of Resolution, Ramilies and Hood. They would have also put more effort into the other 3 Hood class and might have tried to complete the second Chilean battleships as a battleship instead of as the aircraft carrier Eagle.

However, that could only be done by cutting back on other warships (which would not be an option if more cruisers and destroyers had also been sunk), merchant ships which wasn't a good idea even before the German 1917 U-boat offensive or reducing munitions production for the Army, which was undesirable too.

UK still has plenty of cruisers to allow more BB construction. Just look at the number of remaining German cruisers world wide versus UK. What happens after the loss of many cruisers world wide is the UK has to strip other fleets of cruisers. Take the Med. The combined French/Italian navy is more than big enough to handle A-H. The UK does not actually need a single cruiser or capital ship in this ocean.
 
UK still has plenty of cruisers to allow more BB construction. Just look at the number of remaining German cruisers world wide versus UK. What happens after the loss of many cruisers world wide is the UK has to strip other fleets of cruisers. Take the Med. The combined French/Italian navy is more than big enough to handle A-H. The UK does not actually need a single cruiser or capital ship in this ocean.
I disagree on all points. Furthermore, you haven't addressed the potential reduction in the production of destroyers, merchant shipping and/or munitions for the Army in the last two years of the war which are of greater consequence.
 
What limited the German dreadnoughts was their bunkerage capacity and inability to coal at sea. Don't overthink it.

The dreadnought logistics problems were not insurmountable even with the designed fleet, and the fleet that should actually have been built would have anticipated this type of difficulty on the design board. The inability to coal at sea prevented the torpedo boats from being able to provide escort to dreadnoughts. Without proper escort any dreadnought operating in the Western Approaches would be quite vulnerable to submarine or destroyer torpedo attack - a big operational danger. Ships damaged in battle would then have to run the gauntlet of British bases, to say nothing of the Grand Fleet itself, to get back to Germany. More than enough operational hurdles there to allow even a fighting surface navy to decline tackling the problem. So, for the German surface navy - which seemed more interested in preserving its budgetary prestige than in actually doing anything productive - more than enough problems there to do nothing.
 
No it doesn't. All you have to do to win WW1 for the Germans is a time machine and make one minor decision. Not to resume USW. The UK was with in a few months of seeing a 25% or larger decline in imports due to lack of Gold. I do dearly love writing about U-boats winning the war, and this is possible, but it is not the only way to win the war. WW1 was one of those wars where the underdogs won despite 10 to 1 odds against them.

USW was the way the Navy, that was doing nothing productive with its surface forces, oversold a mysterious option to the Army, which was looking all war for a magic bullet to win with. Maybe the Army should have been more skeptical of the Navy's claims, but the Navy's motive in pitching USW had to be related to the fact that two years into the war it had accomplished nothing of note. (Tirpitz's pre-war assumptions on strategy seemed nothing better than sailing out into the North Sea and dying gloriously in battle.)

Now despite doing so well, the German Navy made a good scapegoat for the Army's plans not working. It is not an Admirals fault the Belgium forts held out so long. Nor did German Admirals cause the loss of two Austrian Armies in the east. Now it is ironic, and I have written in other post on how the UK criticism of the German Navy fleet composition was actually correct. And I wrote a uber German wank by just following the UK recommended strategy. A strategy recommend prewar.

It was the navy's fault that it had no viable war plan in 1914 though. It was also the navy's fault that the army was unaware of the importance of Pas de Calais, hence capturing Amiens in late August/early September (when it could have been done), to the navy's prospects in a Channel War.

If the Germans had spent the same funds but build a balance navy as the UK suggested (second class navy), WW1 would have been a humiliating defeat for the UK. Just imagine a world where the Germans entered WW1 not with 40 or so U-boats, but a 150 u-boats. Where the Germans have twice as many cruisers. And the Germans have 2/3 to 3/4 as many capital ships. Nothing changes since the Germans BB spend almost all the war in port, and the RN can't keep capital ships in the North Sea but for hours at a time.

More U-boats in 1914 might have made the difference, or they might have just brought the US in sooner. On the capital ship front, the designs emphasised numbers and defensive power, when the geographical conditions were pretty clear that they needed were ships with longer range, some speed advantage over British dreadnoughts, and at least some capacity for oil firing to augment coal usage. Take the Kaiser Class for example, five ships of 25,000 tons each for 125,000 tons of battleship. If they'd made them 4 ships of 30,000 tons each they could have kept the fighting power of the ship but made them faster and longer ranged - far more useful to Germany's circumstances to have 4 dreadnoughts with operational flexibility than one extra ship in a hopelessly outnumbered North Sea battle.
 
  • The concept of a U-boat type war (non-cruiser rule) merchant war was unthinkable. i.e. People did not think about it. The only person that I found who predicted that all the rules were to be ignored was a German housewife who wrote a short but interesting book analyzing future wars.
Can you elaborate on this point?
 

BlondieBC

Banned
USW was the way the Navy, that was doing nothing productive with its surface forces, oversold a mysterious option to the Army, which was looking all war for a magic bullet to win with. Maybe the Army should have been more skeptical of the Navy's claims, but the Navy's motive in pitching USW had to be related to the fact that two years into the war it had accomplished nothing of note. (Tirpitz's pre-war assumptions on strategy seemed nothing better than sailing out into the North Sea and dying gloriously in battle.)

Yes, the USW was sold on fake data. But the second point is not correct. They navy had done exactly what it was supposed to, but then lost what now would be called the marketing effort and internal politics. The navy plans are build on the Army plans. When the Heer failed to win the war in the first 6 months or so, they blame got shifted to the Navy to a large extent.

It was the navy's fault that it had no viable war plan in 1914 though. It was also the navy's fault that the army was unaware of the importance of Pas de Calais, hence capturing Amiens in late August/early September (when it could have been done), to the navy's prospects in a Channel War.

I used to think that too. And you can find post that I have written to this effect. But then I read about the British Navy prewar plans, and the Germans were 100% effective in stopping these plans. So I have now moved my position. After initial naval success and army failure, the German Admirals adapted slowly and unwisely.

I have also not read prewar documents indicating the German Navy ever seriously consider operations near Calais until after the British Navy had been greatly weakened in a series of battles in the German Blight. I do view these plans as possible, I just don't have evidence that this was done.

More U-boats in 1914 might have made the difference, or they might have just brought the US in sooner. On the capital ship front, the designs emphasised numbers and defensive power, when the geographical conditions were pretty clear that they needed were ships with longer range, some speed advantage over British dreadnoughts, and at least some capacity for oil firing to augment coal usage. Take the Kaiser Class for example, five ships of 25,000 tons each for 125,000 tons of battleship. If they'd made them 4 ships of 30,000 tons each they could have kept the fighting power of the ship but made them faster and longer ranged - far more useful to Germany's circumstances to have 4 dreadnoughts with operational flexibility than one extra ship in a hopelessly outnumbered North Sea battle.

On the design, as I have said in this and other threads. Ship design flows from doctrine which flows form geographic, political, and budget considerations. Once one accepts the German doctrine of defense of the Baltic and German Blight, then the ships are the only rational ships types to build if one wants BB.

As to the U-boats, yes, it is how they are used not the number or ship characteristics that can make these ships anything from huge losers (OTL) to huge winners (ATL). U-boats are huge war winners right up until the point U-boats change USA diplomacy in a large way. And the same can be said of the British blockade. Great idea unless it drags USA into war with Central Powers.
 
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BlondieBC

Banned
Can you elaborate on this point?

Sure.

First, if you want to know why, don't look at post war CYA stuff. Limit yourself to books with a 1913 copyright. Or quoting materials written before 1914. If you list the more commonly held British positions, you will have a very hard time finding prewar support. And more often than not, the prewar documents will show these positions to be false.

Second. As to what was expect, Captain Mahan wrote a book in about 1908 or that has a chapter covering this topic. I take Mahan as roughly speaking, the official spokesman of US Navy. If he had been even near correct, the German naval strategy would have been brilliant since Mahan believed that the Netherlands would not be blockaded. If this was true, then simply defending the German Blight and dominating the Baltic would have been the war winning strategy.

Third. I have read 10's of prewar books and 100's of article and shorter books. None predict the British blockade. None contemplate the USW. Only one German house wife in a book of only 10's of pages mentions roughly paraphrasing "In wars of major significance, people will always do whatever is needed to win. So of course in the next war, the rules of war at sea will not be followed". It is as close to a prediction to how the war would go as I can find.

And I don't think this should be a surprised. Go read policy experts in the 10 years before 9/11. See how many predicted a 15+ year USA war spanning the globe. Or the USA torturing people at Gitmo. Or take the first year after 9/11. See how many people correctly called for a generational war. It will not be that many. It surprises me that people easily accept the recent failures to predict, but think somehow that admirals were smarter in 1910 than USA Generals in 2000.
 
Yes, the USW was sold on fake data. But the second point is not correct. They navy had done exactly what it was supposed to, but then lost what now would be called the marketing effort and internal politics. The navy plans are build on the Army plans. When the Heer failed to win the war in the first 6 months or so, they blame got shifted to the Navy to a large extent.

The High Seas Fleet was not sold to the German public as a mere Baltic coastal defense force. It was marketed as sea power projection force capable of a naval war with Great Britain. Studies on sea imports and blockades, all with the suggestion that the German navy's mission was related to preserving or contesting sea control. Then, when the pre-war marketing pitch didn't match the wartime actions, the Navy was instantly vulnerable to blame for its inactivity. Food was getting short and the fleet had done nothing. At the outbreak of war there was a struggle between the admirals and Tirpitz on the use of the fleet - because it had no clear role - where Tirpitz wanted to go out and fight as his prewar thinking specified, and the admirals wanted to stay in port and essentially sit out the war as a high-priced bargaining chip. From the German public's perspective, how many British dreadnoughts had been sunk by HSF guns, or tons of food had the fleet brought in from the Americas through the blockade? Next to none, of either.

But then I read about the British Navy prewar plans, and the Germans were 100% effective in stopping these plans. So I have now moved my position. After initial naval success and army failure, the German Admirals adapted slowly and unwisely.

There was never serious consideration in the Royal Navy to challenging the Germans in the Baltic Sea, not for the least reason being that to do so would require war with Denmark to open the Belts and secure SLOC. For the Royal Navy war plan (distant blockade) the High Seas Fleet was almost totally ineffective in contesting it, and the units that were used for commerce raiding were all, with the notable exceptions of a few ships, obsolete cast offs. Doctrinally, the High Seas Fleet failed to capitalize on the demonstrated successes of the Emden and Karlsruhe. Instead of switching construction to more light cruisers in 1914, (at the expense of the wasted resources poured into the Badens, Mackensens and Hindenburg), the HSF continued diverting resources into dreadnoughts.

I have also not read prewar documents indicating the German Navy ever seriously consider operations near Calais until after the British Navy had been greatly weakened in a series of battles in the German Blight. I do view these plans as possible, I just don't have evidence that this was done.

I've not read of any pre-war German naval studies on the importance of Pas de Calais in a naval war with Britain and France. But, the lack of these is not an excuse for the German navy, it is evidence of its incompetence and lack of any coherent planning process. It was a serious oversight, that the navy did not identify this region and did not inform the army of it. Had Moltke been made aware of the importance of Amiens to the navy, and given his pessimism that the pursuit of the French southwest of Paris was going to pay off, his offensive into France might have gone differently - and much more successfully from a long war perspective.

On the design, as I have said in this and other threads. Ship design flows from doctrine which flows form geographic, political, and budget considerations. Once one accepts the German doctrine of defense of the Baltic and German Blight, then the ships are the only rational ships types to build if one wants BB.

A 30,000 ton Kaiser Class battleship capable of operations in the Atlantic is also quite capable of defending in the Baltic, but a coastal defense ship designed for the Baltic cannot operate in the Atlantic.

Ship design can flow from narrow doctrinal assumptions - it often does. In this case, not coastal defense, but Tirpitz's doctrinal assumption that he had to build as many ships as possible to meet the Royal Navy in open battle, either in the North Sea or Baltic Sea. This caused him to skimp on many things to achieve numbers - speed, gun size, range, technical innovation. Ship design can also flow from a broad doctrinal assumption - that the ship design must be as flexible for different missions as possible meaning more generally capable ships. The German navy pre-war chose the narrow doctrine when it should have chosen the broad doctrine.

As to the U-boats, yes, it is how they are used not the number or ship characteristics that can make these ships anything from huge losers (OTL) to huge winners (ATL). U-boats are huge war winners right up until the point U-boats change USA diplomacy in a large way. And the same can be said of the British blockade. Great idea unless it drags USA into war with Central Powers.

The question to my mind is whether there is any way that U-boats could be used that does not drag in the United States. That is to say, were the U-boats the cause of US intervention or the pretext? If the cause then careful rules of warfare could lead to better results. If the pretext then more U-boats leads to quicker US intervention.
 
I attempted to read the thread, but gave up at the end of the first page, so this has probably been said already.

I think the Germans couldn't sink the entire BCF. IIRC Lion had a lucky escape early on in the Battle Cruiser Action. If she had blown up like Indefatigable and Queen Mary I think there's a good chance that New Zealand, Princess Royal and Tiger would have been sunk before Evan-Thomas came to the rescue. Depending upon how quickly that happened Hipper might have had time to pick off some of the cruisers and destroyers as they fled.

However, after that the course of the battle is likely to have changed beyond recognition. There's probably a different Race to the North because Evan-Thomas probably covers the retreat of the BCF's surviving cruisers and destroyers rather than being led by Hipper into the main body of the High Sea's Fleet. If Hipper decides to chase them the HSF will be further behind when he meets the Grand Fleet. Then the GF might be able to concentrate its fire on Hipper's battle cruisers and knock them all out before Scheer arrives. Furthermore as Scheer is further behind and further south he might decide that Hipper is beyond help and turn back while he can. Plus as all the ships are likely to be in different positions he might not find himself trapped between the GF and his escape routes. Though this probably means that the British don't loose the Invincible and 3 armoured cruisers.

However, if Scheer decides to quit while he is ahead and order Hipper to break off the chase then he can return to Germany with no ships sunk and others less badly damaged than OTL, while the British have lost 6 out of 10 battle cruisers (that is including HMAS Australia which didn't take part in the battle) instead of 3 out of 10.

The only way I think that they could have sunk the Queen Elizabeths is if Hindenburg had been completed in time to participate in the battle of Jutland so that Beatty's 6 battle cruisers were wiped out even faster (which would enable Hipper to pick off more cruisers and destroyers too) and the Germans got some lucky hits on the 5th Battle Squadron before Evan-Thomas realised that he was outnumbered.

The Germans had still, "Assaulted their gaoler but were still in gaol," but they were in much better shape for a second assault having no ships sunk and none seriously damaged. While the British had lost more capital ships and still had to rectify the faults that the battle had revealed. I think the Germans would use this temporary advantage for more raids on the British East Coast. IOTL the Germans did attempt a raid on Sunderland on 19th August 1916.

I think it's unlikely that all 27 of the BCF's destroyers would have been sunk. However, if they had been that might effect the U-boat war in 1917. IOTL destroyers were taken from the Grand Fleet to escort convoys. ITTL there may be no destroyers to spare. Edit. It would have been a net loss of 19 destroyers because the Grand Fleet lost 8 destroyers in the OTL battle including 2 during the battle cruiser action.

I do like how you think on this. Princess Royal nearly got hit by a torpedo OTL at about 16:11, and had that hit it would probably doom her. Lion nearly exploded. So, if we change luck a little...


HMS Lion - Sunk ~16:28 (Q turret magazine doesn't get flooded)
HMS Princess Royal - Struck by torpedo, 16:11 (OTL This went under her). Slowed, sunk.
HMS Queen Mary - Sunk ~16:25
HMS Tiger
HMS Indefatigable - Sunk ~16:05
HMS New Zeeland - Unable to be seriously damaged without removing piupiu

HMS Malaya - Ammunition fire from casement hit flashes into magazines. Ship slowed, later sunk. (Another OTL hit that was nearly catastrophic)
HMS Barham
HMS Warspite - Unable to regain control of steering during Run to the North. Sunk
HMS Valiant

That's what I can come up with. Then Scheer breaks off and calls it good when they sink those, probably after seeing Jellicoe. Even if Scheer still gets his T crossed by Jellicoe, as long as he doesn't stick his head back into the oven, he gets away with all of his capital ships. Six out of ten isn't bad, and with so many more ships destroyed, it wouldn't be out of the question for Tiger to get more of a beating, maybe being sunk. The other Queens may be hurt more, but I don't see them getting sunk. So, six sunk easily from slight OTL changes, seven if you assume Tiger is a little more unlucky after so many other targets are removed. Destroyers...well, maybe a few more get sunk, but I don't see anyone wasting ammunition on them if they aren't making runs, as long as there are capital ships to shoot
 
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What limited the German dreadnoughts was their bunkerage capacity and inability to coal at sea. Don't overthink it.

Nah, let’s overthink it. The season for breaking through the Scotland-Norway blockade line was from October to about March, during the long winter nights. The season for luring operations in the North Sea were about April to October, during periods of good weather, when breakthrough operations were less likely to work due to long daylight and better weather generally. The seasons for the two strategies were different, so the HSF could have switched back and forth with the changing of the weather.

Kaiser and Konig classes could cruise about 8,000nm at 12kt on 3,600 tons coal and 200 tons oil, (2 nm per ton) or 2,400nm at 21kt, (1.6 tons per mile). A breakout from Germany past Scapa to Greenland or Iceland to recoal in one of the bays there, (or in the icefields during winter, where the waters can be millpond calm) would take about 1,700 tons of fuel out of 3,800 embarked, leaving 2,100 tons. That’s too skimpy to patrol for long in the Western Approaches, so they’d need to coal in Greenland, or the north coast of Iceland, then approach the shipping lanes at cruising speed (12-16kt) to save fuel. The colliers needed for coaling could use neutral Norwegian coastal waters to avoid the Scotland-Norway blockade line, then also avoid the blockade line in the GUIK gap by sailing into the Norwegian Sea. The colliers would need to already be in the Norwegian Sea before the battleships broke out.

Coal consumption could have been eased by using more oil on the coal, then refuelling the oil from an accompanying tanker. Oil could be transferred at sea, so battleships could refuel while underway if the weather allowed. The tankers would have to be fast ships. Mackensen, Hindenburg, Salamis, a couple of the Bayern dreadnoughts. If two of these were converted to fast oilers, then during the breakout they might be able to refuel each dreadnought once or several times, meaning that instead of having 2,100 tons of fuel aboard when they reach Iceland, the ship might have over 3,000 tons.

The final trick was to reduce the armament of the ships to increase coal capacity. Konig and Kaiser had 5 main turrets with 10 x 12” guns. Each turret, guns, and ammunition/propellant weighed 775 tons and occupied a tube of 80,000 square feet going straight from the deck down to above the engine spaces. If one centerline turret was removed, and the space gained used for extra bunkerage, each ship could carry about 5,600 tons of coal and still have an 8 x 12” main armament. Part of the secondary battery could be removed for even more coal storage.

Let’s say with all these changes a Kaiser or Konig Class battleship could sortie with 6,000 tons of fuel embarked and receives 2,000 tons from a collier during the mission, and another 3,000 tons from a fast oiler, like a converted Salamis. On 11,000 tons of fuel it can cruise 22,000 miles at 12kt or 6,800nm at 21kt. That’s enough to operate in the Western Approaches. So the German surface navy didn’t have a logistic excuse for its inaction. It chose to remain in port and be a high priced bargaining chip.
 
HMS New Zeeland - Unable to be seriously damaged without removing piupiu
A lucky hit on the bridge kills everyone on it including the captain and one shell in the next salvo hits a turret.

I do like how you think on this. Princess Royal nearly got hit by a torpedo OTL at about 16:11, and had that hit it would probably doom her. Lion nearly exploded. So, if we change luck a little...

HMS Lion - Sunk ~16:28 (Q turret magazine doesn't get flooded)
HMS Princess Royal - Struck by torpedo, 16:11 (OTL This went under her). Slowed, sunk.
HMS Queen Mary - Sunk ~16:25
HMS Tiger
HMS Indefatigable - Sunk ~16:05
HMS New Zeeland - Unable to be seriously damaged without removing piupiu

HMS Malaya - Ammunition fire from casement hit flashes into magazines. Ship slowed, later sunk. (Another OTL hit that was nearly catastrophic)
HMS Barham
HMS Warspite - Unable to regain control of steering during Run to the North. Sunk
HMS Valiant

That's what I can come up with. Then Scheer breaks off and calls it good when they sink those, probably after seeing Jellicoe. Even if Scheer still gets his T crossed by Jellicoe, as long as he doesn't stick his head back into the oven, he gets away with all of his capital ships. Six out of ten isn't bad, and with so many more ships destroyed, it wouldn't be out of the question for Tiger to get more of a beating, maybe being sunk. The other Queens may be hurt more, but I don't see them getting sunk. So, six sunk easily from slight OTL changes, seven if you assume Tiger is a little more unlucky after so many other targets are removed. Destroyers...well, maybe a few more get sunk, but I don't see anyone wasting ammunition on them if they aren't making runs, as long as there are capital ships to shoot
To be serious...

16:05 Indefatigable blows up
16:11 Princess Royal still missed by a torpedo
16:25 Queen Mary blows up
16:26 Princess Royal hit and blows up instead of OTL near miss
16:28 Lion blows up

ITTL the 2 British battle cruisers (New Zealand and Tiger) left after Lion had blown up were being engaged by 5 German ships. I don't see them surviving for long. Sooner (rather than later) each of them will be hit on a turret.

That is depending upon what Evan-Thomas could do. Was the 5th Battle Squadron engaging Hipper at 16:28? If they were at what range?
 
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