V1 drones during the battle of Britain

The VT fuse was far from a 'laboratory only' model - they were field tested, with initial batches produced in the UK too. The valve (tube) design (by John Cockroft at Pye) was subsequently improved for mass production by Berkner & eventually incorporated into already extant valves (for hearing aids, no less) produced by Western Electric & RCA. Nothing here is beyond the technical capacity of the UK in a world where the priorities are different.

One overlooked area was those shells had to have batteries that were:
small
high power density
work after 10000+G force of being fired from a cannon
have a long shelf life with a temperature range from -20 to+140, from Tundra to South Pacific
easy and cheap to make

US was World leader in Primary Cells, and the National Carbon Company had a battery that did all that in 1942
 
Probably best to mount nebelwerfer to submarines to go after coastal targets. The low accuracy of the V-1 coupled with the few carried on a submarine would mean next to complete uselessness as a weapons system.

Say in 1942 or 1943, a few U-boats with a V1 or nebelwerfer fire into a few cities on the East Coast say New York, it would result in a massive diversion of resources by the allies in an attempt to stop them. Note I am not saying it will win the NAZIs the war.
 
Say in 1942 or 1943, a few U-boats with a V1 or nebelwerfer fire into a few cities on the East Coast say New York, it would result in a massive diversion of resources by the allies in an attempt to stop them. Note I am not saying it will win the NAZIs the war.

I've not see KM plans for doing V-1 launches like the USN later did, but they seemed to be looking into V-2 launches

No matter what they think will do, they have an August '45 date with Enola Gay
 

Deleted member 1487

In either case, I fear you're running the risk of merely seeming, as we say up north, 'a bit dim' in persisting with this tack...
Whatever you need to tell yourself. ;)
Especially when you have to work on learning the facts better.

I understand perfectly well. Power Jets ground ran the first of the WU series in early 1937. Development continued apace, and the first W.1 flew successfully in early 1941. Between W.1 & W.2 (Welland) development, the only real issue encountered in OTL was a lubrication problem which required a straightforward fix, and much later, an equally straightforward change in the alloy used in the compressor as power levels increased dramatically. Frankly, the W.1 was a safer proposition than the Jumo - in any flavour - by 1940. And that's with OTL funding which amounted to peanuts and no small degree of laissez faire . You must remember, one of the primary reasons behind developing centrifugal technologies before axial was precisely because the former was so well understood, as were the potential risks with the latter.
The W.1 was an experimental engine that produced so little thrust that the resulting test aircraft was slower than a Hurricane II.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gloster_E.28/39#Specifications_(Gloster_E.28/39)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_Jets_W.1
With the W.1 aircraft manoeuvring would subsequently be limited by a compressor casing stress to 2g. Maximum jetpipe temperature was 597°C.

350mph was only achieved at 25,000 feet.

The W.2 had potential, but wasn't ready for testing until 1943, based on developments borne out of W.1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_Welland
It could have been moved along more quickly with the government recognizing it as the way to go, but that means a mid-1943 entry into service date, which likely means it stays on the back burner as piston engine developments like the Sabre are rushed instead of waiting for the jet project to matured years later. In 1941 the W.1 jet engine wasn't even intended to be a production model, rather it was simply a test bed to eventually produce a larger production model. So in 1940 the basic W.1 hadn't even flown and seriously proved itself as a viable solution within a reasonable amount of time to the V-1 problem, assuming it was in action in 1940.


A more urgent need and better funding simply makes all this happen sooner. Again, by 1940, there are no likely impediments which cannot be surmounted by understood methods and practices.
In 1940 the W.1 hadn't even flown; it was a development model to boot, which means it was still years away from getting into a combat capable aircraft (the W.1's installation in an aircraft produced a weaker output than a 1940 Hurricane fighter), while the Napier Sabre would have been 'ready' in 1942.
 
Having a V1 like pilotless bomb ready in 1940 is a stretch. There would be no need for such a weapon before 1939. Perhaps after the beginning of 1939 when relations with Britain worsens, Hitler could push for a stand off weapon for use against Britain. It could really start becoming a serious priority around the beginning of June 1940 when it is obvious France will fall and some extra weapon is necessary to force Britain to make peace.

Assuming a two year development cycle, maybe a 1942 deployment is the earliest possible. Which in addition to London, Leningrad is an obvious target.

If it really was ready in 1940, it doesn't really do any good until after September 1940, before then the Germans are trying to invade and establish regular air superiority and this doesn't help them.

What its best at is:
a) a Vengeance weapon for propaganda purposes. Worth extra if you can avoid costly bombing raids like the 1944 Blitz trying to achieve the same purpose.
b) Another unsolvable problem for Britain added to its list of problems. Submarines, night bombings, no other allies, large threatening Italian armies in the colonies, and now flying bombs, why don't we just make peace sort of thing.
c) Prestige among neutrals and the general occupied population for deploying such cool weaponry.
d) A development pathway to more capable and accurate weapons.
 
...
If it really was ready in 1940, it doesn't really do any good until after September 1940, before then the Germans are trying to invade and establish regular air superiority and this doesn't help them.

...

True, not for regular air superiority. But, morale is another important component of shaping the battlefield. in the 1930s there grew up a hysteria or fear of sorts about air attacks on cities. Visions of the urban landscape in flames and bodies littering the streets were in the popular imagination. Just maybe five hundred, or 1000 of these launched on London in the first week of the air campaign in August would damage Brit morale? The rest of the German AF does its thing as OTL vs the RAF while the new 'rocket bombs' scare the hell out of the civilians. Alternate to London the channel cities like Portsmouth are the targets?
 

Deleted member 1487

One overlooked area was those shells had to have batteries that were:
small
high power density
work after 10000+G force of being fired from a cannon
have a long shelf life with a temperature range from -20 to+140, from Tundra to South Pacific
easy and cheap to make

US was World leader in Primary Cells, and the National Carbon Company had a battery that did all that in 1942
Don't forget microtubes, which made the entire thing possible. Also the British models were for unrotated rockets, which had vastly smaller G-forces acting on them.

True, not for regular air superiority. But, morale is another important component of shaping the battlefield. in the 1930s there grew up a hysteria or fear of sorts about air attacks on cities. Visions of the urban landscape in flames and bodies littering the streets were in the popular imagination. Just maybe five hundred, or 1000 of these launched on London in the first week of the air campaign in August would damage Brit morale? The rest of the German AF does its thing as OTL vs the RAF while the new 'rocket bombs' scare the hell out of the civilians. Alternate to London the channel cities like Portsmouth are the targets?
Tying down British defensive resources combating robot bombs does free up the Luftwaffe to achieve it's goals.
 
Whatever you need to tell yourself. ;)
Especially when you have to work on learning the facts better.


The W.1 was an experimental engine that produced so little thrust that the resulting test aircraft was slower than a Hurricane II.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gloster_E.28/39#Specifications_(Gloster_E.28/39)


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_Jets_W.1


350mph was only achieved at 25,000 feet.

The W.2 had potential, but wasn't ready for testing until 1943, based on developments borne out of W.1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_Welland
It could have been moved along more quickly with the government recognizing it as the way to go, but that means a mid-1943 entry into service date, which likely means it stays on the back burner as piston engine developments like the Sabre are rushed instead of waiting for the jet project to matured years later. In 1941 the W.1 jet engine wasn't even intended to be a production model, rather it was simply a test bed to eventually produce a larger production model. So in 1940 the basic W.1 hadn't even flown and seriously proved itself as a viable solution within a reasonable amount of time to the V-1 problem, assuming it was in action in 1940.



In 1940 the W.1 hadn't even flown; it was a development model to boot, which means it was still years away from getting into a combat capable aircraft (the W.1's installation in an aircraft produced a weaker output than a 1940 Hurricane fighter), while the Napier Sabre would have been 'ready' in 1942.

You have a curious (and self - servingly selective) attitude towards facts and the truth, right down to wilfully ignoring the very sources (the esteemed wikipedia, no less...) you cite. Of course, it may well be that you suffer from some type of cognitive disorder, in which case, I apologise if my responses seem harsh or blunt...

Firstly, the W.1 wasn't strictly an experimental design at all (that'd be the WU series, first runs from April 1937), but rather, the first iteration (in the very direct lineage which runs W.1 - Welland / Derwent) of a design deemed suitably mature to 1/. Fly & 2/. To develop further, via The W.1A to W.2 before entering mass production as the Welland - they are, in all meaningful ways, improvements of one, original design. An analogous process to that which took the Jumo from 109-004A to 109-004H via various sub - groups.

The wiki article you cite for the E.28/39 makes clear that the 'initial series of flights' achieved the performance you're gloating over. You may be surprised to learn that no aircraft - ever - has attained its performance maxima within the first phase of flight testing, and particularly not in those designs which employ wholly new technologies. Later flights expanded all parameters and regimes of flight, yet you chose not to read that far, nor seek other sources, didn't you??. Also, wiki has it wrong on one, vital point (unless you're suggesting that the official RAE & Gloster records are wrong, instead...) - The 860lb thrust W.1 was used only for ground handling & the initial 'hops'. The first flight proper used the W.1A, which by May '41 was producing between 1,200 - 1,600lbs thrust (RPM dependent).

Concerning your assertions regarding the W.2, that engine was first run in 1941 & actually flown (in W.2B form, no less) in March '43 - that's rather far from 'not ready for testing until 1943', isn't it?

That the W.1 hadn't flown in 1940 is irrelevant. Neither had any other turbine, save for the HeS3. The more important fact, by far, is that it could have - and probably without too much more expenditure or resourcing. All the pieces of the puzzle are in place by that time, with no serious engineering challenges remaining.
 

Deleted member 1487

Having a V1 like pilotless bomb ready in 1940 is a stretch. There would be no need for such a weapon before 1939. Perhaps after the beginning of 1939 when relations with Britain worsens, Hitler could push for a stand off weapon for use against Britain. It could really start becoming a serious priority around the beginning of June 1940 when it is obvious France will fall and some extra weapon is necessary to force Britain to make peace.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-1_flying_bomb#Design_and_development
On 9 November 1939, a proposal for a remote-controlled aircraft carrying a payload of 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) over a distance of 500 km (310 mi) was forwarded to the RLM (German Air Ministry). Argus worked in cooperation with Lorentz AG and Arado Flugzeugwerke to develop the project as a private venture, and in April 1940, Gosslau presented an improved study of Project "Fernfeuer" to the RLM, as Project P 35 "Erfurt".
 

Deleted member 1487

You have a curious (and self - servingly selective) attitude towards facts and the truth, right down to wilfully ignoring the very sources (the esteemed wikipedia, no less...) you cite. Of course, it may well be that you suffer from some type of cognitive disorder, in which case, I apologise if my responses seem harsh or blunt...

Firstly, the W.1 wasn't strictly an experimental design at all (that'd be the WU series, first runs from April 1937), but rather, the first iteration (in the very direct lineage which runs W.1 - Welland / Derwent) of a design deemed suitably mature to 1/. Fly & 2/. To develop further, via The W.1A to W.2 before entering mass production as the Welland - they are, in all meaningful ways, improvements of one, original design. An analogous process to that which took the Jumo from 109-004A to 109-004H via various sub - groups.

The wiki article you cite for the E.28/39 makes clear that the 'initial series of flights' achieved the performance you're gloating over. You may be surprised to learn that no aircraft - ever - has attained its performance maxima within the first phase of flight testing, and particularly not in those designs which employ wholly new technologies. Later flights expanded all parameters and regimes of flight, yet you chose not to read that far, nor seek other sources, didn't you??. Also, wiki has it wrong on one, vital point (unless you're suggesting that the official RAE & Gloster records are wrong, instead...) - The 860lb thrust W.1 was used only for ground handling & the initial 'hops'. The first flight proper used the W.1A, which by May '41 was producing between 1,200 - 1,600lbs thrust (RPM dependent).

You're trying awful hard to cling to straws with your points. Plus feeling the need to direct barbs at the arguer rather than the sticking to the argument does tend to indicate your inability to prove your point.

The May 1941 model only achieved 350mph at 25,000 feet, which I already mentioned in my post; note that that model wasn't even equipped with weapons or ammo, though there were provisions for 4x.7.7mm MGs.

Concerning your assertions regarding the W.2, that engine was first run in 1941 & actually flown (in W.2B form, no less) in March '43 - that's rather far from 'not ready for testing until 1943', isn't it?

That the W.1 hadn't flown in 1940 is irrelevant. Neither had any other turbine, save for the HeS3.
Ready for flight testing is what was meant. Flight testing isn't production ready either.
The status of German jet engine development is irrelevant to this discussion (though their's wasn't in production until 1944 despite a rush job), as we're talking about the status of British developments in mid-late 1940 and potential prospects for investment; in 1940 the W.1 hadn't even had it's flight testing yet. The prototype of the production model W.2 wasn't even in ready for flight testing/development until 1943 when the second E.28/39 was delivered with it fitted.
There isn't a clear path for years to a production jet engine that could intercept a V-1; IOTL even the Meteor had 13 measly intercepts in 1944-45. In 1940 souped up Merlins or the Napier Sabre are much more clear and fast lines of investments and indeed IOTL in 1944 they yielded the returns on V-1 intercepts.

The more important fact, by far, is that it could have - and probably without too much more expenditure or resourcing. All the pieces of the puzzle are in place by that time, with no serious engineering challenges remaining.
Were it so factual, why was it not done IOTL? Perhaps because there were better options at the time and the jet engine development wasn't nearly as easy, straightforward, and fast what you're claiming?
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Just as an aside how much in the way of resources did the V1 use up compared to say a twin engine bomber of the same period?

What I am getting at is that Britain was very rapidly out producing Germany on the Aircraft front if they are switching to V1 then that would very likely mean that far fewer 'manned' aircraft are being built as a result making the production gap even greater.

I appreciate that sortie for sortie a V1 attack on London was cheaper than manned Aircraft during the Blitz but that is only good for large area attack (and accepting that a large number never reached their target) while the same twin engine bomber can be moved to Norway or Italy or Africa or Poland and be used for a variety of tasks and of course are more accurate in the delivery of bombs?
 

Deleted member 1487

Just as an aside how much in the way of resources did the V1 use up compared to say a twin engine bomber of the same period?

What I am getting at is that Britain was very rapidly out producing Germany on the Aircraft front if they are switching to V1 then that would very likely mean that far fewer 'manned' aircraft are being built as a result making the production gap even greater.

I appreciate that sortie for sortie a V1 attack on London was cheaper than manned Aircraft during the Blitz but that is only good for large area attack (and accepting that a large number never reached their target) while the same twin engine bomber can be moved to Norway or Italy or Africa or Poland and be used for a variety of tasks and of course are more accurate in the delivery of bombs?
Based on one estimate I've seen it was as costly as 2-4% of an He111 bomber airframe alone (no engines or other components). Plus it was made from sheet metal and plywood largely from unskilled forced labor at the VW assembly plant.
 
Folks, I have been reading this thread with interest, as I proposed a similar POD a while back. As tempers seem to be flaring a bit, I thought I would submit a “one act play” to calm things a bit. In the POD I had originally proposed, the V1 as we know it, is successfully tested in the fall of 1939. The Nazi leadership envisions the “V1” as a terror weapon to be used on Paris, to repeat their terror bombings of Warsaw. However just as the weapon begins to arrive in numbers, the French surrender. Then in August, a new opportunity presents itself to the Nazi leadership - London! The plan is to have the Luftwaffe destroy the RAF while the V1 smashes London.

So here is the back story I came up with for the V1 to get the political support, that enables it to be a deployed weapon in 1940.

Ric350

*****************************************

He hated Berlin! There was something about the city that always had a gray cast, no matter how sunny the day. Now even with the recent victory over the Poles, Berlin seemed more oppressive than ever. Of course his colleagues would argue he was only happy in his lab or on the test range, (and they were right). At the end of September, they had run several successful tests of the “Project P 35” with the new engine design, and within days, he had been summoned to Berlin to give a presentation to “high ranking officials”. What unnerved him the most was the timing of this “invitation” so soon on the heels of the successful tests. It was obvious that government informants had infiltrated the facility, and/or members of his team were willingly (or otherwise), providing test results to Berlin. He shouldn’t have been surprised, but it was unnerving.

He glanced at the clock. It was time to begin his presentation, but a look around the conference room gave him pause. Across the table to his left sat representatives from the Wehrmacht; a Colonel and two Majors. To his right sat the Luftwaffe contingent; two Captains. A decidedly mediocre attendance given the expedient tone of his summons. The two groups talked quietly amongst themselves, hardly giving him any notice.

He was about to get their attention and begin, when the double doors of the conference room burst open and four soldiers entered the room: two on each side of the doorway. He immediately noticed their SS badges, and his mouth went dry. The officers at the table turned as one and he could see their reaction reflected his own.

The room remained frozen for several seconds. The Wehrmacht Colonel looked like he was about to speak, when loud talking and laughter came from the hallway. The four SS soldiers snapped to attention, and in walked Field Marshall Göring!

The officers in the room bolted to attention, one of the Luftwaffe Captains doing so with such zeal that the his chair flew backwards, to be caught by one of the SS soldiers, and returned to the table. The Captain flushed red but didn’t move.

Göring was accompanied by five Luftwaffe officers including a General, to whom Göring continued to talk and laugh. Then after scanning the room, Göring said, “be seated gentlemen, and do continue Herr Doctor.” (Ric350 - I will refer him as “HD” in the remainder of this play)

Once everyone had been seated, (and after a calming pause to drink some water), HD was about to start the presentation, when another figure quietly entered the room: Reichsführer-SS Himmler! Again, the original groups of officers came to attention, but HD noticed that none of Görings’ entourage did. Göring only gave Himmler a sidewards glance. HD saw Himmler give the officers permission to sit with a slight hand motion. Himmler nodded to the SS men, who closed the conference room doors. Then Himmler stared at HD and simply said “continue.” HD realized all eyes were on him, taking another sip of water, and with a cold sweat soaking his shirt, HD began the presentation.

“And that gentlemen concludes my briefing. I will take any questions or observations you may have.” The presentation had only taken 45 minutes, and with the exception of one question early in the meeting by the Wehrmacht Colonel, no other questions or comments were given during the presentation. During the meeting Göring would whisper comments occasionally to his entourage followed by laughter, while Himmler stood the entire time in silence, staring at HD from across the table.

After a few awkward seconds Göring spoke. “So Herr Doctor, if I understand your briefing correctly, your machine, while having an impressive top speed, has an impact accuracy of; let me see here in your paper; ah, it’s measured in kilometers!?” “That seems ludicrous to the point where the word accuracy shouldn’t be used at all!” Göring laughs at his joke, joined by the rest of attendees (except Himmler and the four SS men). Göring continued, “Any of my Stuka pilots could easily put a bomb through that window (pointing)!” “That my dear doctor is accuracy, as the Poles found to their dismay!”(more laughter). “Even our comrades in the Wehrmacht artillery” (waving a hand toward the Wehrmacht officers, and smiling at the their unease), “can put their shells in the general vicinity of their target.” “Perhaps they would be interested in your device.” Then in a booming voice Göring stood and said, “We in the Luftwaffe find the suggestion of our sponsorship of this device inappropriate and frankly insulting; it doesn’t even have a pilot!”

HD endured Goring’s tirade trying not to show his disappointment and fear. HD watched silently as Göring, his entourage, filed out of the conference room, with Göring’s loud voice and laughter receding down the hall. HD felt as though he would be physically sick. HD reached for his chair, when he realized that the four SS soldiers were still there.

“Some people are very short-sighted.” With a start, HD turned to see Himmler standing almost at his elbow. HD had focused so much on Göring, he hadn’t noticed Himmler come around the table and stand next to him. HD began to sweat again, and tried desperately not to let Himmler see his hands shake. Himmler motioned to the SS soldiers, and they closed the conference room doors. Himmler continued; “The fat one is still living his glories of the last war.” “He hasn’t realized that warfare has changed.”

“Herr Doctor, I noticed here in your report that your group acknowledges the potential of your device to, and I quote, terrorize the populace or even undisciplined troops, unquote.” Our recent experience in Poland demonstrated the usefulness of such terror. Our analysis of various campaigns there showed that groups of terrorized civilians, trying to escape areas of shelling or bombing, created blockages of roadways that had detrimental effects on Polish military withdrawals and counter attack. Even just the sound of the Stuka sirens caused panic. As a result, the Poles lost the initiative at several crucial points, to our advantage, and ultimate victory.” “Terror is a weapon to be wielded, as useful as bullets or bombs.”

HD didn’t know if Himmler expected a response, so he remained quiet. Luckily HD guessed right, as Himmler began to speak again. “Per your report, the Project P 35 requires minimal strategic resources, and unskilled labor to manufacture, is that correct?” “Yes, I mean, partially Reichsführer.” Himmler's’ stare hardened, so HD explained quickly; “Only the pulse motor requires skill to manufacture, as does the guidance system.” “However the main fuselage and wings are simple constructions using basic wood and metal materials, and could be made by semi-skilled or even unskilled labor.”

Himmler was quiet for a few seconds, then asked, “if you are provided the required materials, could your team build 1000 motors and guidance systems in 6 months?” SD responded, “yes Reichsführer, that should not be a problem, given that we are provided the necessary materials.” “However we do not have nearly enough semi-skilled or unskilled labor to produce that number of airframes.” Himmler’s stare softened somewhat, “My office will ensure you received whatever materials you need.” “As for the labor, my office will provide that as well.” HD thought he detected a slight smile on Himmler’s face as he said that, which somehow was more sinister than his stare.

Himmler continued, “I want a detailed production proposal submitted to my office by the end of the week.” “My office will begin shipment of materials to your facility within 30 days of your report.” “The labor force and airframe assembly facility will be ready within 60 days.” “I expect full production to begin no later than January 1st.” “I will speak to the Wehrmacht and get their support as well, as you can expect nothing from the Luftwaffe.”

HD was about to question the rapid schedule plan given Poland’s recent surrender, but immediately thought better and stayed silent. Himmler turned and walked around the table to the conference room doors. Himmler paused there for a second, then turned to HD and said, “Herr Doctor, I am going to update the Fuhrer regarding your proposal.” “You would do well not to disappoint him, or me.” With that Himmler walked out, followed by the two SS soldiers. HD slumped into a chair. The full weight of what had just occurred seemed to rob him of his breath, and sapped the strength from his muscles.

He hated Berlin!
 
Folks, I have been reading this thread with interest, as I proposed a similar POD a while back. As tempers seem to be flaring a bit, I thought I would submit a “one act play” to calm things a bit. In the POD I had originally proposed, the V1 as we know it, is successfully tested in the fall of 1939. The Nazi leadership envisions the “V1” as a terror weapon to be used on Paris,!

Germany did not have a heavy or even a good medium bombing option in 1939. The V1 might have been looked as a cheap alternative.
 
Based on one estimate I've seen it was as costly as 2-4% of an He111 bomber airframe alone (no engines or other components). Plus it was made from sheet metal and plywood largely from unskilled forced labor at the VW assembly plant.

Republic-Ford were building the US Copy of the V1 the JB2 'Loon' at the end of WW2 and they were effectively building 1000 for the cost of a single B29 - so I could see that being the case

I think the cost was $600 and 350 man hours each (IIRC)

Not convinced that it could be ready in massed numbers for 1940 but certainly it would have been a cost effective weapon if it had
 

Deleted member 1487

Republic-Ford were building the US Copy of the V1 the JB2 'Loon' at the end of WW2 and they were effectively building 1000 for the cost of a single B29 - so I could see that being the case

I think the cost was $600 and 350 man hours each (IIRC)

Not convinced that it could be ready in massed numbers for 1940 but certainly it would have been a cost effective weapon if it had
5000 RM per V-1; in 1944-45 30,000 were built. In 1940 it was 2.5 RM per dollar, not sure what it was in 1944, probably quite a bit worse exchange rate.
 

"On 9 November 1939, a proposal for a remote-controlled aircraft carrying a payload of 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) over a distance of 500 km (310 mi) was forwarded to the RLM (German Air Ministry). Argus worked in cooperation with Lorentz AG and Arado Flugzeugwerke to develop the project as a private venture, and in April 1940, Gosslau presented an improved study of Project "Fernfeuer" to the RLM, as Project P 35 "Erfurt".

On 31 May, Rudolf Bree of the RLM commented that he saw no chance that the projectile could be deployed in combat conditions, as the proposed remote-control system was seen as a design weakness. Heinrich Koppenberg, the director of Argus, met with Ernst Udet on 6 January 1941 to try to convince him that the development should be continued, but Udet decided to cancel it.

Despite this, Gosslau was convinced that the basic idea was sound and proceeded to simplify the design. As an aircraft engine manufacturer, Argus lacked the capability to produce a fuselage for the project and Koppenberg sought the assistance of Robert Lusser, chief designer and technical director at Heinkel. On 22 January 1942, Lusser took up a position with the Fieseler aircraft company. He met Koppenberg on 27 February and was informed of Gosslau's project. Gosslau's design used two pulsejet engines; Lusser improved the design to use a single engine.

A final proposal for the project was submitted to the Technical Office of the RLM on 5 June and the project was renamed Fi 103, as Fieseler was to be the chief contractor. On 19 June, GeneralfeldmarschallErhard Milch gave Fi 103 production high priority, and development was undertaken at the Luftwaffe's Erprobungsstelle coastal test centre at Karlshagen, part of the Peenemünde-West facility.

By 30 August, Fieseler had completed the first fuselage, and the first flight of the Fi 103 V7 took place on 10 December 1942, when it was airdropped by a Fw 200.[8]"

Wiking,
I read this article before, I assumed it meant that even given high priority by Milch in June of 1942, we didn't see operational deployment until June of 1944, two years later (perhaps this was delayed by bombing and competing priorities, i.e. V2, but there looks like there was some design tweaking kind of progress going on from November 1939 to June of 1942 that happened too). So if we assume it take 2 years to operationally deploy the idea. We are talking November 1941 before we will see these actually in France shooting at London.

So operational deployment in August 1940 means serious priority given in August 1938, which seems a bit early, I could believe earlier in 1939, the Z plan is cancelled, Prague is occupied, etc, that someone might be thinking of long range stand off weaponry like the V1 as useful against England. Hitler was somewhat practical about weaponry and its "bang vs buck" until later in the war, when he just needed an against all odds war winning idea, so a lot of stretches need to happen IMO.

It is alternate history though, so still fun to read about how such a weapon if deployed early would change things, it just seems unlikely to happen.
 

Deleted member 1487

"On 9 November 1939, a proposal for a remote-controlled aircraft carrying a payload of 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) over a distance of 500 km (310 mi) was forwarded to the RLM (German Air Ministry). Argus worked in cooperation with Lorentz AG and Arado Flugzeugwerke to develop the project as a private venture, and in April 1940, Gosslau presented an improved study of Project "Fernfeuer" to the RLM, as Project P 35 "Erfurt".

On 31 May, Rudolf Bree of the RLM commented that he saw no chance that the projectile could be deployed in combat conditions, as the proposed remote-control system was seen as a design weakness. Heinrich Koppenberg, the director of Argus, met with Ernst Udet on 6 January 1941 to try to convince him that the development should be continued, but Udet decided to cancel it.

Despite this, Gosslau was convinced that the basic idea was sound and proceeded to simplify the design. As an aircraft engine manufacturer, Argus lacked the capability to produce a fuselage for the project and Koppenberg sought the assistance of Robert Lusser, chief designer and technical director at Heinkel. On 22 January 1942, Lusser took up a position with the Fieseler aircraft company. He met Koppenberg on 27 February and was informed of Gosslau's project. Gosslau's design used two pulsejet engines; Lusser improved the design to use a single engine.

A final proposal for the project was submitted to the Technical Office of the RLM on 5 June and the project was renamed Fi 103, as Fieseler was to be the chief contractor. On 19 June, GeneralfeldmarschallErhard Milch gave Fi 103 production high priority, and development was undertaken at the Luftwaffe's Erprobungsstelle coastal test centre at Karlshagen, part of the Peenemünde-West facility.

By 30 August, Fieseler had completed the first fuselage, and the first flight of the Fi 103 V7 took place on 10 December 1942, when it was airdropped by a Fw 200.[8]"

Wiking,
I read this article before, I assumed it meant that even given high priority by Milch in June of 1942, we didn't see operational deployment until June of 1944, two years later (perhaps this was delayed by bombing and competing priorities, i.e. V2, but there looks like there was some design tweaking kind of progress going on from November 1939 to June of 1942 that happened too). So if we assume it take 2 years to operationally deploy the idea. We are talking November 1941 before we will see these actually in France shooting at London.

So operational deployment in August 1940 means serious priority given in August 1938, which seems a bit early, I could believe earlier in 1939, the Z plan is cancelled, Prague is occupied, etc, that someone might be thinking of long range stand off weaponry like the V1 as useful against England. Hitler was somewhat practical about weaponry and its "bang vs buck" until later in the war, when he just needed an against all odds war winning idea, so a lot of stretches need to happen IMO.

It is alternate history though, so still fun to read about how such a weapon if deployed early would change things, it just seems unlikely to happen.
I posted that to point out that had it been as pursued in 1939 when proposed as it was later that it could have been ready by 1942 at the latest.
Yes IOTL it was partially delayed by the bombing of Peenemunde, primarly though the V-2, which is why the British of course did it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Hydra_(1943)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Crossbow

But then there was impact from Combined Bomber Offensive from 1943 on. V-1 production was in part done at Mittelwerk, the underground production facility, to avoid the bombing offensive, which would not have been an issue in 1941. The other facility was the VW facility in Fallersleben, which was actually heavily underutilized even as late as 1943.

Now if the concept had been proposed in 1936-37 when there was work being done on drone and remote controlled aircraft (the Americans had worked on the cruise missile concept in WW1 even) then it was certainly do-able by 1940, though the pulsejet wasn't in mass production by then IIRC.

Interestingly the concept was even explored in 1916 by the Germans:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cruise_missile#History
Germany had also flown trials with remote-controlled aerial gliders (Torpedogleiter) built by Siemens-Schuckert beginning in 1916.[2]
But that is probably more similar to the Fritz-X than the V-1.

The Soviet missile program started in the early '30s it seems too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_for_the_Study_of_Reactive_Motion

So people were thinking in that direction.
 
How about using the V1 as cannon fodder? Since their acuracy is pretty much non-existent, aim them "en masse" at London and/or Portsmouth; those big areas are bound to get some hits. At the very least, the UK radar screens will be filled with enemies heading for the cities. Use the bombers for the small targets: airfields, etc.

Since the RAF simply doesn't have enough fighters, it will be forced to choose what to intercept.
 
Top