USSR invades Germany?

First: the Soviets don't have the ability to strike a mortal blow against Germany. Even later in the war, Soviet logistics had grave difficulty supporting an advance of more than 200 km. And that was after their motor transport had been enhanced with hundreds of thousands of Lend-Lease trucks. In 1939-1940, they would be lucky to reach the Oder.
On other side in 1938 Soviet manufactured app. 182K of trucks and 120k of tractors while Germany some 87k of trucks. OTL in 1941 Soviets had 270K of trucks. Germans employed some 0.6 million vehicles (vehicles, not trucks and it was including captured and from production in occupied territories). But I agree with you that they would be lucky if they reach Oder. With no damage to Soviet industry truck production can continue on levels similar to OTL 1939-1940.

There is also possibility to obtain trucks in US. Not through L-L but through direct purchases. Soviets had enough gold in their gold reserves to buy same amount of trucks they got through L-L and not even feeling it.

After much debate, Germany goes east in 1940, with Romania and Hungary as allies. A large force has to be left in the Saar to guard against Franco-British attack, but the east gets everything else. The renewed German offensive smashes up the Soviet front, and reaches Kiev, Smolensk, and Estonia by late August.
I am not so sure about Romania. Romania before fall of France was at least as much neutral as it could be though it was moving towards German sphere due to economic ties and being cut off. On other side they had some Entente guarantees, Entente was pre buying Romanian Oil and exports of Oil to Germany fall dramatically in late 1939 early 1940! In my opinion if Soviet restrain themselves from ultimatum to Romania regarding Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Romanians will sit quietly and watch.

Hungary, here I am not so sure but Hungarians restrained themselves from going against Entente. Soviets is different story but even OTL in 1941 it took a while till they joined Barbarossa. Again if Soviets do not try to attack into Ruthenia Hungarians may be more inclined to watch Romania and Carpathian borders.

Slovakia as being German puppet may join or Soviets may decide to attack across Carpathians till Slovak mobilize and German reinforcement arrive. But due to mountainous terrain if Soviet managed to act quickly enough after breaking through Dukla pass eventually Slovakian other mountains will be frontlines for a long time. I would guess Soviets could make it to Presov or even Poprad area before German reinforcement stabilize frontlines. Slovak troops could be reluctant to fight Soviets initially and if played smartly (there were still Czech and Slovak soldiers, even if small number in Soviet union evacuated from Poland who could be used).
 
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How so? Casualties in 1942 were about as high as those in 1941 in overall terms, but then the 1941's casualties took place in 5-6 months whereas the 1942 casualties took place a little over twice that time, so that makes it clear that casualty rates were about half as low, although a look at it by the half-year shows that they were closer to '41s in the first half of the year and further away in the latter half. 1943's casualties, and casualty rates, were then half-again that of 1942's.

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Soviet vs. German casualty rate ratios remained incredibly high into latter half 1943. While the Soviets acted creatively in the Southern region, they continued the use uncoordinated counterattacks there. More importantly, the same level of poor organization was shown in the Ryzhev meatgrinder in 1942 as in 1941. Even in Kharkov 1943 they did similar stupidity. These are the same guys that lost 10 to 1 at Prokharovka throwing in tank formations without proper management.
 
Soviet vs. German casualty rate ratios remained incredibly high into latter half 1943.

Yet vastly lower then they were in 1942, which in turn were lower then they had been in 1941. If your argument is that casualty ratios matter as a indicator of performance (an argument I should note that I do not accept), then they show Soviet improvement.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Yet vastly lower then they were in 1942, which in turn were lower then they had been in 1941. That is indicative of improvement.
Or the decline of German abilities to attack. Case Blue was a serious decline in ability compared to Barbarossa, same with Operation Citadel compared to Case Blue.
 
Or the decline of German abilities to attack. Case Blue was a serious decline in ability compared to Barbarossa, same with Operation Citadel compared to Case Blue.

The Germans ability to attack would have to be matched by a commensurate increase in the ability of the Soviets to defend, or it would be meaningless. When the Germans attacked the Soviet weak point in the south 1942, the results were the same as in 1941, taking hours to overcome the tactical defenses and days to blow through the operational defenses, only failing after penetrating far into the strategic depths. When they attacked the stronger points in the center and north in '42, the results were rather more different: it took considerably longer for the Germans to fight through the tactical-operational defenses and they never achieved penetrations into the Soviets strategic depths. By mid-1943, German attacks, which could involve even more men and machines then those in either 1941/42, repeatedly failed to breach even Soviet tactical defenses.

The difference in outcome makes rather clearer the improvement in Soviet performance then pointing to casualty ratios. Nor, as I already alluded too, can it be attributed to material weakness: many German attacks in 1942 enjoyed similar quantities of men, armor, artillery, and air support as those of '41 and the German attacks in '43 could even be more powerful then those of 1941/42. In a number of ways, 1943 was really the peak of German strength on the Eastern Front, especially among the panzer forces that was the Germans main offensive arm. Yet they still failed to even repeat their previous performances.
 
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Yet vastly lower then they were in 1942, which in turn were lower then they had been in 1941. If your argument is that casualty ratios matter as a indicator of performance (an argument I should note that I do not accept), then they show Soviet improvement.

If I may ask what's your reasoning on this? Obviously casualty ratios are not the only factor in calculating performance, Vietnam and the Eastern Front are great examples of this, but is it not a basic principle that the army who is able to complete an operation with less casualties and therefore less resources expended compared to an army who is also capable but sustains more losses has generally performed better?
 
If I may ask what's your reasoning on this? Obviously casualty ratios are not the only factor in calculating performance, Vietnam and the Eastern Front are great examples of this, but is it not a basic principle that the army who is able to complete an operation with less casualties and therefore less resources expended compared to an army who is also capable but sustains more losses has generally performed better?

A large part of it is that casualty accounting is is usually all over the place and hence people play accounting games with them. The Soviets certainly wouldn't be unique here. Hell, I've talked to NATO officers who have seen some pretty creative accounting of equipment losses in Afghanistan! You get cleaner loss reports for air and naval combat, but ground combat is always a mess. Generally, the biggest indicator casualties show is the possible effect on the army being able to continue to execute its mission (relative to the armies resources, of course) rather then that of the armies specific performance.
 
Yet vastly lower then they were in 1942, which in turn were lower then they had been in 1941. If your argument is that casualty ratios matter as a indicator of performance (an argument I should note that I do not accept), then they show Soviet improvement.
If one looks at the casualties per major battles, the ratios remain very very high.
 
OTL, the Soviets got easy pickings, in the Baltic states, Romania, Finland (well not so easy there, but probably not possible at all with Germany made hostile). Also got a convenient new trading partner in Germany.

The big risk here for the Soviets is the Germans under duress make peace with the Allies, giving independence for Poland and the Czechs in exchange for a free hand in the east.

Its not real obvious until about May 20th 1940 that the Soviets might have misplayed this. But no one anywhere expected that to happen.

Plus, I just cant see the Soviets agreeing to a pact with Hitler, for reasons good to them, then 2 months later, just breaking that.

If the Soviets have the ability to read the future, best bet is October 1940 when its obvious the Germans aren't going to invade England, and the British are in it to win it, (and the Germans just burned through a bunch of planes and fuel trying to win the Battle of Britain, embargo Germany.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Germans ability to attack would have to be matched by a commensurate increase in the ability of the Soviets to defend, or it would be meaningless.
That doesn't logically hold. The Soviets could have the same ability to defend as in 1941, but if the Axis powers lack the same ability to attack then they cannot inflict the same number of casualties proportionally speaking. Plus there were operation where things were different in 1942 than in 1941, like the assaults on fortified positions like Sevastopol, which were not attempted to the same degree in 1941.

When the Germans attacked the Soviet weak point in the south 1942, the results were the same as in 1941, taking hours to overcome the tactical defenses and days to blow through the operational defenses, only failing after penetrating far into the strategic depths. When they attacked the stronger points in the center and north in '42, the results were rather more different: it took considerably longer for the Germans to fight through the tactical-operational defenses and they never achieved penetrations into the Soviets strategic depths. By mid-1943, German attacks, which could involve even more men and machines then those in either 1941/42, repeatedly failed to breach even Soviet tactical defenses.
Which supports the point that the Soviet ability to defend wasn't really better, it was the lack of German ability to conduct a major offensive along multiple axes of attack that was lacking. As it was the only reason the Soviets were weak on the southern flank was the failed Soviet offensive in May, plus major defeats in the Crimea, and preparatory attacks against Soviet armies in the area to weaken them before the main offensive. Then the major problem they faced on that front was the logistic overreach and overexpansion of the frontage to defend.

The Germans didn't really attack in the Center or North in 1942 except for a few local offensives; you're forgetting that the Center and North were stripped of forces to get AG-South up to strength for their offensive. The Soviets did most of the attacking in those areas and the Germans mostly either limited counter attacks or defending.

In 1943 the Germans were actually considerably weaker than in either 1941 or '42 and fighting against an opponent with more men and equipment at the front than in either 1941 or '42. Since we are talking about the overall strategic situation as of Citadel the Luftwaffe had lost more of their strength in the East compared to the same period in 1941 or 1942, while overall AFV strength was certainly no better and significantly worse even though the quality of the weapons had gone up. Division for division we can't really say the Soviets got better at fighting since they simply had far more men and equipment than they had in previous years and were well dug in...yet they still suffered considerably worse despite having better ratios than in previous years. Not only that, but the offensive had to be broken off to send divisions engaged to other fronts to face the Wallies, which had not been an issue in most of 1941-42.

The difference in outcome makes rather clearer the improvement in Soviet performance then pointing to casualty ratios.
That's actually not clear at all for the reasons I list above.

Nor, as I already alluded too, can it be attributed to material weakness: many German attacks in 1942 enjoyed similar quantities of men, armor, artillery, and air support as those of '41
We have been talking about for the entire front, not selected operations. I specifically said that since the Axis could only mass for one army group level offensive on the scale of 1941 in 1942 they simply could not inflict casualties on the level of Barbarossa. If anything though AG-South over-performed on their front compared to 1941 though. The Ostheer was considerably weaker overall in equipment and men as compared to 1941. In 1943 it was even worse, they had to strip out the entire front to launch one limited offensive at a bulge in the line, while the Soviets had so much more than they could launch multiple concurrent offensives, while the Wallies were forcing the diversion of the Luftwaffe in numbers so great that the Luftwaffe was about half as strong as it was in 1941 in the East, while several of the best divisions had to be diverted during Kursk and screws up your point.

and the German attacks in '43 could even be more powerful then those of 1941/42.
Again not over the entire front, as Kursk required the resources of the entire front, which still being weaker in AFVs, aircraft, and men than in the previous year, which in turn was worse than 1941.

In a number of ways, 1943 was really the peak of German strength on the Eastern Front, especially among the panzer forces that was the Germans main offensive arm. Yet they still failed to even repeat their previous performances.
Only for AFVs, aircraft strength in Summer 1943 was at an average all time low (except for certain exceptional moments in 1941 or 1942 say at the start of December 1941 due to attrition and transfers of units west), and manpower was down as well. Having more Panzers isn't really helpful when the enemy is relatively stronger in all areas than in previous years and air support is lower, especially relative to the enemy and in previous years. Not only that, but some of the best divisions had to be transferred to other areas of the front and to the west due to Allied landings, which means that it wasn't even fully comparable to previous years. Compared to say Sevastapol German forces did better at Kursk in terms of casualty ratios, despite being outnumbered unlike in 1942.

To deny the massive improvements the Red Army made in it's performance in this day and age basically has as much credence as reiterating Nazis propaganda. Soviet formations, both infantry and mechanized, went from being unable to fight as coherent units above the battalion level to fighting as full on combined-arms divisions/corps and even armies in 1943.

I didn't say the Soviets made no improvements, which would be silly to say compared to the situation in say June 1941, as even the Soviet forces in December 1941 were improved in structure and equipment on hand, not to mention quality. However it is hard to disaggregate Soviet improvement from German decline in terms of the reasons for the cause of the drop in overall casualties for the year for the entire front. It is hardly 'nazi propaganda' to acknowledge in 1942 that Soviet combat effectiveness improvements might have been less than major overall and more a function in the loss of capabilities of Axis forces. It is silly to say that the Soviets didn't have the ability to fight as coherent units as of say August 1941, as the situation in June 1941 was a function of surprise and lack of mobilization, which was quickly corrected. As of July the Soviets were launching multi-front attacks coherently, the problem being lack of equipment and time to coordinate, as well as the greater German ability to fight maneuver battles relative to the Soviets, an issue they still faced in 1943, but had corrected the material deficits thanks in part to L-L, which made a huge difference compared to 1941. Certainly reforms in unit structure made a difference, but those had also appeared in 1941 and were honed in 1942, but still didn't make much of a difference until attrition on Axis forces, their overextension, fighting on multiple fronts, and L-L had all taken hold by 1943.

Your obviously not actually reading your source. Those links give a total of 63 divisions raised between July 1940 and December 1940 alone, of which 14 were infantry divisions raised specifically for the invasion of Russia, another 10 were panzer of which 9 were committed to Barbarossa and another 14 were motorized, 9 of which were committed to Russia. That's a total of 32 divisions, around half of the total raised in the latter part of 1940, and far more then a mere handful. Now in the case of the panzer divisions, I know that the raising was achieved by a reorganization which better balanced the panzer divisions by reducing the number of tanks so most of the panzer crews would have come from the already existant panzer divisions, but this still leaves the divisions infantry, artillery, and support personnel who have to be trained as well as the personnel of the motorized and infantry divisions. And yet, the German performance in 1941 was even better then that of 1940 or even 1939.
How many of those were static/occupation divisions? Most of them and most were not used in the East. Of the infantry divisions raised most were veteran divisions made up of parts of other divisions. The 'new' motorized divisions were largely existing units upgraded to motorized divisions, which meant they were actually stripped of significant parts of their manpower, as those divisions only had 6 regiments of infantry compared to the 9 in a foot division. That savings in manpower then allowed other divisions to be formed. The Panzer divisions were from existing panzer divisions, which were simply chopped in half and fluffed out with manpower and equipment, the extra manpower likely from the veteran divisions converted to motorized ones.

The performance in 1941 was in part due to the experience gained in 1940 and the deficits corrected in the meantime, including for newly trained manpower. The Germans had gained a lot of experience from the expansion pre-war about how to pair new and veteran manpower to produce effective units, but by and large they really didn't have many 'new' combat divisions and had a year to meld them together with veteran leadership and soldiers taken from other units. The Soviet system diluted existing divisions and reserve divisions with too much new manpower and not enough veterans, plus of course the purges having taken out so much of their experienced officers meant that they simply overexpanded what they had and threw it into combat too fast to make effective divisions.

The ability to finish training and provision support was a direct function of the frontline stabilizing for long enough for the Soviets to do so.
Going by what I've found from Soviet memoirs in the period of 1941-43 there was very little time for training, though of course more in 1942 and 1943 than in summer or autumn 1941. Loss rates were still extremely high and resources for training were limited for quite some time.

So in other words what I've been saying will happen IATL. Thank you for agreeing.
You're leaving the part out about the combat experience. There was a lot more had by 1943-44 than would be had in a single disastrous campaign in late 1939.

The T-34 and various Soviet equipment manufactured in '41/'42 used already existing machine tools for their manufacture. The cutting machinery for the T-34s turret, for example, had been first installed in Soviet factories in 1938. The fact the Soviets were able tout them into production is testament to the fact the tooling for their manufacture already existed.
Do you have a source on that? Their casting system for the hulls was new AFAIK.

German failures did not hinge on the relative quality in AFV between the two forces, so the idea it's some sort of excuse doesn't follow. That the superior tactical performance of the few T-34s the Soviets could get into combat did not impact the operational/strategic situation does not disprove simply reaffirms the old adage that isolated tactical performance is meaningless in to a wider operational-strategic situation.
Of course it didn't, but there is the mythology of the T-34 that some in the German army made to explain the failure of Barbarossa. Over 3,000 in June 1941 though can't be claimed to have had absolutely no impact on the broader situation, same with the thousands more than showed up over the course of Barbarossa, but alone didn't necessary have any sort of decisive impact due to the vast problems the new design had, including lack of spare parts, inexperience of the crews operating them, and the two man turret among other issues. The breakdown rate in June-July demonstrated that.

Which makes it odd that your desperately trying to argue otherwise. Although given their economic situation, their also screwed in a one-front war against the USSR.
What do you think I'm trying to argue? All I've said is that before the Soviets are able to effectively able to reform themselves and get into a position to be able to win militarily the war is likely to be over for political reasons or dramatically reshaped itself to change the USSR's chances.

A one front war would be a very different situation, especially if they aren't blockaded and would more likely than not end up in a stalemate or some sort of negotiated deal.

I mean probably a trickle in 1940 and a large number in 1941. The accident rates did not prevent the Soviets from fixing their organization and training regimes nor would it IATL.
If they rush it they'd have a trickle by spring 1941, but probably face a series of technical issues in the field and might only be able to get useful ones by autumn. IOTL the Soviets simply didn't care about the accident and loss rates and just pushed it anyway. Accident loss rates were pretty astronomical IOTL.

The T-70, IS-series, and to a lesser extent the T-44 were all designed and entered into production during the war, as did many of the Soviet aircraft models which formed up the main models of Soviet aircraft in '43 and '44, yet did so without much interruption in production. Furthermore, contrary to you claim, the old models in the Red Air Force were still in service in significant numbers. The Soviets had to fiddle with their small arms productions and were able to place into production several other new weapon systems (such as AT rifles and light artillery pieces) in ‘41 with massive quantitaties subsequently produced. Hell, as it was the switch from the old to modern models failed to significantly impact Soviet tank output in '40 or '41, so the supposition the Soviets can’t switch out for modern models while also ramping up overall production doesn’t have much support.
How many of each were actually produced during the war? Those were the exceptions I was thinking of along with the PPSH43. Though the T-44 did not enter production during the war, it was still being tested. The Soviet aircraft of 1943-44 that were new were adaptations of existing models rather than totally new aircraft; they were able to be made from existing equipment because they were so close to existing models. Like the LaG-5 it was the LaG-3 with a new engine. I didn't say old models weren't still in service, they clearly were and died in droves in 1941. Or fell out of the sky as the Soviets lost about 10,000 aircraft to accidents in 1941, in part due to having a lot of old air frames still in service; they might have kept survivors going, but most were out of production when the new models were phased in. The 'new' ATRs and artillery were either simplified models of existing equipment or in the case of artillery of existing calibers so could use the same equipment. Most of the wartime 'new' models were adopted because they were largely designed to make use of existing production equipment.

Soviet tank output from 1940-41 was limited compared to wartime anyway, so it wasn't as if output would be substantially impacted, but output quality was seriously lacking for the T-34 in 1940 and most of 1941. The Soviets could of course phase things in in 1940-41 with the T-34, but you've got the quality issue that impacted it IOTL without the pressures of war, plus the problem of needing to make the switch over when going all out in production rather than in peace time.

Average training time for enlisted in 1944 was two months longer then it had been prior to the war and officer training had doubled from one to two years, so 1944 training was in fact above pre-war standards.
Got a source on that?

And the scale of losses was a direct result of the Germans repeatedly encircling and annihilating entire Soviet armies repeatedly for a year on end, which isn't happening IATL after the first month or two.
If the Soviets stop attacking and the Germans can't, what major relevant combat experience are they going to get other than they clearly had logistics problems and CiC issues? That won't prevent another smashing the following campaign season, as the full extent of the problems won't be revealed until they fix the obvious stuff and they keep losing.

It hit the Soviets so badly that you can't point to any instance of how it adversely affected the Soviet. And Stalin had plenty of options to purge by the time of Stalingrad. Rokossovsky, Konev, Timoshenko, Zhukov... just to name a few. All had previously screwed up pretty badly in quite recent disasters yet he didn't shoot them. What's more, even in the cases where Stalin reacted to defeats by shooting people, he also did more then that: he also tried to figure out what had fucked up and fix it. I know you are wedded to a cartoon villain view of Stalin because that conforms to your views that the USSR is just the punching bag of the Great Powers, but the reality is that Stalin was not such a one-dimensional a character. Even when he did scapegoat a mistake, he also attempted to fix it. As one historian said of him: "Stalin wasn't a very good forgiver. But he was a great learner."
There wasn't really any way to disaggregate the Great and 1941 purges from the overexpansion issue, the rushed modernization issue, and the reorganization issue. It all was cumulative. We could say the successes and reforms at the end of the Winter War were undone by the purges in 1940-41, which gave us the situation at the start of Barbarossa, but how can you say it was just one thing with all the rest of the problems the Red Army had?

Of the commanders you listed they also had successes, so purging them for failure wouldn't necessarily make sense. No one claimed that Stalin purged everyone with any failures in the field ever, just that he was willing to purge those he wasn't friends with or necessarily very personally familiar with.

Having read a fair bit about Stalin's methods of leadership, he was to some extent a classic paranoid mass murderer who went far beyond just about anyone but Mao in brutalizing his own people through direct ordered violence. That said he did learn somewhat how wrong he had been over and over and to trust his handpicked commanders, but he got exceptionally lucky that Hitler made as many mistakes as he did and that the USSR had so much strategic depth otherwise he'd have ended up with the USSR in a France situation, but much worse off. Saying he was a 'great learner' is giving him too much credit. It was more like what Churchill said about America "after exhausting all other options he did the right thing".

He was rehabbed to help with a war that had already ended? :rolleyes:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konstantin_Rokossovsky#Great_Purge,_trial,_torture_and_rehabilitation

After his trial Rokossovsky was sent to the Kresty Prison in Leningrad, where he remained until he was released without explanation on March 22, 1940.

Semyon Timoshenko, who had been named People's Commissar for Defence of the Soviet Union after the debacle of the Winter War and was in urgent need of experienced officers to fill command posts for the rapidly expanding Soviet army, returned Rokossovsky to the command of the 5th Cavalry Corps at the rank of Colonel.[13]
The aftermath of the war at least.

I thought I had seen it in Stumbling Colossus but I was mistaken. I'm trying to track down the book I saw the figure in, both so I can cite it and give the exact number...
It would be appreciated if and when you do.

There is no evidence that the '41 purge had any impact on the air force and armaments industry. The fact that the Soviet air force constantly improved during the course of 1941 and '42 as did the armaments industry suggests it didn’t do much of anything.
Given the accident rate with aircraft in 1941 there is a lot to be said about the impact on production quality after the penalty for failing to meet production output demands was demonstrated. They improved because they really didn't have much place to go but up.

Japan is not much of a possibility, as they were conclusively cowed by Khalkin Ghol and the Kwangtung army is in no position to attack. It's a similar story with Italy, whose poor performance already demonstrates how unprepared for war they are and only joined OTL 1940 because they expected the war to last a few weeks and your admission which is an assumption and not a given (seeing as Germany has run out of currency to pay for oil imports and it's ability to threaten Romania is badly compromised by having to fight a two-front, it's more likely a invasion of Romania would be superfluous in cutting off German oil supplies and the Soviets have the strategic sense not to make unnecessary enemies). The Soviets do have Allies to help them externally: the Anglo-French, who would be massively building up their own forces and drawing off far more German forces then the Anglo-Americans ever did in 1941-43. Even without them though, the Soviets they don't need external help: they have even more resources then they received IOTL 1943-44 while Germany by mid-1940 will be on the verge of an economic collapse.
Tokyo was cowed because Germany had signed a deal with the USSR and wasn't about to help them. The Kwangtung army was in a fine position to attack the USSR given that the Far East forces weren't about to get reinforced and Zhukov and his reinforcements are either long gone or just recently left, not to return as they were stripped out of the forces in Western Russia.

Italy was very obsessed with their position in the Balkans vis a vis Romania, which was their source of oil and a foreign policy fixation of Mussolini (not to mention his hatred of the USSR). Whatever their performance would be, which actually wasn't bad in 1941 in the USSR and only ran into issues on other fronts due to under resourced attacks in multiple directions, their entry is yet another problem that the USSR would have to face.

Romania was accepting German barter, so I don't know what you're on about; the Romanians were accepting German payments and hadn't cut shipments IOTL. If it were superfluous why did Zhukov propose to invade Romania to cut off German oil supplies in 1941 when they weren't paying Romania cash for oil then?

The Allies have no interest in helping Stalin after he betrayed them by signing on with Germany in August, then betraying Germany being turning on her ITTL, plus also invading and taking part of Poland, when defending Poland against invasion was the entire reason the Allies went to war in the first place. Likely the Allies sit back and watch the dictators beat each other to hell, keep up the blockade, and work behind the scenes to get someone in the military to remove the Nazis and liberate Poland for a deal, then work to contain Stalin. Chamberlain and Daladier had no interest in Stalin conquering Poland and half of Germany, IOTL Churchill only signed on to it because of FDR and the lack of ability he had to impose any deal himself on the Soviet in 1944-45. Trading Hitler for Stalin isn't something the Allies of 1940 had any interest in.

Also of the stuff the Soviets got IOTL through LL is stuff they couldn't source for themselves and they'd be prevented from buying abroad, like modern radios, weapons, machinery, certain raw materials, etc. IOTL they were allowed in 1941 to buy some of them because of the Nazi invasion, but were actually relying on Germany for those sorts of things because they couldn't source them elsewhere.

And yeah, the Soviets will take time to fix their system. I never disputed that. It'll just take less time without them having to replace their entire army multiple times over. Historically, it took roughly 4-5 seasons (summer '41, autumn '41, winter '41/'42, spring '42, summer-autumn '42) for the Soviets to reach the point where they could reliably mount a defense against German armored thrusts and mount their own successful such thrusts in a similar (although not identical) style despite having to replace their army from scratch three times over, operating from a vastly shrunken human-resource base, and having to endlessly deal with situations where replacement had to receive more priority over improvement. With their improved strategic situation, it'll probably take the Soviets something around 2/3rd-3/4ths the amount of time. On the flip side, the German position is also much weaker in the longer-run, with their economy due to implode during the latter part of 1940, regardless of whether the Anglo-French are actively fighting them or not, so their own deterioration will also be duly accelerated.


Of course the Allies are going to help the Soviets. Why wouldn't they? It's in their interest to ship as much material to the Soviets so as to ensure as few as their own people die and they know it. Daladier and Chaimberlain may not have been fans of Stalin, but contrary to your implications, they were even less fans of Hitler by 1939 after he had wiped his ass with the Munich Agreement. As 'Frigid but Unprovocative': British Policy towards the USSR from the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the Winter War, 1939 put it: "Anti-communist ideology during this period took a back seat to the demands of realpolitik." Better to split Central Europe and share it with the Soviets then to have the either the Soviets or the Germans control all of it. By the time the Soviets get their act together, the WAllies position against Hitler will have solidified, helped by their obtaining of military superiority over the Germans as their own rearmament continues apace while the German war economy disintegrates and their forces are attrited in the east, and their attitudes toward the Soviets improve out of tacit recognition of the Soviets shouldering the burden of the blood price, there would be no interest in any sort of deal, and Hitler's political position would have been reinforced by his previous successes, the fact Germany is at war with the great Bolshevik threat and people's reaction to that is to rally around the leader harder, and the generals sympathy towards his ideals that they later tried desperately to hide after he was dead.


I assume their logistics are fueled by magic and pixy dust? Because they certainly don't have the resources to launch such a deep offensive without knocking out France. Also, why are Romania and Hungary when the Anglo-French are undoubtedly able to exert them same influence they did IOTL to keep them out and not have it disrupted by the Germans knocking out France?




Again, I'm guessing the Germans have magic and pixy dust to continue advancing against improving Soviet forces which are not improving fast enough despite more time having passed since the start of the war from OTL because, well, inherently stupid Slavs I guess. And also are able to overcome their economy collapsing and hence their military resources drying up during the latter part of 1940 through teutonic aryan willpower.
 
Romania was accepting German barter, so I don't know what you're on about; the Romanians were accepting German payments and hadn't cut shipments IOTL. If it were superfluous why did Zhukov propose to invade Romania to cut off German oil supplies in 1941 when they weren't paying Romania cash for oil then?

But Romanians were cutting down supplies of oil to Germany in 1939/40. Selling more to Britain then to Germans.
 
The T-34 and various Soviet equipment manufactured in '41/'42 used already existing machine tools for their manufacture. The cutting machinery for the T-34s turret, for example, had been first installed in Soviet factories in 1938. The fact the Soviets were able tout them into production is testament to the fact the tooling for their manufacture already existed.
Which shows what bungling brain-dead incompetents Soviet ordnance managers were - to have this magnificent weapon completely ready for production and then apparently forget about it for two years or so...

Or maybe, just maybe, there were a lot of engineering problems to work out, and production happened just about as fast it could have.

Of course the Allies are going to help the Soviets. Why wouldn't they?
Because Stalin's a treacherous weasel, and they don't think they need the USSR.

...Hitler's political position would have been reinforced by his previous successes, the fact Germany is at war with the great Bolshevik threat and people's reaction to that is to rally around the leader harder...
Hitler's political position was undermined in 1939 by his decision to embark on a war which at that time few Germans were confident about winning. The success in Poland got him some credit, but not a lot. It was the stunning victory over France that made the war popular in Germany. In this context, he would be the man who trusted Stalin and exposed Germany to Bolshevik attack. This would qualify as the "setback" that Halder considered a necessary precondition for a coup against HItler.

I assume their logistics are fueled by magic and pixy dust? Because they certainly don't have the resources to launch such a deep offensive without knocking out France.
How exactly did defeating France add to German resources? Some captured vehicles, PoWs as slave labor... Yes, there was some industrial loot. But look at all the claims on German resources resulting from the western campaigns. Germany had to garrison occupied France, fight the Battle of Britain, garrison Norway and the Low Countries, defend against British bombing. Plus Germany fought the Balkan campaigns, send the DAK to Africa...

And with all those drains, Germany carried out an offensive against the USSR in 1941 that was enormously deeper that what I suggested here. Remember, this is the army that took three months to defeat Finland against the army that crushed France in six weeks.

I don't think it's overestimating to suggest that in a year of campaigning in this context, the Germans would advance as far as they did in two months in OTL 1941.

Also, why are Romania and Hungary when the Anglo-French are undoubtedly able to exert them same influence they did IOTL to keep them out and not have it disrupted by the Germans knocking out France?

Stalin attacking all out? Might be just a little alarming? Romania and Hungary stayed out of the war in OTL 1939-1940 because they had nothing to gain or lose. Romania submitted to Soviet demands in July 1940 because Germany wouldn't back them (the Hitler-Stalin Pact covered Bessarabia). ATL, Germany and the USSR are at war. They can sit on their hands and hope Germany wins, or they can join. If the USSR wins, they are dead meat.

How so? Casualties in 1942 were about as high as those in 1941 in overall terms, but then the 1941's casualties took place in 5-6 months whereas the 1942 casualties took place a little over twice that time, so that makes it clear that casualty rates were about half as low, although a look at it by the half-year shows that they were closer to '41s in the first half of the year and further away in the latter half. 1943's casualties, and casualty rates, were then half-again that of 1942's.

Yeah, that's about right. Soviet losses declined substantially - from megacatastrophic in 1941, to horrendous in 1942, to merely severe in 1943-1945. (E.g. 30,000 KIA at Seelow Heights in April 1945.

(Horrendous in 1942? Consider Operation BUSTARD HUNT, in May 1942, where the Germans cleared out eastern Crimea. The Soviets lost over 170,000 men - the Germans 7,500. Or FREDERICUS (the same month), where the Germans crushed the Izyum salient, inflicting 270,000 casualties for 30,000 of their own. Sure, by this time, the Soviets could survive such blows without great disruption. But to paraphrase Everett Dirksen, "100,000 men here, 200,000 men there, and pretty soon you're talking about real losses.")[/QUOTE]
 

Deleted member 1487

But Romanians were cutting down supplies of oil to Germany in 1939/40. Selling more to Britain then to Germans.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1020261.pdf
With the disappearance of foreign imports from the west as a result of the Allied blockade, Germany took swift action to alleviate its desperate demand for oil. As the war escalated and fuel reserves began to tighten, production of domestic crude was stepped up dramatically, as was production of synthetic petroleum. Turning to their neighbors in the east, Germany pressed both Romania and the Soviet Union to significantly increase current oil exports. Romania was particularly critical to the Reich’s oil stockpile program, producing 8 million barrels for German export in 1940—a staggering increase of 4.7 million barrels in only two years.15

If they were selling more to the Brits than the Germans, then the Romanians were increasing sales to both by quite a bit.
 
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https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1020261.pdf


If they were selling more to the Brits than the Germans, then the Romanians were increasing sales to both by quite a bit.
Sure. But deliveries significantly fell in September 1939 and started to recover only in May 1940.

Axworthy: Third Axis fourth Ally: Romanian armed forces in WWII

With France still in war and Soviets joining it, there is huge possibility Romanians will cut supplies totally or even more.
 

Deleted member 1487

Sure. But deliveries significantly fell in September 1939 and started to recover only in May 1940.

Axworthy: Third Axis fourth Ally: Romanian armed forces in WWII

With France still in war and Soviets joining it, there is huge possibility Romanians will cut supplies totally or even more.
That may not be accurate, table from USSBS:
main-qimg-4e1bf6c8e5d1467ceb21e16d1efa261d


Romanian oil production was dropping from 1939-40, but exports to Germany rose. Italy was the one that got the cut.

Plus Romania had effectively economically subordinated itself to Germany in 1939 and reaffirmed that in December 1939 IOTL:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germa...ic_Relations_between_the_Two_Countries_(1939)
The German-Romanian Treaty for the Development of Economic Relations between the Two Countries was a bilateral economic agreement signed between the German and the Romanian governments in Bucharest on 23 March 1939. The agreement established German control over most aspects of Romanian economy, and thus forcing the Romanian government to join the Axis Powers at a later date. According to a contemporary report of the Time Magazine, "in no instance of modern times has one State made such humiliating, far-reaching economic concessions to another" as Romania to Germany, the same publication considering that it transformed Romania into a "German dependency".[1]

Ratifications were exchanged in Berlin on 20 December 1939 and the agreement became effective on 20 January 1940. It was registered in League of Nations Treaty Series on 17 January 1940.[2]

The agreement strengthened the Third Reich economically and placed at its disposal the resources of the Romania at a time Hitler was planning to invade Poland. The British government was alarmed by that development, and on 13 April 1939 committed itself to the defense of Romania from German aggressive designs on its sovereignty. However, the Romanian government assessed that British support will not be effective, and this evaluation seemed even more realistic following the German occupation of Poland in September 1939 and France in May–June 1940 and British withdrawal from the continent at the same time. As a result, the Romanian government decided to cooperate with the German government and later that year joined the Axis Powers.

Plus the Russians had already tried to push for the Romanians to allow their troops into Romanian territory for a pledge to defend it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania_in_World_War_II#Background
On 13 April 1939 France and the United Kingdom had pledged to guarantee the independence of the Kingdom of Romania. Negotiations with the Soviet Unionconcerning a similar guarantee collapsed when Romania refused to allow the Red Army to cross its frontiers.[1][6]

On 23 August 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Among other things, this recognized the Soviet "interest" in Bessarabia (which had been ruled by the Russian Empire from 1812–1918). This Soviet interest was combined with a clear indication that there was an explicit lack of any German interest in the area.

Eight days later Nazi Germany invaded the Second Polish Republic. Expecting military aid from Britain and France, Poland chose not to execute its alliance with Romania in order to be able to use the Romanian Bridgehead. Romania officially remained neutral and, under pressure from the Soviet Union and Germany, interned the fleeing Polish government after its members had crossed the Polish–Romanian border on 17 September, forcing them to relegate their authority to what became the Polish government-in-exile.[7] After the assassination of Prime Minister Armand Călinescu on 21 September King Carol II tried to maintain neutrality for several months longer, but the surrender of the Third French Republic and the retreat of British forces from continental Europe rendered the assurances that both countries had made to Romania meaningless.[1]

Effectively Romania had no reason to trust the Allies after they let Poland get overrun and in fact had a lot to fear from Russia, which had already expressed interest in moving forces into their territory. Germany was the only game in town and if the Soviets attacked them the answer certainly didn't seem to be the Soviets, as the Allies were willing to let them get away with invading Poland without a DoW or really any action against them. If as proposed here that the Allies and Soviets might work together Romania had a lot of fear from a Soviet victory and little to gain by siding with the Allies, especially if Stalin turned his gaze on them. Plus once Calinescu was assassinated (likely by the Iron Guard with German help) the primary voice for a pro-Allied foreign policy was gone.
 
That may not be accurate, table from USSBS:
main-qimg-4e1bf6c8e5d1467ceb21e16d1efa261d


Romanian oil production was dropping from 1939-40, but exports to Germany rose. Italy was the one that got the cut.

Plus Romania had effectively economically subordinated itself to Germany in 1939 and reaffirmed that in December 1939 IOTL:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Romanian_Treaty_for_the_Development_of_Economic_Relations_between_the_Two_Countries_(1939)


Plus the Russians had already tried to push for the Romanians to allow their troops into Romanian territory for a pledge to defend it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania_in_World_War_II#Background


Effectively Romania had no reason to trust the Allies after they let Poland get overrun and in fact had a lot to fear from Russia, which had already expressed interest in moving forces into their territory. Germany was the only game in town and if the Soviets attacked them the answer certainly didn't seem to be the Soviets, as the Allies were willing to let them get away with invading Poland without a DoW or really any action against them. If as proposed here that the Allies and Soviets might work together Romania had a lot of fear from a Soviet victory and little to gain by siding with the Allies, especially if Stalin turned his gaze on them. Plus once Calinescu was assassinated (likely by the Iron Guard with German help) the primary voice for a pro-Allied foreign policy was gone.
And they had not reason to trust Germans either, as 1940 showed.

As per Axworthy:
Export to Germany 1939 - 1.55 million tons, 1940 1.3 million t and 1941 3.17 million tons.

Break downs after war started till Battle of France per Axworthy:
To: Britain Germany
October 1939 ? 98,000t
November 1939 35,000 t 66,000t
December 1939 140,000 t 60,000t
January 1940 120,000 t 28,000t
February 1940 75,000 t 21,000t
March 1940 120,000 t 45,000t
April 1940 70,000 t 52,000t
May 1940 75,000 t 53,000t

In May 29th 1940, when French defeat was imminent, Romania signed oil pact with Germany and in June Romanian export to Germany doubled and only in August 1940 they reached agreed levels.
So Romanians were trying to at least balance.
As to Soviet pressure - it came after Oil Pact was signed - barter of oil and grains for arms. With France not defeated, Britain still on continent and Soviets in war with Germany, I wouldn't count on Romanians supplying Oil to Germany with Soviets on their border. And actually what could Germans really do? Fighting in France, fighting in Poland, would they be able to scrap forces to invade Romania? And how would the press Hungary to allow them pass through their territory? Hungarians were trying not to alienate Western allies too, even if they kept their eye on Transylvania.
British and French guarantees were taken with grain of salt but still were understood as last chance to stay out of German orbit. At that time Romania stayed fully mobilized. With Fall of France it was all over for Romania. Germans didn't support Romanians against Soviet demands and actually press on them 2nd Vienna award.
In Romania western allies lost a lot of influence by not supporting Czechoslovakia in 1938 and in March 1939 - Romania also objected to Polish and Hungarian occupation of parts of Czechoslovakia and actually partially mobilized in March 1939 when Hungarians advanced to Ruthenia and Eastern Slovakia.. Interestingly they rejected German offer to take share on division of Romania. But that's I guess different story.
 

Deleted member 1487

And they had not reason to trust Germans either, as 1940 showed.

As per Axworthy:
Export to Germany 1939 - 1.55 million tons, 1940 1.3 million t and 1941 3.17 million tons.

Break downs after war started till Battle of France per Axworthy:
To: Britain Germany
October 1939 ? 98,000t
November 1939 35,000 t 66,000t
December 1939 140,000 t 60,000t
January 1940 120,000 t 28,000t
February 1940 75,000 t 21,000t
March 1940 120,000 t 45,000t
April 1940 70,000 t 52,000t
May 1940 75,000 t 53,000t

In May 29th 1940, when French defeat was imminent, Romania signed oil pact with Germany and in June Romanian export to Germany doubled and only in August 1940 they reached agreed levels.
So Romanians were trying to at least balance.
As to Soviet pressure - it came after Oil Pact was signed - barter of oil and grains for arms. With France not defeated, Britain still on continent and Soviets in war with Germany, I wouldn't count on Romanians supplying Oil to Germany with Soviets on their border. And actually what could Germans really do? Fighting in France, fighting in Poland, would they be able to scrap forces to invade Romania? And how would the press Hungary to allow them pass through their territory? Hungarians were trying not to alienate Western allies too, even if they kept their eye on Transylvania.
British and French guarantees were taken with grain of salt but still were understood as last chance to stay out of German orbit. At that time Romania stayed fully mobilized. With Fall of France it was all over for Romania. Germans didn't support Romanians against Soviet demands and actually press on them 2nd Vienna award.
In Romania western allies lost a lot of influence by not supporting Czechoslovakia in 1938 and in March 1939 - Romania also objected to Polish and Hungarian occupation of parts of Czechoslovakia and actually partially mobilized in March 1939 when Hungarians advanced to Ruthenia and Eastern Slovakia.. Interestingly they rejected German offer to take share on division of Romania. But that's I guess different story.
Well our numbers are at odds. The USSBS table directly contradicts Axworthy. What is the source for his numbers?
As to trust, clearly Romania did not trust anyone, but was playing the poor hand they were dealt. The Romanians only upped their oil to Germany after being threatened by the Soviets and ceded Bessarabia even though Germany said they wouldn't support them. BTW the 'oil pact' was signed in March 1939, ratified in December 1939 and came into effect in January 1940. ITTL they won't be fighting in France, rather they'd only be fighting Russia in Poland and if anything keeping Russia off of Romania's back ITTL.
 
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