USSR/Imperial Japan: Are we biased?

At some point when anyone talks about a Nazi victory we get to the discussion about Japan invading the USSR. It is brushed aside with a few sentences of Japan impaling themselves upon Soviet forces, until they are pushed back, or give up. Our basis for this are two single battles from 1938 and 1939.

First there was the Battle of Lake Khasan was two weeks in 1938 between 7,000 Japanese, and almost 25,000 Soviets. The Soviets "won" yet for Japan the incident showed what was considered a perfect tactical example of how to take a hill at night. The next battle was the famous Khalkhin Gol which saw an intellegence officer with 37,000 soldiers and 200 tanks go against Georgy Zhukov, over 50,000 soldiers, and near 500 tanks. Inside of this battle Zhukov made an attack, which at the time was seen as foolish, in which he had two armored columns not supported by infantry push forcward and encircle the Japanese.

I always find it odd how we accept proof of Japan not being able to fight the Soviets from small battles between a pivotal figure in WWII, and access to supplies against an intellgence officer with fewer forces.

So does Japan deserve the brush off when we speak of it fighting the USSR? I do not think it does. For at the same time we speak of poor Soviet tactics, and methods over in Finland, or against the Germans we scoff at the thought of a successful Japan. Just the same do we go on at length about the Japanese fighting spirit, and ability against UK, or US troops, only to turn them into bumbling fools if we set them against the Russians.
 
Japan fought the Americans and British in the jungle, where the Japanese advantage of fighting spirit is maximized and Western advantage of firepower is minimized. Bring that balance of forces to Siberia, and it's a whole other ballgame. One cannot make it through a Soviet wheel-to-whell artillery barrage on open field with the Power of Bushido.
 
While I think people do tend to underestimate Japan's tactical inferiority to the USSR, the issue is surely that strategically it is hard to see where the Japanese attack goes. Yes, they might secure Vladivostock, but most other strategic targets are hundreds if not thousands of miles to the west. Japanese logistics would be stretched to breaking, presumerably allowing the Soviets to form a line somewhere amongst the wilderness. People can throw out that there are resources in the Russian far east, and yes ofcourse there are, but not the kind that can be utilized immediately.

As a result the situation gets decided one way or another on the other side of the world. If the Soviets win then presumerably they can send an overwhelming army to drive out the Japanese at their leisure.
 
Japanese did fine in 1904 against similarly armed Russian Imp Army and their geriatric Generals. By late 30s Japanese were using nearly same equipment and tactics. Just a receipe for getting your butts whupped by whoever comes along with real tanks, real artillery, and belt fed MGs.
 
Japanese logistics would be stretched to breaking

Indeed. The transsiberian Rail being the only Railway going there would be a prime target for partisans. And there aren't too many roads suitable for trucks, either.
And General Winter, which was hard enough in Russia, is even more severe in Siberia (if the japanese actually get far enough for that continental climate)
 

Markus

Banned
So does Japan deserve the brush off when we speak of it fighting the USSR? I do not think it does. For at the same time we speak of poor Soviet tactics, and methods over in Finland, or against the Germans we scoff at the thought of a successful Japan. Just the same do we go on at length about the Japanese fighting spirit, and ability against UK, or US troops, only to turn them into bumbling fools if we set them against the Russians.

In Finland the Soviets could not manouvere due to the terrain and the weather but they adapted quite fast. And the Wehrmacht was tactically and technically the opposite of the IJA:

The IJA was a light infantry force with little and light artillery and armour and a pre-WW1 doctrine. The Red Army was not in a good shape but they had more and better heavy weapons than the IJA and knew how to use them. Plus fighting on the defensive is less challanging for green troops than attacking.

And with regard to the Japanese being bumbling fools, there was a reason they were so fond of outflanking. They were not good at attacking a reasonably trained, equipped and prepared enemy frontally.
 
In Finland the Soviets could not manouvere due to the terrain and the weather but they adapted quite fast. And the Wehrmacht was tactically and technically the opposite of the IJA:

And of course the Finns showed us they are a nation of relentless warrior gods in 1944 by kicking out the Wermacht after making it clear their conquest wasn't worth the price Stalin would have to pay.
 
There are several reasons that a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, even at the height of the German invasion, would have failed.
First, the Soviets raised a new division for each one sent West from Siberia or Mongolia. The Soviets typically for most of the war maintained about 50 divisions in the Far East facing Japan. They also maintained parity or superiority in artillery and armor to Japan.
Second, the Japanese would have been literally hundreds of miles from the nearest rail head for supply. This means with every mile they advance their supply situation becomes more tenious. At Khalkin Gol the Japanese were 350 miles from their railhead and able to maintain just one infantry division at that position. The Soviets threw the equivalent of a reinforced corps against them and wiped out that divison, albeit at the cost of heavy casualities. But, then again, when have the Soviets ever been overly concerned with casualities?
Third, the Japanese army was in no way fit or capable of sustained large scale continential warfare against a major industrial power.
And, lastly, the Japanese get very little by invading. They don't aquire any major industrial sites, no major resources they really need and, no useful population for labor. If their invasion is for economic gain they get none from this course of action.
 
At some point when anyone talks about a Nazi victory we get to the discussion about Japan invading the USSR. It is brushed aside with a few sentences of Japan impaling themselves upon Soviet forces, until they are pushed back, or give up. Our basis for this are two single battles from 1938 and 1939.

First there was the Battle of Lake Khasan was two weeks in 1938 between 7,000 Japanese, and almost 25,000 Soviets. The Soviets "won" yet for Japan the incident showed what was considered a perfect tactical example of how to take a hill at night. The next battle was the famous Khalkhin Gol which saw an intellegence officer with 37,000 soldiers and 200 tanks go against Georgy Zhukov, over 50,000 soldiers, and near 500 tanks. Inside of this battle Zhukov made an attack, which at the time was seen as foolish, in which he had two armored columns not supported by infantry push forcward and encircle the Japanese.

I always find it odd how we accept proof of Japan not being able to fight the Soviets from small battles between a pivotal figure in WWII, and access to supplies against an intellgence officer with fewer forces.

So does Japan deserve the brush off when we speak of it fighting the USSR? I do not think it does. For at the same time we speak of poor Soviet tactics, and methods over in Finland, or against the Germans we scoff at the thought of a successful Japan. Just the same do we go on at length about the Japanese fighting spirit, and ability against UK, or US troops, only to turn them into bumbling fools if we set them against the Russians.

First of all, consider the stakes:

The Soviet Union stands to lose, perhaps, Vladivostok and Northern Sakhalin. Japan can lose Southern Sakhalin, Manchuria, Korea, and their whole effort in China. Japan can't win based on these alone.

The Japanese have no tanks to rival the Soviet T-34, no artillery to rival the Soviet's own highly powerful guns, and they are looking at a foe who may well outnumber them. Consider, also, Japan's performance in August Storm, where the Japanese were handed their heads by the Red Army.

Naval Superiority means that Japan might be able to grab Sakhalin and hold Korea with heavy use of Naval Bombardment, but a Manchuria for Northern Sakhalin swap is not favorable either.

Japan is well and utterly screwed against the Soviets. PoDs can be considered to change this point--seeing those incidents in 38 and 39 as a motivator to demand that improvement "We are the best army in the world, therefore we demand the best equipment in the world" and perhaps erode the Soviet's technical superiority--but without such a PoD, the Japanese will only win against a Soviet Union that's lost Moscow and has either given up on or has little interest in holding the Far East.

That might well happen, but otherwise, the IJA is not taking down the Red Army.
 
The Japanese may not be able to win battles but their presence may be able to pull hundreds of thousands of troops away from the west. This would weaken the fight against Germany and complicate logistics for the whole country.

Personally I don't think this would be enough to defeat Russia but it would probably extend the war.
 
Well, it's useful to remember that both Zhukov's force at Khalkhyn Gol and the Army for August Storm were elite formations with abnormally high proportions of artillery, mechanisation, and armor. Both campaigns were very much demonstration strikes intended to wow those watching, the Japanese in the former case to allow the Soviets to keep smaller garrisons in the East, and the Anglo-Americans in the latter case. August Storm in particular, attacked with but days worth of fuel (armored units were running out of fuel within 2 days), and burned supplies at a prodigious and unsustainable rate against a stripped, disorganized, and badly outnumbered Japanese force precisely because they knew they had to get in their blows fast before Japan collapsed.

The Soviets could not sustain an army the scale of August Storm in the East for long, and even the Khalkhyn Gol force's elite elements could not be deployed if the USSR were fighting for its life in the West. Not that the Japanese would have an easy time of it, but pinning down the Siberian divisions is at least a significant blow 1941-42, and cutting off the half of Lend-Lease that flowed through Vladisvostok is just as significant. Both combined may still not be enough to knock the USSR out, but then, it can't be said for certain.

One point that is true is that Japan has very little to gain out of the campaign, even if the Soviets have a great deal to lose. It'll just end up drawing off forces allowing the U.S. to crush Japan sooner even if the USSR collapses. But Japan has acted irrationally enough times that it shouldn't be impossible to persuade the Japanese high command that helping the Germans defeat the USSR would net some worthwhile gains later.
 
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