USS North Carolina and USS Washington at Pearl Harbour December 7th 1941

The advantage that subs have, especially against WW II carriers, is that even today they need to turn into the wind to launch or recover aircraft and have to do it for the entire evolution (generally 20-30 minutes depending on the size of the strike package and efficiency of the deck spotting) and they have to do it on nearly an ongoing basis (to launch/recover CAP and search aircraft) Cruisers have to come to a virtual stop to recover float planes (which also need to land into the wind). This effectively handcuffs a carrier force to relatively compact area. This allows sub to make somewhat reasonable approaches, not in all cases, but in some, particularly if there is a weak screen.

Carriers are predictable moving ducks in landing traps taking on aircraft^1 and are easy to torpedo (Taiho is an extremely famous example: especially WW II ones, since they cannot zig-zag when taking on aircraft), but launching aircraft is a different story. They can change target aspect by zig-zag and still launch into the wind by up to 25 degrees (50 degrees cumulative, weave side to side). The sub has to get in closer (about 1,500 meters separation) or the angle solution becomes almost impossible to set. Wasp went down because Freddy Sherman forgot this little tidbit of maneuvering trivia and spent too long trapping in a straight line in sub-infested waters without jinking.

The effectiveness of hydrophones also drops off with speed due to increased flow noise, during flight operations carriers are more or less deaf as a post.

True for any ships, not just carriers. However, Soryu operated ASW trained specialist birds for Kido Butai; so she was expected to slow down from time to time and listen for ye olde U-boate. The Type 93 Mod 2 and 3 hydrophones should have been able to hear noisy Tambor beyond effective American torpedo firing range, and as for the Mark XIVs. Do you have any idea what kind of a howl those fishes's screws put out? Those were designed to be loud so American sound gear could track their runs into target at up to 4,000 meters away. Even a moderately fast Japanese ship with Type 93 hydrophones should have heard them coming in from far enough way at the Japanese ships' cruise speeds (7 m/s). Fast enough to dodge by combing the bearings if it was about 2,500 -2,700 meters run or 120+ seconds. So... to defeat this, the American has to get in very close, again less than 1,500 meters, ideal separation or about 70 to 100 seconds run time. Tambor will find that difficult at best. Her best chance is against a Chikuma or a transport.
 
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What if the newest battleships of the US navy didn't have their propeller difficulties and were completed earlier and therefor would have arrived at Pearl harbour days or weeks before it was attacked by the Japanese? The North Carolina was definitely sheduled to go there, not sure about the Washington though, but for the sake of argument lets say it will be.

Did the japanese even have info on these 2 ships?
Where would they be berthed in the harbour?

You might find this thread of interest.

The ships would be located by the harbor master somewhat in order of arrival and individual ship needs.

For example, Pennsylvania (Fleet Flagship, Kimmel) and Calfiornia (Battleforce Flagship, Pye) would normally be tied up at 1010 dock (where Helena and Oglala are) but Pennsy had to go into drydock and California was anchored at the end of Battleship Row.

Borrowing the map from the above thread

Pearl_Harbor_Map_-_250dpi.gif


the berth near Avocet is open. IIRC, the last battleships back in the harbor were Arizona and Nevada, but Arizona needs Vestal (a repair ship) to come alongside so they are tied up without an outboard battleship. So a possibility might be one or both near Avocet, or Nevada in that spot and BatDiv 6 berthed in the location previously occupied by Nevada

1010 Dock is another possibility, if there wasn't a good reason for Helena and Oglala to be there.

Would they automatically be made top priority targets by the pilots when seeing them?

Given the historic over-concentration on West Virginia and Oklahoma, I have my doubts about the Japanese concentrating on the outer battleships in Battleship Row, as they failed to historically.

if they were open for torpedo attack how bad could the damage be(knowing full well the most damage was done by the dive bombers) compared to the ships hit OTL?
Is there a chance they could go like the Arizona from dive bombers?

The destructive blow to Arizona wasn't struck by dive bombers; Fuchida's Kates were carrying converted 14in battleships shells and acting as level bombers for their run on Battleship Row.

I think the more likely scenario is one where they will be at sea with Lexington and Enterprise. The inter-war Fleet Problems showed the vulnerabilities of carriers to surface action pre-radar or in conditions where the carrier's aircraft couldn't operate. The USN had developed the Balanced Fleet approach, where the carrier and battleship were co-capital ships. Given the USN FINALLY had battleships fast enough to practically explore that idea, I think it's far more likely they would have been with the carriers.


If they were a total loss, would that change the American tactic at all? What about the Japanese tactics?

I'd say there would be changes, but not much. They can be targeted, but that means other ships are less targeted. Still, a larger portion of the US battleship fleet can be knocked out or a few months, giving the Japanese more room. Interestingly the Atlantic fleet might be adjusted as well, so compensate the loss of ship in the pacific.

Again though, these ships wer brand new and i'm wondering mostly about the psychological impact the future of US battleships. Depending on what happens during the attack of course.

If they were a total loss, I can't see much difference in future battleships. The South Dakotas and Iowas were already on the ways; maybe the Iowas are early enough to get a bulge for additional torpedo protection.

But as I said, given the historic over-concentration, to make the a total loss might necessitate berthing them in place of West Virginia and Oklahoma.

My thoughts,
 
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