Since I pointed out that the Ranger was used in a non-combatant role after suggesting that it was a viable option for limited combat duty (do you dispute this?)
I don't dispute the order in which you made your comments. What I do dispute is the "possibilities" you suggest can be inferred from
Ranger's Atlantic "combat" experience.
You wrote...
CV-4 was smallish (though she could embark 86 aircraft, certainly an adequate number for some operations), and her protection though limited, was acceptable for light-to-moderate combat operations. She spent almost 2 years in the Pacific in a non-combat role...
... and I've continued to point out that
Ranger's two combat operations in the Atlantic were laughable by Pacific standards and thus are no predictor of any use in the Pacific.
In
Torch,
Ranger was just one of several CVEs, a little larger than the rest so she carried the admiral in charge of the CVEs, but she was used in the same fashion as those CVES and the only threat she faced was a limited one posed by submarines. In her other combat mission, the two day, shoot & scoot, Norway shipping raid, submarines were again the main threat and she faced all of three Luftwaffe aircraft.
Any operation in the Pacific would take place in a much more threatening environment against, when compared to the KM and LW naval arm, a much more dangerous navy and naval air force.
We certainly disagree about the viability of the Ranger for combat operations...
Yes, we disagree. You are also disagreeing with the USN commanders of the time who knew more about the
Ranger and her actual capabilities than you and I ever will.
Finally, your comment regarding MacArthur is telling...
It would be if I hadn't failed to explain the MacArthur/King tussle in a manner that allowed you to understand the point I was making. The fault there has been mine and mine alone, so I'll try again.
King was a man of towering passions. It would be hard to list all the people and organizations he loathed because a list suggests he hated some more than others. In reality, King hated them all
equally.
He loathed MacArthur not only because MacArthur was "army" but also because MacArthur was MacArthur. King and the entire USN were hesitant to send any ships to the southwest Pacific because, once sent, MacArthur very rarely sent them back. (The
Indianapolis tragedy was fueled in part by this perception.) When MacArthur screamed for another carrier to assist
Lexington, King would be damned if MacArthur was going to get anything, let alone the new
Essex decks just arriving in 1943.
When King's political masters finally ordered him to provide MacArthur with a carrier, King looked over his limited options only to go hat in hand to another nation and organization he
hated as much as MacArthur and
beg Britain for a Royal Navy carrier.
That's the
telling part of the story. King had swallow his pride and beg a carrier from Britain for less than 90 days work in light combat operations. King had to beg a carrier from one organization he
loathed, the Royal Navy, to assist someone else he
loathed, MacArthur, because King believed he had
no other options.
Here's the point I've been failing to get across to you:
If King thought USS Ranger could have done that "simple" 90 day job, he never would have been forced to beg Britain to loan HMS Victorious. If he had seen
Ranger as an option, King, who had already been forced to "lose" to MacArthur, would not have also been forced to "lose" to the Royal Navy.
If that little story about King and HMS
Victorious doesn't explain to you how the USN felt about
Ranger's suitability for combat operations, nothing will.