USS Enterprise sunk at Pearl Harbor

(Yes, this is a variation on the carriers at Pearl Harbor thread.)

On the morning of December 7, 1941, the USS Enterprise was supposed to be back at Pearl Harbor. However, due to rough seas, the Enterprise was delayed and, luckily, missed being among those ships sunk at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked. (Some of her planes were shot down in the attack, by a combination of both Zeroes and friendly fire.)

So, WI the Enterprise came back as planned and was sunk at Pearl Harbor (the Japanese would likely go after it as well)?

Effects on the Pacific War?
 

Rubicon

Banned
(Yes, this is a variation on the carriers at Pearl Harbor thread.)

On the morning of December 7, 1941, the USS Enterprise was supposed to be back at Pearl Harbor. However, due to rough seas, the Enterprise was delayed and, luckily, missed being among those ships sunk at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked. (Some of her planes were shot down in the attack, by a combination of both Zeroes and friendly fire.)

So, WI the Enterprise came back as planned and was sunk at Pearl Harbor (the Japanese would likely go after it as well)?

Effects on the Pacific War?

Minimal
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
 
We can talk about the fall of 1943 all we want but allowing Japan free run until mid 43 would be intolerable. I would think in the short run, more land based assets would have been sent to the Pacific and much of the fleet assets that went to North Africa would have been routed as well if Australia was threatened. The USN would have made do with CVE assets until the Essex and Independence arrived.
 
Enterprise lost...

At the most simplistic level, losing the Enterprise probably means that the Wasp is sent to the Pacific in Jan/Feb 1942, instead of June (OTL). The Ranger might also be transferred (in OTL it went there in 1944), though I suspect that this might not happen immediately. There is at least some likelihood that Essex (as well as CVLs like the Independence class) would be accelerated as well, though this is somewhat debateable.

Using CVEs is probably a non-starter, as they were vitally important for convoys in the Atlantic, and didn't provide sufficient air wings for most carrier operations in the Pacific.Certainly CVEs couldn't keep up with task forces (typically CVEs averaged about 18 knots, which while fine for convoy work, was not going to work with a fast task force), and thus wouldn't have been terribly useful in the Central Pacific and the Solomons.

One possible change might be making the USN a bit more conservative in the Pacific, though I rather doubt it. Most of the choices made in terms of deployments (the exception being the Dolittle raid, which had FDR's personal blessing) were pretty much mandated by the strategic situation and by the Japanese deployments. Since we were 'reading their mail' via Magic, we had a reasonably high degree of confidence in our actions, and thus made committment of foces accordingly.
 
The Ranger might also be transferred (in OTL it went there in 1944)...


Ranger never served in the Pacific and only undertook two combat missions; Operation Torch and a two day raid off northern Norway.

She's simply too small, too slow, and too poorly protected. The USN never considered using her.

There is at least some likelihood that Essex (as well as CVLs like the Independence class) would be accelerated as well, though this is somewhat debateable.

Perhaps more CVLs off Cleveland hulls, but their construction has pretty much already been accelerated as much as practical.

Using CVEs is probably a non-starter...

Agreed. The idea is not only a non-starter, it's also ludicrous.

Something like the loan of HMS Victorious may be seen. Her use in conjunction with Saratoga in the southwest Pacific had more to do with King not wanting MacArthur to get his hands on a new carrier than any "lack" of USN flightdecks and she spent more time in Pearl being fitted out for Pacific/USN service than the time she actually operated, but there's no reason why she couldn't have been used in her CAP-providing role for longer.
 

Markus

Banned
Loosing Enterprise on Dec. 7th make even a positive difference, if it leads to the cancellation of the Doolittle PR-stunt and more carriers are send into the Coral Sea. If that prevents the loss of Lex, the number of US CV is back to where it was IOTL, if the IJN looses a fleet carrier all the better, if the battle ends like IOTL, the USN would get low on carriers before the end of the Guadalcanal Campaign.
 

Rubicon

Banned
the USN would get low on carriers before the end of the Guadalcanal Campaign.

...and that would be different from OTL just how?

USS Lexington sunk on May 8th 1942
USS Saratoga
USS Enterprise
USS Yorktown sunk on June 7th 1942
USS Hornet sunk on October 27th 1942
USS Wasp sunk on September 15th 1942 (by the most incredible torpedo salvo of the war. One Carrier sunk, one battleship severly damaged, and a destroyer sunk)

The British had to reinforce the US navy with HMS Victorious at the end of -42 to bolster the Carrier strike force.

If USS Enterprise is sunk on December 7th makes absolutely no differance in the end. Japan fought so insanly ought of it's weight that it isn't even a challange.

Sometime from May-45 to October -45, two japanese cities will get a greeting from either a fat man or a little boy. Sinking Enterprise or not would not change that either way.
 

Markus

Banned
...and that would be different from OTL just how?

The British had to reinforce the US navy with HMS Victorious at the end of -42 to bolster the Carrier strike force.

That. Earlier reliance on BB, earlier carrier support from the RN.
 
The British had to reinforce the US navy with HMS Victorious at the end of -42 to bolster the Carrier strike force.


No. First, Victorious was used during the summer of '43, not the end of '42.

Second, as has been repeatedly explained on this board, the use of HMS Victorious had everything to do with Ernie King not wanting to give MacArthur a carrier King would then have to fight to get back and very little to do with any supposed USN carrier "deficit".

Victorious, despite being fresh from a refit in Norfolk which ended January of '43, still needed three months work at Pearl to make her ready for service in the Pacific with USN aircraft. After that refit, she was used for less than two months during the invasions around New Georgia where she provided CAP for the USS Lexington task group as that carrier flew off strikes. After that brief service, she was steaming back to Pearl for an "un-refit" by September and her return to Scapa by October.
 
The Ranger

Don Lardo,

CV-4 was smallish (though she could embark 86 aircraft, certainly an adequate number for some operations), and her protection though limited, was acceptable for light-to-moderate combat operations. She spent almost 2 years in the Pacific in a non-combat role, and most of the earlier part of WWII delivering aircraft (flying them off) while engaging in two combat operations.

Was she a 1:1 replacement for the Enterprise...of course not...but that wasn't the question. Is it possible that, given the loss of the Enterprise that the USN might consider using her to lighten the load on other (more robust) carriers...at least possible, and with enough stress, likely...

Your suggestion re: converting CLs to CVLs strikes me as an interesting one...certainly it would have provided a 'stop-gap' solution...

Markus,

You don't like the Dolittle raid I see? Unlikely that it would have been cancelled though...FDR thought it was a dandy idea, and the political need for a strike of some sort (no matter what) was simply too strong to withstand. Aside from that, I am not sure that I agree with you that it was a useless PR stunt...it had at least some impact on Japanese naval planning, and helped encourage them to overextend themselves...
 
My notion about the CVE's was less to do about combat operations but to backstop ongoing operations. It's likely the Wasp would have been sent to the Pacific.

I would think the USN would be forced to be more conservative but allocation of more land based assets like earlier deployment of the P-38 and more bomber assets to bridge the gap until the Essex class carriers arrivals would be in order. I do wonder if the construction of the Essex class carriers could have been accelerated if necessity required it.
 
She spent almost 2 years in the Pacific in a non-combat role...


No. Starting in the summer of 1944 when the IJN was essentially anchored in the western Pacific, she spent a little over one year training carrier borne night fighters out of first Pearl and later San Diego.

... and most of the earlier part of WWII delivering aircraft (flying them off) while engaging in two combat operations.

She delivered aircraft in the Atlantic, a very different combat environment than the Pacific, and her two combat operations were Torch, where French North Africa didn't present much of a threat, and a two day raid on northern Norway where the Luftwaffe didn't present much of a threat either.

Is it possible that, given the loss of the Enterprise that the USN might consider using her to lighten the load on other (more robust) carriers...at least possible, and with enough stress, likely...

When the US was down to one carrier in the Pacific, there was still no pressure to use Ranger. She's too slow, too small, and too old for combat. She's also too valuable in her actual wartime role; training carrier squadrons.

Your suggestion re: converting CLs to CVLs strikes me as an interesting one...certainly it would have provided a 'stop-gap' solution...

That isn't my suggestion. That's what actually happened.

The 9 Independence-class light carriers were converted from either previously laid Cleveland-class light cruiser hulls or planned hulls of the same class.
 
Incidentally, carrier conversions were proposed for the Alaskas and some of the Iowas and Baltimores then under construction, but were rejected on account of being inefficient and unneeded. I doubt any such conversion would happen, even in this TL, but it's food for thought, all the same.
 

Rubicon

Banned
No. First, Victorious was used during the summer of '43, not the end of '42.


Seems like we are misscommunicating here.

What I meant was that at the end of -42 the British sent HMS Victorious to bolster the US Navy, not that she arrived in the South Pacific at that time. :rolleyes:
 

Markus

Banned
Markus,

You don't like the Dolittle raid I see? Unlikely that it would have been cancelled though...FDR thought it was a dandy idea, and the political need for a strike of some sort (no matter what) was simply too strong to withstand. Aside from that, I am not sure that I agree with you that it was a useless PR stunt...it had at least some impact on Japanese naval planning, and helped encourage them to overextend themselves...

At the time the useless PR stunt was conducted, the IJN was working on kicking the Allies out of New Guinea. Preventing that was strategically far more important and it could have been done in a way that saves one american and costs two japanese fleet carriers. How is this for striking back?

With regard to USS Ranger; she is big, quite fast but was practically unarmoured. One 550lb bomb could have sunk her.
 

Bearcat

Banned
At the time the useless PR stunt was conducted, the IJN was working on kicking the Allies out of New Guinea. Preventing that was strategically far more important and it could have been done in a way that saves one american and costs two japanese fleet carriers. How is this for striking back?

Agreed, but his point was that politically, its unlikely to change. FDR wanted his raid, for purely morale purposes.

Average folk in the US would be little interested in what was being achieved in New Guinea. They were very interested in hitting Japan, even with a pinprick. FDR was very sensitive to that, with morale shaken so badly after the initial Pacific debacle.

Now in hindsight, you're absolutely right. Far better to crush Shokaku and Zuikaku at Coral Sea than to drop a handful of bombs on Tokyo. But getting Roosevelt to see that in 1942 is very, very difficult.
 
Seems like we are misscommunicating here.


We're not "misscommunicating". You're simply wrong.

What I meant was that at the end of -42 the British sent HMS Victorious to bolster the US Navy...

What you meant is of no consequence because Victorious didn't leave the yards in Norfolk to begin her service with the USN until January of 1943.
 
With regard to USS Ranger; she is big...


She was not. At roughly 17,00 tons she was only slightly larger than the Independence-class light carriers and over 2000 tons lighter than the USS Wasp.

... quite fast...

She was not. While all but empty, she made slightly more than 29 knots during her acceptance trials and never reached that speed again.

... but was practically unarmoured. One 550lb bomb could have sunk her.

Those bits are correct. And given her near lack of compartmentalization, a single torpedo would do the same.
 
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