Chapter XII
“The pluck of Lord Nelson on board of the Victory and genius of Bismarck devising a plan
The humour of Fielding (which sounds contradictory) with coolness of Paget about to trepan”
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Taken at the signing of the New Reinsurance Treaty on 3rd November 1888, this photograph shows Prince Andrey Lieven with Chancellor Bismarck at Charlottenburg.
“An understanding had developed within the Bourgeois establishment that the monarchists no longer posed a serious threat to the Republic. In a speech at Le Havre in 1883, Jules Ferry had stated that
“the Royalist threat no longer exists, it is buried in two tombs” in reference to the death of the heirless Legitimist pretender, the Comte de Chambord the fact that Napoleon III’s son, the Prince Imperial, had been killed by the Zulus whilst serving in the British Army. Although Ferry continued to warn of the threat from a potential coalition of the right, the constitutional convention that any government had to count on the majority support of a republican majority, which allowed a view to persist that the Republic’s security was assured in the absence of any vocal opposition. In part, this was aided by a policy of political decentralisation that had been set-up following the fall of the Second Empire. Although conservatives warned of the example of the Paris Commune, republican sweeps in the municipal elections of the '70s and '80s proved that most civic leaders were not the Deep Red Revolutionaries that they were assumed to be. In his first speech as President, de Freycinet praised the example set by the Mayors, holding a grand dinner for 12,000 of them to celebrate their efforts. The gala was so large that it had to be hosted in tents, which occupied almost four acres of the Tuileries Gardens. Despite this, Mayors occupied the bottom rung of a hierarchy that led from village council to the Élysée, with the potential for a handful of radicals to make their way up the ladder, bypassing the weary commentators fixated purely on the composition of Parliament.”
-From
“A New History of France” by Thomas Gildea, Cambridge University Press 1988
“The first edition of
"L'Action nationale" launched with little fanfare, being just one of a hundred reactionary newspapers that existed, Mayfly-like, in the heated climate of Third Republic Paris. The opening editorial, written by Barrès , did little to make the publication notable in any way, and without the financial assistance of Rochefort-Luçay, it seems unlikely that the journal would have lasted beyond the inaugural year. In spite of this, the Marquis’ steadfastness served Maurras well, and by the end of 1888,
"L'Action"had begun to break even, aided by the aforementioned unpopularity of the Moderate Republicans in the following both the
“Wilson Scandal” and the anger from many conservatives, who had lost their Caesar with the death of General Boulanger.
"L’Action nationale" had an overtly revanchist tone that sat well to the right of Rochefort-Luçay’s more mainstream paper,
“L'Intransigeant", which had started out aligned to the centre-left before moving rightwards during the height of Boulangermania. Maurras had little time to appeal to this lower-middle class demographic, focusing almost entirely upon the intelligentsia. Although his first editorials represent an interesting contrast with later publications, given their focus upon upholding principles of decentralisation (forgetting, obviously, the the Carpets and Bourbons deserve the most credit for turning a dozen feuding Duchies into a viable nation state) this is still one of his
'trois idees politiques' that were stated almost a decade before the titular pamphlet was published. The first years of
“L’Actions nationale” arguably represent Maurras’ most creative period, with a depth of searing criticism that his later polemics would not quite reach.”
-From
‘The Politics of Newspaper Ownership in the French Third Republic’ in
“Studies in Nineteenth Century Politics” by Martial Lamontagne, La Follette University of Wisconsin-Madison 2002
“The traditional relationship between Chancellor and King-Emperor of Prussia was inverted during Bismarck's generation-long tenure. Generally, it was always he who held the upper hand with regards to foreign policy. Whilst William I was not a shrinking violet as far as domestic matters were concerned, he could quite easily be bullied, cajoled or browbeaten into submission by the Chancellery. In opposing both the war against Austria as well as Bismarck’s political campaigns against the Catholics, he had annoyed Bismarck. When such disagreements occurred, William rarely voiced them openly, but on the handful of times when he did, the Chancellor was ferocious, unleashing a trident of tears, rages and threats of resignation. The Kaiser found this intolerable, prompting his famous aphorism that
“It is hard being Emperor under Bismarck.” This was not purely self-deprecation, he was prompted on another occasion to note that
“The Chancellor is simply more important than I am.”
Bismarck’s dominance of Berlin’s political life, both as a political manager and a figure of national unification, was to delay the transformation of the Prussian Crown into an Imperial one by at least thirty years. William I was a patrician and hugely respected monarch, but he had been in his mid-seventies when the Reich was proclaimed and never quite moved out of his previous mindset as King of Prussia. His ferocious whiskers and gravitas masked a insular nature and he rarely made public appearance or journeyed outside his old territory even after being proclaimed Emperor at Versailles in 1871. Although the most powerful monarch in Continental Europe, he retained the thrifty habits of his youth, eschewing the installation of install hot water in his Berlin palace on the grounds of cost, drawing lines on whisky bottles to prevent court servants from surreptitious tippling and refusing to pay for new uniforms for the
Gardes du Corps unless they had been darned at least three times. He even refrained from installing rubber tires on the Imperial State-Coach, viewing them as an unnecessary extravagance. As Emperor, William considered himself to be the representative for Prussian simplicity, going against Bismarck’s desires for a grand portrayal of Imperial might. Even after his death the Dowager Crown Princess, Auguste-Viktoria of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg, lost her husband’s spendthrift indulgences on dresses, jewellery and dieting advice, which in many ways can be seen as the first example of a
“media monarchy” within the European Courts.”
-From
“Bismarck” by Jules Haversham, Loughton 2002
“Notwithstanding the customary Prussian scepticism for free-trade, the rise of the Social Democrats had naturally led to growing demands amongst the Reich’s elite for colonial acquisitions, who viewed them as a useful foil against the problems associated with economic recession and popular calls for political liberalisation. Although moderates in the government had vetoed any monetary assistance to the struggling trading company in Samoa in 1880, by the end of the decade, a number of National Liberals, including the future Chancellor Helmut von Gerlach, had joined the
Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (German Colonial Society) which aggressively promoted the Imperialist cause. As a means of consolidating his position, the Chancellor associated himself with this movement prior to the elections of 1884, and had, against his natural inclinations, entangled himself in the wranglings over the new territory of
Lüderitzbucht in South West Africa. This caused a minor political dust-up with Whitehall when Cecil Rhodes expressed his anger at the new Portuguese-German Axis. Relations warmed only after the Chancellor swiftly despatched his son, who was acquainted with a number of senior figures including Lord Rosebery, to defuse the situation. An early source of disgruntlement between the two industrial powers in Europe was narrowly avoided, although it would be the best part of a decade before the issue was entirely resolved.
After successfully defending the conservative majority in the Reichstag, colonial ambitions hardly factored into Bismarck's final decade of leadership, preferring instead to focus on domestic means of ensuring a stable continuation of power. A month after settling the new Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, a wealthy young adventurer visited his office in Berlin, rolling out a map of Central Africa and started excitedly talking about the excellent potential for exploiting the diamond mines there. The Chancellor looked at him for a moment before responding, much to the aristocrat’s consternation, that
“my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia and here is France with Germany in the middle; that is my map of Africa.” For the next decade, it was this view that would dominate Berlin’s foreign policy, especially as London moved away from continental isolationism.
-From
“For Blood and Iron: Anglo-German Relations 1871-1943” by Julia Villiers, MIPS Press 2009
“The importance of the renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty has been overstated. However, it is not hard to understand why, given the circumstances that led to the rapprochement of the Continental Alliance in 1888. Relations between Germany and Russia had become strained throughout the late-1870s, not helped by an increasingly chauvinist press based in Moscow. Anti-German sentiments had grown increasingly vocal ever since the Serbo-Bulgarian conflict of 1885, which had dissolved the Dreikaiserbund and also led to a perception amongst the Slavophiles in the Tsar’s Court that Germany had a
“divide and rule” attitude to the Balkans. German anger was more economic than ideological, mainly concerned with opposition to any financing of the Russian railway-building program. The actual terms of the clandestine pact, which enforced neutrality with the proviso that Russia did not attack Austria, nor Germany France, was seen by senior figures as being too convoluted, with both Caprivi and Friedrich von Holstein feeling that it only served to complicate matters. Prior to his assassination, even the Crown Prince William made it clear to Bismarck that he considered the treaty of only secondary importance to his personal relationship with Alexander III.
Yet it was the secrecy of the Treaty that ultimately saved it from cancellation. Alexander’s foreign minister, Nikolay Girs, was moved to the Treasury in September and replaced by Andrey Lieven. Lieven, a Baltic nobleman, was keen to renegotiate the substance of the matter rather than risk losing it entirely. The Tsar’s Germanophobia has been prone to hyperbole by many historians, but both Bismarck and Frederick III were well aware of the shift against the Westernisers in Petersburg and were keen to ensure that the war scare with France following the Strassburg Tragedy did not escalate into a general European conflict. To his credit, Alexander III was also acutely aware of the problems that would be associated with a further decline in foreign relations and instructed Lieven to consult with Berlin at the earliest convenience. Shortly afterwards, the newly installed foreign minister made his first visit abroad, arriving in Berlin in early November. Lieven and Bismarck, much the surprise of Prince Heinrich, immediately found common ground with regards to renegotiation, with Lieven reporting in his diary that
“the Chancellor seems as irritated by the zealots within his own Parliament as I do with the High Pochvennichestvo” (the ultra-nativists that represented the most ardent Slavophiles.) Matters were concluded far quicker than the original Treaty had been, with Lieven agreeing to extend the expiration date by a further three years after the originally agreed date of 1890 and to end overtures towards Paris. Bismarck meanwhile agreed to further tolerate Russian ambitions towards the Bosphorus.”
-From
“The Three Empires: Russia, Germany , Austria-Hungary and the Making of Europe” by Paul Davies, Brent 1960
“Several years of poor harvests and the Emir’s forced population transfers had contributed to a rebellious attitude within the Northern Provinces of Afghanistan by the summer of 1888. Having already subdued one family member, Sardar Ayub Khan, for control of Kandahar and Herat in 1881, it was of little surprise to Abdur Rahman when another cousin, Mohammad Is'hak, did likewise. The Emir was typically candid when he heard the news, noting his oft-repeated qip that
“only a harem deserve a bed of roses.” Rahman left Kabul at the head of his newly modernised army on September 18th, reaching the Oxus six weeks later, before moving east towards the mountainous hinterland. However, the late start to the campaign had presented an advantage to Is’hak’s forces, who refused to be drawn into open battle in the valleys of the Hindu Kush. The Emir’s forces were harried continuously from this point, prompting Rahman to winter in the city of Baghlan.
Any student of this period would be well-served by reading Matthew Arnold’s 1853 poem,
"Sohrab and Rustum", particularly the imagery associated with the Afghan wilderness,
“My father, whom the robber Afghans vex,
And clip his borders short, and drive his herds,
And he has none to guard his weak old age.
There would I go, and hang my armour up”
The Emir was an urbane and well-educated man, but he may not have been as acquainted with Arnold’s verse as he perhaps should have been. On November 3rd, whilst worshiping in a village that had assumed to be pacified barely three miles from his headquarters, Rahman’s guard were assaulted by a band of guerrillas associated with his rival. Sensing the danger, the Emir, accompanied by two horsemen, forded the Kunduz River in the direction of the city. Although a strong rider, the current proved too strong and threw Rahman from his horse into the freezing torrent. His body was found three days later, almost ten miles downstream. Although his sixteen year old son Habibullah was immediately acknowledged as Emir, the conservative elements in the court were quick to mobilise against his reforming tendencies, much to the concern of Lord Preston in Delhi.”
-From
“Shadowboxing Giants: A Study of Anglo-Russian Antagonism in Central Asia” by Edward Holst, North Star Press 1973
“The 1888 Presidential Election was held on Tuesday 6th November, pitting the incumbent Grover Cleveland against his Republican challenger John Sherman in one of the closest fights in history. The President faced only token opposition at the Democratic Convention in Chicago's newly-rebuilt "Wigwam” Centre, with most excitement coming from the nomination of the Vice-Presidential candidate to replace Thomas A. Hendricks, who had died in office early in the term. Illinois native and Pensions Commissioner John C. Black was eventually selected as Cleveland’s running mate.
The Republican Convention in Cincinnati was more fractured, with former Indiana Senator Benjamin Harrison challenging the favourite, John Sherman of Ohio. Although Sherman led on the first ballot, his advantage was whittled away during subsequent rounds, aided by alleged “vote buying” by the former Governor of Michigan, Russell Alger. A subsequent outcry from a number of Southern delegates reversed this, allowing Sherman to regain his lead, triumphing on the sixth ballot. The Vice-Presidential vote was less controversial, with former Secretary of the Treasury Walter Q. Gresham comfortably nominated.
Just as with the previous election, the result was very close, with Cleveland squeaking ahead in the nationwide results by 50,000 votes. The Republicans had prepared their candidate well, and Sherman’s strong reputation as an anti-Monopoly campaigner was sufficient in defeating the Democratic Tammany Hall Machine in New York. Despite his numerical victory amongst the electorate, the loss of New York state swung the Electoral College in favour of the Sherman-Gresham ticket, who triumphed 239 to 162.”
-From
“American History from Grant to Munsey” by William Keble, Merlin 2004
“By the mid-1880s, the Meiji Regime was in a state of flux. Liberals looked towards Britain, whilst the Prussian-inspired nationalists such as Katsura Tarō took the view that military strength had to take absolute precedence over economic development. In February, he met with Yamagata Aritomo, then serving as Home Secretary, in order to discuss matters relating to the future of the armed forces given the Emperor’s demands for fiscal prudence. Katsura naturally adopted the view that the overall strength of the army was a guarantor of national unity. Only two years before, the Generals Miura and Soga had been relieved of their command, in the face of unprecedented attacks by the militarists, leading to army reform that was dictated by the efforts of the so-called
“Kodama Committee,” dominated by Katsura, with Major Meckel advising his actions as they directly affected the infantry. In May 1885, army garrisons had been reorganised into brigades consisting of two infantry regiments, which were further expanded into seven integrated divisions by the summer of 1888. The establishment of such a system allowed for the Imperial Army to conduct itself autonomously whilst overseas, thereby allowing regime to extend Japan’s influence onto the Asian mainland whilst forgoing the communication difficulties that had plagued earlier attempts.
In order to improve troop morale, which had been the victim of explosive growth in draft avoidance for the entire decade, rising from approximately 3.5% to nearly 10% between 1880 to 1887, Katsura had the law tightened in June 1888, which narrowed the range of exemptions for agricultural work, meaning that all males between seventeen and forty were liable for military service. Indeed, Meiji Japan entered the era of Constitutional Government, in a way that allowed the General to forcibly purge the entire Getsuyokai (Monday Club). That month, he proposed all army study groups be merged under one umbrella that allowed for Kodama and his allies within the officer corps to quit the Getsuyokai. Well over five-hundred complied. In an audacious move, he even lobbied the Minister for Foreign Affairs to move his rival, Major-General Horie Yoshisuke, into the reserves and sent as a military attaché to London. By November, six of the seven divisional commanders within the army addressed a letter to the Minister for War, Ōyama Iwao, insisting the Getsuyokai be merged with the overall army society, the Kaikosha. By happenstance, Katsura happened to be Patron of this organisation, and thereby seemed to be close to assuming overall ideological control of the entire Army. However, he had moved too fast to remove all threats to his position. An unofficial
“Getsuyokai-in-Exile” was covertly formed under Tani Tateki, who used his position within in the House of Peers to demand a more conservatively-minded defence policy, placing wealth creation above expansionism.”
-From
“Meiji to Shikibun: Japan and the Quest for Modernity” by Helga McGregor-Moore, Loughton 1974