USAAF forever.
- Thread starter lounge60
- Start date
I think in order to do this, you'd have to lessen the use of strategic bombing during WWII. It's one thing to have the USAAF subordinate to the Army when they're mostly performing close air support, but when the majority of their salvos are being flown either against enemy fighters or on long distances bombing raids, making a separate branch makes a lot of sense.
those Bomber Barons are the chief cause for that separation, which looking back on I believe was a mistake for the US military.
This has come up before, and I'm going to stump once more for the best and easiest PoD IMO: prior to WWII, the Department of the Navy gets control of strategic bombers as being more in line with the Navy's mission of power projection.
B-17s were initially touted as being capable of coast defense by bombing ships, and large aircraft were often called "ships".
Strategic Aviation would be added to the Navy Department, and after the war would get a commander on the same tier as the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and (in wartime) Commandant of the US Coast Guard.
The War Department would retain tactical aviation. The Air Corps would be a branch of the US army equal to the infantry, cavalry, engineers, etc.
This would be beneficial for the US armed forces, I think, and also, I think, meets the objective of the OP.
B-17s were initially touted as being capable of coast defense by bombing ships, and large aircraft were often called "ships".
Strategic Aviation would be added to the Navy Department, and after the war would get a commander on the same tier as the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and (in wartime) Commandant of the US Coast Guard.
The War Department would retain tactical aviation. The Air Corps would be a branch of the US army equal to the infantry, cavalry, engineers, etc.
This would be beneficial for the US armed forces, I think, and also, I think, meets the objective of the OP.
not bad, and in theory, according the the Air Corps, the B17 'officially' was designed to intercept and attack enemy warships at sea, while the B24 was actually the best US maritime patrol aircraft of World War II
Why not just a split , with the Army keeping its CAS AC and a Strategic Air Command analogue USAF. Army gets light transports (C-47/C-130)
CAS (A-10/ A-1E) , Helo's (UH-1/AH-64) ie all the stuff thats useful if you want a tac strike/AD fighter in a F-16 is perfect.
So you get
USAAC 47
A-1
A-26
FG-1
C-47
O-2
USAF
B-29
B-36
F-51K
F-80
C-54
its really not that hard the Army had a huge influence and did OTL keep some AC. We just want them to keep more types of AC. USAF still gets its Space/Missle toys. Army has enough types to insure a good TACAIR mix well into present day. So lets extend to Vietnam circa 68
USAAC
A-4
A-7
F-8 (crusaders had short legs great for FEBA CAP)
AC-130
C-130
OV-10
UH-1
AH-1
OH-58
CH-47
RF-8
USAF
B-52
B-58
F-4
C-141
KC-135
U-2
SR-71
Circa 90
USAAC
A-10
AV-8B
F-16(TAC/ADF variants)
C-130
OA-10
UH-60
AH-64
MV-22
USAF
B-1B
B-2
F-117
F-111
F-15
C-141
C-5
KC-135
Aurora (yeah i know it doesnt exist)
Obviously I cheated and use OTL airframes to flesh out a mock OOB but better than making it all up lol. The driver needed is already there the political will just needs to be found let the Bomber Barons have just a little less influence Post-war and The Army dept a little more and bingo.
CAS (A-10/ A-1E) , Helo's (UH-1/AH-64) ie all the stuff thats useful if you want a tac strike/AD fighter in a F-16 is perfect.
So you get
USAAC 47
A-1
A-26
FG-1
C-47
O-2
USAF
B-29
B-36
F-51K
F-80
C-54
its really not that hard the Army had a huge influence and did OTL keep some AC. We just want them to keep more types of AC. USAF still gets its Space/Missle toys. Army has enough types to insure a good TACAIR mix well into present day. So lets extend to Vietnam circa 68
USAAC
A-4
A-7
F-8 (crusaders had short legs great for FEBA CAP)
AC-130
C-130
OV-10
UH-1
AH-1
OH-58
CH-47
RF-8
USAF
B-52
B-58
F-4
C-141
KC-135
U-2
SR-71
Circa 90
USAAC
A-10
AV-8B
F-16(TAC/ADF variants)
C-130
OA-10
UH-60
AH-64
MV-22
USAF
B-1B
B-2
F-117
F-111
F-15
C-141
C-5
KC-135
Aurora (yeah i know it doesnt exist)
Obviously I cheated and use OTL airframes to flesh out a mock OOB but better than making it all up lol. The driver needed is already there the political will just needs to be found let the Bomber Barons have just a little less influence Post-war and The Army dept a little more and bingo.
Good one!
Maybe if the navy Zep program pops up earlier and with more sucess we see some Aviation Admiral picking up Douhet and starting up a Maritime Aircraft Wing to include Flying Boats and Coastal Defense Bombers. He manages to pull off a political coup and brings a lot of the disgruntled "Bomber Barons" over from the Army and strategic aviation becomes a Navy thing. Hell, contemporarily in civilian aviation Juan Trippe was already framing aviation in nautical terms with "Captains" and "Commanders" and "Clippers" and the like, so that'd fit in with the public perceptions. The US becomes the world's only "Naval minded" aviation nation and the USAAC (IMO it remains an Army Air Corps rather than Force) takes on a much more tactical, integrated arms concept ala Germany.
Admiral Moffet is your best candidate for this (killed when the USS Akron crashed at sea)
Thanks galveston bay!
Seriously, anyone want to write this? I'll help with research.
Concept: please feel free to shoot full of holes. Constructive criticism strongly encouraged!
PoD: Admiral Moffett is not aboard USS Akron when she crashes.
After the loss of USS Akron and USS Macon, Admiral Moffett reluctantly concluded that airships were too vulnerable to bad weather to be fleet scouts. Convinced that a long-range aircraft could still be highly useful, he turned to multi-engine flying boats and land-based aircraft. His attention was particularly caught by the Martin YB-10 which had recently been ordered by the Army Air Corps.
With the retirement of Admiral Pratt as CNO in July of 1933, the gentlemen’s agreement between Pratt and MacArthur that the Army would be responsible for coastal defense beyond the range of the Coast Artillery Corps was no longer operative. Moffett secured permission from the new CNO, Admiral Standley, to order a dozen B-10’s from Martin, but the Army, which owned the design, blocked his attempts.
In March of 1934, the Air Mail scandal rocked the Army Air Corps. Moffett followed the events with interest, but took no immediate action.
In 1934 the Army commissioned the Boeing XB-15 to test the design of a long-range bomber. Moffett, deciding that such a plane would be ideal for ocean reconnaissance and naval strike, lobbied for the program to be transferred to the Navy. He pointed to the disastrous Air Mail flights, especially their navigational problems, and that a flight with such a range would certainly include much over-water time. The Army, he also pointed out, was both clearly infringing on Navy territory with their YB-11 amphibian program (later cancelled), while being unwilling to share the B-10.
In 1935 Congress handed down a Solomon’s decision: henceforth flying boats, amphibians, and strategic bombers would be developed by the Navy. The B-10, however, along with several other twin-engine combat aircraft, would remain under Army control. The US Army Air Corps was confirmed as a combat branch of the US Army, equal in all respects to the other combat branches such as infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with the missions of ground attack and battlefield air superiority. Army aviation advocates were less than thrilled with this decision, correctly seeing it as greatly limiting their future influence and mission.
Moffett, naturally, was extremely pleased. While the XB-15 proved a failure, its successor the B9B (OTL B-17) was a powerful, long-range aircraft: everything Moffett wanted. The Army was forced to content itself with the Douglas B-17 Bolo (OTL B-18). Despite the crash of the prototype in October of 1935, the Navy in January 1936 ordered 50 B9Bs, with the intent of equipping a wing of four squadrons of 12 aircraft each, plus two spares.
PoD: Admiral Moffett is not aboard USS Akron when she crashes.
After the loss of USS Akron and USS Macon, Admiral Moffett reluctantly concluded that airships were too vulnerable to bad weather to be fleet scouts. Convinced that a long-range aircraft could still be highly useful, he turned to multi-engine flying boats and land-based aircraft. His attention was particularly caught by the Martin YB-10 which had recently been ordered by the Army Air Corps.
With the retirement of Admiral Pratt as CNO in July of 1933, the gentlemen’s agreement between Pratt and MacArthur that the Army would be responsible for coastal defense beyond the range of the Coast Artillery Corps was no longer operative. Moffett secured permission from the new CNO, Admiral Standley, to order a dozen B-10’s from Martin, but the Army, which owned the design, blocked his attempts.
In March of 1934, the Air Mail scandal rocked the Army Air Corps. Moffett followed the events with interest, but took no immediate action.
In 1934 the Army commissioned the Boeing XB-15 to test the design of a long-range bomber. Moffett, deciding that such a plane would be ideal for ocean reconnaissance and naval strike, lobbied for the program to be transferred to the Navy. He pointed to the disastrous Air Mail flights, especially their navigational problems, and that a flight with such a range would certainly include much over-water time. The Army, he also pointed out, was both clearly infringing on Navy territory with their YB-11 amphibian program (later cancelled), while being unwilling to share the B-10.
In 1935 Congress handed down a Solomon’s decision: henceforth flying boats, amphibians, and strategic bombers would be developed by the Navy. The B-10, however, along with several other twin-engine combat aircraft, would remain under Army control. The US Army Air Corps was confirmed as a combat branch of the US Army, equal in all respects to the other combat branches such as infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with the missions of ground attack and battlefield air superiority. Army aviation advocates were less than thrilled with this decision, correctly seeing it as greatly limiting their future influence and mission.
Moffett, naturally, was extremely pleased. While the XB-15 proved a failure, its successor the B9B (OTL B-17) was a powerful, long-range aircraft: everything Moffett wanted. The Army was forced to content itself with the Douglas B-17 Bolo (OTL B-18). Despite the crash of the prototype in October of 1935, the Navy in January 1936 ordered 50 B9Bs, with the intent of equipping a wing of four squadrons of 12 aircraft each, plus two spares.
Winston Smith
Banned
Seems like a brilliant plan Gridley. If this is turned into a TL, perhaps the P6M Seamaster will serve with a nautical version of SAC?