US pre WW1

This isn't a WI, just what I've figured out from a couple of recent threads and want to write down in one place. There is probably some AH possibilities in there somewhere.

  • 1903 Dick Act, sets out Federal control of the Militia and grants Federal funds to militia training and equipment
  • 1906 US occupies Cuba
  • 1907 Costal and Field Artillery separated, 6 field artillery regiments set up.
  • 1908 Dick Act amended, Militia MUST be Federalised before any volunteer units can be raised
  • 1911 Concentration of the Manoeuver Division and 2 Brigades on the Mexican border, very chaotic.
  • 1912 US Navy and Marines invade and occupy Nicaragua
  • 1912 Secretary of War Henry Stimson prepared Plan to form permanent divisions in both Regular Army and National Guard.
  • 1912 US occupies Cuba
  • 1913 US Army forms 4 permanent divisions based on 4 geographical areas and 3 coastal defence inspectorates based on 3 coastal areas.
  • 1914 Stimson Plan to create 12 divisions from National Guard units upon Federalisation/Mobilisation
  • 1914 US Army 2nd division concentrated on Mexican border, movement orders dispatched by single 5 line telegraph
  • 1914 US invades and occupies Vera Cruz Mexico
  • 1915 US Marines invade and occupy Haiti
  • 1915 2 batteries of 4.7" 'heavy' artillery of the 5th field regiment (designated as the 'army' artillery in the Stimson plan) deploy to the Mexican border after the Norias Raid.
  • 1915 Plattsburgh Camp set up to train college students to be prospective Officers.
  • 1916 Punitive division formed of 2 cavalry and 1 infantry brigade to pursue Pancho Villa into Mexico
  • 1916 US occupies Dominican Republic
  • 1916 National Defense Act, authorises doubling of Army and tripling of National Guard numbers over a 5 year period, further increases Federal Control of NG
  • 1916 NG Federalised/mobilised and concentrated on the Mexican border due to threat of war with Mexico due to Punitive Expedition. Chaotic but some 117,000 NG troops on southern border within 3 months. 12 Provisional Divisions formed.
  • 1916 US 7th, 8th 9th, 3rd New York and 2nd Pennsylvania artillery regiments formed, 9th and 3rd NY are America's 2nd and 3rd 'heavy' artillery regiments with 4.7" guns and 6" howitzers in the 9th and 4.7" howitzers in the 3rd NY.
  • 1917 Punitive Expedition recalled
  • 1917 NG units begin standing down, by April about 70,000 still Federalised and on border. Valuable training and experience gained during the Federalisation.
 
1916 - Washington Artillery of New Orleans increased from battalion to regimental strength; reequipped with 3 inch guns
 
1913 Gen Wood reported the NG had 48 artillery batteries, by 1914 there were 54 with 10 Battalion HQs, on the even of Federalisation there were 6 regiments, 12 battalions and 17 batteries and on the eve of WW1 6 regiments, 19 battalions and 79 batteries all of which had served on the Mexican border.

On the eve of war the US had 571 3" guns, 40 3.8" guns/howitzers (not in units), 52 4.7" guns (batteries in 5th and 9th field artillery), 112 4.7" howitzers (batteries in 5th field and 3rd NY) and 41 6" howitzers (2 batteries in 9th field).
 
Wouldn't it need to be the "Garrison Plan"? Stimson left office in 1913.

Not really, Stimson's plan was to organise the US Army into permanent fighting organisations: brigade in Hawaii and divisions in CONUS and NG into 12 divisions. Garrison was a supporter of the Preparedness Movement and wanted a peacetime army of 140,000 and a Volunteer Reserve of 400,000 and do away with the NG, but this was not supported at all and Garrison left office in Feb 1916 without changing the structure put in place during and after Stimson. His successor Baker didn't appear to have a plan of his own, indeed he called himself an innocent when he took office.

So when Federal mobilisation occurred it was more or less along the lines of the Stimson plan, New York NG in particular was close to Stimson's model. In the event provisional divisions were formed that didn't correspond to the exact numbered divisions in the plan.
 
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Driftless

Donor
1903(December): Wright Brothers successful heavier-than-air flight.
1907(December): US Army Signal Corps issues specs for a heavier-than-air flying machine
1910(November): Eugene Ely flies off the cruiser USS Birmingham - kind of a sheep-trap set up, but it worked.
1911(January): Eugene Ely successfully lands on a temporary deck on the the cruiser USS Pennsylvannia.
1911: First flight across the continental divide (7,100 and difficult flight conditions)
 
October 1916 War Department Report: Chief of the Militia Bureau
FIELD ARTILLERY

Since the date of the last report, October 1 1915 the following new units have been completed:

Massachusetts, one battalion and one regimental headquarters.
Connecticut, five batteries, one headquarters company, and one
supply company.
New York, one regiment.
Pennsylvania, two regiments, two batteries, and one regimental
and two battalion headquarters.
New Jersey, one battery.
Maryland, one battery.
Virginia, one battery.
District of Columbia, one battery.
Illinois, one battalion and one regimental headquarters.
Colorado, one battery and one battalion headquarters.
Wisconsin, two batteries.
The result shows a gain of 36 batteries.

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b2980525;view=1up;seq=915
 
Now for the bad news: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924095656413;view=1up;seq=13

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
The Regular Army of the United States on June 30, 1914, con-
sisted of 4,701 officers and *87,781 men. Of these, 758 officers and
17,901 men belong to the Coast Artillery, and are therefore prac-
tically stationary in coast defenses; 1,008 officers and 18,434 men
belong to the staff, technical and noncombatant branches of the
Army, including recruits and men engaged in recruiting. This
leaves the Army which can be moved from place to place—that is, the
mobile Army, so-called—composed of 2,935 officers and 51,446 men.
At that time the various characters of troops were disposed of
approximately as follows:
In the Philippines, 33 regiments Infantry, 2 regiments Cavalry, 1
regiment Field Artillery, 2 companies Engineers, 11 companies Coast
Artillery (aggregate strength, 9,572). In the Hawaiian Islands, 3
regiments Infantry, 1 regiment Cavalry, 1 regiment Field Artillery, 1
company Engineers, 8 companies Coast Artillery (aggregate strength,
8,195). In the Canal Zone, 1 regiment Infantry, 3 companies Coast
Artillery (aggregate strength, 2,179). In China, 2 battalions Infantry
(aggregate strength, 849). In Alaska, 1 regiment Infantry (aggre-
gate strength, 862). In Vera Cruz, 4 regiments Infantry, 2 troops
Cavalry, 1 battalion Field Artillery, 1 company Engineers (aggregate
strength, 4,090). In Porto Rico, a 2-battalion regiment Infantry
(strength, 707). In United States, 17 regiments Infantry, 11}}
regiments Cavalry, 3% regiments Field Artillery, 2 battalions Engi-
neers, 148 companies Coast Artillery (aggregate strength, 64,579).
Troops en route and officers at other foreign stations, 1,449.
Practically all these organizations in the United States are on
what is known as a peace footing, which means that an Infantry
company, which upon a war footing should have 150 men, now has
65 men; a Cavalry troop, which upon a war footing should have 100
men, now has 71 men; an Artillery battery, which upon a war footing
should have 190 men, now has 133 men. The Coast Artillery com-
panies are always kept on a war footing of 104 men each.
In addition to work with the troops themselves, the officers of the
Army are called upon to do a great variety of work known as detached
service. For instance, the Engineers have 66 officers detached for
river and harbor work, and the other branches of the Army have
578 officers of the line detached for service in training the Organized
Militia of the several States, on duty at schools, recruiting, etc.
*Includes Quartermaster Corps, 3,809, and Hospital Corps, 4,055.
As a result, scarcely any unit in the Army ever has its proper com-
plement of officers, and the need for an increase of officers is urgent
and imperative. In continental United States we had in the mobile
Army on June 30, 1914, 1,495 officers and 29,405 men.
We have a reserve—that is, men who have been trained in the

Army and under the terms of their enlistment are subject to be called

back to the colors in time of war—consisting of 16 men.
The Organized Militia of the various States totals 8,323 officers and
119,087 men. The enlisted men thereof are required, in order to
obtain the financial aid which the Congress authorizes the Secretary
of War to extend under certain conditions, to attend 24 drills a year
and 5 days annually in the field. If all of the National Guard
could be summoned in the event of war and should all respond (an
inconceivable result), and if they were all found fairly efficient in the
first line—that is, the troops who would be expected to immediately
take the field—we could summon a force in this country of Regulars
and National Guard amounting to 9,818 officers and 148,492 men.
And this is absolutely all. The only other recourse would then
be volunteers, and to equip, organize, train, and make them ready
would take, at the smallest possible estimate, six months.
Anyone who takes the slightest trouble to investigate will find that
in modern warfare a prepared enemy would progress so far on the
way to success in six months, if his antagonist had to wait six months
to meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as well concede
defeat without contest.
With respect to reserve matériel, one or two obvious things had
perhaps better be stated. This matériel, of course, can not be
quickly improvised. It requires long periods of time to produce; it
is the absolute essential of modern warfare, and must be kept on hand
if emergencies are to be prepared for. We have on hand in reserve
sufficient small arms, small-arm ammunition and equipment, roughly
figuring, for the 500,000 men that would have to be called into the
field in any large emergency. We have nothing like sufficient artillery
and artillery ammunition. This has been urgently presented in all of
the recent reports of the head of this Department and the Chiefs of
Staff, and Congress has from time to time recently increased the appro-
priations for these purposes. There is universal agreement among
all who know, that artillery is an essential feature of modern warfare,
and that a proper proportion thereof to any army is indispensable
if success is to be even hoped for. It is imperative that the manu-
facture of artillery and artillery ammunition should progress as
rapidly as is possible until a proper reserve thereof has been obtained.​
 
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Driftless

Donor
Notable US Military infantry & marine weapons of the era (US designed)


1892 – Springfield(Krag) .30 Rifle

1895 – M1895 Lee Navy 6mm Rifle

1895 – Colt .30 MG “Potato Digger”

1897 – Winchester 12 gauge pump shotgun

1898 – Colt “New Service” Revolver

1902 – Browning Auto 5 12 gauge shotgun

1903 – Colt Pocket Hammerless Semi-auto pistol

1903 – M1903 Springfield .30 Rifle

1907 – Winchester Semi Auto Rifle (not used by US military, but some use in other countries)

1911 – M1911 Colt .45 semi-auto pistol

1912 – Winchester Model 12 pump shotgun “trench gun” used for several generations

1914 – Lewis LMG (Not used by US early on, but extensive use abroad)

1917 – Browning .50 water-cooled HMG

1917 – Mk1 Hand Grenade

1918 – Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR)

1918 – Mk2 Hand Grenade “the Pineapple”

1919 – Browning .30 MG

1921 – M2 Browning .50 HMG
 
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