US Pacific Fleet not moved to Pearl Harbor

Might as well throw this into the grab-bag of recent WW2 Pacific Front PODs. What would happen if the USN didn't move the Pacific Fleet forward to Pearl Harbor from San Diego?

Assuming the Japanese still decide to start a war with the Allies in late 1941 or early 1942, do they mount a carrier raid on San Diego? Is that even plausible, given the extended distance needed to steam and the increased odds of getting caught?

If not, what is Nagumo and his fleet doing at the outbreak of war? Ensuring the destruction of the ABDA forces more quickly? Trying to force the unwilling American fleet in the East Pacific into a decisive battle? What effect does the survival of the battleline have on American strategy in the early stages of the Pacific War?
 
Assuming the Japanese still decide to start a war with the Allies in late 1941 or early 1942, do they mount a carrier raid on San Diego? Is that even plausible, given the extended distance needed to steam and the increased odds of getting caught?
I don't think so.
The chance of getting spotted on the way there is a lot higher.
Logistics may also be an issue.

If not, what is Nagumo and his fleet doing at the outbreak of war? Ensuring the destruction of the ABDA forces more quickly? Trying to force the unwilling American fleet in the East Pacific into a decisive battle? What effect does the survival of the battleline have on American strategy in the early stages of the Pacific War?
The reason the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor was to neutralize the US fleet in order to have a swift and uncontested campaign in South East Asia without major interference by the US Navy. Something that did work out to a large extent, in OTL.
With the fleet based in San Diego, the US would need a lot more time to get to South East Asia. Therefore the Japanese may risk to start the attack on South East Asia first, using the Kido Butai in order to have a swifter advance but keeping it always ready to fight against the US fleet, should the Americans decide to intervene decisevely at this early stage.
IMHO trying to "rescue" the Phillipines would probably be suicidal for the US Navy and would lead to greater loss of both life and ships than Pearl Harbor in OTL. Therefore it may not be attempted.
However an intact USN could support an earlier deployment and securing of key islands in the Pacific by US forces (without coming in direct confrontation with the Japanese), making things harder for the Japanese. I am thinking for example about a swifter securing of the Solomon islands.

In other words:
If the Japanese try to attack San Diego, they probably get spotted, lose more forces and have to keep their carriers for a longer time away from other duties. Furthermore other operations in the Pacific would be influenced, because more tankers would be needed to refuel the fleet and more battleships would be necessary to cover the Japanese carrier force, in case the Americans spot them early.
In other words, this option is probably a bad idea for the Japanese.

If the Japanese do not attack San Diego, they have more forces available in South East Asia, accelerating their advance.
Then:
a) If the USN try to "rescue" the Phillipines, the USN suffers alot of casualties.
b) If the USN does not try to "rescue" the Phillipines, the USN has the potential to secure vital islands in the East Pacific, not reached by the Japanese by then, thus perhaps stopping the Japanese advance earlier than in OTL.
 
The decision to move the US Fleet to Pearl was a key factor in the events leading up to Japan's decision to declare war. Though keeping the Fleet at San Diego would have altered the run up to the war slightly, I doubt it would have altered the larger strategic picture.

Even without the fleet, I could still see Pearl Harbor being attacked in the hopes of damaging/neutralizing the harbor, perhaps by a flotilla of midget submarines? Also keep in mind that with the Pacific fleet not at Pearl, garrisons such as Wake and Midway are probably going to be weaker.

Overall though I'd wager that the Japanese are going to shift their focus and use their 1st carrier fleet to take care of some immediate business. Without the major threat of the US Pacific fleet I'd wager that the IJN splits up the 1st airfleet into several units and proceeds to launch sneak attacks on the major anchorages of their immediate targets. 2 carriers hit the US fleet in the Philippines, 2 carriers (ostensibly for peaceful purposes...) hit the British at Singapore, and another 2 hit the Dutch. Following these sneak attacks, the carrier air wings are added to local air units in attacking the immediate Japanese targets.

Following the Japanese attack the US fleet is pretty much caught with it's pants down in San Diego. They have to relocate to Pearl Harbor first before they can hit back. Once they relocate to Pearl though, I'd wager they implement War Plan Orange. However this plays right into the hands of the Japanese who engage the US fleet in a decisive battle and (probably) manage to sink a good number of their ships. In the book Rising Sun Victorious such a battle serves to force the US to the table, I'm a tad skeptical but then again...
 
ISO WWII Alternative History Novel

This probably isn't the correct forum to use, but my search has been fruitless to date... Can anyone point me in the direction of a novel written some years ago about an alternative history where the US actually does an amphibious landing on the home islands of Japan? I think it was called Fire in the Mountains or Fire in the Hills?? Thanks for anyone's input!
 
When the US Pacific Fleet had remained at the West Coast, it would not have been considered a threath to the Japanese, due to the vastness of the Pacific and the much longer supplylines needed to operate the US Fleet in the Pacific. The foreward base of Pearl Harbor made things more different, so that was why it was attacked in the first place, to neutralize the USN for the time being.

So: When still at the West Coast, Japan would not have bothered much about it, unless there were foreward bases of main fleet operations in the region of the Japanese ruled waters. (By threaty this had been prohibited mainly during the Washington Treaty and its succeding Naval Agreements.)
 
Would this change Japan's plan? Would they attempt to instead attack the Western Allies and avoid attacking the USA, with the aim of knocking the USA off balance instead of having to smash her fleet?

Otherwise, there will probably be no Pearl Harbor when Yamamoto doesn't have a case for it.
 
No Japanese attack

The Japanese carriers didn't have the range to attack San Diego. Actually, they had to take extreme measures (stowing oil in the bilges and on deck) to get some of the shorter range carriers to Pearl Harbor, and used all but one or two of their fleet tankers in the operation.

Having the fleet in Pearl Harbor was designed to deter the Japanese from attacking the British and Dutch by raising doubts as to whether the US would enter the war if the Japanese attacked Malaysia and Dutch East Indies. A Japanese attack on the Allies that didn't include an attack on the US was kind of an Allied nightmare, and one that the US worked hard to avoid. The US buildup on the Philippines was obviously designed to threaten Japanese lines of communication if the Japanese bypassed the US-held territory, and the positioning of the fleet was part of the package.

If the US hadn't put the fleet in Pearl Harbor, I'm guessing that the Japanese would have applied additional pressure on the British and Dutch in the second half of 1941, and the two governments might have caved in to it. I could see the Dutch especially trying to appease the Japanese by say resuming oil shipments if it looked like the US was likely to stay out of any conflict with the Japanese. Without the US involved, the British and Dutch forces in the Far East were no match for the Japanese, and they had to have known it, though racial foolishness might have blinded some of the leadership.

I suppose it's possible that the British might have moved additional forces east in that case, maybe building up its fleet at Singapore. The US could have moved more of its fleet to the Atlantic to free up British ships to go to the Far East. By the fall of 1941 the US navy was essentially fighting on the side of the British in the Atlantic--running convoys and trying to sink U-boats or radioing their locations to the British. I could see Roosevelt making an implicit deal where the US moved a carrier and three or four more battleships to the Atlantic and the British added a carrier or two and three or four more battleships to the force headed to Singapore. That could have had interesting implications: maybe a "Pearl Harbor" against a British fleet in Singapore as the opening shot in the war, and no Japanese attack on US territory, at least not initially.

I doubt that the US would be allowed to stay out of the war indefinitely though. A US-held Philippines inherently threatened Japanese sealanes to the Dutch East Indies, and if the US went ahead with the Flying Tigers plans we would have had US planes with US pilots fighting the Japanese. I doubt that the Japanese would let that pass for too long.

If the Japanese clobbered an enlarged British fleet at Singapore, that would have implications all over the world, because while the additional US ships could do some things, they couldn't do things like supplying Malta until the US entered the war, which might take a while under this scenario.
 
Dale, I don't buy the Japanese kicking off the war without an attack on the Philippines (and the US). If the Japanese enjoyed massive success (helped by the Kido Butai) in the DEI, Malaysia, etc., then the obvious US response would be a massive buildup in the Philippines. Rather than facing minimally trained Filipino troops leavened by the Philippine Scouts and a few US Army and Marine regular formations, and a small-ish air force largely neutralized in the opening days of the conflict, the Japanese could potentially face several divisions of US regulars, along with armor and Marine units, with a heavily beefed up air force, dispersed over several fields and including a larger contingent of B-17s - in other words, a force that could easily have held out for quite a while, even with Macarthur in command.

Japan would then have had to worry about dealing with a much more powerful Philippines before even thinking about moving past it to attack other US possessions, as the PI would be standing astride their lines of communication, not to mention an immediate threat to every Japanese base south of Formosa. Additionally, US submarines based out of the Philippines would be a massive concern immediately for the Japanese.

The other nightmare scenario for the Japanese here would be that the US would ALREADY have evidence of the effectiveness of Japanese carrier aircraft against BBs, and would be that much less likely to steam the Battle Fleet across the Pacific to seek an engagement with Japan.

What happens if, instead, the US steams across the Pacific with Yorktown, Lexington, Enterprise, and Saratoga, probably in two task forces, an possibly even with Hornet and/or Wasp, supported by 4-6 battleships? If this force is under friendly air cover in the Philippines, can the IJN decisively win?

I don't see the US taking this risk. If the PI are attacked on day 1 of the war, even without Pearl Harbor, the Japanese are able to neutralize that base as per OTL, AND the US would be much more likely to steam the PacFlt battleships across the Pacific, which would probably be disastrous.

What do you think about the chances of the Pacific Fleet in a daytime surface engagement with the IJN? I do know that many of the Japanese BBs (such as the Kongos) were underarmored and underpowered - would this play into a possible US VICTORY if they forced a surface fight? I don't know, and am not knowledgeable enough to begin to answer that question. I do think that the Pacific Fleet NOT being at Pearl Harbor would probably be better for Japan than if it had been.
 

stalkere

Banned
This probably isn't the correct forum to use, but my search has been fruitless to date... Can anyone point me in the direction of a novel written some years ago about an alternative history where the US actually does an amphibious landing on the home islands of Japan? I think it was called Fire in the Mountains or Fire in the Hills?? Thanks for anyone's input!

There is also, IMHO, the excellent "Lighter than a feather" written by David Westerheimer, same fellow who wrote "Von Ryan's Express"

http://www.amazon.com/Death-Lighter-Feather-David-Westheimer/dp/0929398904

I found this one when I was in High School, and talked about it with my mom and my uncle,who were living on Kyushu at the time. My Uncle was the equivalent of a Captain in the IJAF at the time.
Ed
 
There is Robert Conroy's "1945", which has nothing to recommend it other than the death of Douglas MacArthur. Whoops, sorry for the spoiler. He also wrote "1942" about an alternate Midway, which is equally disappointing.

Also, the book "MacArthur's War", by Douglas Niles and Michael Dobson, fits the criteria but isn't very good.

The above two don't even rise to the level of some of the TL's on this forum, but check them out if you like.
 
Under both the last versions of Plan Orange and the Rainbow Plans, the Philippines were written off as indefensible, as it was seen as impractical to relieve them in time or build up enough of a garrison to hold out for the couple years that the naval offensive through the Mandates was projected to take. The plan for the Philippines garrison and the Asiatic Fleet were simply to hold out and do as much damage as they could before surrendering or retreating, and the reinforcement of the Philippines in 1941 was basically a result of MacArthur spouting a line of BS about the forces there being able to hold out with reinforcements that the politicians found convincing.

Under both the Orange & Rainbow plans, Pearl Harbor was the initial forward base of the fleet, where upon mobilization, the elements of the fleet, including the combatants and the fleet train, the ground combat elements needed to reinforce Hawaii and other US bases (Midway, Johnston Atoll, Wake in some versions) and for first-stage operations, supporting air units, and the merchantmen necessary to haul them all around, were all to concentrate in Hawaii.

Under the late-'30s version of Plan Orange, it was estimated that this would take some 30-60 days, to call up reservists, convert merchant ships to their wartime role, recommission reserve ships, and get enough to Hawaii for the first moves into the Marshalls.

With the Rainbow plans, it was assumed that the diversion of assets to the Atlantic necessary to meet the Nazi threat would delay any serious Pacific offensive for several years, so the plan was to concentrate on holding a Midway-Wake-Johnston line from the forward base of Hawaii, with offensive action limited to probes into the Marshalls and raids by submarines, and possibly fast carriers and cruisers.

A dash through the Mandates to relieve the Philippines was part of several versions of the Orange Plan in the 1920s and early '30s, but was rejected as a suicidally risky gamble, because if it doesn't work, you have a shot-up fleet stranded behind enemy lines a long way from home, and with the capability the INJAF demonstrated at the beginning of the Pacific War, things could go very badly indeed. Even if there is no Pearl Harbor bombing to wreck the battleline, the admirals would oppose such an operation for good reason; however the politicians might try to make something happen (although to the best of my knowledge, FDR was usually pretty good about not meddling in operational matters.)

If the bulk of US naval forces in the Pacific are on the West Coast when the war in the Pacific kicks off, the Philippines are still probably on the Japanese shopping list, but there's no raid on Pearl Harbor because it's not worth the risk- there wouldn't be a whole lot there, and the Japanese knew OTL that it was an incredible gamble, that pushed their capabilities to the limit, only justified by the chance of effectively neutralizing US naval power in the Pacific at one blow. Trying to hit Pearl as the fleet is concentrating there once the war starts is much risker because the base will have defenses on wartime alert, and as others have mentioned, even if the Japanese had the logistical capability to send Kido Butai to hit, say San Diego, which they didn't, they almost certainly would have been spotted and lost the element of surprise which was so critical to the success of the Pearl Harbor raid.

In a scenario such as what the OP is suggesting, I think that the Japanese stick with their traditional 'Decisive Battle' strategy of using aircraft, submarines, and other light forces to cause attrition to the US fleet as it advances through the Mandates before seeking a decisive fleet action between the Marianas & the Philippines. (With an intact US fleet, I don't think the Japanese push into the Solomons). KB, in such a scenario, may be committed to helping the Japanese offensive in SE Asia, or used in raids in the Indian Ocean against the British, or against whatever US or Australian targets look tempting, but not too much, as strategically, it would need to be preserved for the big fleet action the Japanese would expect.
 
Even if there is no Pearl Harbor bombing to wreck the battleline, the admirals would oppose such an operation for good reason; however the politicians might try to make something happen (although to the best of my knowledge, FDR was usually pretty good about not meddling in operational matters.)
I agree.
Furthermore the Japanese would still have sunk Repulse and Prince of Wales with their aircraft, making clear once again that battleships cannot be safe without air cover.
 

Bearcat

Banned
I agree.
Furthermore the Japanese would still have sunk Repulse and Prince of Wales with their aircraft, making clear once again that battleships cannot be safe without air cover.

Yes.

So less changes here than one might think at first. The US still would realize that the old BBs are too slow anyway, and can't advance in the face of both carrier- and land-based air.

The Central Pacific advance still has to wait for the Essex-class CVs to start arriving, along with the Independence CVLs.

MacArthur still turns Australia / New Guinea into his own private war to retake the PI. So something similar to Coral Sea stil happens.

Lack of PH *might* butterfly away the Doolittle raid, but maybe not. The public will still want to see *something done* to japan, and this is one of the few good options.

Early carrier raids probably unfold similar to OTL.

And Yamamoto still desperately wants the decisive battle.... and casts his eyes upon Midway.

Changes? Wake probably falls easier. The old BBs are undamaged, and don't require as much shipyard time to raise and refurbish. Maybe resulting in other new ships being ready sooner in '43-'44?

My hunch is the length of war doesn't vary significantly, maybe three months or so one way or another, dependent mostly on butterflies.
 
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