Under both the last versions of Plan Orange and the Rainbow Plans, the Philippines were written off as indefensible, as it was seen as impractical to relieve them in time or build up enough of a garrison to hold out for the couple years that the naval offensive through the Mandates was projected to take. The plan for the Philippines garrison and the Asiatic Fleet were simply to hold out and do as much damage as they could before surrendering or retreating, and the reinforcement of the Philippines in 1941 was basically a result of MacArthur spouting a line of BS about the forces there being able to hold out with reinforcements that the politicians found convincing.
Under both the Orange & Rainbow plans, Pearl Harbor was the initial forward base of the fleet, where upon mobilization, the elements of the fleet, including the combatants and the fleet train, the ground combat elements needed to reinforce Hawaii and other US bases (Midway, Johnston Atoll, Wake in some versions) and for first-stage operations, supporting air units, and the merchantmen necessary to haul them all around, were all to concentrate in Hawaii.
Under the late-'30s version of Plan Orange, it was estimated that this would take some 30-60 days, to call up reservists, convert merchant ships to their wartime role, recommission reserve ships, and get enough to Hawaii for the first moves into the Marshalls.
With the Rainbow plans, it was assumed that the diversion of assets to the Atlantic necessary to meet the Nazi threat would delay any serious Pacific offensive for several years, so the plan was to concentrate on holding a Midway-Wake-Johnston line from the forward base of Hawaii, with offensive action limited to probes into the Marshalls and raids by submarines, and possibly fast carriers and cruisers.
A dash through the Mandates to relieve the Philippines was part of several versions of the Orange Plan in the 1920s and early '30s, but was rejected as a suicidally risky gamble, because if it doesn't work, you have a shot-up fleet stranded behind enemy lines a long way from home, and with the capability the INJAF demonstrated at the beginning of the Pacific War, things could go very badly indeed. Even if there is no Pearl Harbor bombing to wreck the battleline, the admirals would oppose such an operation for good reason; however the politicians might try to make something happen (although to the best of my knowledge, FDR was usually pretty good about not meddling in operational matters.)
If the bulk of US naval forces in the Pacific are on the West Coast when the war in the Pacific kicks off, the Philippines are still probably on the Japanese shopping list, but there's no raid on Pearl Harbor because it's not worth the risk- there wouldn't be a whole lot there, and the Japanese knew OTL that it was an incredible gamble, that pushed their capabilities to the limit, only justified by the chance of effectively neutralizing US naval power in the Pacific at one blow. Trying to hit Pearl as the fleet is concentrating there once the war starts is much risker because the base will have defenses on wartime alert, and as others have mentioned, even if the Japanese had the logistical capability to send Kido Butai to hit, say San Diego, which they didn't, they almost certainly would have been spotted and lost the element of surprise which was so critical to the success of the Pearl Harbor raid.
In a scenario such as what the OP is suggesting, I think that the Japanese stick with their traditional 'Decisive Battle' strategy of using aircraft, submarines, and other light forces to cause attrition to the US fleet as it advances through the Mandates before seeking a decisive fleet action between the Marianas & the Philippines. (With an intact US fleet, I don't think the Japanese push into the Solomons). KB, in such a scenario, may be committed to helping the Japanese offensive in SE Asia, or used in raids in the Indian Ocean against the British, or against whatever US or Australian targets look tempting, but not too much, as strategically, it would need to be preserved for the big fleet action the Japanese would expect.