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We all know about the American occupation of Okinawa that started in 1945 and ended with the reversion of the island to Japan in 1972 (though of course US bases remain).

But less known are the proposals of Commodore Perry to occupy that island ("Great Lew-Chew") and make it an American protectorate a century earlier, at least if negotiations with Japan failed. As early as December 1852, several months before first visiting the Ryukyus, he wrote to Secretary of the Navy John Pendleton Kennedy, suggesting that the islands might be needed as a base for his expedition:

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Commodore Perry to Secretary of the Navy.

U. S. Steam Frigate Mississippi,

Madeira, December 14, 1852.

...it will be desirable in the beginning, and indeed, necessary, that the squadron should establish places of rendezvous at one or two of the islands south of Japan, having a good harbor, and possessing facilities for obtaining water and supplies, and by kindness and gentle treatment conciliate the inhabitants so as to bring about their friendly intercourse.

The islands called the Lew Chew group are said to be dependencies of Japan, as conquered by that power centuries ago, but their actual sovereignty is disputed by the government of China.

These islands come within the jurisdiction of the prince of Satsuma, the most powerful of the princes of the empire, and the same who caused the unarmed American ship Morrison, on a visit of mercy, to be decoyed into one of his ports and then fired upon from the batteries hastily erected. He exercises his rights more from the influence of the fear of the simple islanders than from any power to coerce their obedience; disarmed, as they long have been, from motives of policy, they have no means, even if they had the inclination, to rebel against the grinding oppression of their rulers.

Now, it strikes me, that the occupation of the principal ports of those islands for the accommodation of our ships of war, and for the safe resort of merchant vessels of whatever nation, would be a measure not only justified by the strictest rules of moral law, but what is also to be considered by the laws of stern necessity; and the argument may be further strengthened by the certain consequences of the amelioration of the condition of the natives, although the vices attendant upon civilization may be entailed upon them.

https://books.google.com/books?id=LSIPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA105

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The response of Secretary of State Edward Everett:

February 15, 1853

The President [Fillmore] concurs with you in the opinion that it is highly desirable, probably necessary for the safety of the expedition under your command, that you should secure one or more ports of refuge of easy access. If you find that these cannot be obtained in the Japanese islands without resort to force, it will be necessary that you should seek them elsewhere. The President agrees with you in thinking that you are most likely to succeed in this object in the Lew-Chew islands. They are, from their position, well adapted to the purpose; and the friendly and peaceful character of the natives encourages the hope that your visit will be welcomed by them.

In establishing yourself at one or two convenient points in those islands, with the consent of the natives, you will yourself pursue the most friendly and conciliatory course, and enjoin the same conduct on all under your command. Take no supplies from them except by fair purchase, for a satisfactory consideration. Forbid, and at all hazards prevent, plunder and acts of violence on the part of your men toward these simple and unwarlike people, for such they are described to be. Let them from the first see that your coming among them is a benefit, and not an evil to them. Make no use of force, except in the last resort for defence, if attacked, and self-preservation.

https://books.google.com/books?id=LSIPAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA108

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Perry's first visit to Okinawa was in May-June 1853. He wrote a letter to the new Secretary of the Navy, Dobbin, assuring him that everything was going fine (though George H. Kerr argues in *Okinawa: The History of an Island People,* p. 311, that "Perry's policy in Okinawa was throughout based on coercion" contrary to Fillmore's instructions, and that the official *Narrative* "not unexpectedly" minimizes the evidence of this):

Napa [Naha], Lew-Chew, June 2, 1853

This beautiful island is a dependency of Japan, and is governed by the same laws; the people are industrious and inoffensive, and I have already made considerable progress in calming their fears and conciliating their friendship ; and, as I propose to make, this a port of rendezvous for the squadron, it may be hoped that, in the course of time, the whole population of the island may become quite friendly.

They have already consented to receive compensation for the supplies which they are to furnish the ships.

I am only waiting here to establish a good understanding with these people before my visit to Japan, that information of our friendly demonstration towards the Lew-Chewans may precede us, and assure the Japanese that we have no hostile intentions.

https://books.google.com/books?id=G6BTAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA28

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Afterwards Perry arrived in Japan, forced the Japanese to receive him, presented the letter from (former) President Fillmore, and left for the China coast, promising to return to receive Japan's reply. Before returning to Japan, and uncertain whether the Japanese would accept his terms, he wrote a couple of letters to the Secretary of the Navy, in which he proposed a US protectorate over Okinawa:

December 24, 1853

Considering that I am acting very much upon my own responsibility, I should desire to be instructed as to the policy, which I do not hesitate to recommend, of continuing the influence which I have already acquired over the authorities and people of the beautiful island of Lew-Chew; an influence, in truth, acquired without the commission of a single wrong upon the people, but rather contributing to their advantage.

The department will be surprised to learn that this royal dependency of Japan, tracing its royal genealogy in regular succession from the twelfth century, is in such a state of political vassalage and thralldom, that it would be a merit to extend over it the vivifying influence and protection of a government like our own.

It is self-evident that the course of coming events will ere long make it necessary for the United States to extend its territorial jurisdiction beyond the limits of the western continent, and I assume the responsibility of urging the expediency of establishing a foothold in this quarter of the globe, as a measure of positive necessity to the sustainment of our maritime rights in the east.

I shall continue to maintain the influence over the authorities and people of Lew-Chew which I now command, but it is important that I should have instructions to act promptly, for it is not impossible that some other power, less scrupulous, may slip in and seize upon the advantages which should justly belong to us.

https://books.google.com/books?id=G6BTAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA81

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January 25, 1854

To this end it is my intention, should the Japanese government refuse to negotiate, or to assign a port of resort for our merchant and whaling ships; to take under the surveillance of the American flag, upon the ground of reclamation for insults and injuries committed upon American citizens, this island of Great Lew-Chew, a dependency of the empire, to be held under such restraint, until the decision of my government shall be known, whether to avow or disavow my acts. Until such action is had, the responsibility will rest solely upon me, and I shall assume it as a measure of political precaution, for it is certain that if I do not take preliminary steps before leaving this port for Yedo, for adopting such course, the Russians or French, or probably the English, will anticipate the design.

It will be understood, that in no way will the authorities or people of the island be molested or interfered with, nor will any force be used, unless in self-defence; in truth, we already possess all necessary influence in the island, which has been acquired by kindness and non-interference with their laws and customs.

The Americans have stronger claims for redress upon the Japanese than any other civilized nation; and though it does not belong to the spirit of our institutions to extend our dominion beyond sea, positive necessity requires that we should protect our commercial interests in this remote part of the world, and in doing so, to resort to measures, however strong, to counteract the schemes of powers less scrupulous than ourselves.

Therefore, in my present position, I cannot but feel the weight of responsibility which this peculiar state of things imposes upon me; and being aware of the expectation of the government and people of the United States, with respect to Japan, I shall not flinch from the exercise of powers, the propriety of which may be, at first, questioned by many, but the avoidance of which would be pronounced by all as showing a want of sagacity and firmness on my part.

This friendly intercourse of the Americans with the inhabitants of the island has already contributed greatly to their advantage, and no one can foretell the benefits that would arise to these debased and inoffensive people by a certainty of protection from a powerful nation like ours.

The most scrupulous regard to the rights of the authorities and other classes has been observed, and they are gradually becoming less reserved; and if it were not for the numerous Japanese agents and spies, who are ever on the watch to notice and report to the Imperial government every event that transpires, making those who manifest any friendly regard for us to be held accountable at some future time, the Lew-Chewans, it is thought, would rejoice in being placed in a political position rendering them independent of the tyranny of their Japanese rulers...

And as I would earnestly request the department to instruct me whether I shall take further measures for holding possession of this island, provided the Japanese government may not comply with our just demands, or whether I am to abandon all claims upon it, and leave the authorities and people as I found them--an alternative I might hope would not be determined on, as well in justice to this defenceless and overburdened people as a regard to the commercial interests of our country.

https://books.google.com/books?id=G6BTAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA109

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This was taking expansionism too far even for an expansionist Democrat like President Franklin Pierce. Secretary of the Navy Dobbin replied to Perry:

May 30, 1854

Your suggestion about holding one of the Lew-Chew islands "upon the ground of reclamation for insults and injuries committed upon American citizens" "should the Japanese government refuse to negotiate or to assign a port of resort for our merchant and whaling ships," is more embarrassing. The subject has been laid before the President, who, while he appreciates highly the patriotic motive which prompts the suggestion, is disinclined, without the authority of Congress, to take and retain possession of an island in that distant country, particularly unless more urgent and potent reasons demanded it than now exist. If, in future, resistance should be offered and threatened, it would also be rather mortifying to surrender the island, if once seized, and rather inconvenient and expensive to maintain a force there to retain it. Indulging the hope that the contingency may not arise to occasion any resort to the expedient suggested, and that your skill, prudence, and good judgment may enable you
to triumph over the ignorant obstinacy of the Japanese without violence, it is considered sounder policy not to seize the island as suggested in your despatch.

https://books.google.com/books?id=G6BTAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA112

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Can anyone see an American president actually going along with Perry's idea in 1854? Suppose no agreement with Japan was worked out and Perry did seize Okinawa and make it a US protectorate? Consequences? Even if the Okinawans themselves are as satisfied with American protection as Perry claimed, it puts the US in the position of challenging *two* nations'--Japan's and China's--claims of sovereignty over Okinawa (and the other Ryukyus). Moreover, the whole idea of a distant "colony" or "protectorate" seemed un-American and unconstitutional to many Americans. To quote an 1859 article in *North American Review* on "American Diplomacy in China":

"This policy of taking islands and commencing colonies in the Eastern seas may perhaps seem startling to some of our conservative readers at home; and yet it would be quite interesting to see how often this notion has been broached, and what favor it has occasionally found. Sometimes it is presented in the modest form of a coal-station or a guano deposit, and sometimes in the more ambitious shape of a great colonial settlement in Formosa. Just at the time when the English government--unhappily, we think, for the interests of humanity--were turning the cold shoulder on new colonies in Asia and Africa, on Borneo, Natal, and New Zealand, some of our public men were thinking and talking about what, after all, are but colonies in distant regions. In 1852, Commodore Perry suggested to Mr. Fillmore's government the propriety of "securing" one of the Lew Chew Islands as a place of refuge and supply for our whaling-ships, and hinted at his own great success in past years "in subjugating towns and communities in other parts of the world"; and the idea was not altogether discouraged. When, a year later, Commodore Perry renewed the suggestion, on the ground of reprisals for some alleged wrong done by the Japanese, Mr. Secretary Dobbin thus extinguished it [quoting the response I quote above--DT]

"That all such acquisitions (annexation has of course a different meaning) are unconstitutional, utterly and absolutely so, and could only have had their origin in the minds of untrained public men, is very clear to us; and we might turn over such adventurous political speculators to the law on this subject, as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in a case which, on this point at least, we hope may be considered as binding authority.

"'There is certainly no power,' said Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, 'given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States, or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure. No power exists to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently in that character. Whatever is acquired must be acquired so as to become a State of the Union, and not to be held as a colony." 19 Howard, 446." [This might have been a convenient text for the anti-imperialists of a few decades later--except of course that *Dred Scott* was utterly discredited by that time.--DT [1]]

http://books.google.com/books?id=UFsCAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA516

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In any event, in OTL Perry did reach an agreement with the Japanese, so even if Dobbin had not objected, the rationale for seizing Okinawa would be gone. However, that doesn't mean Perry had lost all interest in Okinawa. During the months between Perry's first arrival at Okinawa and his return there on the way back from Japan, he left a small staff to supervise a coaling depot at Naha. On his return visit, "The base at Naha could be abandoned, and to this end the commodore ordered that the coal supplies at Tomari were to be taken aboard ship once more. Nevertheless, he cautioned the Okinawans to hold the depot in readiness against possible need on another day. Perhaps he felt the presence of an American coal depot--even though it was an empty one--would serve as a technical check upon British, Russian, or French interests." George H, Kerr, *Okinawa: The History of an Island People,* p. 333.

When Perry, at his Edo Bay negotiations, demanded that five Japanese ports be opened to commerce and navigation, and named Naha as one of them, "The Japanese commissioners countered with an assertion that 'Lew Chew is a very distant country, and the opening of its harbor cannot be discussed by us.' The Emperor of Japan was alleged to have very limited authority in the Ryukyu islands. This Perry interpreted as a disclaimer of responsibility sufficiently clear to give the Ryukyu kingdom the status of an independent sovereignty." Kerr, *Okinawa: The History of an Island People,* p. 330.

So when Perry returned to Okinawa he basically dictated the following "Compact" to the regent there (obviously it fell far short of any grandiose plans for occupation or a "protectorate"):

Compact between the United States and the kingdom of Lew-Chew, signed at Napa [Naha], Great Lew-Chew, the 11th day of July, 1854.

Hereafter, whenever citizens of the United States come to Lew-Chew, they shall be treated with great courtesy and friendship. Whatever articles these persons ask for, whether from the officers or people, which the country can furnish, shall be sold to them; nor shall the authorities interpose any prohibitory regulations to the people selling; and whatever either party may wish to buy, shall be exchanged at reasonable prices.

Whenever ships of the United States shall come into any harbor in Lew-Chew, they shall be supplied with wood and water at reasonable prices; but if they wish to get other articles, they shall be purchaseable only at Napa.

If ships of the United States are wrecked on Great Lew-Chew, or on islands under the jurisdiction of the royal government of Lew-Chew, the local authorities shall despatch persons to assist in saving life and property, and preserve what can be brought ashore till the ships of that nation shall come to take away all that may have been saved; and the expenses incurred in rescuing these unfortunate persons shall be refunded by the nation they belong to.

Whenever persons from ships of the United States come ashore in Lew-Chew, they shall be at liberty to ramble where they please, without hindrance, or having officials sent to follow them, or to spy what they do; but if they violently go into houses, or trifle with women, or force people to sell them things, or do other such like illegal acts, they shall be arrested by the local officers, but not maltreated, and shall be reported to the captain of the ship to which they belong, for punishment by him.

At Tumai [Tomari] is a burial-ground for the citizens of the United States, where their graves and tombs shall not be molested.

The government of Lew-Chew shall appoint skilful pilots, who shall be on the lookout for ships appearing off the island; and if one is seen coming towards Napa, they shall go out in good boats beyond the reefs to conduct her in to a secure anchorage; for which service the captain shall pay the pilot five dollars, and the same for going out of the harbor beyond the reefs.

Whenever ships anchor at Napa, the local authorities shall furnish them with wood at the rate of three thousand six hundred copper cash per thousand catties; and with water at the rate of six hundred copper cash, (43 cents,) for one thousand catties, or six barrels full, each containing 30 American gallons.

Signed in the English and Chinese languages, by Commodore Matthew C. Perry, commander-in chief of the United States naval forces in the East India, China, and Japan Seas, and special envoy to Japan, for the United States; and by Sho Fu Fing, Superintendent of Affairs (Tsu-li-kwan) in Lew-Chew, and Ba Rio-si, Treasurer of Lew-Chew, at Shui [Shuri], for the government of Lew-Chew; and copies exchanged this 11th day of July, 1854, or the reign Hien Fung, 4th year, 6th moon, 17th day, at the town hall of Napa.

http://books.google.com/books?id=tbZBAAAAYAAJ&pg=RA12-PA174

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The Lew Chew Compact was ratified by the US Senate in March 1855. It did not prove to be of much consequence; in November 1872, when the Japanese government announced to foreign governments that it had taken responsibility for the Ryukyu kingdom, it assured them that it would assume full responsibility for all obligations and rights affected by treaties entered into by the Ryukyuans. As Kerr notes (p. 364), "This satisfied everyone concerned but the Okinawans" and Washington accepted Japan's position. China made a few efforts to get the US to mediate its dispute with Japan over the Ryukyus--in 1879 it even tried to use General Grant, who was in the Far East as part of his world tour at the time. Japan did accept Grant's suggestion of direct negotiations with China, and an agreement was even reached, leaving Okinawa and the islands to the north in Japan's control, giving China undisputed possession of Miyako and Yaeyama, and revising the Tientsin Treaty to grant Japan most-favored-nation trading rights. But the Peking government repudiated its negotiators, and Japan angrily announced that it considered the Ryukyu question closed. (What if Peking had not repudiated its negotiators? Japan would eventually have taken Miyako and Yaeyama as well as Taiwan after the 1894-5 war but like Taiwan they would presumably have been returned to China in 1945, which means they would be governed from Taipei today... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sakishima_Islands )

Incidentally, the Ryukyus weren't the only island group Perry was interested in acquiring for the US:

"While the boundary quarrel with Russia was in progress at the north, Japan was drawn into a triangular sovereignty dispute in the Bonin Islands, which lay only five hundred miles southeast of the Japanese capital. It was held that these islands had been granted in fief to Ogasawara Sadayori in the late 16th century, but Japanese interest and settlement had been intermittent. In June, 1827, Captian Beechey of H.M.S. 'Blossom' had surveyed the archipelago and posted a declaration of possession in the name of the British crown, an inscribed copper plate nailed to a tree on an uninhabited island. Two years later a group of settlers sponsored by the British consul at Honolulu, but under the leadership of an American named Nathaniel Savoury, appeared in the Bonin Islands. During the next twenty years a mixed colony of British, American, Hawaiian, Portuguese, Italian, French, and Spanish adventurers developed, with fluctuating fortune, on these islands.

"Perry surveyed the Bonins, bought land there for a coaling depot, and declared his intention to claim that they were under the protection of the United States. Savoury was ordered to run up the American flag. The British at Hongkong protested, courteously but strongly, and Washington repudiated Perry's unauthorized action. The Japanese were alarmed; the shogunate sent officers over to the Bonins in 1864 to reassert Japan's traditional claims, but the sovereignty question remained in dispute until 1875, when the United States and Great Britain agreed to abandon all claims." Kerr, *Okinawa,* p. 355.

[1] Actually, a few anti-expansionists did try to use *Dred Scott* for anti-imperialist purposes--arguing that it was still valid on this point, even if the ACW and the subsequent constitutional amendments had made it obsolete on slavery. They did not have much success. For a typical reply:

"The decision is either law or not law. It can not be valid as to colonies, a secondary consideration, and invalid as to slavery, a primary issue. It must stand or fall as a whole. Hence we have this dilemma. If to-day the Dred Scott decision is law, then the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments are not law; the results of the rebellion are nullified; the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional; slavery can be maintained in all our Territories; and the negro has no 'rights which the white man is bound to respect.'4 This dilemma has been overlooked.

"The major premise of Judge Taney's argument against colonies is that our sole authority to acquire territory is derived from the power to admit States. That proposition has never been accepted by any other judge or court. On the contrary, unanimous benches have declared our right to acquire territory, irrespective of its situs, and irrespective also of any franchise of statehood, as a primary attribute of sovereignty and as a corollary of the war and treaty powers. Judge Taney's major premise has been specifically overruled three times.5 The Supreme Court having held it utterly fallacious, all his arguments fall with it. His conclusion, therefore, that we can not hold territories per se falls also, and is as dead to the American people as the Stamp Act or statutes against witchcraft."
http://books.google.com/books?id=OEvQAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA543
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