US - No Stratigc Aviation Doctrine in 1930s

Assume in the 1920s & 30s the idea of 'stratigic' aviation/bombers is squelched. The primary doctrine in one of "Strike", that is focusing on the enemy military forces, including deep strike to interdict logisitcs lines, forwaard airfields, major HQ, supply depots, as well as against the forward combat forces. Designs for long range heavy bombers are not solicited by the US Army Air Corps. Fast twin & single engined bombers are sought, & tactical close support doctrine is given attention, to the point where the dive bomber development of the 1920s is continued to the latter 1930s.

How does this affect Overall US Army doctrine & practice when mobilization starts in 1940. I expect this will effect strategy to some extent as well.
 
I like this question, but I suspect you're going to get a lot of different answers.

For one thing, rejecting strategic bombing doctrine is going to have major political butterflies, as it implies that there will be a deployed army to act as an air corps of- this only makes sense if interventionism is the mood of the moment.

Looking at what the US actually built, there are some very capable mediums in there- a force composed of Mitchells, Invaders and Marauders looks fairly effective to me.

There would of course be alternative designs- who by and what, hm.
 

Deleted member 1487

Assume in the 1920s & 30s the idea of 'stratigic' aviation/bombers is squelched. The primary doctrine in one of "Strike", that is focusing on the enemy military forces, including deep strike to interdict logisitcs lines, forwaard airfields, major HQ, supply depots, as well as against the forward combat forces. Designs for long range heavy bombers are not solicited by the US Army Air Corps. Fast twin & single engined bombers are sought, & tactical close support doctrine is given attention, to the point where the dive bomber development of the 1920s is continued to the latter 1930s.

How does this affect Overall US Army doctrine & practice when mobilization starts in 1940. I expect this will effect strategy to some extent as well.

How would that happen though??? The US was extremely interested in strategic actions due to experience in previous conflicts and the lessons of WW1. You'd almost need WW1 to end in 1914 or 1915 with a German victory that suggests that rapid operational decisions combined with tactical excellence and overwhelming firepower to shatter enemy armies would be the solution, rather than OTL where the lesson was that war would bog down and strategic attacks on their economies would be needed to win a war of attrition. You'd need attritional warfare to not really develop as a lesson of WW1, which means an early win.

Of course perhaps you have the US develop a doctrine that is more like the OTL Luftwaffe one of a broad range of missions for the air force rather than just an independent strategic role...
but the problem with that is you still have airmen interested in developing their own independent role, rather than being what Richthofen lamented was his role as the 'army's whore' when constantly pressed into ground support operations. Actually I don't think it is possible to get the USAAF or USAF interested in the army support/operational interdiction role to the exclusion of strategic bombing because of the political implications for the service. Airmen will ALWAYS want to be their own independent service, rather than an auxiliary support arm, so will develop the role that let's them do their own mission independent of the other services. Otherwise they are just like the Soviet air force in WW2. Even that was the result of the Allies taking over strategic bombing as their mission and the Soviets having to focus resources on one area to maximize their advantage and because they were bad at strategic bombing, but post-war they developed their own strategic bombing mission and abandoned the pure army support role.

Frankly its impossible to see the OP what if even being possible due to the general world thought before and after WW2 being completely opposite of that. No offense Carl, its just that its pretty much impossible to see airmen letting themselves be just a support arm for the army in the long run.
 
For one thing, rejecting strategic bombing doctrine is going to have major political butterflies, as it implies that there will be a deployed army to act as an air corps of- this only makes sense if interventionism is the mood of the moment.

Could the focus on a 'strike' doctrine not be for ant-shipping ?

The USAAF concentrating on proving you don't need a fleet to guard the coast of the continental US ? ;)

Bonus points if you get them to develop effective torpedo bombers not using torpedoes from the Navy....
 
That takes you into interservice politics; the navy would object, the line of demarcation is what, if I remember it right, army aircraft were not allowed to operate more than 300nm offshore.

Coast defence is permissibly Army business- the artillery is theirs anyway- but maritime strike, certainly in the USN's opinion of the time, properly belongs to the Navy.

It was the strategic bombing advocates who changed this, and if they do not have the political clout to do so, I would reckon land based naval patrol squadrons are going to get what long range aircraft exist.
 
Maritime defense also takes you back to VLR aircraft with a large lift capacity & four engines. The Navy could develop those if the Army is not involved in the blue water warfare.
 
How would that happen though??? The US was extremely interested in strategic actions due to experience in previous conflicts and the lessons of WW1. Y

The Army Air Corps was very interested in tactical and strike aviation as well in the 20s & early 30s. Udet brought his first dive bomber home from Kansas, the A8 support bomber & variants were built in the early 1930s, the XA-14 support bomber emerged in the mid 30s. Depression related budget cuts and a tight fisted Congress caused all but the B17 & some interceptor programs to be stall for the remainder of the 1930s. The choice of the few programs to preserve was not a open & shut choice with Congressiona concerns about contracts to their home district more important than what the AAC might want. Neither was it a open & shut case within the Army. Experience with tactical or support missions in the Great War had created a deep interest in close support doctrine & not every officer was wholly comitted to the concept of the stratigic strike bomber. Ultimately the choice was made where to invest the residual development and training funds & the tactical aviation languished until 1940 when the Air Corps leaders started to scramble to catch up.

I dont see it as inconceivible the decision could have gone the other way & Boeings 299 project collects dust & the B10 crews trained for short or medium range strike & interdiction missions vs the long range 'stratigic' mission traning.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Army Air Corps was very interested in tactical and strike aviation as well in the 20s & early 30s. Udet brought his first dive bomber home from Kansas, the A8 support bomber & variants were built in the early 1930s, the XA-14 support bomber emerged in the mid 30s. Depression related budget cuts and a tight fisted Congress caused all but the B17 & some interceptor programs to be stall for the remainder of the 1930s. The choice of the few programs to preserve was not a open & shut choice with Congressiona concerns about contracts to their home district more important than what the AAC might want. Neither was it a open & shut case within the Army. Experience with tactical or support missions in the Great War had created a deep interest in close support doctrine & not every officer was wholly comitted to the concept of the stratigic strike bomber. Ultimately the choice was made where to invest the residual development and training funds & the tactical aviation languished until 1940 when the Air Corps leaders started to scramble to catch up.

I dont see it as inconceivible the decision could have gone the other way & Boeings 299 project collects dust & the B10 crews trained for short or medium range strike & interdiction missions vs the long range 'stratigic' mission traning.

Sure, this is all confirmed in a book I was just looking at an hour ago:
https://books.google.com/books?id=8TMwihcxz-0C&pg=PA182&lpg=PA182&dq=vereint+schlagen+manual&source=bl&ots=wjjHJvFbgT&sig=ykBgiY-NfxwZb1HDxXNHdyV48EA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi_spHV2MPMAhUIJiYKHbXVA9YQ6AEIMTAC#v=onepage&q=vereint%20schlagen%20manual&f=false

The issue is that the strategic role was just too popular because it gave the air force an independent role rather than as an appendage of the army, which appealed to far more within the USAAF hierarchy, who had aspirations of being an independent arm like the RAF, rather than just a specialized part of the army and therefore subject to its budget desires and being potentially left as a 'luxury item' to be cut as needed. Strategic doctrine was in effect a political gambit to ensure it had dedicated budget that was not cutable at the whim of the army and a plan to get out from underneath the army at some point.

Also things like the B17 had too much flexibility for use with the navy as well as the USAAF.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Air_Forces#Creation
The roots of the Army Air Forces arose in the formulation of theories of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School that gave new impetus to arguments for an independent air force, beginning with those espoused by Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell that led to his later court-martial. Despite a perception of resistance and even obstruction then by the bureaucracy in the War Department General Staff (WDGS), much of which was attributable to lack of funds, the Air Corps later made great strides in the 1930s, both organizationally and in doctrine. A strategy stressing precision bombing of industrial targets by heavily armed, long-range bombers emerged, formulated by the men who would become its leaders.[4]

A major step toward a separate air force came in March 1935, when command of all combat air units within the Continental United States (CONUS) was centralized under a single organization called the "General Headquarters Air Force". Since 1920, control of aviation units had resided with commanders of the corps areas (a peacetime ground forces administrative echelon), following the model established by commanding General John J. Pershing during World War I. In 1924, the General Staff planned for a wartime activation of an Army general headquarters (GHQ), similar to the American Expeditionary Forces model of World War I, with a GHQ Air Force as a subordinate component. Both were created in 1933 when a small conflict with Cuba seemed possible following a coup d'état, but were not activated.

Activation of GHQ Air Force represented a compromise between strategic airpower advocates and ground force commanders who demanded that the Air Corps mission remain tied to that of the land forces. Airpower advocates achieved a centralized control of air units under an air commander, while the WDGS divided authority within the air arm and assured a continuing policy of support of ground operations as its primary role.[5] GHQ Air Force organized combat groups administratively into a strike force of three wings deployed to the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts but was small in comparison to European air forces. Lines of authority were difficult, at best, since GHQ Air Force controlled only operations of its combat units while the Air Corps was still responsible for doctrine, acquisition of aircraft, and training. Corps area commanders continued to exercise control over airfields and administration of personnel, and in the overseas departments, operational control of units as well.[n 1] Between March 1935 and September 1938, the commanders of GHQ Air Force and the Air Corps, Major Generals Frank M. Andrews and Oscar Westover respectively, clashed philosophically over the direction in which the air arm was moving, exacerbating the difficulties.[6]

The expected activation of Army General Headquarters prompted Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to request a reorganization study from Chief of the Air Corps Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold resulting on 5 October 1940 in a proposal for creation of an air staff, unification of the air arm under one commander, and equality with the ground and supply forces. Arnold's proposal was immediately opposed by the General Staff in all respects, rehashing its traditional doctrinal argument that, in the event of war, the Air Corps would have no mission independent of support of the ground forces. Marshall implemented a compromise that the Air Corps found entirely inadequate, naming Arnold as acting "Deputy Chief of Staff for Air" but rejecting all organizational points of his proposal. GHQ Air Force instead was assigned to the control of Army General Headquarters, although the latter was a training and not an operational component, when it was activated in November 1940. A division of the GHQ Air Force into four geographical air defense districts on 19 October 1940 was concurrent with the creation of air forces to defend Hawaii and the Panama Canal. The air districts were converted in March 1941 into numbered air forces with a subordinate organization of 54 groups.[7]

The likelihood of U.S. participation in World War II prompted the most radical reorganization of the aviation branch in its history, developing a structure that both unified command of all air elements and gave it total autonomy and equality with the ground forces by March 1942.

In the spring of 1941, the success in Europe of air operations conducted under centralized control (as exemplified by the British Royal Air Force and the German Wehrmacht's military air arm, the Luftwaffe) made clear that the splintering of authority in the American air forces, characterized as "hydra-headed" by one congressman,[n 2] had caused a disturbing lack of clear channels of command. Less than five months after the rejection of Arnold's reorganization proposal, a joint U.S.-British strategic planning agreement (ABC-1) refuted the General Staff's argument that the Air Corps had no wartime mission except to support ground forces.[8] A struggle with the General Staff over control of air defense of the United States had been won by airmen and vested in four command units called "numbered air forces", but the bureaucratic conflict threatened to renew the dormant struggle for an independent United States Air Force. Marshall had come to the view that the air forces needed a "simpler system" and a unified command. Working with Arnold and Robert A. Lovett, recently appointed to the long-vacant position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, he reached a consensus that quasi-autonomy for the air forces was preferable to immediate separation.[9]
At very least you'd need to kill Billy Mitchell.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Mitchell#Promoting_air_power
 
You really need to stop Wiki spaming. Makes you look bad. At the least. Look at the sources cited in the wiki articles.

The article does nothing to set aside that into the 1930s the AAC was strongly invested in support aviation & makes no case a decision for focusing on heavy bombers was inevitable or set in stone.

How much of your time expended on wrestling over PoD is up to you. The effects are a lot more interesting here.
 

Deleted member 1487

You really need to stop Wiki spaming. Makes you look bad. At the least. Look at the sources cited in the wiki articles.

The article does nothing to set aside that into the 1930s the AAC was strongly invested in support aviation & makes no case a decision for focusing on heavy bombers was inevitable or set in stone.

How much of your time expended on wrestling over PoD is up to you. The effects are a lot more interesting here.

Source of the wiki quote:

  • Nalty, Bernard C., editor (1997). Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, Vol. I. Air Force History and Museums Program, USAF. ISBN 0-16-049009-X


I question the chance that there would be much other than OTL twin engine bombers for tactical/operational bombing and some limited dive bombers; as it was even the Germans had recognized that dive bombing was on the way out due to AAA advances against ground targets; in their case Udet forced it on them. By the 1940s there may be the 'fast' dive bombers of the A-36. Likely fighter-bombers would be the way they go in the 1940s. The Brits even though they tried to ape the Germans right after France by ordering dive bombers from the US had pretty much dropped them by 1942 and never fielded them because they were ultimately thought to be useless on the modern battlefield.

If we are really going to run with a totally a-historical development of the USAAF as a tactical air force, then we're likely to see a-historical designs that never were even proposed IOTL, so we could speculate endlessly about that. As to doctrine it probably won't be all that different to the German one in 1940 minus the direct combat experience in Europe that the Germans had. Then they would evolve probably a similar system to what the RAF developed in the Desert, especially as they would be forced to rely on their experience until the USAAF got its own.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Top