US Navy without Rickover?

[Minchandre]

I was rereading Red Mars, and they mention that the Martian expedition is given a Rickover reactor. Interested, I looked it up - apparently Admiral Hyman Rickover is the longest serving officer in US Navy history (63 years), and is considered by most to be single-handedly responsibly for the current state of the US nuclear navy.

Now, I am not a naval history buff, but I'm sure we have some here, and I was wondering how people thought the US Navy would evolve without Rickover. Would there still be nuclear surface ships? (Submarines seem too fitting for nuclear reactors to not have them). Would the safety record be the same? Apparently Rickover was big on safety. He apparently had a hand in development of civilian nuclear power in the US, which could also be critical - 20% of US power is nuclear.

 

[Readman]

Indeed, Rickover is pretty much the Father of American Nuke Boats. Without him, I expect different priorities and possibly even a less capable US Sub Fleet. At least, from what I know of things anyway. I'm not as well versed in the subject as I'd like to be, either

 

[Color-Copycat]

The Air Force might've gotten a piece of the nuclear action in his absence. IOTL, they managed a few experimental reactors, but I think that was about it. Nevertheless, I recall seeing design plans of some nuclear powered aircraft and that sort of thing.

 

[Johnrankins]

The Air Force might've gotten a piece of the nuclear action in his absence. IOTL, they managed a few experimental reactors, but I think that was about it. Nevertheless, I recall seeing design plans of some nuclear powered aircraft and that sort of thing.

Yes, there was. Nuclear powered aircraft were designed in the mid to late '50s.

 

[asnys]

The Air Force might've gotten a piece of the nuclear action in his absence. IOTL, they managed a few experimental reactors, but I think that was about it. Nevertheless, I recall seeing design plans of some nuclear powered aircraft and that sort of thing.

The Air Force had a huge piece of the action as it was. The Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program amounted to almost fifteen years of work and about a billion dollars, back when that was real money, and included three test reactors and two atomic-powered turbojet rigs. (Well, three turbojets, but HTRE 2 was only HTRE 1 with some modifications).

Edit to add: Six test reactors if you count the ASTR, the BSR and the TSF, which were used as radiation sources for shielding tests. The ASTR actually flew, although it wasn't hooked up to anything.

Removing Rickover won't get ANP in the air, however. The program was very badly mismanaged, a product of an unenthusiastic AEC and an overenthusiastic USAF. Problems included: the main focus was on the simple but ineffective direct-cycle approach; constant changes in program direction and priority; unclear administrative and funding structure; the project was delayed for two years because the JCS couldn't decide if they wanted the thing; work on the indirect cycle was delayed for another two years due to contract wrangling; the ICBM; and Robert McNamara. (Although he didn't so much kill it as put it out of its misery.) I'm working on a TL that will save ANP, but it's going to take a lot more than getting rid of Rickover, and I'm still not entirely convinced it's even possible.

 

[JacktheCat]

Well, the biggest change, biggest butterfly down the time line,

is, no Rickover, no Jimmy Carter.

(not that that is totally a bad thing)

 

[Bureaucromancer]

Well, the biggest change, biggest butterfly down the time line,

is, no Rickover, no Jimmy Carter.

(not that that is totally a bad thing)

Yes, he did say that Rickover had a huge impact on his life, but I suspect that already being a submarine qualified officer Carter would be pretty likely to join the nuclear program whoever was running it... And while I agree that without Rickover it would be smaller, and likely less safe the chances of there NOT being a nuclear submarine program strike me as virtually nil.

I tend to think that without Rickover our program might look a lot more like the Soviet one. Less dominant in terms of the overall fleet (and don't forget that the US Navy was NOT all nuclear until after the Cold War had ended - albeit barely), a lot less emphasis on surface units and more accidents but still very significant. Once Nautilus is launched the advantages are really pretty indisputable, and while a delay of a few years might be conceivable the potential of nuclear power being applied to submarines is pretty obvious to anyone even vaguely involved in wartime operations.

 

[Hyperbolus]

Perhaps design effort on nuclear subs during the late 1940's/early50's is limited to R&D by the Naval brass to free up funds for the super carrier USS United States?
-I understand that delaying Nautilus, Seawolf and other prototype SSN's might not by itself free up sufficient funds to build, say 2 super carriers and new attack planes for them, but it could narrow the shortfall. After all, OTL had the 'revolt of the admirals' when the carrier was cancelled.

 

[Southpaw]

Yes, he did say that Rickover had a huge impact on his life, but I suspect that already being a submarine qualified officer Carter would be pretty likely to join the nuclear program whoever was running it... And while I agree that without Rickover it would be smaller, and likely less safe the chances of there NOT being a nuclear submarine program strike me as virtually nil.

I tend to think that without Rickover our program might look a lot more like the Soviet one. Less dominant in terms of the overall fleet (and don't forget that the US Navy was NOT all nuclear until after the Cold War had ended - albeit barely), a lot less emphasis on surface units and more accidents but still very significant. Once Nautilus is launched the advantages are really pretty indisputable, and while a delay of a few years might be conceivable the potential of nuclear power being applied to submarines is pretty obvious to anyone even vaguely involved in wartime operations.

I was under the impression that that the Soviet fleet was mostly dominated by its subs and small ASW and missile corvettes and frigates until the 80s, when they started building some small carriers?

EDIT: Oops, I was thinking of submarines, not nuclear surface ships.

 

[Bureaucromancer]

And the Soviets always had a lot more diesel than nuclear submarines.

 

[asnys]

I wonder what effect this would have on civil nuclear power. I know Rickover was involved in the adoption of PWRs for civil energy, with Shippingport and all, but I'm not sure how his absence would effect it...

 

[BlondieBC]

I wonder what effect this would have on civil nuclear power. I know Rickover was involved in the adoption of PWRs for civil energy, with Shippingport and all, but I'm not sure how his absence would effect it...

The current PWR and BWR reactors were chosen because they were spinoffs of the military complex reactors. We chose a reactor that both was fast to deploy and produced waste plutonium. If we designed a civilian reactor from scratch, i bet we have molten salt thorium reactors. Thorium advantages for civilian use.

1) Hard to make weapons from them. They produce only 8% annual surplus fuel, and U-233 emits hard radiation that is harms both men and electronics.

2) Fuel is much more common.

3) Don't go boom like Fukushima or Chernobyl when core is exposed.

The down side to Thorium that you need two industrial nuclear complexes. One for weapons, one for civilian power.

 

[jkay]

The cemetary's full of irreplaceable people, Lincoln said. And we democracies tend to value safety more than unfree governments. Though it'd certainly be a different nuclear navy; tons of butterflies there.

And, nuclear planes failed for technical reasons, not political. Safe reactors are too heavy, especially back then, and safety's even more important in the air because in the air, you get radioactive stuff splattered all over the landscape if it fails.

 

[JacktheCat]

Yes, he did say that Rickover had a huge impact on his life, but I suspect that already being a submarine qualified officer Carter would be pretty likely to join the nuclear program whoever was running it... And while I agree that without Rickover it would be smaller, and likely less safe the chances of there NOT being a nuclear submarine program strike me as virtually nil.

Oh, actually I was thinking of the political ramifications, as Carter always said that it was Rickover that really lit the fire of ambition within himself.

But this is a tech thread, so please ignore my political musings.

 

[Riain]

Maybe without Rickover Jimmy Carter wouldn't have been a nuclear engineer with a working knowledge of physics, so when he saw the UFO in 1969 he would have been more amazed and interested.

 

[asnys]

The current PWR and BWR reactors were chosen because they were spinoffs of the military complex reactors. We chose a reactor that both was fast to deploy and produced waste plutonium. If we designed a civilian reactor from scratch, i bet we have molten salt thorium reactors. Thorium advantages for civilian use.

1) Hard to make weapons from them. They produce only 8% annual surplus fuel, and U-233 emits hard radiation that is harms both men and electronics.

2) Fuel is much more common.

3) Don't go boom like Fukushima or Chernobyl when core is exposed.

The down side to Thorium that you need two industrial nuclear complexes. One for weapons, one for civilian power.

The thorium MSR is a lovely thing. (In fact, that's one of the main attractions of a successful ANP - you get a large military constituency for MSRs.) But the MSR is not guaranteed a win without Rickover - far from it. Even if no Rickover removes Shippingport and the development of PWRs - which I'm not convinced it would - a purpose-built civilian reactor probably means a solid-fuel breeder of some kind, unless we also change the people in charge of the AEC in the 60s and 70s.

Which we could, of course. Fun fact: John McCone offered Alvin Weinberg a seat on the Atomic Energy Commission IOTL. Sadly, he turned him down.

Oh, and minor quibble: U-233 is only one-seventh as radioactive as Pu-239. It's the U-232 contamination that causes radiation problems.

And, nuclear planes failed for technical reasons, not political. Safe reactors are too heavy, especially back then, and safety's even more important in the air because in the air, you get radioactive stuff splattered all over the landscape if it fails.

Nuclear planes failed for both technical and political reasons. Safety was a problem, but it wasn't the big problem - the Air Force just figured they'd only fly it over water or uninhabited land. Different times and all that. It might have become the dominant issue if they'd been close to flying the thing, of course.

The big technical problem was that, after fifteen years and a billion dollars, ANP knew how to build a nuclear plane, but they didn't know how to build a nuclear plane that would be worth flying. The GE direct-cycle turbojets would give you an aircraft that was enormous, expensive, and slow, and the P&W indirect-cycle engines were still some years from testing. Although we can't know if P&W could have had a useful power plant by 1960 without the various management issues, they certainly didn't help.

 

[Galaxyman]

I'm not sure how civilian reactor development would have been affected without Rickover on the scene. Maybe there isn't as close a cooperation between the naval and civilian reactor development programs?
I think the big difference without Rickover is the makeup of the US attack submarine fleet. Rickover, as head of Naval Reactors, stymied development of alternative propulsion methods for ships, especially submarines. As a result, the US ended up phasing out conventional subs; and it does not have the construction capabilities to make conventional subs nowadays.
ITTL, I think the US maintains a small conventional sub fleet (maybe a max of 12 boats) throughout the Cold War and into the present day; to be used in situations that would be unfeasible for nukes, and for "aggressor" training for the nuke attack boats. The US would also maintain a conventional sub manufacturing capability, and compete with countries like Germany, France and Russia in the export of these subs.