US has better tank for the Battle of the Bulge.

There are potential scenarios but:
- amphibious landings were not possible because many of the close support craft were still operating off Le Havre and needed refitting before being used for an assault
- FAAA turned down operations in support of Walcheren several times as 'not a proper use of airborne troops'
- the German forces retreating from Normandy were heading towards Germany, so there were not that many to pocket; it generally took 2-3 days of operations by a Corps to clear each of the Channel ports once the right units were in place

EDIT: Of course if the US had a better tank, they might have broken through the Siegfried line faster.:)
 
Looks like a thread jacking has occurred, but thats seldom deterred me


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Antwerp was recognised as an objective - on August 17th he cabled Brooke:

After crossing Seine 12 and 21 Army Group should keep together as a solid mass of some 40 divisions which would be so strong that it need fear nothing. That force should move northwards.
21 Army Group should be on the western flank and should clear the Channel coast and Pas de Calais and West Flanders and secure Antwerp. The American armies should move with right flank on the Ardennes directed on Brussels, Aachen and Cologne.

OTL the force was dispersed and so weaker, but moved far faster than expected; if it had been stronger then the Allies might have been able to choose to open Antwerp.

What I don't see included with that message from Monty to Brooke is the time line he expected the 40 divisions to accomplish this. Was he expecting two weeks or two months?

Second is the securing of the Scheldt is implied in "secure Antwerp". does this indicate he understood the urgency in securing the route to the port?

Third is the "40 Divisions. It appears this includes the dual movement of the 12 AG on Achen/Cologne. Maybe 21 & 12 AG could muster 40 divisions at this point, but as has been endlessly demonstrated in these discussions the fuel was lacking to keep 40 divisions on the attack. Either Monty understood this & was thinking of a longer than OTL advance, where the fuel caught up, or he did not understand the true supply situation.

Games or map exercises usually are flawed from the excess of hindsight. After walking through this once I possessed a far better understanding of the mechanics of the German situation as of 1 September than Monty or Ike could ever hope for. Testing these with various 'blind' techniques can offset the hindsight factor, but from experience in 50+ blind games I know how difficult that is to set up. But, on the map exercise I've found that dropping the maximum number of airborne units from the coast to Antwerp can aid 21 AG greatly in opening the port of Antwerp in the first couple weeks of September. The key here is the use of the airborne to prevent the 15th Army & reinforcements from Holland from reoccupying the Beveland & Walchern islands. Seizing the Ferry crossings on both banks, the road junctions/bridges south of the Scheldt, & disrupting the defense of Antwerp saves a lot of grief later.

There are a few technical questions I still have on the German side. One is the nature of the 'fortifications on Walchern & to the SE around Bruges. The best information I have so far indicates these were strictly coastal defenses facing the sea. The one exception may be a small position NE of Bruges, north of the Leapold Cannal.

The second related question is the numbers of Germans actually north of Bruges & the Leopold canal & on Walchern island. Again the bet info I have indicates the crews of the fixed coast artillery were there, and a caretaker unit/s perhaps of brigade size. That is a scatter of sentries and guards & a few service units. The bulk of the 15th Army was still racing across Flanders & the lead elements do not seem to be near Bruges or Ghent on the 1st. If anyone has reliable & detailed information on this I'd really appreciate sharing it.
 
What I don't see included with that message from Monty to Brooke is the time line he expected the 40 divisions to accomplish this. Was he expecting two weeks or two months?

Second is the securing of the Scheldt is implied in "secure Antwerp". does this indicate he understood the urgency in securing the route to the port?

Third is the "40 Divisions. It appears this includes the dual movement of the 12 AG on Achen/Cologne. Maybe 21 & 12 AG could muster 40 divisions at this point, but as has been endlessly demonstrated in these discussions the fuel was lacking to keep 40 divisions on the attack. Either Monty understood this & was thinking of a longer than OTL advance, where the fuel caught up, or he did not understand the true supply situation.

All good points, but none with definitive answers.

My understanding this is Montgomery's 'simplified' overview thinking, which had not been planned by his staff.

Time scale is probably months not weeks - there would be expectations of German defensive lines at the Seine, Somme, and Belgium border.

Antwerp I'm not sure about, but at this point (mid-August) they would have been expecting Brest, Chastity, Le Havre and the Channel ports to come on-line during the campaign. Antwerp would have been useful for the campaign post the Rhine crossing, but I'm not convinced that it would have been seen as critical.

There weren't 40 divisions available at this point, let alone fuel for them, but this seems to be Montgomery's hyperbole - making a simplistic point to set the overall strategy (see also the 'thrust towards Berlin').

The key here is the use of the airborne to prevent the 15th Army & reinforcements from Holland from reoccupying the Beveland & Walchern islands. Seizing the Ferry crossings on both banks, the road junctions/bridges south of the Scheldt, & disrupting the defense of Antwerp saves a lot of grief later.

Absolutely agree.

There are a few technical questions I still have on the German side. One is the nature of the 'fortifications on Walchern & to the SE around Bruges. The best information I have so far indicates these were strictly coastal defenses facing the sea. The one exception may be a small position NE of Bruges, north of the Leapold Cannal.

The second related question is the numbers of Germans actually north of Bruges & the Leopold canal & on Walchern island. Again the bet info I have indicates the crews of the fixed coast artillery were there, and a caretaker unit/s perhaps of brigade size. That is a scatter of sentries and guards & a few service units. The bulk of the 15th Army was still racing across Flanders & the lead elements do not seem to be near Bruges or Ghent on the 1st. If anyone has reliable & detailed information on this I'd really appreciate sharing it.

Definitive text is probably Moulton's Battle for Antwerp.

German naval batteries
Zeebrugge - 2 x203mm, 2 x150mm, 4x105mm
Breskens pocket - 4 x94mm, 4 x280mm 4 x150mm 4 x120mm 4 x76mm, 4 x105mm - some guns were taken out of casements to fire landward
Walcheren - closed casements 12 x150mm; open casements 4 x220mm; 11 x 94mm (captured 3.7in AA), 2 x75mm, 1x 50mm
North Beveland - 8 x150mm

Railway guns in Breskens pocket 3 x203mm

Other artillery on Walcheren
7 Heavy AA batteries
16 smaller coastal defence batteries
5 batteries in the interior
70th Division artillery

Infantry - Walcheren
89th Fortress Regiment
70th Division - 3 x 2 battalion regiments - this got pulled into fighting in the Breskens pocket, crossing and recrossing the Scheldt
Other infantry
64th Division - arrived from Germany first week of September
Plus whatever else gets pushed back north by the Allies - 712th (original coastal defence south of the Scheldt), 245th, 59th, 711th, 719th, 346th, 347th all crossed the Scheldt.

Minefields
1700 naval mines laid June 1944
 
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Definitive text is probably Moulton's Battle for Antwerp.

German naval batteries
Zeebrugge - 2 x203mm, 2 x150mm, 4x105mm
Breskens pocket - 4 x94mm, 4 x280mm 4 x150mm 4 x120mm 4 x76mm, 4 x105mm - some guns were taken out of casements to fire landward
Walcheren - closed casements 12 x150mm; open casements 4 x220mm; 11 x 94mm (captured 3.7in AA), 2 x75mm, 1x 50mm
North Beveland - 8 x150mm

Railway guns in Breskens pocket 3 x203mm

Other artillery on Walcheren
7 Heavy AA batteries
16 smaller coastal defence batteries
5 batteries in the interior
70th Division artillery

Infantry - Walcheren
89th Fortress Regiment
70th Division - 3 x 2 battalion regiments - this got pulled into fighting in the Breskens pocket, crossing and recrossing the Scheldt
Other infantry
64th Division - arrived from Germany first week of September
Plus whatever else gets pushed back north by the Allies - 712th (original coastal defence south of the Scheldt), 245th, 59th, 711th, 719th, 346th, 347th all crossed the Scheldt.

Minefields
1700 naval mines laid June 1944

Thanks. The 64th ID I had identified. The 89th Fortress regiment may have different identifications, or there may have other small units adrift there. The 70th ID I can't trust my memory on. Perhaps there will be time to check it this week end. There appear to have been parts of three divisions in or near Antwerp 1 September. Between the Belgian revolt and the XXX Corps they did not offer much resistance south of the main waterway.

If I am remembering correctly the number of naval mines were more than doubled, and some block ships or barges sunk after 1 September.
 
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