What I don't see included with that message from Monty to Brooke is the time line he expected the 40 divisions to accomplish this. Was he expecting two weeks or two months?
Second is the securing of the Scheldt is implied in "secure Antwerp". does this indicate he understood the urgency in securing the route to the port?
Third is the "40 Divisions. It appears this includes the dual movement of the 12 AG on Achen/Cologne. Maybe 21 & 12 AG could muster 40 divisions at this point, but as has been endlessly demonstrated in these discussions the fuel was lacking to keep 40 divisions on the attack. Either Monty understood this & was thinking of a longer than OTL advance, where the fuel caught up, or he did not understand the true supply situation.
All good points, but none with definitive answers.
My understanding this is Montgomery's 'simplified' overview thinking, which had not been planned by his staff.
Time scale is probably months not weeks - there would be expectations of German defensive lines at the Seine, Somme, and Belgium border.
Antwerp I'm not sure about, but at this point (mid-August) they would have been expecting Brest, Chastity, Le Havre and the Channel ports to come on-line during the campaign. Antwerp would have been useful for the campaign post the Rhine crossing, but I'm not convinced that it would have been seen as critical.
There weren't 40 divisions available at this point, let alone fuel for them, but this seems to be Montgomery's hyperbole - making a simplistic point to set the overall strategy (see also the 'thrust towards Berlin').
The key here is the use of the airborne to prevent the 15th Army & reinforcements from Holland from reoccupying the Beveland & Walchern islands. Seizing the Ferry crossings on both banks, the road junctions/bridges south of the Scheldt, & disrupting the defense of Antwerp saves a lot of grief later.
Absolutely agree.
There are a few technical questions I still have on the German side. One is the nature of the 'fortifications on Walchern & to the SE around Bruges. The best information I have so far indicates these were strictly coastal defenses facing the sea. The one exception may be a small position NE of Bruges, north of the Leapold Cannal.
The second related question is the numbers of Germans actually north of Bruges & the Leopold canal & on Walchern island. Again the bet info I have indicates the crews of the fixed coast artillery were there, and a caretaker unit/s perhaps of brigade size. That is a scatter of sentries and guards & a few service units. The bulk of the 15th Army was still racing across Flanders & the lead elements do not seem to be near Bruges or Ghent on the 1st. If anyone has reliable & detailed information on this I'd really appreciate sharing it.
Definitive text is probably Moulton's
Battle for Antwerp.
German naval batteries
Zeebrugge - 2 x203mm, 2 x150mm, 4x105mm
Breskens pocket - 4 x94mm, 4 x280mm 4 x150mm 4 x120mm 4 x76mm, 4 x105mm - some guns were taken out of casements to fire landward
Walcheren - closed casements 12 x150mm; open casements 4 x220mm; 11 x 94mm (captured 3.7in AA), 2 x75mm, 1x 50mm
North Beveland - 8 x150mm
Railway guns in Breskens pocket 3 x203mm
Other artillery on Walcheren
7 Heavy AA batteries
16 smaller coastal defence batteries
5 batteries in the interior
70th Division artillery
Infantry - Walcheren
89th Fortress Regiment
70th Division - 3 x 2 battalion regiments - this got pulled into fighting in the Breskens pocket, crossing and recrossing the Scheldt
Other infantry
64th Division - arrived from Germany first week of September
Plus whatever else gets pushed back north by the Allies - 712th (original coastal defence south of the Scheldt), 245th, 59th, 711th, 719th, 346th, 347th all crossed the Scheldt.
Minefields
1700 naval mines laid June 1944