An old post of mine:
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Mikestone8 said:
Also what would its terms be? After al, in 1939 it was France (and Britain) that went to war with Germany, not vice versa. Would the alliance apply to such a case?
Presumably it would have similar provisions to the Guarantee Treaty of OTL
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv13/ch27 *except* that it would not contain Article Three:
"The present Treaty must be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations, and must be recognized by the Council, acting if need be by a majority, as an engagement which is consistent with the Covenant of the League. It will continue in force until on the application of one of the Parties to it the Council, acting if need be by a majority, agrees that the League itself affords sufficient protection."
Michael Lind has argued in *The American Way of Strategy* that "Wilson doomed the Anglo-American security treaty with France by including clauses that subordinated the treaty to the cumbersome machinery of the League [quoting Article III]. Instead of a traditional U.S. alliance with Britain and France, which Lodge and other realists would have supported, Wilson insisted that the treaty be in effect only temporarily until the League of Nations could assume responsibility for the protection of France and every other country in the world."
https://books.google.com/books?id=AMIQLEp6rqcC&pg=PA99
Note, though, that the treaty refers to "any *unprovoked* movement of aggression." Presumably the US would have to judge what was or wasn't "unprovoked." Even if the treaty includes guarantees of the demilitarization of the Rhineland, some Americans might agree with Hitler's argument (though it was of course only a cynical excuse) that France's treaty with the Soviet Union was "provocation." Though it is possible France would never have come to the agreement with the USSR if there were an Anglo-American guarantee *and*--the difficult part--an apparent will on the part of both the UK and US to enforce it.
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To that post, I would add A.J.P. Taylor's argument that the treaty would only have offered paper security to France, anyway:
"This abortive treaty, too, offered only a paper security. No American troops were to remain in France, nor British troops either; and, with both British and American forces reduced to the peacetime level, there would have been no troops to send in case of dange
r. Briand pointed this out in 1922 when Lloyd George revived the proposal, though without American participation. The Germans, he said, will have plenty of time to reach Paris and Bordeaux before British troops arrive to stop them; and this is exactly what happened, despite a British alliance, in 1940. The Anglo-American guarantee, even if had been implemented, was no more than a promise to liberate France if she were conquered by the Germans--a promise fulfilled in 1944 even without a treaty. The United States was debarred both by geography and by political outlook from belonging to a European system of security; the most that could be expected from them was that they would intervene belatedly if this system of security failed."
https://books.google.com/books?id=nxCw5map13AC&pg=PA31